Because of Google's sucky decision to terminate their sucky FTP publishing service, you might notice that the URL of this blog has changed from www.dynamoo.com/blog to blog.dynamoo.com.
Everything is lashed together with symbolic links and .htaccess files for now, if you notice anything odd then contact me.
Sponsored by..
Friday, 5 February 2010
More fake ad networks
The German news site Handelsblatt was recently the victim of a malvertising campaign:
The fake ad agencies are in the 213.163.75.x range, all recently registered through BIZCN.COM in China, a fairly well known black hat registrar.
Note that while the domains appear to be fake, the registration data may include the details of innocent third parties, so I have not published it here. I would recommend avoiding doing business with them unless you can absolutely verify their credentials.
Synopsystd.com
02.02.2010 Handelsblatt malware on Web siteThe malware campaign was running via Doubleclick and Nuggad.net, directing through a bunch of domains that look like ad agencies but aren't before ending up in a server in Panama.
Update: Infection banners confirmed!
The S-CERT was able to reproduce the infection in its test laboratory on the IHT website. Infection occurs through an advertising banner, which is from "Doubleclick.net. This will in turn include advertisements from the domain "muentely.com" in the Handelsblatt-page insert. The latter site is obviously manipulated and contains malicious JavaScript code.
Further investigations in the S-CERT laboratory testing have confirmed that will be used including a PDF vulnerability to the spread of malware. The studies also show that there is an alternative to the vulnerability, attempts to exploit gaps by further appropriate attack code to install a malware onto vulnerable PCs.
According to the investigations of the S-CERT is the malware with the accessing PCs will eventually become infected, a so-called Scareware: Users are informed by insertion of appropriate dialogue, that their PC is infected with malware wide area. To remove this malware, an appropriate protective software is available for purchase. To give emphasis to the malware message that ensures Scareware that can be started on any new applications over infected PCs. Relevant information of users may also indicate an infection.
The fake ad agencies are in the 213.163.75.x range, all recently registered through BIZCN.COM in China, a fairly well known black hat registrar.
Note that while the domains appear to be fake, the registration data may include the details of innocent third parties, so I have not published it here. I would recommend avoiding doing business with them unless you can absolutely verify their credentials.
Synopsystd.com
- Namdoline.com
- Quintat.com
- Bradfortnd.com
- Ealana.com
- Rovitalt.com
- Favorti.com
- Muentely.com
- Briarmod.com
- Deltamsc.com
- Jessiereet.com
- Startrailrs.com
- Connata.com
- Vehiced.com
- Essiell.com
- Holdrism.com
- Bellwaynetworks.com
- Forlifemedia.com
- Revoltechmarketing.com
- Hickoryhs.com
- Ingramctc.com
- Luxortd.com
- Morrelmedia.com
- Gappion.com
- Savoyee.com
- Goldbaynetwork.com
Thursday, 4 February 2010
"Hello, this is Icon calling on behalf of BT.."
The phone rings from an undisclosed International number.. an automated voice say "Hello, this is Icon calling on behalf of BT.." and it then goes on to explain that there's nobody to talk to me and I should call back on 0800 980 0127 to unsubscribe. Except of course that I'm bloody on TPS.
So who are they? Icon Communications Centers are based in Prague and have a website at www.icon-cc.com (no, I'm not giving them a link). In fact, the crummy job is advertised right here. OK, I say crummy.. the good thing is that Prague is a very nice place, but you probably won't see too much of it in a call centre.
Enjoy.
Edited: so I spoke to the very polite person on the other end and very politely suggested that the stop ringing. Having plugged the caller for details (yes, they really do work near the centre of the city) it seems that Icon are perhaps not a bad gig if you can speak English and find yourself in Prague looking for a job.
So who are they? Icon Communications Centers are based in Prague and have a website at www.icon-cc.com (no, I'm not giving them a link). In fact, the crummy job is advertised right here. OK, I say crummy.. the good thing is that Prague is a very nice place, but you probably won't see too much of it in a call centre.
Enjoy.
Edited: so I spoke to the very polite person on the other end and very politely suggested that the stop ringing. Having plugged the caller for details (yes, they really do work near the centre of the city) it seems that Icon are perhaps not a bad gig if you can speak English and find yourself in Prague looking for a job.
Sergey Ryabov / director@climbing-games.com strikes again
There's a somewhat unusual spate of injection attacks doing the rounds, code is being injected into the middle of victim pages through an unknown flaw, starting document.write(unescape('%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%20%6C%61%6E%67%75%61%67%65%3D and then going on for a bit.. deobfuscating the code actually leads to a second layer of obfuscation, but once that is decoded it becomes clearer.
The injected code points to itsallbreaksoft.net
This then bounces through paymoneysystem.info/in.cgi?michaeleknowlton before hitting a seemingly random PPC search engine site hosted on 95.211.27.154, for example sdeh.net/iframe.html. Sophos have an excellent write-up of the anatomyof the injection attack here, and it's pretty clear that somebody is ripping somebody else off for PPC traffic.. its hard to say who the victims actually are.
The domains itsallbreaksoft.net and paymoneysystem.info belong to the same person, these are interesting because of the registration details:
It's all kind of strange as there doesn't appear to be a malware payload, which is good. But because of the way click arbitrage works, finding the real victims and villains is tricky, although interested researchers may want to have a poke around.
The injected code points to itsallbreaksoft.net
This then bounces through paymoneysystem.info/in.cgi?michaeleknowlton before hitting a seemingly random PPC search engine site hosted on 95.211.27.154, for example sdeh.net/iframe.html. Sophos have an excellent write-up of the anatomyof the injection attack here, and it's pretty clear that somebody is ripping somebody else off for PPC traffic.. its hard to say who the victims actually are.
The domains itsallbreaksoft.net and paymoneysystem.info belong to the same person, these are interesting because of the registration details:
Nexton LimitedThese contact details are very well known for very bad things. Incidentally, the registrar is ruler-domains.com, also an enterprise registered to "Sergey Ryabov" (if that's a real person).
Ryabov Sergey (director@climbing-games.com)
+79219270961
Fax: +79219270961
Scherbakova st., 6-38
Saint-Petersburg, 197375
RU
It's all kind of strange as there doesn't appear to be a malware payload, which is good. But because of the way click arbitrage works, finding the real victims and villains is tricky, although interested researchers may want to have a poke around.
Using Google Images to fight fraud
A great post from the guys at F-Secure about how an employee used Google Images to stop being ripped off. Probably a good tip to stop getting defrauded at auction sites.
Tuesday, 2 February 2010
Pathetic
A multibillion dollar company operated by a bunch of f*cking amateurs.
In particular.. the bit that says "We are building a migration tool", but for some unfathomable reason we have decided to kick off this change before it's ready. Sure, Blogger is a free platform and I could always ask for my money back.
Another favourite is: "only .5% of active blogs are published via FTP".. and the reason for this is that for the past couple of years Blogger's FTP service has become increasingly unreliable for no particular reason.
Unfortunately, anyone who had business dealings with Google that involve real money will know that the the f*ck you attitude to customer service is very much ingrained in Google. To a certain extent, being jerked around when you are not paying for the service is one thing.. but business partners in things like advertising, YouTube and enterprise applications also suffer the same thing.
Yes, Google is still often awesome. But sometimes, like this time, it's just pathetic.
Wednesday, 20 January 2010
AdSlash.com is a bogus ad network
We've seen a number of ads being punted through AdSlash.com to legitimate ad networks, but it appears that these are leading to a PDF Exploit (don't visit these sites, obviously!).
For example:
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131939386&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=728x90&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131939386&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/stats_js_e.php?id=131939386
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/bdb/Health/banner_728.gif
fridayalways.com/kven/index.php
fridayalways.com/kven/js/common.js
fridayalways.com/kven/pdfadmnplay.php
fridayalways.com/kven/files/backoutblack.pdf
or
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131959519&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=120x600&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131959519&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
uparms.com/uparmglde/index.php
uparms.com/uparmglde/js/zingvaz.js
uparms.com/uparmglde/sexxhsdtk.php
which then loads a PDF exploit
or
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131958218&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=300x250&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131958218&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
setsup.com/setglde/index.php
setsup.com/setglde/js/common.js
setsup.com/setglde/ffcollab.php
setsup.com/setglde/files/slob.pdf
Despite the use of "zedo.com" in the subdomain, there is no evidence that these are being syndicated through Zedo.
Let's look at the WHOIS entry for AdSlash.com first:
The address looks kind of legitimate, but there's no Duck Creek Road in Oakland and the phone number is most likely Los Altos, not Oakland. Also the fact that it has been registered just days ago is a clue.. and it turns out that the registrar is BIZCN.COM of China which is an odd choice for a California company.. in other words, the domain registration details are fake.
AdSlash.com is hosted on 217.23.7.6 which is reportedly a Worldstream Data Center in Faro, Portugal. There's a cluster of servers with fake registration details which are probably related:
217.23.7.6
Adslash.com
Dc2way.com
Ispmns.com
Rtcohost.com
Vpsroll.com
217.23.7.7
Net-wisp.com
Realhgost.com
Slhoste.com
217.23.7.8
Inhostin.com
Nx7tech.com
Vpbyte.com
217.23.7.9
Eywtech.com
Qhostin.com
Sslcode.com
Blocking the entire 217.23.7.x range will probably do no harm at all, it is full of typosquatting domains and other crap.
The PDF exploit itself is hosted in Russia on 213.108.56.18 at Infoteh Ltd (UNNET-LINER), there are a bunch of domains serving these exploits up:
As a side note, AdSlash.com did used to be owned by a hosting company called RackSlash, but it expired and was re-registered.
If you are accepting new ad banners - always remember to look closely at WHOIS details and other credentials to ensure that you are dealing with who you think you are.
For example:
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131939386&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=728x90&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131939386&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/stats_js_e.php?id=131939386
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/bdb/Health/banner_728.gif
fridayalways.com/kven/index.php
fridayalways.com/kven/js/common.js
fridayalways.com/kven/pdfadmnplay.php
fridayalways.com/kven/files/backoutblack.pdf
or
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131959519&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=120x600&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131959519&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
uparms.com/uparmglde/index.php
uparms.com/uparmglde/js/zingvaz.js
uparms.com/uparmglde/sexxhsdtk.php
which then loads a PDF exploit
or
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131958218&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=300x250&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131958218&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
setsup.com/setglde/index.php
setsup.com/setglde/js/common.js
setsup.com/setglde/ffcollab.php
setsup.com/setglde/files/slob.pdf
Despite the use of "zedo.com" in the subdomain, there is no evidence that these are being syndicated through Zedo.
Let's look at the WHOIS entry for AdSlash.com first:
Domain name: adslash.com
Registrant Contact:
PublishingAlert
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us
Administrative Contact:
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us
Technical Contact:
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us
Billing Contact:
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us
DNS:
ns1.everydns.net
ns2.everydns.net
Created: 2010-01-04
Expires: 2011-01-04
The address looks kind of legitimate, but there's no Duck Creek Road in Oakland and the phone number is most likely Los Altos, not Oakland. Also the fact that it has been registered just days ago is a clue.. and it turns out that the registrar is BIZCN.COM of China which is an odd choice for a California company.. in other words, the domain registration details are fake.
AdSlash.com is hosted on 217.23.7.6 which is reportedly a Worldstream Data Center in Faro, Portugal. There's a cluster of servers with fake registration details which are probably related:
217.23.7.6
Adslash.com
Dc2way.com
Ispmns.com
Rtcohost.com
Vpsroll.com
217.23.7.7
Net-wisp.com
Realhgost.com
Slhoste.com
217.23.7.8
Inhostin.com
Nx7tech.com
Vpbyte.com
217.23.7.9
Eywtech.com
Qhostin.com
Sslcode.com
Blocking the entire 217.23.7.x range will probably do no harm at all, it is full of typosquatting domains and other crap.
The PDF exploit itself is hosted in Russia on 213.108.56.18 at Infoteh Ltd (UNNET-LINER), there are a bunch of domains serving these exploits up:
- alwaysinwork.com
- fridayalways.com
- runsup.com
- uparms.com
- upmostly.com
The whole UNNET-LINER netblock of 213.108.56.0 - 213.108.63.255 looks fairly sordid, blocking access to it will probably do no harm.
Registrant:
Name: dannis
Address: Moskow
City: Moskow
Province/state: MSK
Country: RU
Postal Code: 130610
Administrative Contact:
Name: dannis
Organization: privat person
Address: Moskow
City: Moskow
Province/state: MSK
Country: RU
Postal Code: 130610
Phone: +7.9957737737
Fax: +7.9957737737
Email: moldavimo@safe-mail.net
Technical Contact:
Name: dannis
Organization: privat person
Address: Moskow
City: Moskow
Province/state: MSK
Country: RU
Postal Code: 130610
As a side note, AdSlash.com did used to be owned by a hosting company called RackSlash, but it expired and was re-registered.
If you are accepting new ad banners - always remember to look closely at WHOIS details and other credentials to ensure that you are dealing with who you think you are.
Monday, 18 January 2010
Is Q-dating.com a fake?
At first this looks like some random spam:
Subject: Find a sexdate - Free registration!After a bit of "wtf" I decided to check out the WHOIS details to see who was spamming:
From: "Q-dating" <info@qdates.net>
Date: Mon, January 18, 2010 3:19 pm
Having trouble reading this email?
FIND A SEXDATE IN YOUR OWN AREA?
www.Q-Dating.com
[http://mailings.email-pro.net/link.php?M=000&N=143&L=118&F=T]
Chantal 24 jaaronline
Single, searching for sexdate!
I'm not ready to settle down
and looking for a sexbuddy
Irene 34 jaaronline
Married, looking for date.
I am a loving wife of 34 years looking for a nice man.
The best dating site of the UK. Advanced searching, Instant chat, test it
now FREE! Click here
Click here to unsubscribe
[http://mailings.email-pro.net/unsubscribe.php?M=000&C=00000&L=7&N=143]
Company: Realcom LimitedOh, well that's kind interesting.. they appear to be based in the UK. A quick check at Companies House does come up with a Realcom Ltd.. but it's a wholly innocent and unconnected company in Oxfordshire.
Name: Andy Ling
Address: 33, Throgmorton street
City: LONDON
Country: UNITED KINGDOM
Postal Code: EC2N 2BR
Phone: +44 7937 082 210
Fax:
Email: realcomltd@hotmail.com
There's not much of a web presence about from this Dutch-language review [autotranslated] which also complains that the site is a fake and that unauthorised credit card transactions have been made.
A bit of searching around finds some related domains:
Q-dating.com [94.229.169.102]
Q-dating.eu [78.109.162.121]
Qdates.net [78.109.162.122]
Q-dating.be [78.109.162.119]
Q-dating.de [78.109.162.119]
Q-dating.net [78.109.162.119]
Credifact.net [94.229.169.102]
Megacasting.eu [94.229.169.102]
Email-pro.net [Parked].. mailings.email-pro.net is on 78.109.162.119
All infrastructure is supplied by UKFast (abuse -at- ukfast.co.uk)
There are plenty of other dating sites to choose from.. some of them may even be genuine. But given the complaints and the questionable WHOIS details, then probably best to avoid this one.
Is trafficbuyer@gmail.com Bryan Hunter of Modena, Inc?
We have seen quite a lot of the domain registrant trafficbuyer@gmail.com lately [1] [2] [3] and it would be fair to say that this email address has been connected with malware domains for a few months [4] [5].
Domains operated by trafficbuyer@gmail.com appear to be part of the routing mechanism to bad sites, but there's no indication of who the email address actually belongs to. Is it an ad network, or is it the bad guys themselves.. and if it's an ad network, why are they hiding their name?
This post at Spyware Sucks gave a clue. There are several domains which are interesting because they have changed hands during their lifetime from a firm called Modena Inc (modenainc.com) owned by one Bryan Hunter of Oregon and are now in the hands of "trafficbuyer".
Big Truck Autobody (dissolved, failed to renew in 2004)
CreditYes, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2008, though still trading at CreditYes.com)
Diminished Value, Inc (filings overdue as of November 2009, trading at DiminishedValue.com)
ExitExchange Corporation (still active, although check the rating at WOT for ExitExchange.com or simple Google it)
Modena Homes, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2008)
Modena, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2009)
Modena, Inc (older incorporation, administrative dissolution in 2004)
Pro Web Design LLC (administrative dissolution in 2004)
Wind Song Creek Estates LLC (administrative dissolution in 2009)
Now, given the WHOIS history of these domains we would suggest that either Bryan Hunter is trafficbuyer@gmail.com or he sold the domains on to this person. If they are the same person, then perhaps he would like to review his business relationships and clean them up...
Domains operated by trafficbuyer@gmail.com appear to be part of the routing mechanism to bad sites, but there's no indication of who the email address actually belongs to. Is it an ad network, or is it the bad guys themselves.. and if it's an ad network, why are they hiding their name?
This post at Spyware Sucks gave a clue. There are several domains which are interesting because they have changed hands during their lifetime from a firm called Modena Inc (modenainc.com) owned by one Bryan Hunter of Oregon and are now in the hands of "trafficbuyer".
- banner0609.com
- banner0709.com [6] [7] [8]
- banner07092.com
- banner08091.com
- banner08092.com [9]
- banner08093.com [10]
- bannersulike.com [11] [12] [13]
- extrabanner.com [14]
- islandbanner.com
- foobanner.com
- greenlightbanner.com [15] [16]
- more-banners.com [17] [18] [19] [20]
- paperbanner.com
- trendbanner.com [21]
- yellowlinebanner.com [22] [23]
- zoombanner.com [24]
Manager, Domain domains@modenainc.comBy September 2009 they had all changed to:
Modena Inc.
921 SW Washington ST
Suite 228
Portland, Oregon 97205
United States
(503) 241-1091 Fax --
Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.comSo, who are Modena Inc of Oregon? According to the State of Oregon, the two key people here are Bryan Hunter and Andrew Vilcauskas, although Mr Hunter's name is most often associated with Modena, Inc. The official status for Modena, Inc shows "Administrative Dissolution" which means that the state dissolved the company for non-filing of paperwork.. this seems to be a common issue. If we look at businesses related to Bryan Hunter then we see:
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
+1.8005551212 Fax --
Big Truck Autobody (dissolved, failed to renew in 2004)
CreditYes, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2008, though still trading at CreditYes.com)
Diminished Value, Inc (filings overdue as of November 2009, trading at DiminishedValue.com)
ExitExchange Corporation (still active, although check the rating at WOT for ExitExchange.com or simple Google it)
Modena Homes, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2008)
Modena, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2009)
Modena, Inc (older incorporation, administrative dissolution in 2004)
Pro Web Design LLC (administrative dissolution in 2004)
Wind Song Creek Estates LLC (administrative dissolution in 2009)
Now, given the WHOIS history of these domains we would suggest that either Bryan Hunter is trafficbuyer@gmail.com or he sold the domains on to this person. If they are the same person, then perhaps he would like to review his business relationships and clean them up...
Friday, 15 January 2010
zoombanner.com / YieldManager malvertisement on ebuddy.com
ebuddy.com is running a malicious ad on the zoombanner.com domain, apparently managed by Yieldmanager.
First, the "legitimate" end of the malware chain loads at ad.zoombanner.com/content?campaign=1171557&sz=6
This forwards to deliver.commismanderakis.com/rotate?m=2;b=6;c=1;z=585778
Which goes to content.fishpotboutademalled.com/track/3388182/S_IT?[snip]
Then img.commismanderakis.com/img?XAhIPWtICDkJX0FVHXUDKFoRYhYlRxFCNlsBGEhLBEtVdRdiCRYKBA8kKV9RHBEaXFJfXFMHAQ
Followed by the payload domain at jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep
then jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/j006102Hd793447cR55e239b8T9cc338b5V0100f060203L69740000000000000000
then jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/o006102203317l0010Hd793447cR55e239b8T9cc338b6V0100f060
Finally jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/e006102203318l0010Hd793447cJ0d000601R55e239b8T9cc338a4U0ec2fc77V0100f0600
This last hop tries to load an executable (and probably some other crap I haven't spotted), not very well detected according to VirusTotal. Oh yes, there's a PDF exploit too.
The malicious ad is an Italian language vacation banner in this case.
Most of the domains have anonymous registration details, except zoombanner.com which has the same details that were used in the malicous ads featured here and here.
A search for the IP addresses show Linode is providing most of the infrastructure (again) with ezzi.net providing the payload server.
ad.zoombanner.com
69.164.215.205, 69.164.215.204 [Linode]
deliver.commismanderakis.com
74.207.232.205, 74.207.232.206, 74.207.232.248, 74.207.232.249, 74.207.232.250, 74.207.232.25, 74.207.232.30, 74.207.232.31, 74.207.232.35, 74.207.232.39, 74.207.232.202, 74.207.232.203 [Linode]
content.fishpotboutademalled.com
69.164.196.55 [Linode]
jduvazuc.info
216.150.79.74 [AccessIT / ezzi.net]
Incidentally, 69.164.196.55 also hosts a bunch of domains which are probably malicious:
First, the "legitimate" end of the malware chain loads at ad.zoombanner.com/content?campaign=1171557&sz=6
This forwards to deliver.commismanderakis.com/rotate?m=2;b=6;c=1;z=585778
Which goes to content.fishpotboutademalled.com/track/3388182/S_IT?[snip]
Then img.commismanderakis.com/img?XAhIPWtICDkJX0FVHXUDKFoRYhYlRxFCNlsBGEhLBEtVdRdiCRYKBA8kKV9RHBEaXFJfXFMHAQ
Followed by the payload domain at jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep
then jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/j006102Hd793447cR55e239b8T9cc338b5V0100f060203L69740000000000000000
then jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/o006102203317l0010Hd793447cR55e239b8T9cc338b6V0100f060
Finally jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/e006102203318l0010Hd793447cJ0d000601R55e239b8T9cc338a4U0ec2fc77V0100f0600
This last hop tries to load an executable (and probably some other crap I haven't spotted), not very well detected according to VirusTotal. Oh yes, there's a PDF exploit too.
The malicious ad is an Italian language vacation banner in this case.
Most of the domains have anonymous registration details, except zoombanner.com which has the same details that were used in the malicous ads featured here and here.
zoombanner.com
Registrant:
Domain Owner
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
Domain Name: ZOOMBANNER.COM
Created on: 24-Jul-09
Expires on: 24-Jul-10
Last Updated on: 24-Jul-09
Administrative Contact:
Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.com
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
+1.8005551212 Fax --
Technical Contact:
Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.com
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
+1.8005551212 Fax --
Domain servers in listed order:
NS45.DOMAINCONTROL.COM
NS46.DOMAINCONTROL.COM
A search for the IP addresses show Linode is providing most of the infrastructure (again) with ezzi.net providing the payload server.
ad.zoombanner.com
69.164.215.205, 69.164.215.204 [Linode]
deliver.commismanderakis.com
74.207.232.205, 74.207.232.206, 74.207.232.248, 74.207.232.249, 74.207.232.250, 74.207.232.25, 74.207.232.30, 74.207.232.31, 74.207.232.35, 74.207.232.39, 74.207.232.202, 74.207.232.203 [Linode]
content.fishpotboutademalled.com
69.164.196.55 [Linode]
jduvazuc.info
216.150.79.74 [AccessIT / ezzi.net]
Incidentally, 69.164.196.55 also hosts a bunch of domains which are probably malicious:
- Aspoutceringlapham.com
- Baalcootymalachi.com
- Bangywhoaswaikiki.com
- Bertbleepedupsurge.com
- Bluegumgodfulfrowzly.com
- Bookletjigsawsenam.com
- Boursesdeployporomas.com
- Cabullacoexertstephen.com
- Camastuthbroomer.com
- Camocaexcidealaric.com
- Cursarophitkamass.com
- Dunnishbribesteen.com
- Dusaexsurgeenzed.com
- Eelfishminibusdaniel.com
- Enyopensilflux.com
- Fishpotboutademalled.com
- Galasynjingkoendoss.com
- Gombayuranidetripper.com
- Haileschoralephydra.com
- Haredjuvenalalkyds.com
- Hoofishsmutsdela.com
- Jigmenbrasschaves.com
- Jumnamontanodillon.com
- Limanadernaggly.com
- Malabarvoiotiahsln.com
- Mashlampeasewahima.com
- Miauwbustianraynold.com
- Mowewindsortejo.com
- Nahshufrosterpappus.com
- Negreetflurtagma.com
- Nitrotowelvidovic.com
- Oaterhabeasroyalet.com
- Ospswraxledfummel.com
- Oundycelticrecomb.com
- Pcdosbahnerdalea.com
- Pealedlupulicdunker.com
- Polarlyfoetiskart.com
- Potwareabipondeana.com
- Psatchargeehewart.com
- Puddyolderrippon.com
- Sallierdiaushawed.com
- Sarddieterchuted.com
- Scullogmooerslarking.com
- Siwardupttorntrib.com
- Skouthlazordurning.com
- Suttenbnetifla.com
- Tacomanheathsdisodic.com
- Temperabiceswayaka.com
- Teughlyhesperegerek.com
- Toterterrenobrasero.com
- Vaccarykakkakcaddoan.com
- Viperanmeatsoths.com
- Viznomyboohoorigs.com
- Voluntyseventechny.com
- Wartedbiterhunter.com
- Woodardvirgetoruli.com
- Yawybottlersuccahs.com
- Zirklehalavahhaunchy.com
"Croft Pole Distributors Limited" bogus job offer
Croft Pole Distributors Ltd (www.croftpoles.co.nz) are a wholly legitimate business based in Whangarei, New Zealand. This is a fake offer that falsely used Croft Pole's name in order to recruit into a money mule scam.
Of course, this 10% fee is a "too good to be true" scam which could well wind up with you going to prison, so it should be avoided at all costs.
Subject: Online Job OfferThe reply-to address is croftpole.update@gmail.com rather than croftpoles.co.nz, originating IP is 213.132.197.149 in the Netherlands, which hosts three porn sites but has probably been compromised. It is nothing at all to do with Croft Poles.
From: "Croft Pole Distributors Limited" <croftpole.update@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, January 15, 2010 10:52 am
Dear Sir/Ma,
Croft Timber Company Limited is a family owned business that began in 1905 and is still in Croft family hands today.
CTC moved more towards the specialised production of timber poles approximately 20 years ago and now trades locally as Croft Pole Distributors Limited with pole supply outlets in both Northland, Rodney and Auckland.
Within the last ten years CTC has grown considerably with investments in a new and larger site, plant modernisation/expansion and the introduction of equipment such as the Bezner Rounding Machine, Fogarty Kiln, Automatic Stacker, Machine stress grader and edge tester, planer and dry-mill department as well as the constant replacement and upgrading of existing plant and machinery.
The mill site is on about thirty acres of land with rail facilities adjacent and is approximately 25 minutes from the deep water port of Marsden Point. The plant ispresently capable of processing around 2,500-3,000 m3 per month.
We are committed to customer service and our aim is to remain flexible to meet the ever changing market needs with product and service unparalleled in the timber pole industry to date..
Most of our customers from Australia, Canada,United States & United Kingdom pay through various terms of payment which some are not negotiable here in New Zealand. This brings our quest to employ a credible and trustworthy fellow as our representative to coordinate our payments. This would not affect your present job but add more to your income.
Being our representative and assisting us in processing the payments from our clients should earn you a commission of 10% of every payment you coordinate.
Once we makes a sale we deliver the product to a customer (usually through UPS).The customer receives and check the products. After this has been done, the customer has to pay for the products. About 90 percent of our customers prefer to pay through Bank Wire Transfers or certified cheque. We have decided to open this new job position for solving this problem.
Your tasks are;
1. Receive payment from Customers through your Bank Accounts
2. Deduct 10% which will be your percentage/pay on Payments processed
3. Forward balance after deduction of percentage/pay to any of the offices you will be contacted to send payment to. (Payment is to forwarded by Local transfers (Western Union only). A local Money transfer takes barely hours, so it will give us a possibility to get customers payment almost immediately.
For example you have got �50,000.00
You take your income: �5,000.00
You will be able to operate with larger orders and you will be able to earn more.
Our payments will be sent into your Bank account that you provided, deduct your 10%(Salary) and forward the balance to the company via Western Union only.
We understand it is an unusual and incredible job position. This job takes only 3-7 hours per week.
You Will have a lot of free time doing another job, you will get good income and regular job. But this job is very challenging and you should understand it. We are looking only for the worker who satisfies our requirements and will be an earnest assistant, We are glad to offer this job position to you. If you feel that you are serious about this and be an earnest worker, All we will need for recording you to our database is below:
Full Name:-
Address:-
Age:-
Your Phone Number(s):-
Chris Moyle
Branch Manager
Croft Pole Distributors Limited
www.croftpoles.co.nz
Of course, this 10% fee is a "too good to be true" scam which could well wind up with you going to prison, so it should be avoided at all costs.
Aurora
According to McAfee, the attack on Google and several other tech companies that led to the likelihood that Google will quit China was called "Aurora" by the bad guys.The cruiser "Aurora" signalled the start of the Russian Revolution in St Petersburg in 1917.. I wonder if this name was chosen deliberately when the attackers targeted some of the West's biggest tech companies?
Image source
Thursday, 14 January 2010
More malvertisment domains
The malicious ads were running through (and I understand now terminated by) bootcampmedia.com, related to this post, according to commenter cerdo:
traffic.worldseescolor.com
69.164.215.208, 69.164.215.210, 69.164.215.205, 69.164.215.207, 69.164.215.204 [Linode]
deliver.bailagequinismregrow.com
74.207.232.205, 74.207.232.250, 74.207.232.249, 74.207.232.248, 74.207.232.203, 74.207.232.30, 74.207.232.206, 74.207.232.31, 74.207.232.39, 74.207.232.25, 74.207.232.202, 74.207.232.35 [Linode]
img.bailagequinismregrow.com
174.143.243.220, 98.129.238.102, 98.129.238.106, 98.129.236.239, 174.143.245.236, 98.129.237.14, 174.143.242.109, 174.143.243.90, 98.129.236.154, 98.129.238.101, 98.129.238.112, 98.129.236.254, 174.143.241.174, 98.129.238.105, 98.129.238.103, 174.143.243.162, 174.143.242.58, 98.129.238.99
[Slicehost / Rackspace]
content.cabullacoexertstephen.com
69.164.196.55 [Linode]
aanserver88.com
67.225.149.152 [Liquid Web]
bonnapet.com
Was 217.20.114.40 [Netdirekt / internetserviceteam.com] now appears to be down.
afkenai.com
195.2.253.93 [Madet Ltd, Moscow]
bfskul.com
195.2.253.93 [Madet Ltd, Moscow]
I don't have the full trace of these, so it's not exactly clear what these domains are doing in the reported chain.
Blogger cerdo said...Worth checking your logs for and blocking in case they turn up on another network. Checking IPs comes up with:
bootcampmedia.com was also likely hosting a malicious campaign yesterday afternoon, and perhaps still ongoing. I'd contact you Jamie, but I don't have contact info for you. This all is clearly closely related to Dynamoo's post...
traffic.worldseescolor.com is an obvious bad actor. The other related domains:
deliver.bailagequinismregrow.com
img.bailagequinismregrow.com
content.cabullacoexertstephen.com
as well as:
aanserver88.com
bonnapet.com
afkenai.com
bfskul.com
14 January 2010 18:40
Blogger cerdo said...
Yep - saw traffic.worldseescolor.com via bootcamp again less than 30 minutes ago.
Related sites, accessed immediately after traffic.worldseescolor.com:
deliver.boaterdunnagechicot.com
img.boaterdunnagechicot.com
14 January 2010 18:45
traffic.worldseescolor.com
69.164.215.208, 69.164.215.210, 69.164.215.205, 69.164.215.207, 69.164.215.204 [Linode]
deliver.bailagequinismregrow.com
74.207.232.205, 74.207.232.250, 74.207.232.249, 74.207.232.248, 74.207.232.203, 74.207.232.30, 74.207.232.206, 74.207.232.31, 74.207.232.39, 74.207.232.25, 74.207.232.202, 74.207.232.35 [Linode]
img.bailagequinismregrow.com
174.143.243.220, 98.129.238.102, 98.129.238.106, 98.129.236.239, 174.143.245.236, 98.129.237.14, 174.143.242.109, 174.143.243.90, 98.129.236.154, 98.129.238.101, 98.129.238.112, 98.129.236.254, 174.143.241.174, 98.129.238.105, 98.129.238.103, 174.143.243.162, 174.143.242.58, 98.129.238.99
[Slicehost / Rackspace]
content.cabullacoexertstephen.com
69.164.196.55 [Linode]
aanserver88.com
67.225.149.152 [Liquid Web]
bonnapet.com
Was 217.20.114.40 [Netdirekt / internetserviceteam.com] now appears to be down.
afkenai.com
195.2.253.93 [Madet Ltd, Moscow]
bfskul.com
195.2.253.93 [Madet Ltd, Moscow]
I don't have the full trace of these, so it's not exactly clear what these domains are doing in the reported chain.
More malicious OWA domains
Wednesday, 13 January 2010
And there's more..
More domains relating to this Zbot attack:
- ui7772.co.kr
- ui7772.kr
- ui7772.ne.kr
- ui7772.or.kr
- ui7772co.kr
- ui777f.kr
- ui777f.ne.kr
- ui777f.or.kr
- ui777for.kr
- ui777l.co.kr
- ui777l.co.kr
- ui777lco.kr
- ui777p.co.kr
- ui777p.kr
- ui777p.or.kr
- vcrtp.eu
- vcrtp1.eu
- vcrtp21.eu
- vcrtprsa21.eu
- vcrtps21.eu
- vcrtpsa21.eu
- vcrtrsa21.eu
- vcrtrsr21.eu
- vcrtrsrp2.eu
- vcrtrsrp21.eu
Convincing look OWA fake leads to PDF exploit
There are getting spammed out at the moment:
The displayed link isn't the actual link, underneath it points to something like:
http://blahblah.blah.vcrtp21.eu/owa/service_directory/settings.php?email=username@blahblah.bah&from=blahblah.blah&fromname=username
Clicking through the link takes you to a convincing looking OWA (Outlook Web Access) forgery page, populated with the victim's domain name and email address.
There are two exploits on the page, the first one is a drive-by download of an infected PDF file called pdf.pdf for which VirusTotal detection is only 10/41, detected by McAfee as Exploit-PDF.ac and various others. The executable file you are directed to download is also a bit patchy on detections.
Sender names include:
Subjects include:
Some domains in use on this are:
WHOIS details are fake:
ns1.raddoor.com
84.243.201.159 [Netrouting Data Facilities, Amsterdam]
ns2.raddoor.com
71.123.51.158 [Verizon Internet Services Inc, Aston]
ns1.elkins-realty.net
84.243.201.159 [Netrouting Data Facilities, Amsterdam]
ns2.elkins-realty.net
71.123.17.61 [Verizon Internet Services Inc, Whitesboro]
Registrant details for raddoor.com are probably bogus:
From: automailer@blahblah.blah [mailto:automailer@blahblah.blah]
Sent: 13 January 2010 11:08
To: Victim Username
Subject: The settings for the username@blahblah.blah mailbox were changed
Dear user of the blahblah.blah mailing service!
We are informing you that because of the security upgrade of the mailing service your mailbox (username@blahblah.blah) settings were changed. In order to apply the new set of settings click on the following link:
http://blahblah.blah/owa/service_directory/settings.php?email=username@blahblah.blah&from=blahblah.blah&fromname=username
Best regards, blahblah.blah Technical Support.
Letter ID#NGTS7OTY8XPZX8FEUYTTTZ1PF
The displayed link isn't the actual link, underneath it points to something like:
http://blahblah.blah.vcrtp21.eu/owa/service_directory/settings.php?email=username@blahblah.bah&from=blahblah.blah&fromname=username
Clicking through the link takes you to a convincing looking OWA (Outlook Web Access) forgery page, populated with the victim's domain name and email address.
There are two exploits on the page, the first one is a drive-by download of an infected PDF file called pdf.pdf for which VirusTotal detection is only 10/41, detected by McAfee as Exploit-PDF.ac and various others. The executable file you are directed to download is also a bit patchy on detections.Sender names include:
- operator@
- support@
- notifications@
- no-reply@
- system@
- alert@
- info@
Subjects include:
- The settings for the blah@blah.blah mailbox were changed
- The settings for the blah@blah.blah were changed
- A new settings file for the blah@blah.blah mailbox
- A new settings file for the blah@blah.blah has just been released
- For the owner of the blah@blah.blah e-mail account
- For the owner of the blah@blah.blah mailbox
Some domains in use on this are:
- vcrtp1.eu
- vcrtp21.eu
- vcrtprsa21.eu
- vcrtpsa21.eu
- vcrtrsa21.eu
- vcrtrsr21.eu
- vcrtrsrp2.eu
- vcrtrsrp21.eu
WHOIS details are fake:
Name:Domains are on a fast flux botnet, so there's no point listing IPs. However, nameservers are as follows:
Quezada, Ramon
Address:
1800 N. Bayshore Drive
33132 Roma
Roma
Italy
Email:
wawddhaepny@yahoo.com
ns1.raddoor.com
84.243.201.159 [Netrouting Data Facilities, Amsterdam]
ns2.raddoor.com
71.123.51.158 [Verizon Internet Services Inc, Aston]
ns1.elkins-realty.net
84.243.201.159 [Netrouting Data Facilities, Amsterdam]
ns2.elkins-realty.net
71.123.17.61 [Verizon Internet Services Inc, Whitesboro]
Registrant details for raddoor.com are probably bogus:
edmund pang figarro77@gmail.comRegistration details for elkins-realty.net are DEFINITELY bogus:
751 kinau st. #30
honolulu
HI
96813
US
Phone: +1.8085362450
Name : B OOnce your machine is infected, it probably gets infected with a Zbot variant as in these two previous examples.
Organization : B O
Address : 123 elm str.
City : Los Angeles
Province/State : beijing
Country :
Postal Code : 23456
Phone Number : 86--8586104812
Fax : 86--8586104819
Email : BO.la@yahoo.com
More on malvertisements running through Bootcampmedia.com
Sandi at Spyware Sucks has a closer look at the malvertisements running through Bootcampmedia.com and comes up with some more details, following up from this post yesterday.
In this case the endpoint of the infection has switched to bonnapet.com hosted on 217.20.114.40 which is hosted by netdirekt e.K. / internetserviceteam.com, hardly surprising as they are one of the more common havens for crimeware. The internetserviceteam.com name appears to be a sub-brand used for black hat hosting .. perhaps it is time for a visit from the Bundespolizei?
In this case the endpoint of the infection has switched to bonnapet.com hosted on 217.20.114.40 which is hosted by netdirekt e.K. / internetserviceteam.com, hardly surprising as they are one of the more common havens for crimeware. The internetserviceteam.com name appears to be a sub-brand used for black hat hosting .. perhaps it is time for a visit from the Bundespolizei?
Tuesday, 12 January 2010
BoingBoing.net / Bootcampmedia.com ad leads to malware
A malicious ad running on BoingBoing.net is delivering visitors to a PDF exploit.
Given the complicated state of advertising arbitrage, it is unlikely that BoingBoing.net have much control over it. The ad appears to be loading in from ad.yieldmanager.com (which is Yahoo!) and/or ad.z5x.net (DSNR Media Group) both of which are hosted on the same multihomed IP addresses.
The ad itself (pictured) appears to be some sort of get-rich-quick scheme or other.
This ad then directs through ads.bootcampmedia.com/servlet/ajrotator/790744/0/vh?z=BootCamp&dim=335848 to traffic.firedogred.com/content?campaign=1219131&sz=2 (this combination of bootcampmedia.com and firedogred.com has been noted before)
The ad then hops to deliver.amerchibchapowered.com/rotate?m=5;b=2;c=1;z=243826 then content.baalcootymalachi.com/track/3388182/S_SE?[snip] loading an image from img.amerchibchapowered.com along the way.
Finally, the visitor is directed to chohivyb.info/cgi-bin/aer/[snip] which contains an exploit detected as Troj/PDFJs-GI by Sophos.
"Boot Camp Media" is run by a guy called Jamie Dalgetty of Guelph, Ontario in Canada. It's unlikely that he's a bad guy, more likely that his ad network is being exploited by a malcious third party.
traffic.firedogred.com is rather more interesting, multihomed on 69.164.215.204, 69.164.215.205, 69.164.215.207, 69.164.215.208 and 69.164.215.210 at Linode, New Jersey. The domain firedogred.com is slightly interesting:
Registrant:trafficbuyer@gmail.com has been used for these malicious domains for some months and is well known.
Domain Owner
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
Registered through: GoDaddy.com, Inc. (http://www.godaddy.com)
Domain Name: FIREDOGRED.COM
Created on: 15-Sep-09
Expires on: 15-Sep-10
Last Updated on: 15-Sep-09
Administrative Contact:
Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.com
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
(800) 555-1212 Fax --
Technical Contact:
Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.com
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
(800) 555-1212 Fax --
Domain servers in listed order:
NS57.DOMAINCONTROL.COM
NS58.DOMAINCONTROL.COM
deliver.amerchibchapowered.com is also multihomed at Linode on 74.207.232.250, 74.207.232.25, 74.207.232.30, 74.207.232.31, 74.207.232.35, 74.207.232.39, 74.207.232.202, 74.207.232.203, 74.207.232.205, 74.207.232.206, 74.207.232.248 and 74.207.232.249. The domain was registered on 7th January 2010 and is hidden by DomainsByProxy.
content.baalcootymalachi.com is hosted on 69.164.196.55 at Linode again, again registered on 7th January via DomainsByProxy.
img.amerchibchapowered.com is hosted on a large number of servers at 174.143.243.90, 174.143.243.162, 174.143.243.220, 174.143.245.236, 98.129.236.154, 98.129.236.239, 98.129.236.254, 98.129.237.14, 98.129.238.99, 98.129.238.101, 98.129.238.102, 98.129.238.103, 98.129.238.105, 98.129.238.106, 98.129.238.112, 174.143.241.174, 174.143.242.58, 174.143.242.109 - these are all hosted at Slicehost.com which is a customer of Rackspace.
Finally, chohivyb.info is hosted on 216.150.79.74 which is some outfit called ezzi.net of New York owned by another outfit called AccessIT. No prizes for guessing that chohivyb.info has been registered only very recently with anonymous details.
216.150.79.74 is a well-known malware server, and that hosts the following domains which you can assume are malicious:
- Ablxsr.info
- Ajgdrt.info
- Alevfq.info
- Alfwqr.info
- Alrpsl.info
- Ameronada.info
- Bnzbfz.info
- Bodxmt.info
- Bplimo.info
- Briliantio.info
- Bvqlag.info
- Bzjsqk.info
- Ccwarj.info
- Cityopicos.info
- Clthth.info
- Ctksji.info
- Dasyxe.info
- Dbivoh.info
- Dgltup.info
- Dpuefh.info
- Dtjblp.info
- Enhmqq.info
- Enqpqk.info
- Euespj.info
- Exmxfd.info
- Fblooe.info
- Fdwghs.info
- Fopqde.info
- Fprvsu.info
- Frgbat.info
- Fymjjz.info
- Gelvmf.info
- Gnautw.info
- Gnysgg.info
- Gredotcom.info
- Grupodanot.info
- Grxqog.info
- Gukuny.info
- Gyckjq.info
- Hagijd.info
- Haqdsc.info
- Hgtbng.info
- Hjdnps.info
- Hyiyyi.info
- Iakecg.info
- Iaoaxz.info
- Iewwpn.info
- Ijaflj.info
- Iohbvo.info
- Jhrubd.info
- Jokirator.info
- Kbwstb.info
- Kibfsz.info
- Klamniton.info
- Ktebkx.info
- Kxlglw.info
- Leeloe.info
- Lgcezx.info
- Lkraat.info
- Lktcaj.info
- Llchqs.info
- Lnmrjz.info
- Lokitoreni.info
- Lqhczk.info
- Lywavy.info
- Lyzocu.info
- Mallstern.info
- Manaratora.info
- Megafrontan.info
- Mesxql.info
- Mngmjc.info
- Monsatrik.info
- Montrealt.info
- Mruvienno.info
- Mrvsnq.info
- Nalszu.info
- Ncnzfh.info
- Neiaea.info
- Nigrandara.info
- Njcmug.info
- Npmkrr.info
- Ntaxkj.info
- Obzdkn.info
- Ocftfa.info
- Optugj.info
- Otfcco.info
- Owpwhi.info
- Pbrugb.info
- Plxxii.info
- Pncgfd.info
- Ppusmb.info
- Prbakn.info
- Qdinql.info
- Qgxelo.info
- Qqtwft.info
- Realuqitor.info
- Refrentora.info
- Retuvarot.info
- Rfouce.info
- Rljysj.info
- Rocqdn.info
- Roeaaj.info
- Semqef.info
- Snosrz.info
- Spgsgh.info
- Stqvqw.info
- Swrapz.info
- Tcoqgo.info
- Tehfnn.info
- Top-lister1.info
- Transforltd.info
- Tsfxzg.info
- Tyenxv.info
- Ugrdzf.info
- Uliganoinc.info
- Urupnk.info
- Utpxno.info
- Uyguau.info
- Vbqfdm.info
- Veqibp.info
- Vkfaao.info
- Vwwtlp.info
- Wddifv.info
- Wdhcvv.info
- Wdokxd.info
- Wevoratora.info
- Wtstds.info
- Wvkjxx.info
- Wvlsam.info
- Xbhmws.info
- Xbxynl.info
- Xcisup.info
- Xxiyrv.info
- Ybeaxd.info
- Yfntrg.info
- Yqjxkj.info
- Ywbxen.info
- Zdkaki.info
- Zhwtqz.info
- Zlpbha.info
- Znkwjc.info
- Zqpwco.info
Obviously block or null-route these destinations as you feel fit, and do not purchase any ads from firedogred.com!
Added: You probably want to block these too..
216.150.79.76
- Cacorq.info
- Clxhbz.info
- Dgrxqh.info
- Diwiowano.info
- Dmdurz.info
- Funkol.info
- Geetol.info
- Gitoer.info
- Gondiroda.info
- Gutrandin.info
- Hizfek.info
- Hopore.info
- Ivgzda.info
- Jopqae.info
- Kolpao.info
- Nadotraza.info
- Niraynome.info
- Ofahitino.info
- Oirjsa.info
- Ornotivec.info
- Pirtaf.info
- Popsto.info
- Rellok.info
- Ruhcsy.info
- Sacmtf.info
- Sdoras.info
- Tapiroten.info
- Tiizwb.info
- Traxemere.info
- Ulmqmq.info
- Vivibt.info
- Xsxydj.info
- Yuncdjbiw.info
- Yyoqny.info
216.150.79.77
- Bnodas.info
- Brasilianstoree.info
- Byzypub.info
- Depahugu.info
- Gionasodor.info
- Giratunes.info
- Gyreal.info
- Hlopki.info
- Huerin.info
- Igerinsar.info
- Jcafuzixa.info
- Joketarona.info
- Koevoru.info
- L-iza.info
- Laryju.info
- Manocoraz.info
- Nbuuf.info
- Npefu.info
- Nvihobepo.info
- Pe-aqemop.info
- Pyneh.info
- Retiof.info
- Rzajexu.info
- Tolkienad.info
- Tymane.info
- Typolazu.info
- Vfoxoe.info
- Wanitale.info
- Yawibyve.info
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Thursday, 7 January 2010
"Testkauf" - German language "mystery shopper" scam
For some reason, I've been getting a lot of these German-language spams, mostly originating from Brazil..
Subject: TestkaufThis roughly translates as:
Mitarbeiter fuer Testeinkauf bundesweit gesucht.
Bewerbung bitte an blahblah@yahoo.de
Subject: Test ShoppingIn each case, the header contain a fake "from" address, the Yahoo! email address changes constantly.. and the mail seems to come from Brazil. This is most likely just a version of the mystery shopper scam, and should be avoided.
Searching nationwide for employees to do test purchasing.
To apply, please contact blahblah@yahoo.de
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