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Tuesday, 26 August 2008

Asprox: beyry.ru, iopoe.ru, jetp6.ru, nucop.ru, port04.ru and vj64.ru

There's been a slight shift in the characteristics of the current Asprox attack. The javascript called is now script.js rather than ngg.js or js.js, and this goes to a redirect script currently pointing at /cgi-bin/index.cgi?lle on the local domain.

Active domains in this new attack seem to be as follows, new ones are in bold.
  • beyry.ru
  • cb3f.ru
  • cnld.ru
  • iopc4.ru
  • iopoe.ru
  • jetp6.ru
  • loopk.ru
  • netr2.ru
  • okcd.ru
  • nucop.ru
  • port04.ru
  • ueur3.ru
  • vj64.ru
Check your logs or block these domains. Most business outside of Russia and neighbouring countries could probably block the entire .ru TLD with minimal impact. Look also for the CGI sript (/cgi-bin/index.cgi?lle) to find potentially infected client PCs.

Friday, 22 August 2008

Asprox: iopc4.ru, jetp6.ru, loopk.ru, netr2.ru and ueur3.ru

The domains used is the Asprox SQL injection attack have been stable for most of the past week, but over the last 24 hours some ne wdomains have been registed, so check your logs and/or block the following:

  • iopc4.ru
  • jetp6.ru
  • loopk.ru
  • netr2.ru
  • ueur3.ru

It is likely that some more will turn up during the course of the day.

Friday, 15 August 2008

Another SQL injection domain: mo98g.cn

I mentioned some days ago that there seems to be a parallel SQL injection attack to Asprox with all the hallmarks of being Chinese. Over the past day or so, mo98g.cn has appeared on some infected sites (often alongside Asprox) making a call to mo98g.cn/q.js which is hosted on 222.122.128.5 in South Korea.

The back end seems not to be working at present, so maybe the server has been cleaned up. In any case, this is another domain to block or check your logs for.

Asprox: ujnc.ru

Just a single new Asprox domain to list this morning: ujnc.ru which is still using the js.js redirector, i.e. www.ujnc.ru/js.js. All the domains from the past two days are still active too.

Thursday, 14 August 2008

Asprox: 3njx.ru, cb3f.ru, cnld.ru, nbh3.ru and okcd.ru

Some more Asprox domains to block or look for in your logs:

  • 3njx.ru
  • cb3f.ru
  • cnld.ru
  • nbh3.ru
  • okcd.ru

Renewed Asprox activity: bcus2.ru, jkn3.ru, juc8.ru and locm.ru

After a quiet few days, Asprox seems to have flared up again (at about 1000 CET) with a new set of malware domains, still launching from a SQL injected js.js file on compromised hosts. Keep an eye out for these domains or block them.

These domains are all very recently registered through naunet.ru, there are probably many more on the way soon.

  • bcus2.ru
  • jkn3.ru
  • juc8.ru
  • locm.ru

Tuesday, 12 August 2008

All quiet on the Asprox front?

For the moment the Asprox SQL injection attacks seem to have stopped, although infected sites are still infected and need to be secured as soon as possible.

So, does this mean that the bad guys have given up? Well, no.. but there are probably thousands of sites out there which are still infected, so from that point of view they will still be getting "hits" to their malware sites.

Perhaps the answer is this - the people behind the SQL injection attacks are doing something else. Two very newsworthy events happening over the past few days have been the war in Georgia and the Beijing Olympics. Dancho Danchev reports that the RBN have been actively involved in attacking Georgian sites, including using SQL injection attacks. F-Secure report that Chinese sites have been attacked since the run-up to the Olympics started.

It might well be that these Asprox attacks will be quiet for a couple of weeks, but it is likely that general SQL injection attacks will ramp up again soon.

Sunday, 10 August 2008

Spammers are still stupid

Another case where a spammer is too stupid to use the spamming tool they have just bought.

Subject: hey
From: "hvgoxscw"
Date: Sun, August 10, 2008 7:59 pm

You have 2 options here,
Option 1 - You can put ANY text you want in here.

Option 2 - We will fill it in with the text only portion of the
html message if you put the macro for you: [url removed]
in here.

NOTE: Some email clients don't disply html data. In that case what you
put here will be seen by the recipient. If the email client does

display html data then this will NOT be seen by the recipient.
Based on this you may wish to put a text version of your add here;
however, you can also put some macros here to make the message
more random.

Or use Option 3 and don't add anything at all. Idiot.

Saturday, 9 August 2008

"Hey, take a look!!" / "Yahoo Daily News"

Looks like another variant of the Storm Worm /Zapchast doing the rounds:

Subject: Hey, take a look!!
From: "Yahoo Daily News"

Hello friend !
You have just received a yahoo messenger ultimate version !!


Click Download Now to begin downloading and installing Yahoo Messenger ultimate version 10 ver 10.1



1. Download Now Click Download Now to begin downloading and installing Yahoo! Messenger ultimate version 10.
ver. 10.1
2. When prompted, please click the Run button in each window that appears.

Other versions: XP (9.0 Beta), Vista, Mac, Web, Mobile

Thank you for using our services !!!
Please take this opportunity to let your friends use about this new software by sending them the source.

Copyright © 2008 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved. Copyright/IP Policy | Terms of Service |Guide to Online Security

Relevant advertising creates a better web experience. See how

NOTICE: We collect personal information on this site.

To learn more about how we use your information, see our Privacy Policy
In this case the target file to download is msgr8.5us.exe, VirusTotal detection is pretty good.

Expect to see a LOT of these over the next few days, either themed for the Olympics or the war in South Ossetia. Although the subject will always change, a crash course in user education can help to mitigate the risk.

ISC: "More SQL Injections - very active right now"

The Internet Storm Center has published technical details on the Chinese-based SQL injection attack which may be of interest to SQL administrators and programmers and also security specialists. It also flags up another javascript file to look for: csrss/w.js

Keep an eye out for log activity pointing to this file. Blocking the entire .cn TLD will probably do very little harm for most businesses.

Asprox: block 91.203.93.4 and js.js

A shift in behaviour from the Asprox botnet - this time all traffic from infected sites is being redirected through a fixed IP at 91.203.93.4. Blocking 91.203.93.0/24 will probably do no harm.

Also, the name of the javascript file has changed to js.js, so look for this in your logs.

The Silent Noise blog is tracking Asprox domains too, with some interesting developments that we haven't had the chance to dig deeper into.

Tuesday, 5 August 2008

Asprox domains: 5/8/08

Current Asprox domains to look for in your blogs or block. These have all been active for 3 or 4 days now, which is an unusually long time for this current SQL injection attack.

  • 8hcs.ru
  • 98hs.ru
  • bgsr.ru
  • bywd.ru
  • ibse.ru
  • ncbw.ru
  • nwj4.ru
  • ojns.ru
  • porv.ru
  • uhwc.ru

Saturday, 2 August 2008

Asprox domains: 2/8/07

These are the currently active Asprox domains to check for. They are all very recently registrations.

  • 8hcs.ru
  • 98hs.ru
  • bgsr.ru
  • bywd.ru
  • ibse.ru
  • ncbw.ru
  • nwj4.ru
  • ojns.ru
  • porv.ru
  • uhwc.ru

Friday, 1 August 2008

Fake "Correspondence manager" job

Money mule scams are now very common - basically some poor fool ends up laundering money or reshipping goods following the instructions of someone they have never met and is likely to be untraceable.

This particular job offer seems to go a step further. This "correspondence manager" could well be another layer in the scammer's obfuscation. Perhaps the correspondence manager handles communications with the money mules?

One danger here is that this particular role is more credible that the "money for nothing" jobs that scammers usually offer. On the face of it, it doesn't involve handling money, but it does seem to be very easy and the salary looks attractive.

There's an interesting bit of social engineering where the email says "THE SELECTED CANDIDATE MUST PASS A CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK". Of course, it is the employer who needs to pass a background check too. Always verify that your job offers are from a genuine, verifiable business.




Subject: Re: WELL - PAID JOB!
From: ls51@salud.gov.pr
Date: Fri, August 1, 2008 11:52 am

Dear, Job Seeker!

Our firm has an opening vacancy: Correspondence manager.

Please attach your resume in DOC or reach text format and apply right now. This
position is limited.



Company Name
Global Logistic


Job Category
Correspondence


Location
United States


Position Type
Part-Time/Home Based


Salary
$ 35,000 - $ 50,000


Experience
1+


Desired Education Level
High School or Equivalent


Date Posted
March 17, 2008



Job Summary:
You will make some basic tasks from your manager daily; manage personal assets;
making simple correspondence operations. You don't need to have any kind of
education or experience. We will make online training for position offered. You
will have more information in job description document. Apply now.
Requirements: US citizenship or US permanent residency

High school or College in relevant field or 1+ years experience in management;
basic computer, good verbal and grammar skills; must have a cellular phone for
urgent tasks; must be able to work part-time; must provide resume for
qualification process.

ALL RESUMES WILL BE CONFIRMED AND VERIFIED. THE SELECTED CANDIDATE MUST PASS A
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK
If you're interested send your full name, phone number, age and RESUME
mailto:NannieHolderCE@gmail.com and I'll redirect it to our HR department.


Beware of unsolicited loan offers

Loan scams are a another variant of the advanced fee fraud scam (e.g. fake lotteries, dead dictator's fortunes etc). These seem to be more popular recently due to the "credit crunch". Fundamentally the approach is the same as any other advanced fee fraud: you apply for the loan only to discover that there is a fee payable up front. Of course, no legitimate lender would ask for an up front fee for a loan.

Although the wording for this particular example sounds like it is from Nigeria, the IP address is from the Hathway network in Bangalore. Oddly from "from" address is Hathway too.

Subject: LOAN OFFER
From: ramanks@hathway.com
Date: Thu, July 31, 2008 8:14 pm
Priority: Normal


Dear Customer
We are corporate lenders. we give out loans to
A very honest and reliable personalities. we give
out our loans at low interest rate and moderate
values as cheap as 3% rate. Because of scam
we tender our qualifications if it satisfies, you
can continue with the transaction, but if you are
not satisfied you can go to another lender.
Channel your response to this email.
thomassteve2@gmail.com
Greatest Regards
Marketing Manager
Mr Thomas Steve.
Although this particular one is pretty laughable, it is likely that the scammers will get better at it. Beware of unsolicited loan offers and remember that all fees and interest will come out of your repayments, not from an up front fee.

Wednesday, 30 July 2008

PestPatrol: Zuten detected in c:\windows\minidump

This one looks like a false positive.. CA PestPatrol with signature version 2008.7.29.15 seems to be detecting Zuten in the c:\windows\minidump folder.

A close examination of the description indicates that the following files may be being misdetected:

%windows%\minidump\mini072908-01.dmp
%windows%\minidump\mini072908-02.dmp
As you can see, yesterday's date in encoded into the .dmp files. If your computer system has generated a .dmp file in the past day, then PestPatrol may well be mis-detecting it.

Tuesday, 29 July 2008

The SQL Injection war

Dancho Danchev had has some very good writeups on the current round of SQL injection attacks. This post on copycat attacks caught my eye, because it shows that there's more than one crew at work here.

If anything, this situation is likely to get worse. The tools needed to carry out a SQL injection attack are now almost available off-the-shelf, the attacks are obviously financially successful because they have been ongoing now for some months, and enumeration of vulnerable servers can be done through Google or Yahoo if you don't want to bother crawling the web.

Identifying and blocking domains helps, but it isn't a real solution. Most of these attacks are thwarted by a fully patch client (and I do mean all the software on the client, the Secunia Software Inspector can help here or some other decent audit tool). Using Firefox + NoScript is a good idea for the technically savvy. But ultimately, the best way of fighting this is to secure or shut down infected SQL servers. Don't be afraid to use the abuse@ email address where a web site is posing a continuing threat.

Asprox domains: 29/7/08

These are this morning's active Asprox domains. New ones are in bold.

  • b4so.ru
  • bce8.ru
  • bjxt.ru
  • bnsr.ru
  • bosf.ru
  • bsko.ru
  • ch35.ru
  • gty5.ru
  • iroe.ru
  • jve4.ru
  • kj5s.ru
  • kjwd.ru
  • kpo3.ru
  • kr92.ru
  • ncb2.ru
  • ncwc.ru
  • nemr.ru
  • njep.ru
  • nmr43.ru
  • oics.ru
  • pfd2.ru
  • po4c.ru

Monday, 28 July 2008

Asprox domains: 28/7/08

These seem to be the current Asprox domains to block or check for. New ones are in bold.

  • bs04.ru
  • bce8.ru
  • bjxt.ru
  • bnsr.ru
  • bosf.ru
  • bsko.ru
  • ch35.ru
  • iroe.ru
  • jve4.ru
  • kjwd.ru
  • kodj.ru
  • kpo3.ru
  • kr92.ru
  • ncb2.ru
  • ncwc.ru
  • nemr.ru
  • nmr43.ru
  • oics.ru
  • pfd2.ru
  • po4c.ru
ngg.js still seems to be the name of the javascript file injected into compromised hosts.

Friday, 25 July 2008

Asprox domains: 25/7/08

These domains seem to be active today, new ones in bold.

  • bce8.ru
  • ch35.ru
  • iroe.ru
  • jve4.ru
  • kjwd.ru
  • kodj.ru
  • kpo3.ru
  • kr92.ru
  • ncwc.ru
  • nemr.ru
  • nmr43.ru
  • pfd2.ru
  • po4c.ru
One oddity - the URL zvz.cc/forums/8L0/join.upq has been spotted as a redirector for these Javascript exploits. Google list zvz.cc that as a malware infected site, it is hard to tell though if this is just another victim or part of the C&C for the botnet. For the record, these are the WHOIS details.. but they might not mean very much.

Registration Service Provided By: ESTDOMAINS INC
Contact: +1.3027224217
Website: http://www.estdomains.com

Domain Name: ZVZ.CC

Registrant:
Himpet .Inc
Evgenij Novoberkov (zvz@tut.by)
Stahanov.St 120
Minsk
Missouri,222120
US
Tel. +022.2720771

Creation Date: 09-Apr-2008
Expiration Date: 09-Apr-2009

Domain servers in listed order:
ns2.zvz.cc
ns1.zvz.cc

Administrative Contact:
Himpet .Inc
Evgenij Novoberkov (zvz@tut.by)
Stahanov.St 120
Minsk
Missouri,222120
US
Tel. +022.2720771

Technical Contact:
Himpet .Inc
Evgenij Novoberkov (zvz@tut.by)
Stahanov.St 120
Minsk
Missouri,222120
US
Tel. +022.2720771

Billing Contact:
Himpet .Inc
Evgenij Novoberkov (zvz@tut.by)
Stahanov.St 120
Minsk
Missouri,222120
US
Tel. +022.2720771

Status:ACTIVE