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Monday, 8 September 2008

"Job Opportunity at Luksus" / luksus-jobs.org scam

Luksus Media is a wholly legitimate Finnish company, but this attempt to recruit a money mule does not come from Luksus, just from a company trying to trade on its name.

This scam is being run by the same people behind the Asprox SQL injection attacks that have been doing to rounds (more information after the email).




Subject: Job Opportunity at Luksus

We have reviewed your resume and would like to introduce you to our
current vacancy.
Luksus, with headquarters in Helsinki, Finland, serves the luxury
lifestyle and offers unparalleled access to the finest luxury
goods. We offer a unique mix of brands, partnerships, and product
expertise. We are currently hiring, work at home positions, to
provide administrative assistance with sales in North America.
Candidates for the job should possess excellent organizational
skills as well as the ability to efficiently multi-task. Ideal
candidates have a strong focus on day-to-day operational
excellence. The candidate should be motivated, proactive, be able
to learn and adapt quickly.

Other duties include, but are not limited to:

* Incorporating effective priorities for the virtual office function
* Administer day-to-day financial responsibilities for clients
* Reporting online daily
* Preparing brief summary reports, and weekly financial reports

Salary part-time (3 hours per day, Monday-Friday): $1,200/month,
plus commission.

If you are interested in this position please send us an email to
Sandra.Collins@luksus-jobs.org expressing your interest and we will
forward you the detailed job description and the working agreement.

Thank You,
Luksus Team



Normally, WHOIS data is pretty useless, but sometimes the email address can give a clue:

Domain ID: D153950800-LROR
Domain Name: LUKSUS-JOBS.ORG
Created On: 28-Aug-2008 11: 34: 57 UTC
Last Updated On: 28-Aug-2008 14: 23: 25 UTC
Expiration Date: 28-Aug-2009 11: 34: 57 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar: Bizcn.com, Inc. (R1248-LROR)
Status: CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED
Status: TRANSFER PROHIBITED
Registrant ID: orgfm19923291709
Registrant Name: Fero Muia
Registrant Organization: Fero Muia
Registrant Street1: 3213 po box
Registrant Street2:
Registrant Street3:
Registrant City: New York
Registrant State/Province: NY
Registrant Postal Code: 12310
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.9917721121
Registrant Phone Ext.:
Registrant FAX: +1.9917721121
Registrant FAX Ext.:
Registrant Email: druid00091@aol.com
Admin ID: orgfm19923292728
Admin Name: Fero Muia
Admin Organization: Fero Muia
Admin Street1: 3213 po box
Admin Street2:
Admin Street3:
Admin City: New York
Admin State/Province: NY
Admin Postal Code: 12310
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.9917721121
Admin Phone Ext.:
Admin FAX: +1.9917721121
Admin FAX Ext.:
Admin Email: druid00091@aol.com
Tech ID: orgfm19923293349
Tech Name: Fero Muia
Tech Organization: Fero Muia
Tech Street1: 3213 po box
Tech Street2:
Tech Street3:
Tech City: New York
Tech State/Province: NY
Tech Postal Code: 12310
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.9917721121
Tech Phone Ext.:
Tech FAX: +1.9917721121
Tech FAX Ext.:
Tech Email: druid00091@aol.com
Name Server: NS1.RELEASEBPB.COM
Name Server: NS2.RELEASEBPB.COM


druid00091@aol.com is an address being used to register today's latest SQL injection domains too, proving that they are linked. releasebpb.com is a set of name servers which are only associated with malware domains, ns1.releasebpb.com is on 194.150.120.47 on ns2.releasebpb.com is on 20.31.85.15.

This type of fraud doesn't use a website to entice people, but it is looking for an email response. In this case, email is delivered to mx.luksus-jobs.org on 12.192.82.225 which is on the AT&T network.

It's hard to tell which of these IPs are part of the Asprox botnet and which ones are rented (usually with fake credit card details). Nonetheless, it gives a glimpse into just how large and efficient these operations can be.

Thursday, 4 September 2008

CNOOC (www.cnooc.com.cn) scam

CNOOC (www.cnooc.com.cn) are a legitimate oil exploration and petrochemicals firm in China. The following job offer is a money mule scam, NOT from CNOOC but from someone pretending to be them. Don't be tempted.





CNOOC Oil Base Group Ltd.
Address:6 Dongzhimenwai Xiaojie,
Dongcheng District, Beijing, China 100027
Telephone:010-8452101, 010-8453198
Fax:010-6460250
EMail:cnooccorporation@yahoo.com.hk
Website:www.cnooc.com.cn


Good Day,

JOB OPPORTUNITY


We are exporters base in China , we deal on Oilexploitation, technical
service, chemicals, fertilizar production, refining,natural gas, power
generation,financial services, logistic services and new energies
development. Visit our corporate website: www.cnooc.com.cn


We have costumers in Asia, Europe, America , Australia , Canada and
Africa.

Our company (CNOOC) was established in 1982. We are interested in
employing
company services, to work with us as our payment agent our north America
customers will make payment to you on our behalf for goods and raw
materials we supplied to our customers in North America.

If your company is interested in working with us,we will be
very glad, Subject to your satisfaction, your company reward of
working with us as a Payment Officer is 5% of any Payment
your company receive from our costumers.

Most payment ranges from $300,000.00 to $3.3 Million US Dollars
Please if you are interested forward the following info to us:

1. Your Full Name:
2. Payment should be made to: Company?s Name:
3. Your Full Contact Address:
4. Phone/Fax Number:
5. Occupation:


Thanks for your corporations.


Yours Sincerely,


Mr. Wu Mengfei
Chief Financial Officer.



Asprox: jic2.ru

Another new addition to the list of Asprox domains is jic2.ru, again registered via Naunet, so block this or check your logs for access. Again, searching your logs for ".ru/script.js"will help locate suspect activity.

Wednesday, 3 September 2008

"Bangui" malware domains

A whole set of domains distributing malware, currently based on 206.53.51.119 and allegedly registered to someone in Bangui (although most likely it is the RBN again). These domains are being used in blog spam and also what appears to be PHP and ASP injection attacks.

Unlike some injection attacks, the pages carry some scraped text that's relevant to the URL. Combine this with the inbound links created through spam and injection attacks and you have a very black hat SEO campaign. Yahoo! seems to be more prone to this type of SEO than Google.

The pages on these domains use a javascript redirector (menu.js) to end up at a set of fake video and rogue anti-malware sites that install all sorts of nasty things.. again, these endpoints have the hallmark of the RBN.

  • Afwwwf.info
  • Apostit.info
  • Bcuioc.info
  • Bglkhg.org
  • Bihuru.org
  • Biiwhw.info
  • Bikgfjr.info
  • Bioblor.info
  • Bioqw.info
  • Biowfr.info
  • Bkjksl.org
  • Bkssdoue.info
  • Bloiw.org
  • Bocaca.org
  • Cascaa.info
  • Cbasoa.info
  • Cbr1000rrxx.info
  • Csccons.org
  • Cskaa.org
  • Eomnb.info
  • Fasca.info
  • Fasfw555.info
  • Fasw.org
  • Fbkshk.org
  • Fdsaa.org
  • Firstnax.org
  • Fjkjfjoi.info
  • Fjwiojnc.info
  • Flsab.info
  • Foeww.org
  • Foxrat.info
  • Fsaff.org
  • Fsafvn.info
  • Fsancao.info
  • Fsanp.org
  • Fsaqq.info
  • Fsaw.org
  • Fsfa22rr.info
  • Fsfkg.info
  • Fsfworg
  • Fsgkle.org
  • Fsjklhg.info
  • Fskjhgkb.info
  • Fullmediabase.net
  • Fwe75r4fyf65.cn
  • Fwfds.org
  • Fwfisow.org
  • Fwjijc.org
  • Fwoijwh.org
  • Gcoigkm.org
  • Gewop.info
  • Gjgkgjhew.org
  • Golodnijya.org
  • Gucwd.org
  • Hellodolly5k.net
  • Hellodomy5k.net
  • Hhkjj.org
  • Hkljccc.info
  • Hodnejgreat.info
  • Hofhwbc.info
  • Hohotv.org
  • Homosapien5k.net
  • Hrr553.info
  • Hudinarjiii.cn
  • Itgfbn.org
  • Jfldsh.org
  • Jflhg.info
  • Jlbyuo.org
  • Jnbq.info
  • Jowely.org
  • Jplhnh.info
  • Juiok.org
  • Jumpsert.org
  • Jwionw.info
  • Kiwedox.org
  • Kjhiofw.org
  • Kjhlfsh.org
  • Knwponc.org
  • Madnes.info
  • Mazafaker.com
  • Mfpwjmc.org
  • Mkmcsss.org
  • Mpfwmcs.org
  • Mpkcmzz.org
  • Mpmccz.org
  • Mybestz5k.net
  • Nado1000traffa.info
  • Nfeow.org
  • Nfwojw.org
  • Nfwon.org
  • Nhphpkj.info
  • Nifa422.info
  • Njpaw.info
  • Nosdsh.org
  • Pokoder.org
  • Sonvfs.org
  • Werbin.org
  • Wfwcn.org
  • Wn59whgp3w.cn
  • Workfox.info
  • Yzfr1yamahad.info

Tuesday, 2 September 2008

Asprox: 2b24.ru

These domains seem to be today's current Asprox SQL Injection domains - check for them in your logs or block them. 2b24.ru seems to be new, the rest have been around for a few days. The exploit is still using a script called script.js to run.

  • 2b24.ru
  • cg33.ru
  • cv2e.ru
  • cv32.ru
  • mc2n.ru
  • mj5f.ru
  • oc32.ru
  • vwsc.ru

Monday, 1 September 2008

"WorldWide Offshore Integrated Systems Inc"

Another money mule scam, this time claiming to be from "WorldWide Offshore Integrated Systems Inc" of New York, a company that does not exist according to the New York Division of Corporations. Also, there are no Google matches for that search term... except that there will be since I've posted this. Oh, you can figure out what I mean.

Originating IP is 78.175.218.143 in Turkey. Also, I can't think of many "WorldWide " corporations that have to use Yahoo!'s free email service.




Subject: Looking for a job? Good chance for you!
Date: Mon, September 1, 2008 4:38 pm



Hello.

WorldWide Offshore Integrated Systems Inc. is a custom software development company
located in New York, USA.

We offer full cycle custom software programming services, from product idea,
offshore software development to outsourcing support and enhancement.
WorldWide Offshore Integrated Systems Inc. employs a large pool of software
engineers coming from different backgrounds.
We are able to balance product development efforts and project duration to your
business needs.

WorldWide Offshore Integrated Systems Inc. customer service department is currently
offering employment for residents
in order to provide it's new branch with qualified personnel.
The private client support desk is responsible for following up client enquiries,
helping the clients to understand how WorldWide Offshore Integrated Systems Inc. can
save them money on foreign
currency transactions, and developing new business through referrals.

First of all you need no prior experience, even though we are value
your current knowledge, but we will provide all necessary training when
you will join us.

If you're a customer service fanatic, and enjoy working in a challenging and
rewarding environment,
please see below for our current list of opportunities.

Requirements:

è Proficiency in MS Word, Excel & Internet
è Excellent communication skills both oral and written

- This work does not require any experience!
- This is a work at home

You will be paid USD 2500 per 2 weeks.

Should you have any questions regarding this letter,
our offer of employment or anything else, please write me an e-mail.
We are excited to have you join our organization and look forward to working with you.


If you are interested in our position reply to e-mail worldwide61@yahoo.com


Best regards,
Katrin Olley
Employment Manager


Asprox: cg33.ru, cv2e.ru, cv32.ru, mc2n.ru, oc32.ru and vwsc.ru

Another bunch of Asprox SQL injection domains to block or monitor for, all quite new:

  • cg33.ru
  • cv2e.ru
  • cv32.ru
  • mc2n.ru
  • oc32.ru
  • vwsc.ru
Alternatively, look for .ru/script.js in your logs which should pick up most of them.

Update: here's another one - mj5f.ru

Friday, 29 August 2008

Atrivo / Intercage

Atrivo, Inc (also known as Intercage) and their main customer, Esthost (related to Estdomains) might well be a familiar name to people working in IT security. Atrivo is based is California and is run by one Emil Kacperski, so it has always surprised me that such a small operator should be a persistent host of malware.

Well, Atrivo's activities have not gone un-noticed by HostExploit.com who have produced a whitepaper and diagram and a YouTube video explaining how Atrivo's network is involved in a typical PC exploit.

Brian Krebs at the Washington Post has a comprehensive commentary. Note in particular the comments from "Emil K." at the bottom of the article. The RBN blog also has a comment here. Fascinating stuff.

Thursday, 28 August 2008

Where a link turns into a lawsuit

I've seen some daft excesses in local politics in my time, but over Sheboygan, Wisconsin, things have taken a new twist... with a lawsuit over a link.

Jennifer Reisinger operates a website called Sheboygan Spirit which appears to be very critical of local officials and also a now defunct web design business called Brat City Web Design. She was also involved in a campaign to recall the elected mayor, which probably didn't endear her to some city officials.

Last year, the city filed a lawsuit against Ms Reisinger. Why? Because one of her sites carried a link to the Sheboygan Police Department (oops). First, the city sent a cease and desist asking her to remove it, and when she refused to do so they initiated a criminal investigation and legal proceedings.

Remember, this is just a link to the local police department. Not a link to illegal or confidential material. Of course, really the city didn't have a leg to stand on and in November 2007 decided not to pursue the case.

But Ms Reisinger wasn't finished, and a few days ago filed a counter-suit alleging loss of business and a violation of first amendment rights. It looks like it could be a significant case.. depending on the outcome.

There's more information in this item at the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, and also here at the Citizen Media Law Project.

Wednesday, 27 August 2008

"Bank of America Installation and Upgrade Warning."

The bad guys are busy today, here's another fake bank "upgrade" leading to malware, following on from this one.


Subject: Bank of America Installation and Upgrade Warning.
From: "Bank Of America Update Service Department"
Date: Wed, August 27, 2008 2:23 pm

Attention All Bank of America Customers.
Security & Fraud Protection Update.

At Bank of America, were committed to keeping your information confidential and
secure, and we take that responsibility very seriously.
Our Fraud detection solution helps to protect your business against the risk of
fraudulent transactions alerting you to potential risks.
We have developed the following protection tools to insure you confidentiality.

You can download the latest security pack from our Customer Service Department>>

Sincerely, Jodie William.
2008 Bank of America Corporation. All rights reserved.
This leads to a very convoluted URL with an executable Setup_BankofAmericaclientno4508832.exe - virus detection for this one is a bit poor. Malware is identified variously as TR/ATRAPS.Gen (AntiVir & WebWasher), DeepScan:Generic.Malware.dld!!.083539B0 (BitDefender) and one or two others come up with a generic detection.

Incidentally, the URLs used in both attacks are incredibly long and convoluted.. and not terribly convicincing.

Avoid these "bank certificates" at all costs.

Tilde.exe in C:\Windows\System32 folder


This isn't really about tilde.exe at all, but a file called C:\Windows\System32\~.exe that has a habit of showing up on laptops that have been playing up with frequent browser crashes.

~.exe is kind of an odd name for a file, and crucially it's an ungoogleable name, because Google uses the tilde mark for its Synonym Search function.

Probing more deeply at the file shows that is is 34,616 bytes in size and is described internally as "Microsoft® Remote Std I/O Shell". The version information gives the following details:

  • Company: Microsoft Corporation
  • File Version: 6.0.6001.16470 (fbl_tools(patst).070215-1229)
  • Internal name: remote.exe
  • Language: Language Neutral
  • Original File name: remote.exe
  • Product Name: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
  • Product Version: 6.0.6001.16470
The icon is identical to the remote.exe sometimes supplied with various Microsoft debugging or support tools. Indeed, it does seem to be just another version of remote.exe which is a component of Microsoft's SMS server.

The ~.exe file may also be accompanied by a couple of strange-looking .dat files, for example __c0084F92.dat or __c00E460A.dat which on closer examination are actually executables.

It does genuinely seem to be a bit of Microsoft software, but in this case it would appear to be acting as a trojan downloader. The .dat files are lilely to be the second stage of the infection, and this could well be related to all the fake anti-virus products that have been promoted recently.

~.exe is detected variously as Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.abnd, Win32/TrojanDownloader.Agent.ABND or Trojan:Win32/Vundo.gen!V (VirusTotal results here). The .dat file shows up variously as Trojan-Downloader:W32/FakeAlert.AN, TROJ_TIBS.CKN, Tibs.gen222, not-a-virus:AdWare.Win32.Agent.ekj (VirusTotal results here and here).

Removal: delete the ~.exe file and any unusual looking .dat files that match the above pattern. If the trojan is active, then one of the .dat files will be locked. The F-Secure Online Scanner seems to be able to safely remove this trojan, although a reboot will be required.

This is the first time that I have seen a Microsoft SMS component used in this way. Presumably it attempts to connect up to a back-end server that I have not yet been able to identify. It may well be that a corporate firewall would block such behaviour.

Tuesday, 26 August 2008

"Colonial Bank Emergency Alert System"

Emergency alert system? Nope, malware download more likely.

Subject: Colonial Bank Emergency Alert System.
From: "Colonial Bank Account Support"
Date: Tue, August 26, 2008 8:35 pm

Dear Colonial Bank Customers. Protect your passwords!

- Never write down your passwords.
- Never share passwords with anyone.
- Change your password every few months.
- Change your password if you think it has been compromised.

For a password to be strong and hard to break, it should be at least nine characters
long, contain characters from each of the following three groups: letters (uppercase
and lowercase), numerals, symbols (all characters not defined as letters or
numerals), not contain your name or user name and not be a common word or name.
Be sure your computer is up-to-date with security patches, anti-virus, and
anti-spyware protection.
Download our latest all-in-one Internet software from our Customer Service
Department to make your online life completely secured.

Press here to Start>>

Sincerely, Parker Wheeler.
2003-2008 Colonial bank Support Team
VirusTotal detections are a mixed bag:

File ColonialDigicertx_509.exe received on 08.26.2008 23:52:05 (CET)
AntivirusVersionLast UpdateResult
AhnLab-V32008.8.21.02008.08.26-
AntiVir7.8.1.232008.08.26HEUR/Crypted
Authentium5.1.0.42008.08.26-
Avast4.8.1195.02008.08.26-
AVG8.0.0.1612008.08.26-
BitDefender7.22008.08.26DeepScan:Generic.
Malware.dld!!.6B08AD0D
CAT-QuickHeal9.502008.08.26(Suspicious) - DNAScan
ClamAV0.93.12008.08.26PUA.Packed.MEW-1
DrWeb4.44.0.091702008.08.26-
eSafe7.0.17.02008.08.26Win32.Stration
eTrust-Vet31.6.60502008.08.26-
Ewido4.02008.08.26-
F-Prot4.4.4.562008.08.26-
F-Secure7.60.13501.02008.08.26Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini
Fortinet3.14.0.02008.08.26-
GData192008.08.26-
IkarusT3.1.1.34.02008.08.26Trojan-Proxy.Win32.Small.DT
K7AntiVirus7.10.4282008.08.25-
Kaspersky7.0.0.1252008.08.26-
McAfee53702008.08.26-
Microsoft1.38072008.08.25PWS:Win32/Uloadis.A
NOD32v233902008.08.26-
Norman5.80.022008.08.26W32/Suspicious_M.gen2
Panda9.0.0.42008.08.26-
PCTools4.4.2.02008.08.26Packed/MEW
Prevx1V22008.08.26-
Rising20.59.11.002008.08.26-
Sophos4.32.02008.08.26Mal/EncPk-BA
Sunbelt3.1.1582.12008.08.26VIPRE.Suspicious
Symantec102008.08.26-
TheHacker6.3.0.6.0602008.08.23W32/Behav-Heuristic-066
TrendMicro8.700.0.10042008.08.26Cryp_MEW-11
VBA323.12.8.42008.08.26-
ViRobot2008.8.26.13502008.08.26-
VirusBuster4.5.11.02008.08.26Packed/MEW

Asprox: beyry.ru, iopoe.ru, jetp6.ru, nucop.ru, port04.ru and vj64.ru

There's been a slight shift in the characteristics of the current Asprox attack. The javascript called is now script.js rather than ngg.js or js.js, and this goes to a redirect script currently pointing at /cgi-bin/index.cgi?lle on the local domain.

Active domains in this new attack seem to be as follows, new ones are in bold.
  • beyry.ru
  • cb3f.ru
  • cnld.ru
  • iopc4.ru
  • iopoe.ru
  • jetp6.ru
  • loopk.ru
  • netr2.ru
  • okcd.ru
  • nucop.ru
  • port04.ru
  • ueur3.ru
  • vj64.ru
Check your logs or block these domains. Most business outside of Russia and neighbouring countries could probably block the entire .ru TLD with minimal impact. Look also for the CGI sript (/cgi-bin/index.cgi?lle) to find potentially infected client PCs.

Friday, 22 August 2008

Asprox: iopc4.ru, jetp6.ru, loopk.ru, netr2.ru and ueur3.ru

The domains used is the Asprox SQL injection attack have been stable for most of the past week, but over the last 24 hours some ne wdomains have been registed, so check your logs and/or block the following:

  • iopc4.ru
  • jetp6.ru
  • loopk.ru
  • netr2.ru
  • ueur3.ru

It is likely that some more will turn up during the course of the day.

Friday, 15 August 2008

Another SQL injection domain: mo98g.cn

I mentioned some days ago that there seems to be a parallel SQL injection attack to Asprox with all the hallmarks of being Chinese. Over the past day or so, mo98g.cn has appeared on some infected sites (often alongside Asprox) making a call to mo98g.cn/q.js which is hosted on 222.122.128.5 in South Korea.

The back end seems not to be working at present, so maybe the server has been cleaned up. In any case, this is another domain to block or check your logs for.

Asprox: ujnc.ru

Just a single new Asprox domain to list this morning: ujnc.ru which is still using the js.js redirector, i.e. www.ujnc.ru/js.js. All the domains from the past two days are still active too.

Thursday, 14 August 2008

Asprox: 3njx.ru, cb3f.ru, cnld.ru, nbh3.ru and okcd.ru

Some more Asprox domains to block or look for in your logs:

  • 3njx.ru
  • cb3f.ru
  • cnld.ru
  • nbh3.ru
  • okcd.ru

Renewed Asprox activity: bcus2.ru, jkn3.ru, juc8.ru and locm.ru

After a quiet few days, Asprox seems to have flared up again (at about 1000 CET) with a new set of malware domains, still launching from a SQL injected js.js file on compromised hosts. Keep an eye out for these domains or block them.

These domains are all very recently registered through naunet.ru, there are probably many more on the way soon.

  • bcus2.ru
  • jkn3.ru
  • juc8.ru
  • locm.ru

Tuesday, 12 August 2008

All quiet on the Asprox front?

For the moment the Asprox SQL injection attacks seem to have stopped, although infected sites are still infected and need to be secured as soon as possible.

So, does this mean that the bad guys have given up? Well, no.. but there are probably thousands of sites out there which are still infected, so from that point of view they will still be getting "hits" to their malware sites.

Perhaps the answer is this - the people behind the SQL injection attacks are doing something else. Two very newsworthy events happening over the past few days have been the war in Georgia and the Beijing Olympics. Dancho Danchev reports that the RBN have been actively involved in attacking Georgian sites, including using SQL injection attacks. F-Secure report that Chinese sites have been attacked since the run-up to the Olympics started.

It might well be that these Asprox attacks will be quiet for a couple of weeks, but it is likely that general SQL injection attacks will ramp up again soon.

Sunday, 10 August 2008

Spammers are still stupid

Another case where a spammer is too stupid to use the spamming tool they have just bought.

Subject: hey
From: "hvgoxscw"
Date: Sun, August 10, 2008 7:59 pm

You have 2 options here,
Option 1 - You can put ANY text you want in here.

Option 2 - We will fill it in with the text only portion of the
html message if you put the macro for you: [url removed]
in here.

NOTE: Some email clients don't disply html data. In that case what you
put here will be seen by the recipient. If the email client does

display html data then this will NOT be seen by the recipient.
Based on this you may wish to put a text version of your add here;
however, you can also put some macros here to make the message
more random.

Or use Option 3 and don't add anything at all. Idiot.