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Thursday, 21 September 2017

Malware spam: "Invoice RE-2017-09-21-00xxx" from "Amazon Marketplace"

This fake Amazon spam comes with a malicious attachment:

Subject:       Invoice RE-2017-09-21-00794
From:       "Amazon Marketplace" [yAhbPDAoufvZE@marketplace.amazon.co.uk]
Date:       Thu, September 21, 2017 9:21 am
Priority:       Normal

------------- Begin message -------------

Dear customer,

We want to use this opportunity to first say "Thank you very much for your purchase!"

Attached to this email you will find your invoice.

Kindest of regards,
your Amazon Marketplace

==



[commMgrHmdToken:EVDOOCETFBECA]

------------- End message -------------

For Your Information: To help arbitrate disputes and preserve trust and safety, we
retain all messages buyers and sellers send through Amazon.co.uk. This includes your
response to the message below. For your protection we recommend that you only
communicate with buyers and sellers using this method.

Important: Amazon.co.uk's A-to-z Guarantee only covers third-party purchases paid
for through our Amazon Payments system via our Shopping Cart or 1-Click. Our
Guarantee does not cover any payments that occur off Amazon.co.uk including wire
transfers, money orders, cash, check, or off-site credit card transactions.

We want you to buy with confidence whenever you purchase products on Amazon.co.uk.
Learn more about Safe Online Shopping
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=11081621) and our safe
buying guarantee
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=3149571).



[commMgrTok:EVDOOCETFBECA]
Attached is a .7z archive file with a name that matches the one quoted in the subject line. So far I have seen just two versions of this, each containing a malicious script (sample here and here). These scripts have a detection rate of about 13/58 and they can been seen attempted to download a component from:

ahlbrandt.eu/IUGiwe8?
fulcar.info/p66/IUGiwe8
accuflowfloors.com/IUGiwe8?
aetozi.gr/IUGiwe8?
agricom.it/IUGiwe8?


An executable is dropped (Locky ransomware) with a detection rate of 18/64. Although Hybrid Analysis [1] [2] clearly shows the ransomware, no C2s are currently available (it turns out there aren't any).

UPDATE - additional download locations:
81552.com/IUGiwe8
adr-werbetechnik.de/IUGiwe8
afmance.it/IUGiwe8
afradem.com/IUGiwe8
agriturismobellaria.net/IUGiwe8
agro-kerler.de/IUGiwe8
moonmusic.com.au/IUGiwe8

Monday, 18 September 2017

Malware spam: "Status of invoice" with .7z attachment

This spam leads to Locky ransomware:

Subject:       Status of invoice
From:       "Rosella Setter" ordering@[redacted]
Date:       Mon, September 18, 2017 9:30 am

Hello,

Could you please let me know the status of the attached invoice? I
appreciate your help!

Best regards,

Rosella Setter

Tel: 206-575-8068 x 100

Fax: 206-575-8094

*NEW*   Ordering@[redacted].com

* Kindly note we will be closed Monday in observance of Labor Day *


The name of the sender varies. Attached is a .7z arhive file with a name similar to A2174744-06.7z which contains in turn a malicious .vbs script with a random number for a filename (examples here and here).


Automated analysis of those two samples [1] [2] [3] [4] show this is Locky ransomware. Those two scripts attempt to download a component from:





yildizmakina74.com/87thiuh3gfDGS?
miliaraic.ru/p66/87thiuh3gfDGS?
lanzensberger.de/87thiuh3gfDGS?
web-ch-team.ch/87thiuh3gfDGS?
abelfaria.pt/87thiuh3gfDGS?

An executable is dropped with a detection rate of 19/64 which Hybrid Analysis shows is phoning home to:

91.191.184.158/imageload.cgi (Monte Telecom, Estonia)
195.123.218.226/imageload.cgi (Layer 6, Bulgaria)


.7z files are popular with the bad guys pushing Locky at the moment. Blocking them at your mail perimiter may help.

Recommended blocklist:
195.123.218.226
91.191.184.158



Wednesday, 6 September 2017

QTUM Cryptocurrency spam

This spam email appears to be sent by the Necurs botnet, advertising a new Bitcoin-like cryptocurrency called QTUM. Necurs is often used to pump malware, pharma and data spam and sometimes stock pump and dump.

There is no guarantee that this is actually being sent by the people running QTUM, it could simply be a Joe Job to disrupt operations. Given some of the wording alluding to illegal marketplaces, I suspect this could be the case.

Subject:       Qtum Main Network Launches September 13th, 2017
From:       "Lou Roberson"
Date:       Wed, September 6, 2017 6:37 am
Priority:       Normal


The Blockchain Made Ready for Business
Build Anonymous Decentralized Applications that Simply Work
Executable on mobile devices, compatible with major existing blockchain
ecosystems
TESTNET NOW LIVE!
   
    About
     
The Qtum Foundation is a Singapore based entity that promotes
adoption of the Qtum Blockchain. Project inception began in
March 2016, leading up to a successful crowdsale a year later.
Over 10,000 BTC and 72,000 ETH were raised in less than 5 days,
making Qtum one of the largest crowdfunded projects in history,
at $15.6 million dollars.

Investors received 51,000,000 Qtum tokens which will be
available for withdrawal on September 13, 2017.


The Qtum Foundation plans to be the anonymous blockchain for
business. Development efforts will allow us to market this
platform tovarious industries, such as: Mobile
Telecommunications, Counterfeit Protection, Finance, Industrial
Logistics (shipping, warranty,etc), Manufacturing, P2P Anonymous
Transfers and Anonymous Market Management from phone.
Build anonymous decentralized applications you can trust
     
Smart Contracts that Mean Business
Qtum makes it easier than ever for established sectors and
legacy institutions to interface with blockchain technology.
Create your own tokens, automate supply chain management and
engage in self-executing agreements in a standardized
environment, verified and tested for stability.

   
    Specification

    Total QTUM Supply: 100,000,000
    Block Target: 128 seconds
    Stake Return: ~4 QTUM
    Algorithm: SHA256

     
   
   
    QTUM SPARKNET
   
SPARKNET
          
Sparknet is designed primarily for developers, and as such
documentation at this point will be technical and suited more
for developers.  Testnet tokens do not hold any value and should
not be traded for any monetary instruments. The testnet can be
reset or forked at anytime as deemed necessary for development.

Forum Announcement:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1720632.4220

Release on github:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/releases/tag/testnet-sparknet

Qtum Sparknet Usage and Information: Please see:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/blob/testnet-1/doc/sparknet-guide.md
   
    QTUM SPYNET

Aug 15 The 2nd Qtum Test Network, Skynet, is now live: SKYNET
   
     
Qtum Skynet, the second public testnet for the Qtum blockchain.
All tokens aqcuired during the testnet will cease to exist 
when the mainnet is released which actually has tokens which
hold value. The purpose of the public testnet is to allow
developers to begin testing and developing applications, allow
early adopters to see a preview of how the network will behave,
and for the Qtum development team to run several load tests
which are not directly comparable when done on a private and
controlled network. Qtum Skynet will ideally have the same
consensus features and parameters as the Qtum mainnet.


Qtum Skynet Usage and Information:
Please see:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/releases/tag/testnet-skynet
Please see:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/releases/tag/testnet-skynet-v1.2

As soon as Main Network will be launched, you will be availaible
to build your own applications (DApps) or marketplaces. Fully
scalable and anonymous, so you can easy made any anonymous
marketplace which can be manage from your phone!

Just imagine, your own silkroad made on Qtum blockchain and
managed from your phone with fully anonymous transactions!

    No matter what kind of business you are building, all
transactions will be anonymous, and the network will never
reveal the ip addresses of the applications that are running
on it.

    Even if you sell weapons, drugs, trade in people and are
going to organize a coup d'?tat, you can be sure that you
will remain anonymous.

    Another thing is that it is illegal and sooner or later you
will receive the punishment that you deserve. But everyone
want to know how deep the rabbit hole goes.

    For our part, we can only provide a reliable, scalable and
anonymous ecosystem thanks to which any business can be
built on it and we guarantee that we will do everything
possible to make it sucesfull.

    We give you a choice - "blue pill or red pill"
       
        What Will your choice be?

    So, you have to prepare for Main Network launch  Qtum Custom
Token Walkthrough
   
    CROWDSALE
     
The QTUM token supply will be allocated as follows:

    - 51% of Qtum tokens (51,000,000) will be distributed
through the crowdsale
    - 20% of Qtum tokens (20,000,000 QTUM) will be distributed
among founders, early backers and the development team
    - 29% of Qtum tokens (29,000,000 QTUM) will be allocated to
community initiatives concerning business development, as
    well as academic research, education, and market expansion

For a more detailed overview of QTUM token allocation visit our
website: https://qtum.org/en/crowdsale#question-2
   
    Exchanges
     
Coinone:   https://coinone.co.kr/exchange/trade/qtum/
Yunbi: https://yunbi.com/markets/qtumcny
Bittrex: https://bittrex.com/Market/Index?MarketName=BTC-QTUM
https://bittrex.com/Market/Index?MarketName=ETH-QTUM
CHBTC: https://www.chbtc.com/qtum
BTER: https://bter.com/trade/qtum_cny
https://bter.com/trade/qtum_eth
https://bter.com/trade/qtum_btc

Yubi: https://www.jubi.com/coin/qtum/
Yuanbao:   https://www.yuanbao.com/trade/qtum2cny
Binance:   https://www.binance.com/trade.html?symbol=QTUM_ETH
Allcoin: https://allcoin.com/markets/QTUM-BTC/0/
BTC9: https://btc9.com/trade/22
Biduobao: https://www.biduobao.com/market-qtum.html
Liqui: https://liqui.io/#/exchange/QTUM_USDT
https://liqui.io/#/exchange/QTUM_ETH     
https://liqui.io/#/exchange/QTUM_BTC
Cryptopia: https://www.cryptopia.co.nz/Exchange?market=QTUM_BTC
COSS: https://exchange.coss.io/pair/qtum-eth
https://exchange.coss.io/pair/qtum-btc
HitBTC: https://hitbtc.com/exchange/QTUM-to-ETH/size
Novaexchange: https://novaexchange.com/market/BTC_QTUM/
   
    TEAM
   
   
     
See the full team at: https://qtum.org/en/team

    We are looking for developers to build the next generation
DApps on top of Qtum and invite you all to give our testnet
a try.

    We are always on the lookout to enrich our very talented
team, the next team member can be you!

    SEND YOUR RESUME TO OUR EMAIL: CAREERS@QTUM.ORG

    currently 4500+ Chinese community members

As far as I can see, there are no malicious links anywhere. This one can probably be marked down as an annoyance, and it should be easy enough to block or filter.

Tuesday, 5 September 2017

Malware spam: "Scanning" pretending to be from tayloredgroup.co.uk

This spam email pretends to be from tayloredgroup.co.uk but it is just a simple forgery leading to Locky ransomware. There is both a malicious attachment and link in the body text. The name of the sender varies.

Subject:       Scanning
From:       "Jeanette Randels" [Jeanette.Randels@tayloredgroup.co.uk]
Date:       Thu, May 18, 2017 8:26 pm

https://dropbox.com/file/9A30AA
--
Jeanette Randels DipFA

Taylored Group
26 City Business Centre
Hyde Street
Winchester
SO23 7TA

Members of the CAERUS Capital Group

www.tayloredgroup.co.uk

Office Number: 01962 826870
Mobile: 07915 612277
email: Jeanette.Randels@tayloredgroup.co.uk

Taylored Financial Planning is a trading style of Jonathan & Carole
Taylor who are an appointed representative of Caerus Financial Limited,
Building 120, Windmill Hill Business Park, Swindon, SN5 6NX which is authorised
and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

Email communications are not secure, for this reason Taylored
Financial Planning cannot guarantee the security of the email or its contents or
that it remains virus free once sent. This email message is strictly
confidential and intended solely for the person or organisation to who it is
addressed. It may contain privileged and confidential information and if you are
not the recipient, you must not copy, distribute or take any action in
reference to it. If you have received this email in error, please notify us as
soon as possible and delete the message from your system. 
Despite having what appears to be a Dropbox URL, the link actually goes to another site completely and downloads a .7z archive file containing a malicious VBS script. Attached is another .7z archive file with a slightly different evil VBS script inside.

Detection rates for the scripts are about 13/58 [1] [2]. Automated analysis [3] [4] [5] [6]  shows Locky ransomware attempting to phone home to the following locations:

91.234.35.170/imageload.cgi (FOP Sedinkin Olexandr Valeriyovuch aka thehost.ua, Ukraine)
109.234.35.75/imageload.cgi (McHost.ru / VDSINA, Russia)

McHost is such a well-known purveyor of toxic crap that I recommend you block all of their ranges (plus I guess the related VDSINA ones), or even block the entire Webzilla AS35415. You can find a list of the network ranges here. Also thehost.ua also has a lot of crap and I would lean towards blocking whole network ranges.

Recommended minimum blocklist:
91.234.35.0/24
109.234.35.0/24

Friday, 25 August 2017

Malware spam: "Voicemail Service" / "New voice message.."

The jumble of numbers in this spam is a bit confusing. Attached is a malicious RAR file that leads to Locky ransomware.

Subject:       New voice message 18538124076 in mailbox 185381240761 from "18538124076" <6641063681>
From:       "Voicemail Service" [vmservice@victimdomain.tdl]
Date:       Fri, August 25, 2017 12:36 pm

Dear user:

just wanted to let you know you were just left a 0:13 long message (number 18538124076)
in mailbox 185381240761 from "18538124076" <6641063681>, on Fri, 25 Aug 2017
14:36:41 +0300
so you might want to check it when you get a chance.  Thanks!

                                --Voicemail Service
Attached is a RAR file containing a malicious VBS script. The scripts are all slightly different, meaning that the RARs are too. These are the MD5s I've seen so far for the RAR files themselves:

04059E14170996725CD2ED2324E485F2
0839A18B1F5C1D09F3DF3DC260C07194
0BD5C04D2680B5C8A801B4C2E73BECCD
12D1FC37D223E823C80CF052920DA9AB
1AA539798341930B5492764F2D668987
1ADFF05EEA041B34682FD92CDE45DBFA
1CCF7445D771B7F803E95090E96D0EB2
20162EC71639C4A9080C24B253F5FDFF
24133B658F7730205BCC5789B4CA30F1
42947EBFEFFA9A5CFA3AADDA7EADA572
4AC35594445EB22FE6971A5F81EAB761
4D4DBBCEC5B48EBA30D7B09F994BC009
54E7C8863E161D5A601230E3CD590134
556A6FC4D5607210FA7EF3CAF3CE59D6
645C4FB3BE1A8B1188E8B5A54B1BC011
80D9CEBB286D79955F18013DD3415EEF
8C9B20A61368E8956B6C49DA9AFF30D1
9739211AD009B97EBE0DF353AB11BEB5
9CDDA6C72F41039340E450FA4374E748
A9C0D2F356C455EB40B707D570D27318
BAF4482ED9F6DEE8CBE6F69366AAC434
EA7D52C3328A5A8A0C8334AE3E3C580C
FEC76C943E1252D0DE7D6B7936510B9D


The VBS script is similar to this (variable names seem to change mostly) with a detection rate of about 15/59. Hybrid Analysis shows it dropping a Locky executable with a 18/65 detection rate which phones home to 46.17.44.153/imageload.cgi (Baxnet, Russia) which I recommend that you block.

Malware spam: "Your Sage subscription invoice is ready" / noreply@sagetop.com

This fake Sage invoice leads to Locky ransomware. Quite why Sage are picked on so much by the bad guys is a bit of a mystery.

Subject:       Your Sage subscription invoice is ready
From:       "noreply@sagetop.com" [noreply@sagetop.com]
Date:       Thu, August 24, 2017 8:49 pm

Dear Customer

Your Sage subscription invoice is now ready to view.

Sage subscriptions

To view your Sage subscription invoice click here 

Got a question about your invoice?

Call us on 0845 111 6604

If you're an Accountant, please call 0845 111 1197
If you're a Business Partner, please call 0845 111 7787

Kind Regards

The Sage UK Subscription Team

Please note: There is no unsubscribe option on this email, as it is a service
message, not a marketing communication. This email was sent from an address that
cannot accept replies. Please use the contact details above if you need to get in
touch with us.

The link in the email downloads a malicious RAR file. The samples I saw were closely clustered alphabetically.

helpmatheogrow.com/SINV0709.rar
hendrikvankerkhove.be/SINV0709.rar
heinverwer.nl/SINV0709.rar
help.ads.gov.ba/SINV0709.rar
harvia.uz/SINV0709.rar

The RAR file itself contains a malicious VBS script that looks like this [pastebin] with a detection rate of 19/56, which attempts to download another component from:

go-coo.jp/HygHGF
hausgerhard.com/HygHGF
hausgadum.de/HygHGF
bromesterionod.net/af/HygHGF
hartwig-mau.de/HygHGF
hecam.de/HygHGF
haboosh-law.com/HygHGF
hbwconsultants.nl/HygHGF
hansstock.de/HygHGF
heimatverein-menne.de/HygHGF

Automated analysis of the file [1] [2] shows a dropped binary with a 39/64 detection rate, POSTing to 46.183.165.45/imageload.cgi  (Reg.Ru, Russia)

Recommended blocklist:
46.183.165.45




Thursday, 24 August 2017

Multiple badness on metoristrontgui.info / 119.28.100.249

Two massive fake "Bill" spam runs seem to be under way, one claiming to be from BT and the other being more generic.

Subject:       New BT Bill
From:       "BT Business" [btbusiness@bttconnect.com]
Date:       Thu, August 24, 2017 6:08 pm
Priority:       Normal

From BT
New BT Bill

Your bill amount is: $106.84
This doesn't include any amounts brought forward from any other bills.

We've put your latest BT bill for you to view. See your bill here


We'll take your payment from your account as usual by Direct Debit.

Reduce paper waste
You're still getting paper bills by post. Why not go paper-free, and stop storing and shredding them once and for all?


Need some help?
Go to www.bt.com/business/support.

Thanks for choosing BT.

Robena Morath
CEO, BT Business

Payment processing fee: BT Payment Services Ltd, a BT Group Company, charges this fee.
This or confidential. It's meant only for the individual(s) email contains BT information, which may be privileged or entity named above. If you're not the intended recipient, note that disclosing, copying, distributing or using this information is prohibited. If you've received this email in error, please let me know immediately on the email address above. Thank you. We monitor our email system, and may record your emails.

And a simpler one..

From:    Dianna Mcgrew
Date:    24 August 2017 at 14:50
Subject:    Bill-9835

Hi,

Here is a copy of your bill.

Thank you & have a great weekend!
Most (but not all) of the samples I  have seen then lead to a single website to download the malicious payload, for example:

http://metoristrontgui.info/af/download.php
http://metoristrontgui.info/af/bill-201708.rar
http://metoristrontgui.info/af/bill-201708.7z

metoristrontgui.info is hosted on 119.28.100.249 (Tencent, China) which is an IP we've seen a few times recently [1] [2]. Let's check out that WHOIS:

Domain Name: METORISTRONTGUI.INFO
Registry Domain ID: D503300000042955753-LRMS
Registrar WHOIS Server:
Registrar URL: http://www.eranet.com
Updated Date: 2017-08-24T14:02:07Z
Creation Date: 2017-08-24T13:24:23Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-08-24T13:24:23Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date:
Registrar: Eranet International Limited
Registrar IANA ID: 1868
Registrar Abuse Contact Email:
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:
Reseller:
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: serverTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverTransferProhibited
Domain Status: addPeriod https://icann.org/epp#addPeriod
Registry Registrant ID: C208152073-LRMS
Registrant Name: Robert Ruthven
Registrant Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Registrant Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Registrant City: Portland
Registrant State/Province: OR
Registrant Postal Code: 97202
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.5034359411
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax: +1.5034359411
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Registry Admin ID: C208152073-LRMS
Admin Name: Robert Ruthven
Admin Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Admin Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Admin City: Portland
Admin State/Province: OR
Admin Postal Code: 97202
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.5034359411
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: +1.5034359411
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Registry Tech ID: C208152073-LRMS
Tech Name: Robert Ruthven
Tech Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Tech Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Tech City: Portland
Tech State/Province: OR
Tech Postal Code: 97202
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.5034359411
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax: +1.5034359411
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Registry Billing ID: C208152073-LRMS
Billing Name: Robert Ruthven
Billing Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Billing Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Billing City: Portland
Billing State/Province: OR
Billing Postal Code: 97202
Billing Country: US
Billing Phone: +1.5034359411
Billing Phone Ext:
Billing Fax: +1.5034359411
Billing Fax Ext:
Billing Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Name Server: A.DNSPOD.COM
Name Server: B.DNSPOD.COM
Name Server: C.DNSPOD.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/


VirusTotal confirms a lot of badness here, with all of these evil domains on the same server:

drommazxitnnd7gsl.com
74jhdrommdtyis.net
rtozottosdossder.net
kabbionionsesions.net
ttytreffdrorseder.net
tyytrddofjrntions.net
mjhsdgc872bf432rdf.net
yrns7sg3kdn94hskxhbf.net
trmbobodortyuoiyrt.org
metoristrontgui.info
fsroosionsoulsda.info
aldirommestorr887.info
droohsdronfhystgfh.info

Downloads from this site can be a bit slow, unsurprisingly. The dropped EXE seems to be Locky ransomware with a detection rate of 19/65. Hybrid Analysis shows the sample POSTing to 185.179.190.31/imageload.cgi (Webhost LLC, Russia)

Recommended minimum blocklist:
185.179.190.31
119.28.100.249




Wednesday, 23 August 2017

Malware spam: "Customer Service" / "Copy of Invoice xxxx"

This fairly generic spam leads to the Locky ransomware:

Subject:       Copy of Invoice 3206
From:       "Customer Service"
Date:       Wed, August 23, 2017 9:12 pm


Please download file containing your order information.

If you have any further questions regarding your invoice, please call Customer Service.


Please do not reply directly to this automatically generated e-mail message.

Thank you.
Customer Service Department
A link in the email downloads a malicious VBS script, and because it's quite late I'll just say that Hybrid Analysis has seen it all before. The download EXE (VT 21/64) script POSTS to 5.196.99.239/imageload.cgi (Just Hosting, Russia) which is in a network block that also had a fair bit of Angler last year, so I would recommend blocking all traffic to 5.196.99.0/24.

Malware spam: "Voice Message Attached from 0xxxxxxxxxxx - name unavailable"

This fake voice mail message leads to malware. It comes in two slightly different versions, one with a RAR file download and the other with a ZIP.

Subject:       Voice Message Attached from 001396445685 - name unavailable
From:       "Voice Message" <vmservice@victimdomain.tld>
Date:       Wed, August 23, 2017 10:22 am

Time: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 14:52:12 +0530
Download <http://tyytrddofjrntions.net/af/VM20170823_193908.zip> file to listen
Voice Message

Subject:       Voice Message Attached from 055237805419 - name unavailable
From:       "Voice Message" <vmservice@victimdomain.tld>
Date:       Wed, August 23, 2017 10:21 am

Time: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 14:51:13 +0530
Download <http://mjhsdgc872bf432rdf.net/af/VM20170823_193908.rar> file to listen
Voice Message
Both download locations of tyytrddofjrntions.net and mjhsdgc872bf432rdf.net are hosted on 119.28.100.249 (Tencent, CN). This same IP was seen in this other recent spam run. Both the RAR and ZIP downloads (detection rate about 18/59 [1] [2]) contain the same malicious VBS script [pastebin]. The script tries to download an additional component from one of the following locations:

grlarquitectura.com/Mvgjh67?
grundschulmarkt.com/Mvgjh67?
aldirommestorr887.info/af/Mvgjh67?
grupoegeria.net/Mvgjh67?
gestionale-orbit.it/Mvgjh67?
gdrural.com.au/Mvgjh67?
geocean.co.id/Mvgjh67?
grupoajedrecisticoaleph.com/Mvgjh67?
grupofergus.com.bo/Mvgjh67?
gruppostolfaedilizia.it/Mvgjh67?

You'll note that most of those download locations start with "gr" which indicates that this is just a small subset of hacked servers under the control of the bad guys.

Automated analysis [3] [4] shows a dropped file with a VirusTotal detection rate of 14/64 (probably Locky). Those same analyses show traffic being sent to:

62.109.16.214/imageload.cgi (TheFirst-RU, RU - hostname: gpodlinov.letohost.com)
5.196.99.239/imageload.cgi (Just Hosting, RU - hostname: noproblem.one)

UPDATE:  Several other IPs in the 5.196.99.0/24 range have been used to host malware in the past. I would recommend blocking the entire /24.

Recommended blocklist:
119.28.100.249
62.109.16.214
5.196.99.0/24


Tuesday, 22 August 2017

Malware spam from "Voicemail Service" [pbx@local]

This fake voicemail leads to malware:

Subject:       [PBX]: New message 46 in mailbox 461 from "460GOFEDEX" <8476446077>
From:       "Voicemail Service" [pbx@local]
Date:       Tue, August 22, 2017 10:37 am
To:       "Evelyn Medina"
Priority:       Normal

Dear user:

        just wanted to let you know you were just left a 0:53 long message (number 46)
in mailbox 461 from "460GOFEDEX" <8476446077>, on Tue, 22 Aug 2017 17:37:58 +0800
so you might want to check it when you get a chance.  Thanks!

                                --Voicemail Service

The numbers and details vary from message to message, however the format is always the same. Attached is a RAR file with a name similar to msg0631.rar which contains a malicious script named msg6355.js that looks like this [pastebin]. The script has a VirusTotal detection rate of 14/59.

According to automated analysis [1] [2] the script reaches out to the following URLs:

5.196.99.239/imageload.cgi [5.196.99.239 - OVH, Ireland / Just Hosting, Russia. Hostname: noproblem.one]
garage-fiat.be/jbfr387??qycOuKnvn=qycOuKnvn [91.234.195.48 - Ligne Web Services, France]

A ransomware component is dropped (probably Locky) with a detection rate of 16/64.




Monday, 21 August 2017

Cerber spam: "please print", "images etc"

I only have a couple of samples of this spam, but I suspect it comes in many different flavours..

Subject:       images
From:       "Sophia Passmore" [Sophia5555@victimdomain.tld]
Date:       Fri, May 12, 2017 7:18 pm

--

*Sophia Passmore*


Subject:       please print
From:       "Roberta Pethick" [Roberta5555@victimdomain.tld]
Date:       Fri, May 12, 2017 7:18 pm

--
*Roberta Pethick*

In these two samples there is an attached .7z archive (MD5 31c144629bfdc6c8011c492e06fe914d) with a VirusTotal detection rate of 18/58. Both samples contained a malicious Javascript named 20170821_08914700.js that looks like this [pastebin].

Automated analysis [1] [2] shows a download from the following locations:

gel-batterien-agm-batterien.de/65JKjbh??TqCRhOAQ=TqCRhOAQ [46.4.91.144 - Hetzner, Germany]
droohsdronfhystgfh.info/af/65JKjbh?TqCRhOAQ=TqCRhOAQ [119.28.100.249 - Tencent, China]

The Hybrid Analysis report shows an executable being dropped which is Ceber Ransomware (MD5 c7d79f5d830b1b67c5eb11de40a721b4), with a VT detection of 22/64.

Recommended blocklist:
46.4.91.144
119.28.100.249

Wednesday, 19 July 2017

Necurs oddity II: avto111222@bigmir.net

Yesterday I saw a series spam emails from Necurs apparently attempting to collect replies to super.testtesttest2018@yahoo.com. Although that campaign is continuing today, a new spam run with similar characteristics has started this morning. For example:

From:    jKX Soto [ingmanz@redacted]
Reply-To:    jKX Soto [avto111222@bigmir.net]
Date:    19 July 2017 at 06:43
Subject:    CQJP

hDYNOX

TC
Subject, body text and vendor seem to be randomly generated. But in all cases, the Reply-To address is avto111222@bigmir.net (Bigmir is basically a Ukrainian version of Yahoo from what I can tell).

The purpose of this spam run is unclear, but spammers do sometimes launch probing attacks to see what kind of response they get from servers. This could be an attempt to clean up the Necurs email address database perhaps, perhaps for resale.

Tuesday, 18 July 2017

Necurs oddity: super.testtesttest2018@yahoo.com / "hi test"

This email is sent from the Necurs botnet and appears to be collecting automatic replies, using a Reply-To email address of super.testtesttest2018@yahoo.com.

From:    Randi Collier [zegrtocbjez@hometelco.net]
Reply-To:    Randi Collier [super.testtesttest2018@yahoo.com]
Date:    18 July 2017 at 10:08
Subject:    hi

hi test 

The name of the sender and the "From" email vary, however the "Reply-To" email is consistent, as is the subject and body text. The sending IP varies, but this does look like Necurs from the patterns I can see.

I can't see any particular purpose in harvesting bounce messages in this way. From Necurs samples I see, the bulk of the recipient addresses are invalid in any case.

Malware spam: UK Fuels Collection / "invoices@ebillinvoice.com"

This fake invoice comes with a malicious attachment:

From:    invoices@ebillinvoice.com
Date:    18 July 2017 at 09:37
Subject:    UK Fuels Collection

Velocity
   
   
ACCOUNT NO
******969    
   
Dear CUSTOMER,
Your latest invoice for your fuel card account is now available for you to view online, download or print through our Velocity online management system.

How to view your invoices

Viewing your invoice is easy
1. Log into Velocity at velocityfleet.com
2. Select 'Invoices' from the menu option
3. Select the invoice you wish to view. You can also print or download a copy

We want to ensure we are protecting your information and providing you with a simple, straightforward and secure way to access your account information. Velocity could not be simpler to use, you will not only have access to download all of your invoices, you will also be able to order cards, run reports on transactions and get to view your PIN reminder online.

       
    Your safety is our priority

Please do not reply to this email, it has been sent from an email address that does not accept incoming emails. Velocity will never ask you to supply personal information such as passwords or other security information via email.
   
       
If you are experiencing difficulties in accessing Velocity, please do not hesitate to call us on 0344 880 2468 or email us at admin@groupcustomerservices.com

Thank you for using this service.
Yours sincerely,

UK Fuels Limited Customer Services

   
Spam Policy   |  Customer Services: 0344 880 2468

This email does not come from UK Fuels or Velocity, but is in fact a simple forgery sent from the Necurs botnet.


In the sample I saw there were two attachments, one was a simple text file that looked like this:

Filetype: Microsoft Office Word
Filename: 11969_201727.doc
Creation date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 14:07:26 +0530
Modification date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 14:07:26 +0530
To: [redacted]
The secondis a malicious Word document, in this case named 11969_201727.doc. Opening it comes up with a screen asking you to enable active content (not a good idea!). The VirusTotal detection rate is 10/59.

Automated analysis [1] [2] shows that the malicious document downloads a binary from dielandy-garage.de/56evcxv (although there are probably other locations), downloading a file proshuto8.exe which itself has a detection rate of 11/63. Additional automated analysis [3] [4] with the others shows potentialy malicious traffic to:

37.120.182.208 (Netcup, Germany)
186.103.161.204 (Telefonica , Chile)
194.87.235.155 (Mediasoft Ekspert, Russia)
195.2.253.95 (Sphere Ltd, Russia)


Malware delivered in this was is usually ransomware or a banking trojan. UPDATE: this is the Trickbot trojan.

Recommended blocklist:
37.120.182.208
186.103.161.204
194.87.235.155
195.2.253.95




Tuesday, 13 June 2017

Bellatora Inc (ECGR) pump-and-dump spam

It's been a little while since we've since an illegal pump-and-dump spam from the Necurs botnet, but here is a new one pushing a company called Bellatora Inc (stock ticker ECGR)
From:    Lillie Maynard
Date:    13 June 2017 at 09:37
Subject:    Here's why this company's shares are about to go up tenfold next week.

Yes, it's been some time since I reached out to you with something good but trust me… the wait will have been worth it.

I promised you that I'd only give you a tip if I had something spectacular, and today I do.

Remember my buddy in California who works at Accel? I had lunch with him yesterday and he told me that he firm is about to invest 50 million bucks into a small Marijuana company.

Basically they make weed vaporizers and their stuff is flying off the shelf because both weed, and vaporizers are all the craze right now.

Anyway, long story short, they're putting all that cash in the company at a price of $1.17 per share and yes you guessed it… it's way higher than where the stock price is as we speak.

The price is at just over 10 cents right now. This means that when they announce their involvement in a few days it should go up about tenfold overnight.

In fact, if you look at the chart, the price was at a little over 2 dollars a few weeks ago. My buddy tells me that his firm ‘crashed' it artificially so that they'd have more bargaining power at the table and it makes sense... They're coming in at just $1.17 instead of over 2 dollars.

Nonetheless this is a really rare chance for us to get in. I'll pick up at least 50,000 shares today and I think you should do the same.

The name of the company is Bellatora Inc. and its ticker is ECGR. If you do decide to tell a couple of your friends, please do me a favor and don't mention me by name.

Thanks,
Lillie Maynard
Bellatora seems to be involved in the vaping market, including medical marijuana vaping. I've seen a couple of other P&D spam runs in the past pushing stocks in this industry [1] [2].

Over the past month, the price of ECGR stock has cratered from over $2 per share to just 10 cents today. Yesterday someone traded 455,000 shares of that stock.


According to MarketWired this company has changed names several times over the years:

Company History
- Formerly=Oncology Medical, Inc. until 9-2016
- Formerly=Vianet Technology Group, Ltd. until 4-07
- Formerly=UTTI Corp. until 2-07
- Formerly=Unitech Industries, Inc. until 1-99
- Note=12-96 state of incorporation California changed to Delaware upon emergence from Chapter XI bankruptcy under Federal Bankruptcy Code
A quick look at the financials for this company turns up.. nothing. Which is kind of odd.

Anyway, stock being pushed through illegal pump-and-dump operations such as this is not being done for YOUR benefit, but for some party who holds a lot of stock. Avoid.

The spam run has been going on for about six hours, but has slowed down in the past few hours.


Version 2 - 13th June

It didn't take long for the second version to come out.. and there could be a lot more to come.

From:    Alisa Rich
Date:    13 June 2017 at 15:39
Subject:    Let me tell you why this stock will go up 10x by next week.

Haven't heard from me in a while right? That's because I'm not one to waste your time.

Whenever I do email you, it's because I've got something good. Really good.

My good friend who works at the big VC out in NY invited me for a bite yesterday. Nothing unusual, we always eat lunch together right?

However yesterday he gave me a really amazing piece of information and I want to share that with you.

The place he works at is basically injecting more or less 50 mill into this small American company that's in the cannabis business. Apparently, they've got some really amazing distribution and even better technologies.

Anyway... to make a long story longer he said the value they are coming in at is right around 1.20 a share and that this announcement will be made public some time in the next few days.

Given that the shares are at just 12 cents right now, do you have any idea what's going to happen when the announcement is out?

Yep, you guessed right... It's going to jump up 10 times, literally overnight.

The cannabis company is: Bella tora Inc.

You can buy it if you type E C G R in your brokerage account.

Feel free to tell only your closest friends about this. I really have no clue when the next time I get a tip will be.

Take care,
Alisa Rich




Monday, 5 June 2017

Malware spam: "John Miller Limited" / "Invoice"

This spam pretends to come from John Miller Ltd (but doesn't) and comes with a malicious payload. The domain mentioned in the email does not match the company being spoofed, and varies from message to message.

From:    Felix Holmes
Date:    5 June 2017 at 10:20
Subject:    Invoice


Regards



Felix Holmes

cid:image001.jpg@01D00F00.660A92D0
Kirkburn Ind. Estate
Lockerbie
Dumfries and Galloway
DG11 2FF

Tel – 01576 208 741 (Accounts) 01576 208 747 (Main line)
Fax – 01576 208 748
Ext – 1008/1006
‘’New Website launched 30.05.2014 – visit www.[redacted].uk’’


Attached is a PDF file with a name similar to A4 Inv_Crd 914605.pdf - opening it up (NOT recommended) displays something fairly minimal.

The attachment currently has a detection rate of about 9/56. As is common with some recent attacks, the PDF actually contains an embedded Microsoft Office document. Hybrid Analysis shows the malicious file downloading a component from cartus-imprimanta.ro/8yfh4gfff (176.126.200.56 - HostVision SRL, Romania) although other variants possibly exist.


A file is dropped (in the HA report called miniramon8.exe) at detection rate of 11/61. According to the Hybrid Analysis report, that attempts tom communicate with the following IPs:

192.48.88.167 (Tocici LLC, US)
89.110.157.78 (netclusive GmbH, Germany)
85.214.126.182 (Strato AG, Germany)
46.101.154.177 (Digital Ocean, Germany)


The payload is not clear at this time, but it will be nothing good.

Recommended blocklist:
192.48.88.167
89.110.157.78
85.214.126.182
46.101.154.177



Thursday, 11 May 2017

Malware spam with "nm.pdf" attachment

Currently underway is a malicious spam run with various subjects, for example:

Scan_5902
Document_10354
File_43359


Senders are random, and there is no body text. In all cases there is a PDF attached named nm.pdf with an MD5 of D4690177C76B5E86FBD9D6B8E8EE23ED or 6B305C5B59C235122FD8049B1C4C794D (and possibly more). Detection rates at VirusTotal are moderate [1] [2].

The PDF file contains an embedded Word .docm macro document. Hybrid Analysis [3] [4] is partly successful, but it shows a run-time error for the malicious code, but it does demonstrate that malicious .docm file is dropped with a detection rate of 15/58.

Putting the .docm file back into Hybrid Analysis and Malwr [5] [6] shows the same sort of results, namely a download from:

easysupport.us/f87346b

Given that this seems to be coming from the Necurs botnet, this is probably Locky or Dridex.

UPDATE

A contact pointed out this Hybrid Analysis which looks like basically the same thing, only in this sample the download seems to work. Note the references to "jaff" in the report, which matches this Tweet about something called "Jaff ransomware".

That report also gives two other locations to look out for:

trialinsider.com/f87346b
fkksjobnn43.org/a5/


This currently gives a recommended blocklist of:
47.91.107.213
trialinsider.com
easysupport.us

Tuesday, 2 May 2017

Malware spam: DHL Shipment 458878382814 Delivered

Another day and another fake DHL message leading to an evil .js script.

From: DHL Parcel UK [redacted]
Sent: 02 May 2017 09:30
To: [redacted]
Subject: DHL Shipment 458878382814 Delivered

You can track this order by clicking on the following link:
https://www.dhl.com/apps/dhltrack/?action=track&tracknumbers=458878382814&language=en&opco=FDEG&clientype=ivother

Please do not respond to this message. This email was sent from an unattended mailbox. This report was generated at approximately 08:15 am CDT on 02/05/2017.

All weights are estimated.

The shipment is scheduled for delivery on or before the scheduled delivery displayed above. DHL does not determine money-back guarantee or delay claim requests based on the scheduled delivery. Please see the DHL Service Guide for terms and conditions of service, including the DHL Money-Back Guarantee, or contact your DHL customer support representative.

This tracking update has been sent to you by DHL on behalf of the Requestor [redacted]. DHL does not validate the authenticity of the requestor and does not validate, guarantee or warrant the authenticity of the request, the requestor's message, or the accuracy of this tracking update.

Standard transit is the date the package should be delivered by, based on the selected service, destination, and ship date. Limitations and exceptions may apply. Please see the DHL Service Guide for terms and conditions of service, including the DHL Money-Back Guarantee, or contact your DHL Customer Support representative.

In this case the link goes to parkpaladium.com/DHL24/18218056431/  and downloads a file DHL-134843-May-02-2017-55038-8327373-1339347112.js which looks like this.

According to Malwr and Hybrid Analysis the script downloads a binary from micromatrices.com/qwh7zxijifxsnxg20mlwa/ (77.92.78.38  - UK2, UK) and then subsequently attempts communication with

75.25.153.57 (AT&T, US)
79.170.95.202 (XL Internet Services, Netherlands)
87.106.148.126 (1&1, Germany)
78.47.56.162 (Mediaforge, Germany)
81.88.24.211 (dogado GmbH, Germany)
92.51.129.235 (Host Europe, Germany)
74.50.57.220 (RimuHosting, US)


The dropped binary has a VirusTotal detection rate of 10/60.

Recommended blocklist:
77.92.78.38
75.25.153.57
79.170.95.202
87.106.148.126
78.47.56.162
81.88.24.211
92.51.129.235
74.50.57.220

Thursday, 27 April 2017

Malware spam: Scotiabank / "Secure email communication" / Secure.Mail@scotiabankmail.com

This fake financial spam leads to malware:

From:    ScotiaBank [Secure.Mail@scotiabankmail.com]
Date:    27 April 2017 at 14:13
Subject:    Secure email communication
Signed by:    scotiabankmail.com


Scotia Secure Email Logo
Secure mail waiting: (Secure)
Scotiabank has sent you a secure, encrypted e-mail message. To view this e-mail, please visit "Scotiabank Secure Email Service" or check attach file. For further information on how to use this service please reffer to "the Secure Email User Guide".
The email you receive from Scotiabank, including any attachments, may contain confidential and/or privileged information for the intended recipient(s) only and the sender does not waive any related legal rights or privilege. Any use or disclosure of the information by an unintended recipient is unauthorized and prohibited. If you have received an email message in error, please delete the entire message, including attachments if any, and inform us by return email. 

Opening the attached document SecureMail.doc leads to a simple page that tries to get you to enable Active Content (not recommended!).

Hybrid Analysis shows a download from elevationstairs.ca/fonts/dde60c5776c175c54d23d2b0c.png [70.33.246.140 - Host Papa, US] leading to a dropped file Pscou.exe which has a detection rate of 11/61 and appears to be Upatre.

Malwr Analysis of the downloaded file shows attempted communications to:

82.146.94.86 (Ringnett, Norway)
8.254.243.46 (Level 3, US)
217.31.111.153 (Ringnett, Norway)


scotiabankmail.com has been registered specifically for this attack, or you can block the sending IP of 89.40.216.186 (City Network Hosting AB, Sweden)

Recommended blocklist:
scotiabankmail.com [email]
89.40.216.186 [email]
70.33.246.140
82.146.94.86
8.254.243.46
217.31.111.153

Malware spam: Royal Mail Grоup / "Delivery attempt fail notice"

This fake Royal Mail email leads to malware.

From: Aretha Stickles [mailto:support@360modshop.com]
Sent: 27 April 2017 12:31
Subject: Delivery attempt fail notice

Dеаr customеr [redacted]

Your pаrcel has been in the post office for a very long time.
You must to receive it it within five days.

TRACKING: RB379949016UK
Expeсted Delivery Dаte: April 21, 2017
Class: Packagе Servicеs
Sеrvicе: Delivery Confirmatiоn
Stаtus: eNote Sent
Tо downloаd thе shipping invоicе, visit the link:

http://www.rоyalmail.cоm/business/services/sending/parcels-uk/3463434535

If you do not take it within the specified time, we will have to return it to the sender.
Please print out an order for your pack and take it at the post office.

Kind Regards,

© Royal Mail Grоup Ltd. 2017. All rights rеsеrved

Despite the link appearing to be from "royalmail.com" it's actually a Google redirector..

https://www.google.com/url?hl=ru&q=http://centregold.org&source=gmail&ust=1493375994142000&usg=AFQjCNHEBmT_B17AS-dHem213ejXdbjNAg#bkfhzzat

This bounces to centregold.org [185.133.40.23 - Krek Ltd, Russia] then a load balancer at rns.tobeylabs.com/tracking/delivery/tracking.php?id=554 [31.148.219.65 - KingServers, Netherlands] then either http://booniff.com/delivery/Pack_9356667UK.zip [216.24.167.58 - Amino Communications, US] or https://purolator.topatlantanursinghomelawyer.com/tracking/parcel/Notification_37352742UK.zip [185.159.80.100 - KingServers, Netherlands].

Note that the name of the .ZIP is generated dynamically, so there is some variation in filenames.

Inside the ZIP files is a malicious script (e.g. Pack_9356667UK.js) which according to Hybrid Analysis then communicates with a website at 31.148.219.208 [the same KingServers /24 as before!] and it drops a file mstsc.exe with VirusTotal detection rate of 11/57.

Recommended blocklist:
31.148.219.0/24
185.133.40.0/24
185.159.80.0/24
216.24.167.58



Wednesday, 19 April 2017

Malware spam: "Copy of your 123-reg invoice" / no-reply@123-reg.co.uk

This fake financial spam does not come from 123-Reg (nor is it sent to 123-Reg customers). It has a malicious attachment.

From     no-reply@123-reg.co.uk
Date     Wed, 19 Apr 2017 17:19:51 +0500
Subject     Copy of your 123-reg invoice ( 123-093702027 )

Hi [redacted],

Thank you for your order.

Please find attached to this email a receipt for this payment.

Help and support

If you are still stuck why not contact our support team? Simply visit our 123-reg
Support Centre and click on the Ask a Question tab.

Thank you for choosing 123-reg.

The 123-reg team.
https://www.123-reg.co.uk
The invoice number is randomly generated. The attachment is a PDF file with a name matching the invoice number (e.g. 123-093702027-reg-invoice.pdf).

This PDF file appears to drop an Office document according to VirusTotal results.

Hybrid Analysis shows the document dropping a malicious executable with a detection rate of 15/61. It appears to contact the following IPs (some of which contain legitimate sites):

216.87.186.15 (Affinity Internet, US)
216.177.132.93 (Alentus Corporation, US)
152.66.249.132 (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest)
85.214.113.207 (Strato AG, Germany)
192.184.84.119 (RamNode LLC, US)

The general prognosis seems to be that this is dropping the Dridex banking trojan.

Recommended blocklist:
216.87.186.15
216.177.132.93
152.66.249.132
85.214.113.207
192.184.84.119



Monday, 17 April 2017

Malware spam: "RE: RE: ftc refund" / secretary@ftccomplaintassistant.com

This fake FTC email leads to malware. Curiously, it was sent to a company that received a multimillion dollar FTC fine, but this is almost definitely a coincidence.

From:    Federal Trade Commission [secretary@ftccomplaintassistant.com]
Date:    17 April 2017 at 15:25
Subject:    RE: RE: ftc refund


It seems we can claim a refund from the FTC.
Check this out and give me a call.
https://www.ftc.gov/refunds/company/companyname.com/FTC_refund_recipientname.doc
Thank you
James Newman
Senior Accountant
secretary@ftccomplaintassistant.com
212-0061570

The link in the email actually goes to a URL beginning http://thecomplete180.com/view.php?id= followed by a Base 64 encoded string that appears to be 6281 + recipient email address + 5434 (so for president@whitehouse.gov it would be http://thecomplete180.com/view.php?id=NjI4MXByZXNpZGVudEB3aGl0ZWhvdXNlLmdvdjU0MzQ=)

Obviously this downloaded document is up to no good, but the VirusTotal detection rates are only 5/56. The Word document itself tries to persuade victims to enable macros, which would be a bad idea.


Automated analysis [1] [2] shows network traffic to:

wasstalwihis.com/bdk/gate.php
littperevengpa.com/ls5/forum.php
littperevengpa.com/mlu/forum.php
littperevengpa.com/d1/about.php
hybridinformatica.com.br/blog/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/inc/a1
hybridinformatica.com.br/blog/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/inc/1
hybridinformatica.com.br/blog/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/inc/2


It also appears to start sending traffic via Tor, which is a good reason to monitor Tor on your network. All sorts of files are dropped, most of which don't seem to be particularly malicious. "Gate.php" indicates a Pony downloader, but this does look like a tricky bugger.

Out of the domains contacted, littperevengpa.com and wasstalwihis.com shared the same registrant details and look fairly evil. We can associate the same registrant with the following domains:

soinwarep.com
ronwronsednot.com
withwasnothar.com
dingandrinfe.com
troverylit.com
derby-au.com
utonerutoft.com
situghlacsof.com
tinjecofsand.com
fortotrolhec.com
fydoratot.com
redwronwassdo.com
ronkeddari.com
littperevengpa.com
suranfortrep.com
newbillingplace.com
usps-daily-delivery.com
ringcentral-fax-inbox.com
wassheckgehan.com
wasstalwihis.com
meredondidn.com
satertdiut.com
vernothesled.com
veuntedund.com
ranwithtorsdo.com
notwipaar.com
dintrogela.com
adp-monthly-billling.com
rigakeddo.com
random-billing.com
hetoftinbut.com
hemlittratdidn.com

Perhaps more usefully, we can associate that registrant with the following IPs:

178.170.189.254 [hostname: nejokexulag.example.com] (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
185.146.1.4 (PS Internet Company LLC, Kazakhstan)
185.48.56.63 (Sinarohost, Netherlands)
185.80.53.76 (HZ Hosting, Bulgaria)
188.127.237.232 (SmartApe, Russia)
193.105.240.2 (Sia Vps Hosting, Latvia)
194.1.239.63 [hostname: nejokexulag.example.com] (Internet Hosting Ltd, Russia)
195.54.163.94 (PE Dobrogivskiy Muroslav Petrovich, Ukraine)
212.116.113.108 (Prometey Ltd, Russia)
46.148.26.87 [hostname: nejokexulag.infium.net] (Infium UAB, Ukraine)
47.90.202.88 (Alibaba.com, China)
77.246.149.100 [hostname: nejokexulag.e-vds.ru] (E-planet Ltd, Russia)
87.118.126.207 (Keyweb AG, Germany)
88.214.236.158 (Overoptic Systems, Russia)
91.230.211.67 [hostname: nejokexulag.freeopti.ru] (Optibit LLC, Russia)
93.189.43.36 (NTCOM, Russia)

This gives us a pretty useful minimum blocklist:

178.170.189.254
185.146.1.4
185.48.56.63
185.80.53.76
188.127.237.232
193.105.240.2
194.1.239.63
195.54.163.94
212.116.113.108
46.148.26.87
47.90.202.88
77.246.149.100
87.118.126.207
88.214.236.158
91.230.211.67
93.189.43.36




Thursday, 13 April 2017

Malware spam: "Company Documents" / WebFilling@companieshousemail.co.uk and companieshouseemail.co.uk plus others

This spam email does not come from Companies House, but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment:

From:    Companies House [WebFilling@companieshousemail.co.uk]
Date:    13 April 2017 at 11:10
Subject:    Company Documents
Signed by:    companieshousemail.co.uk



CH Logo

Company Documents

This message has been generated in response to the company complaint submitted to Companies House WebFiling service.

Please note: all forms must be answered or the form will be returned.

Service Desk tel +44 (0)303 8097 432 or email enquiries@companieshouse.gov.uk

Note: This email was sent from a notification-only email address which cannot accept incoming email. Please do not reply directly to this message.
 
Companies House 
Crown way
Maindy
Cardiff
CF14 3UZ
Crown Logo



Documents.doc
48K



---

I observed the email coming from the fake domains companieshousemail.co.uk and companieshouseemail.co.uk  but it looks like there may be more. Email is being send from servers in the 94.237.36.0/24 range (Upcloud Ltd, Finland) and I can see other servers set up to do the same thing:

companieshouseemail.co.uk  94.237.36.104
companieshouseemail.co.uk  94.237.36.145
companieshousemail.co.uk  94.237.36.146
companieshousemail.co.uk  94.237.36.147
companieshousesecure.co.uk  94.237.36.150
companieshousesecure.co.uk  94.237.36.151


Blocking email from the entire 94.237.36.0/24 range at least temporarily might be prudent.

The WHOIS details for these indicate they were registered today with presumably fake details, but that the registrar Nominet have somehow "verified".

Registrant:
Charlene hogg

Registrant type:
Unknown

Registrant's address:
37 Maberley Road
London
SE19 2JA
United Kingdom

Data validation:
Nominet was able to match the registrant's name and address against a 3rd party data source on 13-Apr-2017

Registrar:
GoDaddy.com, LLP. [Tag = GODADDY]
URL: http://uk.godaddy.com

Relevant dates:
Registered on: 13-Apr-2017
Expiry date:  13-Apr-2019
Last updated:  13-Apr-2017

Registration status:
Registered until expiry date.

Name servers:
ns29.domaincontrol.com
ns30.domaincontrol.com
All the attachments I have seen are the same with a current detection rate of 6/55. Hybrid Analysis of the document shows it downloading a component from shuswapcomputer.ca/images/banners/bannerlogo.png and a malicious executable %APPDATA%\pnwshqr.exe is dropped with a detection rate of 14/62.

Automated analysis of the binary [1] [2] show potentially malicious traffic going to:

107.181.161.221 (Total Server Solutions, US)
185.25.51.118 (Informacines sistemos ir technologijos UAB aka bacloud,com, Lithuania)


There are probably other destinations too. The payload appears to be Dyre / Dyreza.

Recommended blocklist:
94.237.36.0/24 (temporary email block only)
shuswapcomputer.ca
185.25.51.118
107.181.161.221