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Thursday, 21 February 2013

"Efax Corporate" spam / fuigadosi.ru

This fake eFax spam leads to malware on fuigadosi.ru:

Date:      Thu, 21 Feb 2013 -05:24:35 -0800
From:      LinkedIn Password [password@linkedin.com]
Subject:      Efax Corporate
Attachments:     EFAX_Corporate.htm



Fax Message [Caller-ID: 705646877]

You have received a 29 pages fax at Thu, 21 Feb 2013 -05:24:35 -0800, (913)-809-4198.

* The reference number for this fax is [eFAX-806896385].

View attached fax using your Internet Browser.


© 2013 j2 Global Communications, Inc. All rights reserved.
eFax ® is a registered trademark of j2 Global Communications, Inc.

This account is subject to the terms listed in the eFax ® Customer Agreement.

The malicious payload is at [donotclick]fuigadosi.ru:8080/forum/links/column.php (report here) hosted on:

84.23.66.74 (EUserv Internet, Germany)
122.160.168.219 (Trackon Couriers, India)
210.71.250.131 (Chungwa Telecom, China)

The following domains and IPs are malicious and should be blocked:
84.23.66.74
122.160.168.219
210.71.250.131
eiiiioovvv.ru
ejjiipprr.ru
emmmhhh.ru
errriiiijjjj.ru
famagatra.ru
faneroomk.ru
finalions.ru
fuigadosi.ru
fulinaohps.ru
fzukungda.ru

ADP Spam / faneroomk.ru

This fake ADP spam tries (and fails) to lead to malware on faneroomk.ru:

From: messages-noreply@bounce.linkedin.com [mailto:messages-noreply@bounce.linkedin.com] On Behalf Of LinkedIn
Sent: 20 February 2013 20:02
Subject: ADP Immediate Notification

ADP Immediate Notification
Reference #: 001737199

Thu, 21 Feb 2013 02:01:39 +0600
Dear ADP Client

Your Transfer Record(s) have been created at the web site:

https://www.flexdirect.adp.com/client/login.aspx

Please see the following notes:
•    Please note that your bank account will be debited within one banking business day for the amount(s) shown on the report(s).
•    Please do not respond or reply to this automated e-mail. If you have any questions or comments, please Contact your ADP Benefits Specialist.

This note was sent to acting users in your system that approach ADP Netsecure.

As usual, thank you for choosing ADP as your business affiliate!

Ref: 890911798


HR. Payroll. Benefits.
The ADP logo and ADP are registered trademarks of ADP, Inc.
In the business of your success is a service mark of ADP, Inc.
© 2013 ADP, Inc. All rights reserved.

The malicious payload is meant to be [donotclick]faneroomk.ru:8080/forum/links/column.php but right at the moment it is not resolving.

We can perhaps do a little digging around to see what's going on here. The WHOIS details show the notorious Russian "Private Person".

whois -h whois.ripn.net faneroomk.ru ...
% By submitting a query to RIPN's Whois Service
% you agree to abide by the following terms of use:
% http://www.ripn.net/about/servpol.html#3.2 (in Russian)
% http://www.ripn.net/about/en/servpol.html#3.2 (in English).

domain:        FANEROOMK.RU
nserver:       ns1.faneroomk.ru. 41.168.5.140
nserver:       ns2.faneroomk.ru. 110.164.58.250
nserver:       ns3.faneroomk.ru. 210.71.250.131
nserver:       ns4.faneroomk.ru. 203.171.234.53
nserver:       ns5.faneroomk.ru. 184.106.195.200
state:         REGISTERED, NOT DELEGATED, UNVERIFIED
person:        Private Person
registrar:     NAUNET-REG-RIPN
admin-contact: https://client.naunet.ru/c/whoiscontact
created:       2013.02.17
paid-till:     2014.02.17
free-date:     2014.03.20
source:        TCI

Last updated on 2013.02.21 17:16:40 MSK

Anyway. it's probably a good idea to block the domain and those NS IPs. The following IPs and domains are all related:


41.168.5.140
110.164.58.250
184.106.195.200
210.71.250.131
203.171.234.53
faneroomk.ru
fzukungda.ru
famagatra.ru
emmmhhh.ru
errriiiijjjj.ru
faneroomk.ru
ejjiipprr.ru
finalions.ru
fulinaohps.ru
eiiiioovvv.ru


Wednesday, 20 February 2013

Verizon Wireless spam / participamoz.com

This fake Verizon Wireless spam leads to malware on participamoz.com:


Date:      Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:24:49 +0400
From:      "AccountNotify@verizonwireless.com" [cupcakenc0@irs.gov]
Subject:      Verizon wireless online bill.
Important account information from Verizon Wireless
Your current bill for your account ending in XXXX-XX001 is now available online in My Verizon
Total Balance Due: $48.15
Scheduled Automatic Payment Date: 02/25/2012
Mind that payments and/or adjustments made to your account after your bill was generated will be deducted from your automatic payment amount.

> Review and Pay Your Bill

Thank you for choosing Verizon Wireless.

My Verizon is also available 24/7 to assist you with:
Vrowsing your usage
Updating your plan
Adding Account Members
Paying your bill
Finding accessories for your devices
And much, much more...

2011 Verizon Wireless
Verizon Wireless | One Verizon Way | Mail Code: 190WVB | Basking Ridge, NJ 07990
We respect your privacy. Please review our privacy policy for more information

If you are not the intended recipient and feel you have received this email in error; or if you
would like to update your customer notification preferences, please click here.
The malicious payload is at [donotclick]participamoz.com/detects/holds_edge.php (report here) hosted on:
161.200.156.200 (Chulanet, Thailand)
173.251.62.46 (MSP Digital / Cablevision, US)

The following IPs and domains are connected should be treated as malicious:
161.200.156.200
173.251.62.46
prosctermobile.com
aftandilosmacerati.com
pardontemabelos.com
participamoz.com

   

SendSecure Support spam / secure_message_02202013_01590106757637303.zip

This fake SendSecure Support / Bank of America spam comes with a malicious attachment called secure_message_02202013_01590106757637303.zip:

Date:      Wed, 20 Feb 2013 11:23:43 -0400 [10:23:43 EST]
From:      SendSecure Support [SendSecure.Support@bankofamerica.com]
Subject:      You have received a secure message from Bank Of America

You have received a secure message.

Read your secure message by opening the attachment. You will be prompted to open (view) the file or save (download) it to your computer. For best results, save the file first, then open it.

If you have concerns about the validity of this message, please contact the sender directly.

First time users - will need to register after opening the attachment.
Help - https://securemail.bankofamerica.com/websafe/help?topic=Envelope
The zip file secure_message_02202013_01590106757637303.zip unzips into secure_message_02202013_01590106757637303.exe with a VirusTotal detection rate of 6/46. According to ThreatExpert, the malware installs a keylogger and also tries to phone home to:

blog.ritual.ca
dontgetcaught.ca

These sites are hosted on 74.208.148.35 which I posted about yesterday. Blocking access to this IP might mitigate against this particular threat somewhat.



"Wire transfer" spam / fulinaohps.ru

This fake wire transfer spam leads to malware on fulinaohps.ru:

Date:      Wed, 20 Feb 2013 04:28:14 +0600
From:      accounting@[victimdomain]
Subject:      Fwd: ACH and Wire transfers disabled.

Dear Online Account Operator,

Your ACH transactions have been
temporarily disabled.
View details

Best regards,
Security department
The malicious payload is at [donotclick]fulinaohps.ru:8080/forum/links/column.php (report here) hosted om the following IPs:

84.23.66.74 (EUserv Internet, Germany)
195.210.47.208 (PS Internet Company, Kazakhstan)
210.71.250.131 (Chungwa Telecom, Taiwan)

These are the same IPs as used in this attack, you should block them if you can.

famagatra.ru injection attack in progress

There seems to be an injection attack in progress, leading visitors to hacked website to a malicious page on the server famagatra.ru.

The payload is at [donotclick]famagatra.ru:8080/forum/links/public_version.php?atd=1n:33:2v:1l:1h&qav=3j&yvxhqg=1j:33:32:1l:1g:1i:1o:1n:1o:1i&jehmppj=1n:1d:1f:1d:1f:1d:1j:1k:1l (report here) which is basically a nasty dose of Blackhole.


84.23.66.74 (EUserv Internet, Germany)
195.210.47.208 (PS Inernet Company, Kazakhstan)
210.71.250.131 (Chungwa Telecom, Taiwan)

The following domains are IPs are all part of the same evil circus:
84.23.66.74
195.210.47.208
210.71.250.131
efjjdopkam.ru
eiiiioovvv.ru
eipuonam.ru
ejiposhhgio.ru
ejjiipprr.ru
emaianem.ru
emalenoko.ru
eminakotpr.ru
emmmhhh.ru
enakinukia.ru
epilarikko.ru
epionkalom.ru
errriiiijjjj.ru
esigbsoahd.ru
estipaindo.ru
ewinhdutik.ru
exiansik.ru
exibonapa.ru
famagatra.ru
finalions.ru

Something evil on 62.212.130.115

Something evil seems to be lurking on 62.212.130.115 (Xenosite, Netherlands) - a collection of sites connected with the Blackhole exploit kit, plus indications of evil subdomains of legitimate hacked sites. All-in-all, this IP is probably worth avoiding.

Firstly, there are the evil subomains that have a format like 104648746540365e.familyholidayaccommodation.co.za - these are mostly hijacked .co.za and .cl domains.

The following list contains the legitimate domains and IPs that appear to have been hijacked. Ones marked in  red   have been flagged as malicious by Google. Remember, these IPs are not evil, it is just the subdomains that are (on a different IP).

190.196.23.231 (clean)
sanjoselosandes.cl
liceomixto.cl
servicioseximia.cl
siitec.cl
sictral.cl
specialdetail.cl
sycabogados.cl

199.34.228.100 (clean)
delfinos.co.za

208.70.149.57 (clean)
cafehavana.co.za
destinationsunlimited.co.za
firearmlicence.co.za
dolceluce.co.za

firearmsafe.co.za
firearmlicense.co.za
familysuite.co.za
bolandparkhotel.co.za
gamesmodels.com
onthebeachjbay.com
disc-deals.com

The second bunch of domains appear to be connected with the Blackhole Exploit kit (according to this report) and can be assumed to be malicious, and are hosted on 62.212.130.115:

google-statistic.in
libola.com
minizip.org
msdbug.com
msrst.com
nlsdl.org
ntdsapi.com
ntmsdba.com
pifmgr.org
piparse.com
spam-rep-service.in

This third group are almost definitely malicious and are on the same server:

garmonyoy.eu
harmonyoy.eu
kinyng.ru
ntimage.net
ntmsapi.net
ntmsmgr.net
pastaoyto.eu
plustab.net
polstore.net
puntooy.eu
pvzvnp.ru
rvwwko.ru

The final group is where it gets messy. These are malicious subdomains that either are on (or have recently been on)  62.212.130.115. It looks like they are hardened against analysis, but they certainly shouldn't be here and can be assumed to be malicious too,

54fd8c9fa1abf2b5.firearmsafe.co.za
32464a746740345e.familysuite.co.za
fece86cc9b68c8761151711302121857a5da12fce1b0b.sanjoselosandes.cl
ba7562877f032c1d0160451302111347717339942fd25832980fc947bbaab6e.liceomixto.cl    104698f48570d66e01910213021108078ff41b00051a92fb8f.liceomixto.cl
897581b79c33cf2d016045130210212851378959885060ea5995f416222722b.liceomixto.cl
cd028570a864fb7a01402413021722022144552c318ce7cab9e09a0d2a6a8b5.cafehavana.co.za
23753bc716e345fd114110130218141121065128682695243c3a6e68eaa454c.destinationsunlimited.co.za
23753bc716e345fd119181130218123421084144fafd9a8a2ecee7c9e8a813d.destinationsunlimited.co.za
23753bc716e345fd.destinationsunlimited.co.za
fefd56cf7bfb28e501402413021916372140748bad59371eb615c227bcf6494.firearmlicence.co.za
fefd56cf7bfb28e50191851302191616816357255aa3a775d33e0e87031dabd.firearmlicence.co.za
efce974cba68e97601902413021819141134725bc512d95c3a3367364f60e7f.dolceluce.co.za
54fd8c9fa1abf2b50152021302192150218227543eacf3e65962cfa456e6742.firearmsafe.co.za
54fd8c9fa1abf2b50190551302192029115216056c76db44aa04bf200b3dd64.firearmsafe.co.za
54fd8c9fa1abf2b501511113021919479278009323500c592bf3b0a3e0e48b8.firearmsafe.co.za
54fd8c9fa1abf2b5115023130219202841813244c0634fe85c4f0d28b6001ac.firearmsafe.co.za
54fd8c9fa1abf2b511511113021920019153428450b973995f121f87d07597d.firearmsafe.co.za
54fd8c9fa1abf2b5019003130219205011588175e845eee9fba56981ef9762f.firearmsafe.co.za
54fd8c9fa1abf2b5019184130219200951610365d41a651918d996c2262265f.firearmsafe.co.za
1002a8108524d63a01411013021917377210805bc813254f0b52ddadc7a4fb6.firearmlicense.co.za
1002a8108524d63a0190861302191834518734754e1569db098dc04657268c7.firearmlicense.co.za
1002a8108524d63a015135130219171541448694b4a5ad611740bce908b41e9.firearmlicense.co.za
1002a8108524d63a01608613021918067148673452fc4f3b25e4a92991e388c.firearmlicense.co.za
32464a746740345e0140861302191352721746257b791a8cb29212692450169.familysuite.co.za
ab02b3809e94cd8a0141851302171831719273654b106add758c4d1ea448054.bolandparkhotel.co.za
fe3116d33bd768c9014185130217152321157054e238a5d15e6899e06b4a256.bolandparkhotel.co.za
ab02b3809e94cd8a014014130217181671594515d6908be7ac815a5c8aec9bd.bolandparkhotel.co.za
104648746540365e.familyholidayaccommodation.co.za
2375dba7f6b3a5ad01900313021810166108414bc5043b30fcbf6df10ac0d36.delfinos.co.za
2375dba7f6b3a5ad.delfinos.co.za
2375dba7f6b3a5ad1141101302181050617308286822211b6e41c16bae4a8ad.delfinos.co.za
104618a40570566e0190861302141716512521554e01e13647caa0d7585e0a2.servicioseximia.cl
104618a40570566e01608613021416261099221452fc4f3fddf44bf19ce67a3.servicioseximia.cl
cd46f5c4e810bb0e014029130214200431169736dd938489c7b1b51af4b6f74.servicioseximia.cl
cd46f5c4e810bb0e0142031302142008713472502551149f67b7bdb45a92f07.servicioseximia.cl
104618a40570566e019096130214190761242645133a051309afb24913257bb.servicioseximia.cl
104618a40570566e01900713021417086116022bad56157e487133b8039b0fb.servicioseximia.cl
104618a40570566e.servicioseximia.cl
dc8a5458498c1a92019024130215034191505755a15eef17404dfc7a914c407.siitec.cl
fe7596178bc3d8dd01515913021423367212073189eb0ffdcfd7bc050f5cc84.sictral.cl
fe7596178bc3d8dd01612913021501048032017adf505b4a51493df8d7e7e8b.sictral.cl
01ce199c04785766.specialdetail.cl
01ce199c047857661140151302151103607956789e2ef312e860b4529ed0fdc.specialdetail.cl
76fdbedfa36bf075014025130213175772228515fdfce25de6ebd91bd067892.sanjoselosandes.cl
23fdcb3fd68b859511416113021320291114120d5436e9454395fe51a4f8bd4.sanjoselosandes.cl
32fd2a6f37db64c501613813021307218103025988506029ed2c2b5c8df9915.sanjoselosandes.cl
5431bca3a167f27901604513021414306142650adf4cf112a9c89769565e055.sanjoselosandes.cl
45fdad0fb0abe3b5.sanjoselosandes.cl
54fdec0ff1cba2d5.sanjoselosandes.cl
23fdcb3fd68b859501612913021321298189883d812e2a7244210d47d2832e5.sanjoselosandes.cl
fece86cc9b68c876.sanjoselosandes.cl
dcceb41ca9a8fab6.sanjoselosandes.cl
98fd50bf4d1b1e05019086130212235552028805ddb0cd40d31dd927eda2037.sanjoselosandes.cl
76fdbedfa36bf07501916613021318165124581972ac37159baca15f93b3b48.sanjoselosandes.cl
23fdcb3fd68b859501916113021320155132506020b16ab30472c9a28008598.sanjoselosandes.cl
76fdbedfa36bf07501612913021318103106829d074104b45444a6bd90368bb.sanjoselosandes.cl
76fdbedfa36bf07501902413021317264126483b1287cb246f1c65418b6a03c.sanjoselosandes.cl
cd8a85e8984ccb5211409913021215378176886b2072dbee3d87f6b240713fd.sanjoselosandes.cl
ef46f7f4ea10b90e.sycabogados.cl
45b90ddb20ff73e1.disc-deals.com
89fd717f5c4b0f5511511113021922528294810b80d17e6193d54e6faa102d8.gamesmodels.com
89fd717f5c4b0f55014185130219223852203155b41df139190d76dfce35e2c.gamesmodels.com
89fd717f5c4b0f550151311302192250727293718c48e6c9eab856d51453cbe.gamesmodels.com
0102d920f434a72a.chinese.onthebeachjbay.com





USPS spam / USPS delivery failure report.zip

This fake USPS spam contains malware in an attachment called USPS delivery failure report.zip.

Date:      Wed, 20 Feb 2013 06:40:39 +0200 [02/19/13 23:40:39 EST]
From:      USPS client manager Michael Brewer [reports@usps.com]
Subject:      USPS delivery failure report

USPS notification

Our company’s courier couldn’t make the delivery of package.

REASON: Postal code contains an error.
LOCATION OF YOUR PARCEL: KnoxvilleFort
DELIVERY STATUS: sort order
SERVICE: One-day Shipping
NUMBER OF YOUR PARCEL: M1PZN6BI4F
FEATURES: No

Label is enclosed to the letter.
Print a label and show it at your post office.

An additional information:

If the parcel isn’t received within 30 working days our company will have the right to claim compensation from you for it’s keeping in the amount of $8.26 for each day of keeping of it.

You can find the information about the procedure and conditions of parcels keeping in the nearest office.

Thank you for using our services.
USPS Global.
The attachment is double-zipped, presumably to try to evade virus and content scanners. Opening it extracts another ZIP file called USPS report id 943577924988734.zip which contains another file called USPS report id 943577924988734.exe.

The VirusTotal detections for this are patchy and fairly generic. Automated analysis tools are pretty inconclusive when it comes to the payload, although if you are trying to clean it up then starting with HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SunJavaUpdateSched (which is set to "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\svchost.exe") is probably a good start.