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Monday 15 January 2018

Swisscoin [SIC] cryptocurrency spam

Swisscoin is a fairly low-volume self-styled cryptocurrency that has been the target of a Necurs-based spam run starting on Saturday 13th January, and increasing in volume to huge levels on Monday.

From:    Florine Fray [Fray.419@redacted.tld]
Date:    15 January 2018 at 10:51
Subject:    Could this digital currency actually make you a millionaire?

Every once in a while, an opportunity comes around. What divides winners from losers is those who seize it and those who don't. By now, you must have heard about all the people who made a killing with bitcoin over the last year. Some of them made more than ten million with just an initial purchase of a thousand bucks. What I want to ask you though is: Did you know that there are hundreds of other digital currencies that have had even bigger gains over the last twelve months? This includes Ripple, Ethereum and Raiblocks – you may have heard about some of them. What is the next big one for 2018? The answer in my opinion is simple. It's Swisscoin [SIC]. The reason for that is very straight forward. It's because it is supported by the Switzerland government. It is already considered as legal in the country and it is entirely shielded from any political instability. It's the type of coin that you can buy a thousand bucks of, and sit on for a few months or even years and that few thousand will likely be worth a few million. SIC has already doubled in value since Saturday and it will double or triple again by this Friday. So, what are you waiting for? For the time being it can only be purchased on /coinexchange [dot] io/ (that's the website address of the exchange). You can set up an account in about thirty seconds, then you send bitcoins to it and you can easily buy swiss coin. If you don't have any bitcoin already you can just google how to get some, it's super simple and will just take you 10 minutes at most, then transfer them to coinexchange's website and get the SIC

----------------

From:    Jeffry Looper [Looper63@redacted.tld]
Date:    13 January 2018 at 18:42
Subject:    This crypto coin could go up fifty thousand percent this year

Dear [redacted],

If you don't already own a few coins of something, then surely at the very least, you must have heard about cryptocurrencies.

Bitcoin, the most famous one, minted countless multimillionaires but did you know that altcoins (bitcoin alternatives) are responsible for even more riches?

Among the "big" ones, NEM went up almost 10,000 percent and Ethereum, more than 4,000 percent

Among the small and unknown ones several gained more than 50,000 percent.

To put this in perspective, a small 1,000-dollar coin purchase in one of these small ones could have turned into more than 50 million bucks.

It seems crazy, doesn't it? Well, it's the reality of the cryptocurrency market today.

Raiblocks, a relatively obscure coin at the time, went from 0.20 on December first to $20 by New Year's Eve. It is now in the top 20 largest coins in the world.

All that to say, the next big winner could be found anywhere, and today I believe I've identified the next one.

After spending hundreds of hours looking at hundreds of different coins, I locked down on one specific target.

Swisscoin.

As the name says, this is a coin created and headquartered in Switzerland. It is one of the only coins in the world recognized as legal tender by the government.

Swisscoin is allowed by the Swiss government and has the potential to climb more than 5,000% before the end of January and more than 50,000% before the end of this year.

This is one of those rare buy-and-hold coins which you WANT to own, and hang onto for the long term, much like those people who bought bitcoin at $1 and kept it for 3 years. FYI, bitcoin is trading at $14,000 now. That's an increase of over 1 million percent.

I recommend you consider putting at least a thousand bucks in Swisscoin immediately. This could quickly turn into enough money to buy a new house, or at the very least a new car.

For those of you who already have bitcoins, all you need to do is open an account at coinexchange.io (this is the url/website, and it takes 1 minute to get setup), transfer some btc to your new account and buy SIC (Swisscoin).

For those of you who are still clueless about Cryptos, the process will be a little bit longer but well worth it.

Open an account at a large exchange such as Coinbase dot com or Coinmama dot com, then add some fund using your credit/debit card or Paypal.

That's the fastest way, but you will be limited to a few hundred bucks at most. It should be enough to get you quickly started but consider adding more funds using a bank transfer so that you can really have skin in the game.

Remember, every thousand bucks of SIC you buy today could easily turn into 500,000 by this time next year.

----------------

From:    Justine Mcfall [Mcfall0748@redacted.tld]
Date:    14 January 2018 at 16:42
Subject:    Let me tell you about one crypto currency that could turn 1000 bucks into 1 million

If you took a chance on bitcoin early on, just a few years ago, your investment could have paid off in a big way.
According to digital-currency website CoinDesk the value of bitcoins was volatile at the beginning.

It was possible to purchase a single bitcoin for just a few cents. Had you bought just a thousand bucks' worth you would be sitting on millions right now.

Want to know what's even crazier? These types of returns have been replicated hundreds of times over so many different alternative coins and it continue happening all the time.

The trick is to buy into a coin very early on before the crowds notice it.

My research shows that Swisscoin (SIC) is going to be the next big one to blow up this year. It has already doubled since yesterday and as the trend continues it could be 10 times as high before the end of the coming week.

Swisscoin is one of the only coins approved by the government in Switzerland. It is 100% legal and useable in everyday life.

Switzerland's Swiss Franc has been one of the most stable and best performing currencies throughout history and Swisscoin aims to replicate this standard with the digital coin.

Could you turn a thousand bucks into a million before the end of 2018 with SIC? The answer is a clear yes.

For the time being SIC only trades on one exchange: coinexchange.io so you need to open an account there (takes about thirty seconds), and transfer bitcoin to it so you can make the purchase.

If you don't own any digital currency yet then you need to open an account at coinbase or coinmama and buy some btc (bitcoin) with your credit or debit card or bank account.

After you get bitcoins, just follow the instructions in the above paragraph.

One thing is for sure, you definitely don't want to miss out on Swisscoin.
Swisscoin trading was recently suspended and only started up again a few days ago. The chart at World Coin Index shows that this has been a real rollercoaster ride.



There are questions as to whether Swisscoin is actually a cryptocurrency or a Ponzi scheme. Honestly, I don't know and I'd advise you to do your own research. However, this has all the markings of a pump-and-dump scheme, so it's quite possible that someone who bought Swisscoins at their peak wants to pump the price up so they can sell off their holdings. Given that the spam is being sent out from a network of hacked machines and does not comply with anti-spam laws, you can pretty much guarantee that this is not legitimate and should be avoided.

UPDATE: a subsequent spam run looks like this:

From:    Trenton Manners [Manners.491@redacted.tld]
Date:    15 January 2018 at 18:42
Subject:    Forget about bitcoin, there's a way better coin you can buy.

It's probably not news to you at this point if I tell you that bitcoin has made tons of people tons of money. Something else you probably already know is that it will never go up like crazy again. Its time to shine is long gone. That's why we must look into what the next big thing is, and the truth is that there have been plenty over the last few months. Can you jump on the next huge one before it soars? Swiss coin {SIC} is the most likely candidate for a fifty thousand percent return this year. It has the support of the Switzerland government. It is already considered as legal in the country. It's the type of coin that you can buy a thousand bucks of right now, sit on for a small period of time and you could make out crazy wealthy when all is said and done. SIC has already doubled since Saturday. This long Martin Luther King weekend could bring you even more upside if you act quickly. For those of you who know what this means… you can get it for under 50 satoshi right now. And if you have no clue what this means, it basically means that you can get in on the ground floor How do you get some? You just need an account at coinexchange. Read the currency's official page to find out more info: https://swisscoin.eu/sic-deposits.html


Monday 4 December 2017

Some random thoughts on Damian Green and those porn allegations

If you live in the UK then you might have noticed the somewhat bizarre furore over Damian Green MP and his alleged viewing of pornography on house his Parliament computer. Now, I don't know for certain if he did or didn't, but to put it in context his private email address also allegedly turned up in the Ashley Madison leak and on top of that there are sexual harassment allegations too. But let's stick to the porn for now.

Anybody who has been involved in forensic investigations of computers may well understand these comments:

Mr Lewis, who retired from the Metropolitan Police in 2014, said although "you can't put fingers on a keyboard", a number of factors meant that he was sure it was Mr Green, the MP for Ashford, Kent, who was accessing the pornographic material.

His analysis of the way the computer had been used left the former detective constable in "no doubt whatsoever" that it was Mr Green, who was then an opposition immigration spokesman but is now the first secretary of state.

"The computer was in Mr Green's office, on his desk, logged in, his account, his name," said Mr Lewis, who at the time was working as a computer forensics examiner for SO15, the counter-terrorism command.

"In between browsing pornography, he was sending emails from his account, his personal account, reading documents... it was ridiculous to suggest anybody else could have done it."  
To put this into context - the computer was seized in 2008 when Green was arrested over the suspected leaking of confidential material. Any investigation such as that will look at web browsing history, recently accessed or saved documents, cookies, bookmarks and stored documents and images. So, it is utterly credibly that the investigation would have found this type of activity if it had occurred.

Indeed, there seems to be no denial that this material had been accessed on the computer, but that Mr Green had not done so. But Mr Lewis's statement also says that things such as private email were accessed concurrently. If you were carrying out an investigation on behalf of a business, then this would indeed be enough to "place fingers on a keyboard".

But here is the surprise - why would this material be accessible at all? Nobody has claimed that it was not accessed, just that Mr Green himself did not access it. But any reasonably-sized business would usually have some sort of filter to stop this happening.

The House of Commons by itself employs over 2000 people. Add to that the staff of the House of Lords, the Lords themselves, MPs and other staff who are not directly employed by either House then you are looking at thousands of employees. That's quite a large organisation, and if there is no effective web filtering for any of them, then that introduces a serious security risk.

Anybody who works in IT in a relatively large organisation such as this will know that at least some of them will try to access pornography. My experience is that people who do this on their work computers are exclusively male, and there are 453 male MPs in the House of Commons. This is certainly a large enough group for some of them to be accessing porn, at least some of the time/


So we can surmise a couple of things - it certainly seems to be possible to access porn from a Parliament computer, and given the number of people working there it seems likely that somebody would try. The number of male MPs certainly seems enough for one of those to try to access porn. Given that it is likely that some of them try, there's no particular reason why it shouldn't be Damian Green. And if one MP is fired from his job because of porn, then you can bet there are other MPs who have done the same thing.

But why not implement some sort of filtering? The problem is that MPs are not employees - Parliament is the primary legislative body in the UK and it is essentially sovereign (despite there being a Queen). Imagine that you worked in an organisation where there were hundreds of C-level executives, and then try to police them from an IT point of view. MPs are probably amongst the worst users in the world to support.

As I said, most organisation of any size filter porn from corporate computers. Strategically, the main reason to do that is not to track down and fire errant employees, but to prevent embarrassment to that organisation. It's all very well to fire a low-level employee for viewing smut, but when it comes to the top of the food chain such terminations can also be damaging to the reputation of the organisation itself. If Parliament isn't filtering this sort of material then it is always likely to end up with this sort of scenario from time-to-time.

Mr Lewis's comments indicate that the material was found on the computer itself, not a proxy log or other external system. It's quite possible that whoever was accessing the material on Mr Green's computer could have saved themselves a lot of grief if they'd used private browsing (although a deep forensic investigation can often find artifacts even when this has happened).

Also, Nadine Dorries MP did state that she shared her password with staff who worked for her. This is terrible practice, and certainly in my organisation if you share your password and somebody abuses it, then you are liable for anything that they did.

Don't forget as well, the habit of porn sites infecting visitors with malware though malicious advertisements, and the habit of more "specialist" sites having been created specifically to infect visitor's computers. MPs might not think themselves to be important enough to hack, but they will have private correspondence with constituents and other parties that should remain private.. and not be leaked out.

Whatever the truth of Damian Green's surfing habits, it looks like Parliament is badly in need of proper regulation of its computer systems. But you really do have the nightmare users from hell in that job. I suspect it is going to take something more that one embarrassed MP to force a change.

Image credits:

Tuesday 31 October 2017

Wednesday 25 October 2017

Updated 3NT Solutions LLP / inferno.name / V3Servers.net IP ranges

 

[For the February 2021 version of this list, click here]

When I was investigating IOCs for the recent outbreak of BadRabbit ransomware I discovered that it downloaded from a domain 1dnscontrol.com hosted on 5.61.37.209. This IP belongs to a company called 3NT Solutions LLP that I have blogged about before.

It had been three-and-a-half years since I looked at their IP address ranges so I thought I would give them a refresh. My personal recommendation is that you block all of these, I have never seen anything of worth on any 3NT range. Note that inferno.name and V3Servers.net are the same outfit and I have included those too. If you know of any other ranges, please consider leaving a comment.

5.45.64.0/19
5.61.32.0/19
37.1.192.0/19
37.252.0.0/20
46.22.211.0/25
46.22.211.128/26
80.79.124.128/26
92.48.122.0/28
92.48.122.16/28
92.48.122.32/28
92.48.122.48/28
95.168.165.0/24
95.168.173.0/24
95.168.177.0/24
95.168.178.0/24
95.168.191.0/24
130.0.232.0/21
184.154.38.40/29
185.4.64.0/22
212.95.54.0/24
212.95.58.0/24
212.95.63.0/24


Tuesday 24 October 2017

Malware spam: "Order acknowledgement for BEPO/N1/380006006(2)"

A change to the usual Necurs rubbish, this fake order has a malformed .z archive file which contains a malicious executable with an icon to make it look like an Office document.

Reply-To:    purchase@animalagriculture.org
To:    Recipients [DY]
Date:    24 October 2017 at 06:48
Subject:    FW: Order acknowledgement for BEPO/N1/380006006(2)

Dear All,
Kindly find the attached Purchase order# IT/IMP06/06-17 and arrange to send us the order acknowledgement by return mail.

Note: Please expedite
the delivery as this item is very urgently required.


Regards,  Raj Kiran

(SUDARSHAN SS)  NAVAL SYSTEMS (S&CS)
BHARAT ELECTRONICS LIMITED  BANGALORE  PH:9180-22195857  BEL Website : www.bel-india.com SRM PORTAL :https://hpcrmp.iscodom.com/irj/portal



Every Sheets of paper is made from a tree.. Save trees... Conserve Trees.... Go Green .... Don't print this email or any Files unless you really need to!!!!
Confidentiality Notice


The information contained in this electronic message and any attachments to this message are intended for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and may contain confidential or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender at Bharat Electronics or support@bel.co.in immediately and destroy all copies of this message and any attachments.

Attached is a file Purchase order comfirmation.doc.z which contains a malicious executable Purchase order comfirmation.exe which currently has a detection rate of 12/66. It looks like the archive type does not actually match the extension..


If the intended target hides file extensions then it is easy to see how they could be fooled..

Incidentally, VirusTotal shows this information about the file:


Copyright: (c)1998 by RicoSoft
Product: System Investigation
Description: System Investigation for NT/9x
Original Name: SysInv2.exe
Internal Name: SysInv2
File Version:2.3.1.37
Comments: Freeware / Careware from RicoSoft

Obviously that's fake, but a bit of Googling around shows SysInv2.exe being used in other similar attacks.

The Hybrid Analysis for is a little interesting (seemingly identifying it as Loki Bot), showing the malware phoning home to:

jerry.eft-dongle.ir/njet/five/fre.php   (188.165.162.201 / Mizban Web Paytakht Co. Ltd., Iran)

Actually, the IP is leaded from OVH and claims to belong to dedicatedland.com in Birmingham, UK:

organisation:   ORG-MWPM1-RIPE
org-name:       Mizban Web Paytakht Mizban Web Paytakht
org-type:       OTHER
address:        55 Orion Building, 90 Navigation Street
address:        B5 4AA Birmingham
address:        GB
e-mail:         info@dedicatedland.com
abuse-mailbox:  info@dedicatedland.com
phone:          +44.7455017803
mnt-ref:        OVH-MNT
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2015-01-22T22:12:03Z
last-modified:  2015-01-22T22:12:03Z
source:         RIPE


The small 188.165.162.200/29 range is marked as "failover IPs".  The WHOIS for dedicatedland.com comes up with a bogus looking address in Massachusetts:

Registrant Email: info@dedicatedland.com
Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
Admin Name: Mizban Web Paytakht LLC
Admin Organization: irnameserver.com
Admin Street: Newton Center 
Admin City: Newton Center
Admin State/Province: Massachusetts
Admin Postal Code: 00000
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.00000000
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax:
Admin Fax Ext: 


However RIPE show them as being in Tehran:
Mizban Web Paytakht Co. Ltd.

No.43, North Ekhtiyariyeh St, Ekhtiyariyeh Sqr
1958743611 Tehran
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF

phone:   +98 2122587469
fax:  +98 2122761180
e-mail:  info (at) dedicatedland (dot) com
Anyway, if you are not interested in sending traffic to Iran, Mizban Web Paytakht own AS64428 which comprises of 185.165.40.0/22 as well. I'll make a guess that the 188.165.162.200/29 range
may be insecure and could be worth blocking.

The email itself originates from 104.171.114.204 which is allocated as follows:

CustName:       jason Richards
Address:        121 main street
City:           suffolk
StateProv:      VA
PostalCode:     23434
Country:        US
RegDate:        2017-01-16
Updated:        2017-01-16
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C06298370


You probably don't need to accept .z attachments at your mail perimeter, and any decent anti-spam tool should be able to look inside archives to determine was is in there.

Tuesday 17 October 2017

Evil network: Fast Serv Inc / Qhoster.com

Checking these IOCs for this latest Flash 0-day came up with an interesting IP address of 89.45.67.107 which belongs to Fast Serv Inc aka Qhoster, probably of Bulgaria but masquerading themselves as a Belize outfit.

I came across Fast Serv / Qhoster a lot last year during the Angler EK epidemic, where they had entire ranges full of badness, often with no discernable legitimate sites at all. It turns out that I'd blocked the /24 a year ago as it was full of EK servers. The full analysis I did of Fast Serv / Qhoster Angler ranges can be found in these Pastebins: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

So, this Flash 0 day gave me a renewed impetus to identify these ranges and keep them the hell off my network. Luckily HE's BGP tool can identify most of the allocated IPs of a /24 size or larger [8] [9] plus a bit of infill from other sources.

I can't guarantee that these ranges are free of legitimate sites, but even a quick glance at some of the ranges (the BGP tool is quite good for this [10]) shows signs of obvious badness in almost all of them. Use at your own risk :)

Note that these ranges are across many different ASes and hosts, although AS201630 is allocated to Qhoster themselves.

5.104.105.192/26
37.157.253.64/26
46.102.152.0/24
46.102.252.0/23
85.204.74.0/24
86.104.15.0/24
86.105.1.0/24
86.105.5.0/24
86.105.18.0/24
86.105.227.0/24
86.106.93.0/24
86.106.102.0/24
86.106.131.0/24
89.32.40.0/24
89.33.64.0/24
89.34.111.0/24
89.35.178.0/24
89.37.226.0/24
89.42.212.0/24
89.43.60.0/24
89.43.202.0/23
89.44.103.0/24
89.45.67.0/24
92.114.35.0/24
92.114.92.0/24
93.113.45.0/24
93.115.38.0/24
93.115.201.0/24
93.117.137.0/24
93.119.123.0/24
94.177.12.0/24
94.177.123.0/24
103.197.160.0/22
138.204.168.0/22
141.255.160.48/28
146.0.43.64/26
168.227.36.0/24
168.227.37.0/24
168.227.38.0/24
168.227.39.0/24
176.223.111.0/24
176.223.112.0/24
176.223.113.0/24
176.223.165.0/24
185.77.128.0/24
185.77.129.0/24
185.77.130.0/24
185.77.131.0/24
188.213.204.0/24
188.215.92.0/24
188.241.39.0/24
188.241.68.0/24
220.158.216.0/22
2403:1480:1000::/36
2403:1480:9000::/36
2a05:6200::/32
2a05:6200:72::/48
2a05:6200:74::/48


Sunday 8 October 2017

Scam: "Help Your Child To Be A Professional Footballer." / info@champ-footballacademyagency.co.uk

This spam email is a scam:

Subject:       Help Your Child To Be A Professional Footballer.
From:       "FC Academy" [csa@sargas-tm.eu]
Date:       Sun, October 8, 2017 10:30 am
To:       "Recipients" [fcsa@sargas-tm.eu]
Priority:       Normal

Hello,
Does your child desire to become a professional footballer?

Our football academy are currently scouting for young football player to participate in 3-6 months training and  our main purpose is to recruit young and talented footballers to help become a great football  player in Life and become a great star .  Our agent will train and linked your child up with big clubs in United Kingdom and Europe.

We will also help your child to get Visa and Work Permit once the admission into our football academy is approved.

Our aim is to provide a wide range of opportunities to complement a successful playing career. We will help your child to find the best route to fulfilling their ambitions of becoming a professional footballer in United Kingdom and Europe.

If you want to help your child achieve their soccer dream, reply us for more information.
Best Regards,
CFAA.

At the time of writing the domain sargas-tm.eu does not exist, but the Reply-To address is actually info@champ-footballacademyagency.co.uk which is a registered domain. The WHOIS details for this say:

Domain name:
        champ-footballacademyagency.co.uk

    Registrant:
        NELSON OZI

    Registrant type:
        Unknown

    Registrant's address:
        404 sapphire tower
        404 sapphire tower
        USA
        Kentucky
        97101
        United States

    Data validation:
        Nominet was not able to match the registrant's name and/or address against a 3rd party
source on 19-Sep-2017

    Registrar:
        Web4Africa Ltd. t/a Web4Africa [Tag = WEB4AFRICA-GH]
        URL: https://www.web4africa.net

    Relevant dates:
        Registered on: 19-Sep-2017
        Expiry date:  19-Sep-2018
        Last updated:  19-Sep-2017

    Registration status:
        Registered until expiry date.

    Name servers:
        dns1.yandex.net
        dns2.yandex.net

Disclaimer
WHOIS lookup made at 10:50:09 08-Oct-2017


There are lots of suspect things about this domain registration - the address is clearly fake, the registrar is based in South Africa and the nameservers are in Russia, and also it was registered just a few weeks ago. A quick bit of Googling around shows that "Nelson Ozi" is also linked to the following probably fraudulent domains:

svbfib.com
svbfibem.com
globalcreditsus.com

These all seem to be connected with an IP range 169.255.59.0/24 (Web4Africa again) which does seem to have a lot of scammy sites hosted on it. Blocking access to that range might be prudent.

The spam email itself comes via another Russian server mail.elmeh.ru but this particular email originated from 103.207.37.101 in Vietnam. Replies to the champ-footballacademyagency.co.uk email would be set to mx.yandex.net which is in Russia again.

It would probably be quite difficult to stuff any more dodgy indicators into this spam. What the scam actually is isn't 100% clear, it could be anything from a simple advanced fee fraud all the way up to child abduction. Avoid.

Thursday 28 September 2017

Malware spam: "Emailing: Scan0xxx" from "Sales" delivers Locky or Trickbot

This fake document scan delivers different malware depending on the victim's location:

Subject:       Emailing: Scan0963
From:       "Sales" [sales@victimdomain.tld]
Date:       Thu, September 28, 2017 10:31 am


Your message is ready to be sent with the following file or link
attachments:

Scan0963


Note: To protect against computer viruses, e-mail programs may prevent
sending or receiving certain types of file attachments.  Check your e-mail
security settings to determine how attachments are handled.
Attached is a .7z file with a name matching the "Scan" part in the header and body text. MD5s of those seen so far (there may be more):

58B76A9DC942AF73CFADFAF764637A48
627A8A6C3F73365161B94ABF5472E5C0
8927AE38D6F84DF1940D0E13491015F9
1CD93386F4FD7D5771A8119C5E9E6C98
A406E870D20A5913B17C4F9D6D52CDCD
EB087BB59BEED8039FC7B7E48F099E79
1D94DC6ECAED3D33D840E61DDAD7AC07
FDB76F480AF0A8D01DA2E4A3098A549F
320401A216CC7A3BA6B9C12163B3EB60
1AC6D2DA56FAA27C60A22CFD2099435F
1BD79C90F2CC8390170A4D6231282328

Inside is a malicious VBS script (example) which exhibits a curious feature:


If you are in the UK, Australia, Ireland, Belgium or Luxembourg you get one binary [VT 12/64], everyone else gets another [VT 20/64]. My Online Security describes this in more detail - the first group get the Trickbot banking trojan and everyone gets Locky ransomware.

In the samples I saw, the Trickbot download locations were:

autoecole-jeanpierre.com/9hciunery8g?
autoecoleathena.com/9hciunery8g?
conlin-boats.com/9hciunery8g?
flooringforyou.co.uk/9hciunery8g?
fls-portal.co.uk/9hciunery8g?
fmarson.com/9hciunery8g?
freevillemusic.com/9hciunery8g?
geeks-online.de/9hciunery8g?
jakuboweb.com/9hciunery8g?
jaysonmorrison.com/9hciunery8g?
melting-potes.com/9hciunery8g?
sherylbro.net/p66/LUYTbjnrf
camerawind.com/9hciunery8g?


The Locky download locations:

americanbulldogradio.com/LUYTbjnrf?
anarakdesert.com/LUYTbjnrf?
atlantarecyclingcenters.com/LUYTbjnrf?
augustinechua.com/LUYTbjnrf?
classactionlawsuitnewscenter.com/LUYTbjnrf?
davidstephensbanjo.com/LUYTbjnrf?
e-westchesterpropertytax.com/LUYTbjnrf?
felicesfiestas.com.mx/LUYTbjnrf?
financeforautos.com/LUYTbjnrf?
mtblanc-let.co.uk/LUYTbjnrf?
plumanns.com/LUYTbjnrf?
poemsan.info/p66/d8743fgh
asnsport-bg.com/LUYTbjnrf?


There may be other locations too.

The following legitimate services are used for geolocation. They might be worth monitoring:

https://ipinfo.io/json
http://www.geoplugin.net/json.gp
http://freegeoip.net/json/


All these recent attacks have used .7z archive files which would require 7zip or a compatible program to unarchive. Most decent mail filtering tools should be able to block or strip this extension, more clever ones would be able to determine that there is a .vbs script in there and block on that too.

UPDATE

A more complete list of download locations from a trusted source (thank you!)

ambrogiauto.com/9hciunery8g
autoecoleathena.com/9hciunery8g
autoecoleboisdesroches.com/9hciunery8g
autoecole-jeanpierre.com/9hciunery8g
camerawind.com/9hciunery8g
conlin-boats.com/9hciunery8g
feng-lian.com.tw/9hciunery8g
flooringforyou.co.uk/9hciunery8g
fls-portal.co.uk/9hciunery8g
fmarson.com/9hciunery8g
freevillemusic.com/9hciunery8g
geeks-online.de/9hciunery8g
givensplace.com/9hciunery8g
jakuboweb.com/9hciunery8g
jaysonmorrison.com/9hciunery8g
melting-potes.com/9hciunery8g
patrickreeves.com/9hciunery8g
sherylbro.net/p66/LUYTbjnrf

americanbulldogradio.com/LUYTbjnrf
anarakdesert.com/LUYTbjnrf
asnsport-bg.com/LUYTbjnrf
astilleroscotnsa.com/LUYTbjnrf
atlantarecyclingcenters.com/LUYTbjnrf
augustinechua.com/LUYTbjnrf
classactionlawsuitnewscenter.com/LUYTbjnrf
davidstephensbanjo.com/LUYTbjnrf
essenza.co.id/LUYTbjnrf
evlilikpsikolojisi.com/LUYTbjnrf
e-westchesterpropertytax.com/LUYTbjnrf
felicesfiestas.com.mx/LUYTbjnrf
financeforautos.com/LUYTbjnrf
fincasoroel.es/LUYTbjnrf
kailanisilks.com/LUYTbjnrf
mediatrendsistem.com/LUYTbjnrf
modaintensa.com/LUYTbjnrf
mtblanc-let.co.uk/LUYTbjnrf
plumanns.com/LUYTbjnrf
poemsan.info/p66/d8743fgh

Tuesday 26 September 2017

Malware spam: "AutoPosted PI Notifier"

This spam has a .7z file leading to Locky ransomware.
From:      "AutoPosted PI Notifier" [NoReplyMailbox@redacted.tld]
Subject:      Invoice PIS9344608
Date:      Tue, September 26, 2017 5:29 pm

Please find Invoice PIS9344608 attached.
The number referenced in the spam varies, but attached is a .7z archive file with a matching filename. In turn, this contains one of a number of malicious VBS scripts (like this) that download an executable from one of the following locations (thanks to a trusted source for these):

camerawind.com/jkhguygv73
envirotambang.com/jkhguygv73
fianceevisa101.com/jkhguygv73
fiancevisacover.com/jkhguygv73
financeforautos.com/jkhguygv73
fincasoroel.es/jkhguygv73
fmarson.com/jkhguygv73
formareal.com/jkhguygv73
fwbcondo.com/jkhguygv73
gaestehaus-im-vogelsang.de/jkhguygv73
gbvm.nl/jkhguygv73
geeks-online.de/jkhguygv73
playbrief.info/p66/jkhguygv73

The dropped file currently has a detection rate of 21/63. There are no C2s.

Thursday 21 September 2017

Malware spam: "Invoice RE-2017-09-21-00xxx" from "Amazon Marketplace"

This fake Amazon spam comes with a malicious attachment:

Subject:       Invoice RE-2017-09-21-00794
From:       "Amazon Marketplace" [yAhbPDAoufvZE@marketplace.amazon.co.uk]
Date:       Thu, September 21, 2017 9:21 am
Priority:       Normal

------------- Begin message -------------

Dear customer,

We want to use this opportunity to first say "Thank you very much for your purchase!"

Attached to this email you will find your invoice.

Kindest of regards,
your Amazon Marketplace

==



[commMgrHmdToken:EVDOOCETFBECA]

------------- End message -------------

For Your Information: To help arbitrate disputes and preserve trust and safety, we
retain all messages buyers and sellers send through Amazon.co.uk. This includes your
response to the message below. For your protection we recommend that you only
communicate with buyers and sellers using this method.

Important: Amazon.co.uk's A-to-z Guarantee only covers third-party purchases paid
for through our Amazon Payments system via our Shopping Cart or 1-Click. Our
Guarantee does not cover any payments that occur off Amazon.co.uk including wire
transfers, money orders, cash, check, or off-site credit card transactions.

We want you to buy with confidence whenever you purchase products on Amazon.co.uk.
Learn more about Safe Online Shopping
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=11081621) and our safe
buying guarantee
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=3149571).



[commMgrTok:EVDOOCETFBECA]
Attached is a .7z archive file with a name that matches the one quoted in the subject line. So far I have seen just two versions of this, each containing a malicious script (sample here and here). These scripts have a detection rate of about 13/58 and they can been seen attempted to download a component from:

ahlbrandt.eu/IUGiwe8?
fulcar.info/p66/IUGiwe8
accuflowfloors.com/IUGiwe8?
aetozi.gr/IUGiwe8?
agricom.it/IUGiwe8?


An executable is dropped (Locky ransomware) with a detection rate of 18/64. Although Hybrid Analysis [1] [2] clearly shows the ransomware, no C2s are currently available (it turns out there aren't any).

UPDATE - additional download locations:
81552.com/IUGiwe8
adr-werbetechnik.de/IUGiwe8
afmance.it/IUGiwe8
afradem.com/IUGiwe8
agriturismobellaria.net/IUGiwe8
agro-kerler.de/IUGiwe8
moonmusic.com.au/IUGiwe8

Monday 18 September 2017

Malware spam: "Status of invoice" with .7z attachment

This spam leads to Locky ransomware:

Subject:       Status of invoice
From:       "Rosella Setter" ordering@[redacted]
Date:       Mon, September 18, 2017 9:30 am

Hello,

Could you please let me know the status of the attached invoice? I
appreciate your help!

Best regards,

Rosella Setter

Tel: 206-575-8068 x 100

Fax: 206-575-8094

*NEW*   Ordering@[redacted].com

* Kindly note we will be closed Monday in observance of Labor Day *


The name of the sender varies. Attached is a .7z arhive file with a name similar to A2174744-06.7z which contains in turn a malicious .vbs script with a random number for a filename (examples here and here).


Automated analysis of those two samples [1] [2] [3] [4] show this is Locky ransomware. Those two scripts attempt to download a component from:





yildizmakina74.com/87thiuh3gfDGS?
miliaraic.ru/p66/87thiuh3gfDGS?
lanzensberger.de/87thiuh3gfDGS?
web-ch-team.ch/87thiuh3gfDGS?
abelfaria.pt/87thiuh3gfDGS?

An executable is dropped with a detection rate of 19/64 which Hybrid Analysis shows is phoning home to:

91.191.184.158/imageload.cgi (Monte Telecom, Estonia)
195.123.218.226/imageload.cgi (Layer 6, Bulgaria)


.7z files are popular with the bad guys pushing Locky at the moment. Blocking them at your mail perimiter may help.

Recommended blocklist:
195.123.218.226
91.191.184.158



Wednesday 6 September 2017

QTUM Cryptocurrency spam

This spam email appears to be sent by the Necurs botnet, advertising a new Bitcoin-like cryptocurrency called QTUM. Necurs is often used to pump malware, pharma and data spam and sometimes stock pump and dump.

There is no guarantee that this is actually being sent by the people running QTUM, it could simply be a Joe Job to disrupt operations. Given some of the wording alluding to illegal marketplaces, I suspect this could be the case.

Subject:       Qtum Main Network Launches September 13th, 2017
From:       "Lou Roberson"
Date:       Wed, September 6, 2017 6:37 am
Priority:       Normal


The Blockchain Made Ready for Business
Build Anonymous Decentralized Applications that Simply Work
Executable on mobile devices, compatible with major existing blockchain
ecosystems
TESTNET NOW LIVE!
   
    About
     
The Qtum Foundation is a Singapore based entity that promotes
adoption of the Qtum Blockchain. Project inception began in
March 2016, leading up to a successful crowdsale a year later.
Over 10,000 BTC and 72,000 ETH were raised in less than 5 days,
making Qtum one of the largest crowdfunded projects in history,
at $15.6 million dollars.

Investors received 51,000,000 Qtum tokens which will be
available for withdrawal on September 13, 2017.


The Qtum Foundation plans to be the anonymous blockchain for
business. Development efforts will allow us to market this
platform tovarious industries, such as: Mobile
Telecommunications, Counterfeit Protection, Finance, Industrial
Logistics (shipping, warranty,etc), Manufacturing, P2P Anonymous
Transfers and Anonymous Market Management from phone.
Build anonymous decentralized applications you can trust
     
Smart Contracts that Mean Business
Qtum makes it easier than ever for established sectors and
legacy institutions to interface with blockchain technology.
Create your own tokens, automate supply chain management and
engage in self-executing agreements in a standardized
environment, verified and tested for stability.

   
    Specification

    Total QTUM Supply: 100,000,000
    Block Target: 128 seconds
    Stake Return: ~4 QTUM
    Algorithm: SHA256

     
   
   
    QTUM SPARKNET
   
SPARKNET
          
Sparknet is designed primarily for developers, and as such
documentation at this point will be technical and suited more
for developers.  Testnet tokens do not hold any value and should
not be traded for any monetary instruments. The testnet can be
reset or forked at anytime as deemed necessary for development.

Forum Announcement:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1720632.4220

Release on github:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/releases/tag/testnet-sparknet

Qtum Sparknet Usage and Information: Please see:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/blob/testnet-1/doc/sparknet-guide.md
   
    QTUM SPYNET

Aug 15 The 2nd Qtum Test Network, Skynet, is now live: SKYNET
   
     
Qtum Skynet, the second public testnet for the Qtum blockchain.
All tokens aqcuired during the testnet will cease to exist 
when the mainnet is released which actually has tokens which
hold value. The purpose of the public testnet is to allow
developers to begin testing and developing applications, allow
early adopters to see a preview of how the network will behave,
and for the Qtum development team to run several load tests
which are not directly comparable when done on a private and
controlled network. Qtum Skynet will ideally have the same
consensus features and parameters as the Qtum mainnet.


Qtum Skynet Usage and Information:
Please see:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/releases/tag/testnet-skynet
Please see:
https://github.com/qtumproject/qtum/releases/tag/testnet-skynet-v1.2

As soon as Main Network will be launched, you will be availaible
to build your own applications (DApps) or marketplaces. Fully
scalable and anonymous, so you can easy made any anonymous
marketplace which can be manage from your phone!

Just imagine, your own silkroad made on Qtum blockchain and
managed from your phone with fully anonymous transactions!

    No matter what kind of business you are building, all
transactions will be anonymous, and the network will never
reveal the ip addresses of the applications that are running
on it.

    Even if you sell weapons, drugs, trade in people and are
going to organize a coup d'?tat, you can be sure that you
will remain anonymous.

    Another thing is that it is illegal and sooner or later you
will receive the punishment that you deserve. But everyone
want to know how deep the rabbit hole goes.

    For our part, we can only provide a reliable, scalable and
anonymous ecosystem thanks to which any business can be
built on it and we guarantee that we will do everything
possible to make it sucesfull.

    We give you a choice - "blue pill or red pill"
       
        What Will your choice be?

    So, you have to prepare for Main Network launch  Qtum Custom
Token Walkthrough
   
    CROWDSALE
     
The QTUM token supply will be allocated as follows:

    - 51% of Qtum tokens (51,000,000) will be distributed
through the crowdsale
    - 20% of Qtum tokens (20,000,000 QTUM) will be distributed
among founders, early backers and the development team
    - 29% of Qtum tokens (29,000,000 QTUM) will be allocated to
community initiatives concerning business development, as
    well as academic research, education, and market expansion

For a more detailed overview of QTUM token allocation visit our
website: https://qtum.org/en/crowdsale#question-2
   
    Exchanges
     
Coinone:   https://coinone.co.kr/exchange/trade/qtum/
Yunbi: https://yunbi.com/markets/qtumcny
Bittrex: https://bittrex.com/Market/Index?MarketName=BTC-QTUM
https://bittrex.com/Market/Index?MarketName=ETH-QTUM
CHBTC: https://www.chbtc.com/qtum
BTER: https://bter.com/trade/qtum_cny
https://bter.com/trade/qtum_eth
https://bter.com/trade/qtum_btc

Yubi: https://www.jubi.com/coin/qtum/
Yuanbao:   https://www.yuanbao.com/trade/qtum2cny
Binance:   https://www.binance.com/trade.html?symbol=QTUM_ETH
Allcoin: https://allcoin.com/markets/QTUM-BTC/0/
BTC9: https://btc9.com/trade/22
Biduobao: https://www.biduobao.com/market-qtum.html
Liqui: https://liqui.io/#/exchange/QTUM_USDT
https://liqui.io/#/exchange/QTUM_ETH     
https://liqui.io/#/exchange/QTUM_BTC
Cryptopia: https://www.cryptopia.co.nz/Exchange?market=QTUM_BTC
COSS: https://exchange.coss.io/pair/qtum-eth
https://exchange.coss.io/pair/qtum-btc
HitBTC: https://hitbtc.com/exchange/QTUM-to-ETH/size
Novaexchange: https://novaexchange.com/market/BTC_QTUM/
   
    TEAM
   
   
     
See the full team at: https://qtum.org/en/team

    We are looking for developers to build the next generation
DApps on top of Qtum and invite you all to give our testnet
a try.

    We are always on the lookout to enrich our very talented
team, the next team member can be you!

    SEND YOUR RESUME TO OUR EMAIL: CAREERS@QTUM.ORG

    currently 4500+ Chinese community members

As far as I can see, there are no malicious links anywhere. This one can probably be marked down as an annoyance, and it should be easy enough to block or filter.

Tuesday 5 September 2017

Malware spam: "Scanning" pretending to be from tayloredgroup.co.uk

This spam email pretends to be from tayloredgroup.co.uk but it is just a simple forgery leading to Locky ransomware. There is both a malicious attachment and link in the body text. The name of the sender varies.

Subject:       Scanning
From:       "Jeanette Randels" [Jeanette.Randels@tayloredgroup.co.uk]
Date:       Thu, May 18, 2017 8:26 pm

https://dropbox.com/file/9A30AA
--
Jeanette Randels DipFA

Taylored Group
26 City Business Centre
Hyde Street
Winchester
SO23 7TA

Members of the CAERUS Capital Group

www.tayloredgroup.co.uk

Office Number: 01962 826870
Mobile: 07915 612277
email: Jeanette.Randels@tayloredgroup.co.uk

Taylored Financial Planning is a trading style of Jonathan & Carole
Taylor who are an appointed representative of Caerus Financial Limited,
Building 120, Windmill Hill Business Park, Swindon, SN5 6NX which is authorised
and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

Email communications are not secure, for this reason Taylored
Financial Planning cannot guarantee the security of the email or its contents or
that it remains virus free once sent. This email message is strictly
confidential and intended solely for the person or organisation to who it is
addressed. It may contain privileged and confidential information and if you are
not the recipient, you must not copy, distribute or take any action in
reference to it. If you have received this email in error, please notify us as
soon as possible and delete the message from your system. 
Despite having what appears to be a Dropbox URL, the link actually goes to another site completely and downloads a .7z archive file containing a malicious VBS script. Attached is another .7z archive file with a slightly different evil VBS script inside.

Detection rates for the scripts are about 13/58 [1] [2]. Automated analysis [3] [4] [5] [6]  shows Locky ransomware attempting to phone home to the following locations:

91.234.35.170/imageload.cgi (FOP Sedinkin Olexandr Valeriyovuch aka thehost.ua, Ukraine)
109.234.35.75/imageload.cgi (McHost.ru / VDSINA, Russia)

McHost is such a well-known purveyor of toxic crap that I recommend you block all of their ranges (plus I guess the related VDSINA ones), or even block the entire Webzilla AS35415. You can find a list of the network ranges here. Also thehost.ua also has a lot of crap and I would lean towards blocking whole network ranges.

Recommended minimum blocklist:
91.234.35.0/24
109.234.35.0/24

Friday 25 August 2017

Malware spam: "Voicemail Service" / "New voice message.."

The jumble of numbers in this spam is a bit confusing. Attached is a malicious RAR file that leads to Locky ransomware.

Subject:       New voice message 18538124076 in mailbox 185381240761 from "18538124076" <6641063681>
From:       "Voicemail Service" [vmservice@victimdomain.tdl]
Date:       Fri, August 25, 2017 12:36 pm

Dear user:

just wanted to let you know you were just left a 0:13 long message (number 18538124076)
in mailbox 185381240761 from "18538124076" <6641063681>, on Fri, 25 Aug 2017
14:36:41 +0300
so you might want to check it when you get a chance.  Thanks!

                                --Voicemail Service
Attached is a RAR file containing a malicious VBS script. The scripts are all slightly different, meaning that the RARs are too. These are the MD5s I've seen so far for the RAR files themselves:

04059E14170996725CD2ED2324E485F2
0839A18B1F5C1D09F3DF3DC260C07194
0BD5C04D2680B5C8A801B4C2E73BECCD
12D1FC37D223E823C80CF052920DA9AB
1AA539798341930B5492764F2D668987
1ADFF05EEA041B34682FD92CDE45DBFA
1CCF7445D771B7F803E95090E96D0EB2
20162EC71639C4A9080C24B253F5FDFF
24133B658F7730205BCC5789B4CA30F1
42947EBFEFFA9A5CFA3AADDA7EADA572
4AC35594445EB22FE6971A5F81EAB761
4D4DBBCEC5B48EBA30D7B09F994BC009
54E7C8863E161D5A601230E3CD590134
556A6FC4D5607210FA7EF3CAF3CE59D6
645C4FB3BE1A8B1188E8B5A54B1BC011
80D9CEBB286D79955F18013DD3415EEF
8C9B20A61368E8956B6C49DA9AFF30D1
9739211AD009B97EBE0DF353AB11BEB5
9CDDA6C72F41039340E450FA4374E748
A9C0D2F356C455EB40B707D570D27318
BAF4482ED9F6DEE8CBE6F69366AAC434
EA7D52C3328A5A8A0C8334AE3E3C580C
FEC76C943E1252D0DE7D6B7936510B9D


The VBS script is similar to this (variable names seem to change mostly) with a detection rate of about 15/59. Hybrid Analysis shows it dropping a Locky executable with a 18/65 detection rate which phones home to 46.17.44.153/imageload.cgi (Baxnet, Russia) which I recommend that you block.

Malware spam: "Your Sage subscription invoice is ready" / noreply@sagetop.com

This fake Sage invoice leads to Locky ransomware. Quite why Sage are picked on so much by the bad guys is a bit of a mystery.

Subject:       Your Sage subscription invoice is ready
From:       "noreply@sagetop.com" [noreply@sagetop.com]
Date:       Thu, August 24, 2017 8:49 pm

Dear Customer

Your Sage subscription invoice is now ready to view.

Sage subscriptions

To view your Sage subscription invoice click here 

Got a question about your invoice?

Call us on 0845 111 6604

If you're an Accountant, please call 0845 111 1197
If you're a Business Partner, please call 0845 111 7787

Kind Regards

The Sage UK Subscription Team

Please note: There is no unsubscribe option on this email, as it is a service
message, not a marketing communication. This email was sent from an address that
cannot accept replies. Please use the contact details above if you need to get in
touch with us.

The link in the email downloads a malicious RAR file. The samples I saw were closely clustered alphabetically.

helpmatheogrow.com/SINV0709.rar
hendrikvankerkhove.be/SINV0709.rar
heinverwer.nl/SINV0709.rar
help.ads.gov.ba/SINV0709.rar
harvia.uz/SINV0709.rar

The RAR file itself contains a malicious VBS script that looks like this [pastebin] with a detection rate of 19/56, which attempts to download another component from:

go-coo.jp/HygHGF
hausgerhard.com/HygHGF
hausgadum.de/HygHGF
bromesterionod.net/af/HygHGF
hartwig-mau.de/HygHGF
hecam.de/HygHGF
haboosh-law.com/HygHGF
hbwconsultants.nl/HygHGF
hansstock.de/HygHGF
heimatverein-menne.de/HygHGF

Automated analysis of the file [1] [2] shows a dropped binary with a 39/64 detection rate, POSTing to 46.183.165.45/imageload.cgi  (Reg.Ru, Russia)

Recommended blocklist:
46.183.165.45




Thursday 24 August 2017

Multiple badness on metoristrontgui.info / 119.28.100.249

Two massive fake "Bill" spam runs seem to be under way, one claiming to be from BT and the other being more generic.

Subject:       New BT Bill
From:       "BT Business" [btbusiness@bttconnect.com]
Date:       Thu, August 24, 2017 6:08 pm
Priority:       Normal

From BT
New BT Bill

Your bill amount is: $106.84
This doesn't include any amounts brought forward from any other bills.

We've put your latest BT bill for you to view. See your bill here


We'll take your payment from your account as usual by Direct Debit.

Reduce paper waste
You're still getting paper bills by post. Why not go paper-free, and stop storing and shredding them once and for all?


Need some help?
Go to www.bt.com/business/support.

Thanks for choosing BT.

Robena Morath
CEO, BT Business

Payment processing fee: BT Payment Services Ltd, a BT Group Company, charges this fee.
This or confidential. It's meant only for the individual(s) email contains BT information, which may be privileged or entity named above. If you're not the intended recipient, note that disclosing, copying, distributing or using this information is prohibited. If you've received this email in error, please let me know immediately on the email address above. Thank you. We monitor our email system, and may record your emails.

And a simpler one..

From:    Dianna Mcgrew
Date:    24 August 2017 at 14:50
Subject:    Bill-9835

Hi,

Here is a copy of your bill.

Thank you & have a great weekend!
Most (but not all) of the samples I  have seen then lead to a single website to download the malicious payload, for example:

http://metoristrontgui.info/af/download.php
http://metoristrontgui.info/af/bill-201708.rar
http://metoristrontgui.info/af/bill-201708.7z

metoristrontgui.info is hosted on 119.28.100.249 (Tencent, China) which is an IP we've seen a few times recently [1] [2]. Let's check out that WHOIS:

Domain Name: METORISTRONTGUI.INFO
Registry Domain ID: D503300000042955753-LRMS
Registrar WHOIS Server:
Registrar URL: http://www.eranet.com
Updated Date: 2017-08-24T14:02:07Z
Creation Date: 2017-08-24T13:24:23Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-08-24T13:24:23Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date:
Registrar: Eranet International Limited
Registrar IANA ID: 1868
Registrar Abuse Contact Email:
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:
Reseller:
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: serverTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverTransferProhibited
Domain Status: addPeriod https://icann.org/epp#addPeriod
Registry Registrant ID: C208152073-LRMS
Registrant Name: Robert Ruthven
Registrant Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Registrant Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Registrant City: Portland
Registrant State/Province: OR
Registrant Postal Code: 97202
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.5034359411
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax: +1.5034359411
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Registry Admin ID: C208152073-LRMS
Admin Name: Robert Ruthven
Admin Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Admin Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Admin City: Portland
Admin State/Province: OR
Admin Postal Code: 97202
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.5034359411
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: +1.5034359411
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Registry Tech ID: C208152073-LRMS
Tech Name: Robert Ruthven
Tech Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Tech Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Tech City: Portland
Tech State/Province: OR
Tech Postal Code: 97202
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.5034359411
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax: +1.5034359411
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Registry Billing ID: C208152073-LRMS
Billing Name: Robert Ruthven
Billing Organization: Gamblin Artists Colors
Billing Street: 323 SE Division Pl
Billing City: Portland
Billing State/Province: OR
Billing Postal Code: 97202
Billing Country: US
Billing Phone: +1.5034359411
Billing Phone Ext:
Billing Fax: +1.5034359411
Billing Fax Ext:
Billing Email: jenniemarc@mail.com
Name Server: A.DNSPOD.COM
Name Server: B.DNSPOD.COM
Name Server: C.DNSPOD.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/


VirusTotal confirms a lot of badness here, with all of these evil domains on the same server:

drommazxitnnd7gsl.com
74jhdrommdtyis.net
rtozottosdossder.net
kabbionionsesions.net
ttytreffdrorseder.net
tyytrddofjrntions.net
mjhsdgc872bf432rdf.net
yrns7sg3kdn94hskxhbf.net
trmbobodortyuoiyrt.org
metoristrontgui.info
fsroosionsoulsda.info
aldirommestorr887.info
droohsdronfhystgfh.info

Downloads from this site can be a bit slow, unsurprisingly. The dropped EXE seems to be Locky ransomware with a detection rate of 19/65. Hybrid Analysis shows the sample POSTing to 185.179.190.31/imageload.cgi (Webhost LLC, Russia)

Recommended minimum blocklist:
185.179.190.31
119.28.100.249




Wednesday 23 August 2017

Malware spam: "Customer Service" / "Copy of Invoice xxxx"

This fairly generic spam leads to the Locky ransomware:

Subject:       Copy of Invoice 3206
From:       "Customer Service"
Date:       Wed, August 23, 2017 9:12 pm


Please download file containing your order information.

If you have any further questions regarding your invoice, please call Customer Service.


Please do not reply directly to this automatically generated e-mail message.

Thank you.
Customer Service Department
A link in the email downloads a malicious VBS script, and because it's quite late I'll just say that Hybrid Analysis has seen it all before. The download EXE (VT 21/64) script POSTS to 5.196.99.239/imageload.cgi (Just Hosting, Russia) which is in a network block that also had a fair bit of Angler last year, so I would recommend blocking all traffic to 5.196.99.0/24.

Malware spam: "Voice Message Attached from 0xxxxxxxxxxx - name unavailable"

This fake voice mail message leads to malware. It comes in two slightly different versions, one with a RAR file download and the other with a ZIP.

Subject:       Voice Message Attached from 001396445685 - name unavailable
From:       "Voice Message" <vmservice@victimdomain.tld>
Date:       Wed, August 23, 2017 10:22 am

Time: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 14:52:12 +0530
Download <http://tyytrddofjrntions.net/af/VM20170823_193908.zip> file to listen
Voice Message

Subject:       Voice Message Attached from 055237805419 - name unavailable
From:       "Voice Message" <vmservice@victimdomain.tld>
Date:       Wed, August 23, 2017 10:21 am

Time: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 14:51:13 +0530
Download <http://mjhsdgc872bf432rdf.net/af/VM20170823_193908.rar> file to listen
Voice Message
Both download locations of tyytrddofjrntions.net and mjhsdgc872bf432rdf.net are hosted on 119.28.100.249 (Tencent, CN). This same IP was seen in this other recent spam run. Both the RAR and ZIP downloads (detection rate about 18/59 [1] [2]) contain the same malicious VBS script [pastebin]. The script tries to download an additional component from one of the following locations:

grlarquitectura.com/Mvgjh67?
grundschulmarkt.com/Mvgjh67?
aldirommestorr887.info/af/Mvgjh67?
grupoegeria.net/Mvgjh67?
gestionale-orbit.it/Mvgjh67?
gdrural.com.au/Mvgjh67?
geocean.co.id/Mvgjh67?
grupoajedrecisticoaleph.com/Mvgjh67?
grupofergus.com.bo/Mvgjh67?
gruppostolfaedilizia.it/Mvgjh67?

You'll note that most of those download locations start with "gr" which indicates that this is just a small subset of hacked servers under the control of the bad guys.

Automated analysis [3] [4] shows a dropped file with a VirusTotal detection rate of 14/64 (probably Locky). Those same analyses show traffic being sent to:

62.109.16.214/imageload.cgi (TheFirst-RU, RU - hostname: gpodlinov.letohost.com)
5.196.99.239/imageload.cgi (Just Hosting, RU - hostname: noproblem.one)

UPDATE:  Several other IPs in the 5.196.99.0/24 range have been used to host malware in the past. I would recommend blocking the entire /24.

Recommended blocklist:
119.28.100.249
62.109.16.214
5.196.99.0/24