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Showing posts with label Hosting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hosting. Show all posts

Thursday 1 August 2013

Olborg Ltd / ОЛЬБОРГ / o1host.net (AS57636) revisited

Update:  I am trying to verify claims that Olborg Ltd are operating a sinkhole (which is a good thing) rather than a malware server (a bad thing).

Last week I pointed out a malware site on 91.233.244.102 hosted by Olborg Ltd / ООО "ОЛЬБОРГ" (AS57636) [1] [2] (website at o1host.net) and made a recommendation that admins block access to the entire 91.233.244.0/23 block.

A polite but concerned email from a customer of Olborg with a legitimate sitein that range asked if I wasn't being rather harsh to Olborg with the recommended /23 block, for just one rogue IP.

First, let me explain my rationale behind recommending larger blocks that just single IP addresses. With many web hosts (and yes, a lot of those are in Eastern Europe) the badness isn't usually restricted to one IP address. This appears to be the case with Olborg, with more than one IP looking suspicious. From the point of view of an administrator, blocking a /24 or /23 displaying these characteristics is often the safest approach.. after all, a /24 only represents 0.000006% of the total address space of the internet, but malware sites do tend to cluster.

So, what exactly is going on with Olborg? Although it has 91.233.244.0/23 allocated to it, it only currently uses 91.233.244.0/24 (i.e. the lower half of the range). Of those IPs there appear to be two main blocks, lower down in the range 91.233.244.20, 91.233.244.22 and 91.233.244.28 all seem to host legitimate sites. But further up, 91.233.244.102, 91.233.244.103 and 91.233.244.106 seem to be malicious. It's hardly the most evil web host in the world though, but these rogue IPs are a concern.

I had a look at all the sites I could find in this address range and analysed their WOT ratings, Google malware prognosis and SURBL status, you can find it here [csv]. The SURBL code takes a little explaining, but basically 127.0.0.16 is malware, 127.0.0.4 is (mostly) spam and 127.0.0.20 is both. There more explanation of that here.

The IP 91.233.244.102 has been an issue for over a year [1] [2] [3] [4] although it may or may not be clean at the moment (anti-analysis techniques mean that it can be hard to be certain). Clean or not, I would certainly advise you not to send traffic to this IP.

OK. So you've read this far and somehow I have still kept you interested in Olborg Ltd. All the badness I can find is concentrated in 91.233.244.96/28 and blocking that should keep you protected from any current potential nastiness. Alternatively, you can block the /23, but do bear in mind that there are some legimate customers in that range too (update: and if they are running a sinkhole then there's no point blocking the /23 anyway)


Monday 10 May 2010

Evil network: Sagade Ltd / ATECH-SAGADE

There's been an awful lot of badness from Latvia recently, with several fake AV apps and other Very Bad Things hosted in the range 91.188.59.0 - 91.188.59.255, which appears to be a wholly bad subnet of pure evil. It looks like a similar setup to Real Host Ltd which was shut down last year.

inetnum: 91.188.59.0 - 91.188.59.255
netname: ATECH-SAGADE
descr: Sagade Ltd.
descr: Latvia, Rezekne, Darzu 21
descr: +371 20034981
remarks: abuse-mailbox: piotrek89@gmail.com
country: LV
admin-c: JS1449-RIPE
tech-c: JS1449-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: AS6851-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered

person: Juris Sahurovs
remarks: Sagade Ltd.
address: Latvia, Rezekne, Darzu 21
phone: +371 20034981
abuse-mailbox: piotrek89@gmail.com
nic-hdl: JS1449-RIPE
mnt-by: ATECH-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered

% Information related to '91.188.32.0/19AS6851'

route: 91.188.32.0/19
descr: BKCNET Autonomous System
descr: IZZI SIA
descr: Ieriku 67a, Riga, LATVIA
origin: AS6851
mnt-by: AS6851-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered

All these websites appear to be malicious, I cannot find a single site that I can identify as being legitimate. Most have obviously fake WHOIS details too. I would recommend blocking access to the whole IP block.

1zabslwvn538n4i5tcjl.com
Urodinam.net
A-fast.com
00g00.ru
Odnotraxniki.ru
Td0.ru
Kerrimckeetq.info
Maiamaribeihlv.info
Marguriiexyhamlin.info
Privatetechnology.biz
Syscodec.com
Systemcodec.net
Traffcash.biz
Kimirleonarda.info
Nitrosearch.info
Fastglobosearch.com
Likinto.com
Mcml1.com
Trol0l0.com
Mokato.com
Ziko.in
Viasot.com
Billsolutions.net
Fastsecurebilling.com
Fast-payments.com
Easypayments-online.com
Billingonline.net
Lotise.com
Manytis.com
Membernameserver.com
Ossarix.com
Soterpo.com
Stepil.com
Winepsy.com
Zingis.com
Bombastats.com
Pornowars.info
Superspuperporn.com
Pornopeace.info
Smackmybitch.info
Belleplaceurl.com
Christophecoinurl.com
Coinurlredirect.com
Coinurlredirection.com
Endroiturlredirect.com
Glossipfd.com
Goldcoinurl.com
Gork.in
Gulk.in
Hnarmettis.com
Hotelplaceurl.com
Lieuurlredirect.com
Mnuyetsgrr.com
My654bestsite.com
Nuvolokijj.com
Parkplaceurl.com
Polk.in
Rozg.in
Samk.in
Sekmoon.net
Silvercoinurl.com
Sumk.in
Vvven.in
Worldplaceurl.com
Zoid.in
Smackbybitch.com
Videosite1.com
Beeape.com
Supercrazynight.com
Supersporns.com
Sys-force.ru
Firsttunesclub.in
Viiistifor1.com
Visiocarii1l.net
Skachivay.com
Allforyouplus.net
Hotfilesfordownload.com
Allforil1i.com
Alltubeforfree.com
Allxtubevids.net
Freeanalsextubemovies.com
Freetube06.com
Freeviewgogo.com
Homeamateurclips.com
Hotxtube.in
Hotxxxtubevideo.com
Iil10oil0.com
Ilio01ili1.com
Illinoli1l.in
Porn-tube-video.com
Porntube2000.com
Porntubefast.com
Viewnowfast.com
Viewxxxfreegall.net
Xhuilil1ii.com
Yourbestway.cn
Youvideoxxx.com
Cern-a.com
Xbasex.com
Rowfirst.com
Autouploaders.net
Poafirst.com
Rodfirst.com
Solaruploader.com
Noafirst.com
My-best-web.com
Pakwer.com
Kdjkfjskdfjlskdjf.com
Stablednsstuff.com
Oklahomacitycom.com

Monday 18 May 2009

martuz.cn injection attack

In the past couple of weeks, thousands of websites were hit with an injection attack pointing to gumblar.cn.. this week it has changed to martuz.cn. It's not a SQL injection attack as far as I can tell, the smart money is that it is using compromised FTP credentials, possibly harvested from end-user PCs rather than a problem with the web server itself.

A typical attack is that JS files on the victim's server are altered with an obfuscated (i.e. partly encrypted) script which might vector through martuz.cn/vid/?id=5718066 or martuz.cn/vid/?id=575730 or something similar, then leading to martuz.cn/vid/?id=3 or another similarly named page (the exact URLs may vary depending on the client software).

There's a writeup about martuz.cn here and here, in the meantime blocking traffic to the domain and the IP address 95.129.145.58 will probably be a good idea.

Monday 2 February 2009

UkrTeleGroup vanishes, morphs.

First some good news (via the WaPo Security Fix blog): well known black hat web host UkrTeleGroup appears to have vanished from the internet. The bad news is that seems to have morphed into a company called Internet Path which is masquerading as a US company.

Unfortunately, it does not appear that this is an Atrivo / McColo / Estdomains style situation where the bad guys are permanently shut down.. yet. But perhaps continued pressure on upstream providers might have some effect.. who knows?

Friday 14 November 2008

McColo dead - spam 69% down

If there was any doubt the McColo was behind a vast majority of the world spam, then I think the figures speak for themselves. We're seeing a 69% drop in spam volumes day-on-day (although we still only have one day's worth of post-McCole data). It will be interesting to see how long this takes to recover back to "normal" levels of awfulness.