Malware spam: "Purchase Order 0000035394 customer 09221" / "Clare Harding" [purchasing@carterspackaging.com]

This fake financial spam does not come from Carters Packaging Ltd but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.

From     "Clare Harding" [purchasing@carterspackaging.com]
Date     Fri, 30 Oct 2015 16:42:26 +0530
Subject     Purchase Order 0000035394 customer 09221

Purchase Order 0000035394

Dear customer,

Please find attached a copy of our order (reference 0000035394), your
reference .

If you have any questions regarding the purchase order please contact us
using the details below.

CLARE HARDING

Purchasing Manager
Carters Packaging Ltd, Packaging House, Wilson Way, Pool, Redruth, Cornwall,
TR15 3RT
Fax: +44 (0) 1209 315 600
www.carterspackaging.com

purchasing@carterspackaging.com

Attached is a file Purchase Order 0000035394.doc which apparently comes in several different versions, although all the samples I saw had the same attachment with a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/55 and which contained this malicious macro [pastebin].

Download locations for all the document versions (h/t to my source) are:

malajsie.webzdarma.cz/45y3f34f/7jh4wqd.exe
fa31.linux-hosting.de/45y3f34f/7jh4wqd.exe
ankarasogukhavadepo.com/45y3f34f/7jh4wqd.exe
selimkaucuk.com/45y3f34f/7jh4wqd.exe

It looks like this is saved as %TEMP%\httsser.exe and it has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/55. That VirusTotal report and this reverse.it report show that it generates network traffic to:

221.132.35.56 (Ho Chi Minh City Post and Telecom Company, Vietnam)

I strongly recommend that you block access to that IP. The payload appears to be the Dridex banking trojan.

MD5s:
a5c52bd47f7fdfd54a2584a669eabe59
337435ffd7a94ce05bea59c0d312e5b3
48dde939b402533d37065bc606ed45a1
d3b4f459d089e6afd52d5650c31aa25e
e70ae9099a5e6daef41fd8dc15191756

Carters Packaging are on the ball and have put a big notice on their site, which is nice work.

Malware spam: "Domain [domain] Suspension Notice" / abuse@enom.com.org

There appear to be many versions of this spam, aimed at domain owners and apparently coming from the actual registrar of the domain. For added authenticity, the owner's name is included in the spam. Here is one example that I got.. it would have been very convincing, except that I had the heads up on this attack a couple of day ago.

From:    ENOM, INC. [abuse@enom.com.org]
Date:    30 October 2015 at 04:11
Subject:    Domain LAPTOP-MEMORY.COM Suspension Notice

Dear Sir/Madam,

The following domain names have been suspended for violation of the ENOM, INC. Abuse Policy:

Domain Name: LAPTOP-MEMORY.COM
Registrar: ENOM, INC.
Registrant Name: CONRAD LONGMORE

Multiple warnings were sent by ENOM, INC. Spam and Abuse Department to give you an opportunity to address the complaints we have received.

We did not receive a reply from you to these email warnings so we then attempted to contact you via telephone.

We had no choice but to suspend your domain name when you did not respond to our attempts to contact you.

Click here and download a copy of complaints we have received.

Please contact us for additional information regarding this notification.

Sincerely,
ENOM, INC.
Spam and Abuse Department
Abuse Department Hotline: 480-406-7704

In this case, clicking on the link goes to edecisions.com/abuse_report.php?LAPTOP-MEMORY.COM and downloads a file LAPTOP-MEMORY.COM_copy_of_complaints.pdf.scr - it looks more authentic because the domain name is in the file download, but in fact you can specify any domain name and it gives a matching file.

Before we look at the analysis of the downloaded executable, let's look at the domain name edecisions.com. It looks like the sort of domain that might contain abuse reports, but in fact it is a hijacked GoDaddy domain hosted on 65.78.174.100 and a quick look at VirusTotal indicates that one of the other 4 sites on the same server was also compromised and was serving up malware in 2013. This is definitely a good candidate to block.

The downloaded file has a VirusTotal detection rate of 2/55. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] indicate that whatever the hell this is, it tries to contact a LOT of other servers. We can see that the following domain names are accessed (mostly POST attempts):

0tv.co
abettertravelagent.com
agentclicktocall.com
airconditioning12601.com
all-inclusiveresortstravel.com
allgroupstravel.com
allreadytravel.com
ameliastyle.com
anabolicsteroidsrx.com
anunciamicasa.com
aprovechatudia.com
armangarzon.info
beachhouseplans.com
bigboattravel.com
biznal.com
bloccailmutuo.com
boilersandfurnaces.com
breakerhub.com
breathtakingsolutions.com
brindegenie.com
cameroonmarket.com
camirate.com
carltonchambers.co.uk
certifiedphytoceramides.com
chuckwhitlock.com
ciiapparelblog.com
circuitbreakerhub.com
colebar.com
cpasolutiononline.com
cruiseandtravel.agency
cruises-travelandmore.com
cruisetravelpros.com
cruisewithdawn.com
cruisingatdawn.com
cywellness.com
dallascircuitbreaker.co
dallascircuitbreaker.com
dallaselectricalsurplus.com
dallasreconditionedtransformers.com
dangerousgarciniacambogia.com
dawat-restaurant.com
designbrossard.com
designingartinstitute.com
designtravelagency.com
destinycruiseandtravel.com
enterrealtyny.com
superfunshoes.com
tarkshyainc.com

Note that almost everything is in the A-D range, which makes me suspect that this is only a fraction of the compromised domains. If we look at the IP addresses of those domains, then it gets even more interesting:

50.87.144.249 (Unified Layer, US)
50.87.151.145 (Unified Layer, US)
108.167.140.175 (WebSiteWelcome, US) [13 instances]
162.144.0.215 (Unified Layer, US)
162.144.12.115 (Unified Layer, US)
192.185.5.33 (WebSiteWelcome, US) [2 instances]
192.185.16.67 (WebSiteWelcome, US) [7 instances]
192.185.19.115 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.185.21.162 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.185.22.63 (WebSiteWelcome, US) [4 instances]
192.185.90.237 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.185.101.210 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.185.140.214 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.185.152.133 (WebSiteWelcome, US) [2 instances]
192.185.183.81 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.185.226.164 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.254.186.85 (WebSiteWelcome, US) [2 instances]
192.254.231.138 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
192.254.234.204 (WebSiteWelcome, US)
198.57.242.171 (Unified Layer, US) [4 instances]
198.57.244.38 (Unified Layer, US)
208.109.119.156 (GoDaddy, US)

A check of those WebSiteWelcome and Unified Layer IPs on VirusTotal (for example 192.185.226.164) indicates several compromised domains on the same server, indicating that the entire box has been popped.

It isn't clear what the payload is, but given the fact that it is aimed at domain owners and given the unusual characteristics of the malware, I can make a guess that it is some sort of password stealer, possibly harvesting domains or server admin credentials. If you are not using multi-factor authentication for your domains, then perhaps now would be a good time to choose to do so.

Recommended blocklist:
50.87.144.249
50.87.151.145
108.167.140.175
162.144.0.215
162.144.12.115
192.185.5.33
192.185.16.67
192.185.19.115
192.185.21.162
192.185.22.63
192.185.90.237
192.185.101.210
192.185.140.214
192.185.152.133
192.185.183.81
192.185.226.164
192.254.186.85
192.254.231.138
192.254.234.204
198.57.242.171
198.57.244.38
65.78.174.100

UPDATE:

The payload appears to be the Cryptowall ransomware.

Malware spam: "Documents for Review and Comments" / Pony / eyeseen.net

This fake document scan email has a malicious attachment:

From:    Sarah [johnson@jbrakes.com]
Date:    29 October 2015 at 08:27
Subject:    Documents for Review and Comments

Hi Morning,

Attached are the return documents.

Call me if you need anything.

See you soon. :)


Sarah

The attached file is SCANNED DOCS,jpg.z which is a type of compressed file. If you have the right file decompression software, it will extact a malicious executable SCANNED DOCS,jpg.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 17/55.

According to various automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] it drops a file %TEMP%\XP000.TMP\M.exe which itself has a detection rate of 19/54. Out of all the standard analysis tools I have used, only Comodo CAMAS identified the network traffic, a POST to:

eyeseen.net/swift/gate.php

This is hosted on a SoftLayer IP of 198.105.221.5 in Singapore. A quick look at VirusTotal indicates a lot of badness on this IP address, so it is probably one worth blocking.

The payload is Pony / Fareit, which is basically a password stealer.

MD5s:
25a322b9ea5c709c4376bf58527f198a
efc7210f7dbce441f74e3c9f07f28a2e
79ca99c3f751ae334d0340284242e4f6

Malware spam: "Don and Carol Racine" / "www.boatclinic.net" / "boatclinic@aol.com"

This fake financial spam is not from Racine Design Inc but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment:

From     [random]
Date     Wed, 28 Oct 2015 10:39:26 +0100
Subject     [random]

 Dear :
Boat has been done a week now. I contacted you last week
The
Boat is ready to pick up,  I have had inquiries as to people wanting to
buy it,
the carb is in your possession and there is no way to run it,
The boat could
sell real easy at this time of year , Memorial day to 4th of
July most boats
are sold.
Please call me to arrange payment and pickup of the Boat ,
If you
need me to store the boat I can do that at the storage facility ,
they do
charge a fee for this 7.00 per day
The other Invoice for the embroidery will
follow , Balance is due now !
Thanks

Your invoice is attached.  Please
remit payment

Thank you for your business - we appreciate it very
much.


Sincerely,
Don and Carol Racine

Racine Design, Inc.
2036 Imeson
Rd
Jacksonville, Fl.  32220

E-Mail  
boatclinic@aol.com

www.boatclinic.net

phone    (904) 771-8170
fax       
(904) 771-0843

The subject of the email is some randomly-generated sentence, which matches the name of the attached ZIP file. I have seen two samples so far with a detection rate of 3/55 and 2/55 respectively.

Analysis of the binary is pending (please check back), but the payload here is Upatre/Dyre which commonly calls back to 197.149.90.166 (Cobranet, Nigeria), an IP I strongly recommended that you block.

UPDATE:

The reverse.it report shows that the malware does indeed call back to that Nigerian IP address.

Malware spam: eFax message from "Booking.com - HylaFa" - 1 page(s), Caller-ID: 031207944200

This fake fax spam comes with a malicious attachment:

From:    eFax [message@inbound.efax.com]
Date:    28 October 2015 at 10:08
Subject:    eFax message from "Booking.com - HylaFa" - 1 page(s), Caller-ID: 031207944200

---

Fax Message [Caller-ID: 031207944200] You have received a 1 page fax at 2015-10-28 08:57:17 GMT. * The reference number for this fax is lon1_did14-1445421403-1407880525-89. View this fax using your Microsoft Word. Please visit www.efax.com/en/online_fax_FAQ if you have any questions regarding this message or your service. Thank you for using the eFax service! Home     Contact     Login © 2013 j2 Global, Inc. All rights reserved. eFax® is a registered trademark of j2 Global, Inc. This account is subject to the terms listed in the eFax® Customer Agreement. FAX_20151028_1445421437_89.doc 99K

---

The attachment FAX_20151028_1445421437_89.doc is the same as used in this spam run and the payload is the Dridex banking trojan.

Malware spam: "Thank you for your order" / "DoNotReply@ikea.com"

This fake order spam does not come from IKEA but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.

From:    DoNotReply@ikea.com
Date:    28 October 2015 at 08:57
Subject:    Thank you for your order

IKEA UNITED KINGDOM

Order acknowledgement:

To print, right click and select print or use keys Ctrl and P.

Thank you for ordering with IKEA Shop Online. Your order is now being processed. Please check your order and contact us as soon as possible if any details are incorrect. IKEA Customer Relations, Kingston Park, Fletton, Peterborough, PE2 9ET. Tel: 0203 645 0015

Total cost: £122.60 Delivery date: 30-10-2015 Delivery method: Parcelforce We will confirm your delivery date by text,email or telephone within 72 hrs.

Order/Invoice number: 607656390 Order time: 8:31am GMT Order/Invoice date: 30-10-2015

Legal information
Please note that this email does not mean that we have accepted your order and it does not form a binding contract. A contract will be formed between You and IKEA at the time we dispatch your order to you, with the exception of made to order sofas and worktops where order acceptance occurs at the point when we send you our Delivery Advice email.

Your order is subject to IKEAs Terms of use and Return Policy

This is an email from IKEA Ltd (Company Number 01986283) whose registered office address is at Witan Gate House 500-600 Witan Gate West, Milton Keynes MK9 1SH, United Kingdom.
IKEA VAT Number: 527 7733 20
This email is your VAT receipt, please print a copy for your records.
IKEA Ltd does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this email as it has been transmitted over a public network.

Attached is a file IKEA receipt 607656390.doc which contains this malicious macro and which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/55.

Analysis of the document and whatever it downloads is pending, but this is likely to be the Dridex banking trojan.

UPDATE 1:

The reverse.it analysis  of the first sample shows a download from:

alvarezsantos.com/4f67g7/d6f7g8.exe

This dropped binary has a detection rate of just 2/55.

Two further samples have now been seen (VT results [1] [2]) and according to the analysis of one them, it downloads from:

experassistance.fr/4f67g7/d6f7g8.exe

Analysis of the dropped binary is pending. Please check back shortly.

UPDATE 2:

A further reverse.it analysis shows another download location of:

www.retrogame.de/4f67g7/d6f7g8.exe

The reverse.it analysis of the dropped binary is inconclusive.

UPDATE 3:

According to sources clever than I, this doesn't appear to be Dridex at all, but Neutrino Bot / Kasidet which downloads the Shifu banking trojan in the UK.

Malware spam: "ZFRSSE - CMS Collateral Report(s) as of 10/27/2015" / "frs-cms-mailer@olen.frb.org"

This fake financial email.. whatever the heck it is pretending to be.. is not from the Federal Reserve System, but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.

From:    frs-cms-mailer@olen.frb.org
Date:    27 October 2015 at 17:32
Subject:    ZFRSSE - CMS Collateral Report(s) as of 10/27/2015

You have received electronic delivery of the attached CMS Collateral Report(s) from the Federal Reserve System.
______________________________________________________________________

Note: This is an automated message and replies to this mailbox will not be answered.  Questions concerning this message can be directed to your Federal Reserve Bank contact.  This communication and all attachments hereto contain sensitive and confidential information.  As a result, this communication has been encrypted in transit.  This communication is intended solely for the use of the addressee and should be handled in accordance with applicable policies and procedures.  If you have received this communication in error please delete or destroy all copies of it.

This message was secured in transit.  ZFRSSE_20151027173233
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message was secured by ZixCorp(R).
This message center is strictly for use by current Federal Reserve System business partner and customer employees, any other use of this system is strictly prohibited.

The attachment in the sample I saw was named CMS Collateral Report_20151027173233.doc which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/55. The comments in that report point to another VirusTotal report indicating that it drops Upatre.. but unusually, this code appears to have a valid Comodo certificate.

In turn, this drops a version of the Dyre banking trojan with a detection rate of 5/56.

Malware spam: "id:9828_My_Resume"

This fake résumé spam comes with a malicious attachment. It seems that the names are randomly-generated from a list.

From:    Trinh [zhanxing1497kcuo@163.com]
Date:    27 October 2015 at 18:30
Subject:    id:9828_My_Resume
Signed by:    163.com

Good afternoon!!! my name is Bobette Gloster. my resume is doc file.
I would appreciate your immediate attention to this matter.
Yours faithfully
Bobette Gloster

In this case the attachment was named Bobette_resume_1817.doc however this will vary. The VirusTotal analysis of the document gives a detection rate of 8/55, mostly detecting a generic macro downloader.

The macro looks like this [pastebin] and the Hybrid Analysis of the document shows traffic coming FROM 46.30.41.150 (EuroByte LLC, Russia) and being POSTED to the following:

all-inclusiveresortstravel.com
designtravelagency.com
bigboattravel.com
cpasolutiononline.com
ciiapparelblog.com

The first three are on 108.167.140.175 and the second two are on 192.185.101.210 which are both allocated to WebSiteWelcome customers. I would assume that those two servers are completely compromised.

The Hybrid Analysis report shows that the malware has some characteristics that make it look like ransomware.

Recommended blocklist:
46.30.41.150
108.167.140.175
192.185.101.210

UPDATE:
This Tweet indicates that the payload is Cryptowall.

BizSummits aka ExecSummits LLC whacks former employee with lawsuit

I've written about BizSummits aka ExecSummits LLC many times before, exposing their habit of sending spam (which I haven't seen any of lately to be fair) and other questionable business practices. By accident I discovered that in September, ExecSummits file a lawsuit [Techdirt] against former employee Michael Healy.

Techdirt does a reasonable job at bringing together various bits and pieces to explain what is occurring and the background to the story. Worth a read IMO.

PACER fees being what they are, I've uploaded the documents for 1:15-cv-03199-MHC here [zip] if you want to have look.

Malware spam: "RBS Cardholder Application Form" / "Wm Palmer" [Wm.Palmer@sunderland.gov.uk]

This fake financial spam does not come from Sunderland City Council, but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment:

From     "Wm Palmer" [Wm.Palmer@sunderland.gov.uk]
Date     Tue, 27 Oct 2015 18:39:34 +0700
Subject     RBS Cardholder Application Form

Dear Customer,



We now have the go ahead from Corporate Procurement to apply to RBS for your Corporate
Purchase Card. Please find attached the RBS application form which requires your
signature as cardholder on page 2. Also please add the date. Once done can you scan
the document and email it back to me or alternatively post it back to me c/o Purchase
Card Administration Team, Transactional Finance, Room 1.34, Civic Centre, Sunderland
SR2 7DN.



Kind regards,

Wm.
Wm Palmer
Purchase Ordering Officer
Commercial and Corporate Services
Sunderland City Council

Tel: 0191 5617588
www.sunderland.gov.uk

Sunderland City Council: Sunderland Home Page

The Sunderland City Council website is for anyone living, working, visiting or wanting
to invest in Sunderland - a great city by the sea with a balanced way of life ...

Read more...

Attached is a file New_Cardholder_Application_Wm_Palmer.zip containing a malicious executable New_Cardholder_Application.scr - which is exactly the same malware as used in this other fake council spam run today.

Malware spam: "Cyngor Sir Ddinbych - Taliad BACS / Denbighshire CC - BACS Remittance" / credbills@denbighshire.gov.uk

I've never had malware spam in Welsh before.. this is not from Denbighsire County Council, but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment:

From     "credbills@denbighshire.gov.uk" [credbills@denbighshire.gov.uk]
Date     Tue, 27 Oct 2015 17:46:01 +0530
Subject     Cyngor Sir Ddinbych - Taliad BACS / Denbighshire CC - BACS Remittance

Gweler manylion taliad BACS yn atodedig

Please see attached Bacs Remittance

Dilyn ni ar Twitter: http://twitter.com/cyngorsDd Follow us on Twitter: http://twitter.com/DenbighshireCC
Ymwelwch a ni ar-lein ar http://www.sirddinbych.gov.uk Visit us online at http://www.denbighshire.gov.uk
Mae'r wybodaeth a gynhwysir yn yr e-bost hwn ac unrhyw ffeiliau a drosglwyddir gydag
o wedi eu bwriadu yn unig ar gyfer pwy bynnag y cyfeirir ef ato neu atynt. Os ydych
wedi derbyn yr e-bost hwn drwy gamgymeriad, hysbyswch yr anfonwr ar unwaith os gwelwch
yn dda. Mae cynnwys yr e-bost yn cynrychioli barn yr unigolyn(ion) a enwir uchod
ac nid yw o angenrheidrwydd yn cynrychioli barn Cyngor Sir Ddinbych. Serch hynny,
fel Corff Cyhoeddus, efallai y bydd angen i Gyngor Sir Ddinbych ddatgelu'r e-bost
hwn [neu unrhyw ymateb iddo] dan ddarpariaethau deddfwriaethol. The information contained
in this e-mail message and any files transmitted with it is intended solely for the
use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received
this e-mail in error please notify the sender immediately. The contents of this e-mail
represents the views of the individual(s) named above and do not necessarily represent
the views of Denbighshire County Council. However, as a Public Body, Denbighshire
County Council may be required to disclose this e-mail [or any response to it] under
legislative provisions.

Attached is a file DenbighshireCC.zip which contains a malicious executable DenbighshireCC.scr. This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/55. The Hybrid Analysis report shows characterstics common to the Upatre/Dyre banking trojan. In particular it identifies traffic to a know bad IP:

197.149.90.166 (Cobranet, Nigeria)

I strongly recommend that you block traffic to that IP.

Fake seminar sites to avoid, registered to vravindhar@yahoo.com

A contact tipped me off to some fake financial seminar sites, all linked to the email address vravindhar@yahoo.com. They are promoted in spam emails similar to these:

From: rob.koster@fatcacomplianceinstitute.com [mailto:rob.koster@fatcacomplianceinstitute.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 05, 2015 8:33 AM
To: redacted
Subject: FATCA Compliance - [redacted]
Importance: High

Dear Participants,

We are pleased to announce you that FATCA Compliance Institute is conducting a 2 day practical seminar on FATCA Compliance.

This seminar is going to be repeated and held thrice:

[redacted]

The seminar is open to all the Banking & Financial Professionals. The seminar particulars are attached with this mail.

Last date for enrolling your participation is [redacted], 2015.

Please contact for assistance.

Truly,

Rob Koster

Seminar Secretary

E-mail: rob.koster@fatcacomplianceinstitute.com

Website: www.fatcacompliance.org

Tel:+31-800-020-0534(Netherlands and Other EU Countries) 

       +1-312-625-0112(All Other Countries)
FAX:+31-800-020-0534

And also..

 From: alfred@pacibankers.com [mailto:alfred@pacibankers.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 11:50 AM
Subject: Asset Management Auditing and Internal Accounting Controls - [redacted]
Importance: High

Asset Management Auditing and Internal Accounting Controls - 2 Day Program

Dear Delegate

Pacific Standards (www.pacificstandards.com) would like to invite representatives from your organization to attend the above mentioned program scheduled for 2015. We are limiting the number of participants for each cluster to 20, as the courses are designed to be interactive and to encourage discussion and the exchange of ideas.

Program Dates:      Cluster I – February 25 - 26, 2015 

                                      Cluster II – March 9 - 10, 2015                                  

                                      Cluster III - March 18 - 19, 2015 

                                      Cluster IV- April 6 - 7, 2015

                                      Cluster V- April 15 - 16, 2015

                                 

Venue: {redacted}

We invite you to nominate individuals from your respective organization. It is also important to stress that all available slots will be filled on a first come first serve basis. Please advise your colleagues to attend and take advantage of this valuable and pivotal workshop.(Please see the attached brochure for complete course coverage).

Early Registration Deadline is February 15, 2015 

Last Date of Registration is February 17, 2015 

Looking forward for an early reply.

Thanks & Regards,

Alfred

Pacific Standards

Marketing Manager

Email id: Alfred@pacibankers.com

Website: http://www.pacificstandards.com/

Contact Number: +91-8801-990-204

Emails are sent from 159.253.145.90 (Softlayer, Netherlands). The registrant details look like this on most of the domains:

Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: Ravindhar V
Registrant Organization:
Registrant Street: office:7, sushant lok , sushant estate
Registrant City: gugaon
Registrant State/Province: Haryana
Registrant Postal Code: 122002
Registrant Country: India
Registrant Phone: +91.9999960651
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: vravindhar@yahoo.com
Registry Admin ID:

The emails specifically target the finance sector with what appear to be relevant seminars and services, however once payment has been received there is reportedly no further communication and no seminars.

There are a large number of related sites, some using several different domains. There are virtually zero references to these "organisations" on Google, and a close examination of the sites shows several red flags.

Pacific Standards

Claiming to be in Singapore, but boasting an Indian phone number of +91-8801990204, this outfit claims to be part of "Grenoble Learning". Neither Pacific Standards nor Grenoble Learning actually appear to exist.

Domains used:
pacificstandards.com
pacibankers.com
pacific-compliance.com
pacificstan.cc
pacificstan.com
pacificstandards.org

Brown & Co

This claims to be based as 12 Flemington Street, Glasgow but quotes a US contact number of 1-800-BRO-CORP / 1-800-246-8115.  There are many, many companies in the UK with the name "Brown & Co", but where you would expect to see number 12 on that street.. there appears to be a car park.

Domains used:

beta-essentials.me
browncorpuk.org
browncorp.co
betaeventhub.org
betaeventhub.org
betaessentials.in

FATCA Compliance Institute

A quick Google search for "FATCA Compliance Institute" reveals exactly zero reliable references to this important-looking organisation, boasting contact details in both India and The Netherlands.

15-66 plot 101 Prabhu Nagar
Poranki 521137.
Tel:+31-800-020-0534(Netherlands and Other EU Countries)
FAX:+31-800-020-0534 (ONLY EU)
FAX: +31-20-524-1592 (ALL COUNTRIES)
USA Tel: +1-312-625-0112 (All other Countries)
Email: director@fatcacompliance.cc

Corporate Office:

Keizersgracht 209
1006 DT Amsterdam
The Netherlands
The Netherlands Toll-Free:
Tel:+31-800-020-0534
FAX:+31-800-020-0534

USA Tel: +1-312-625-0112 (All other Countries)
Email: director@fatcacompliance.cc

Domains used:

fatcacomplianceinstitute.org
fatcacomplianceinstitute.com
fatcacompliance.cc
fatcacompliance.net
fatcacompliance.org

Rightman Group

The web site here looks very slick. But if you Google for snippets of somewhat ungrammatical text (such as "But, one things remains unchanged – our dedication to doing the best work in the world.") you will find that there are hundreds of sites using the exact same template. Rightman Group has the following contact details listed:

Rightman Group
 United States
199 Scott Street
Suite 810
Buffalo, NY 14204
+1-716-217-2817
USA call charges apply.
---------
 Dreikönigstrasse 30
Zürich, Switzerland
----------
+41-43-508-1974 

The New York State Division of Corporations has no such company as "Rightman Group" listed.

Domains used:

rightmangroup.com
rightman.eu
rightman.cc
rightmangroup.net
rightmangroup.org

Swiss Dossier

I can only imagine that the name "Swiss Dossier" came about through an error in autotranslation. It lists several addresses:

info@swissdossier.com(General)
offices@swissdossier.com(Training Programs)

Tel:  +1-786-235-8424(USA)

Our Global offices are located at:
19th Floor, Prudential Towers(North Side)
Office no: 1901
Chulia Street
Singapore

Aeschenvorstadt, 405
Basel,
Switzerland

79 Thornall Street,
6th Floor, Edison, NJ 08837.
New Jersy
USA

70 Sheppard Avenue, Suite 301,
North York, Ontario M2N 3A4,
Canada

A Google search for "swissdossier.com" comes up with no independent and reliable references to this so-called company.

Domains used:

swissdossier.com
swissdossier.cc
swissdossier.com.co

Treasury Management Institute

According to Companies House in the UK, there is no company in the UK with the name "Treasury Management Institute". The contact details indicate that this is perhaps the workplace of John or Jane Doe:

Email : 
 jdoe@treasurymanagementinstitute.com
 jdoe@treasurymanagementinstitute.cc
Addresses:
01, Temple Quay, Temple Back East, Bristol, BS1 6DZ, UK
SWConsulting Group, Sec 42 Gurgaon, India(Institute operates under the licence of SWConsulting Group)

There are no independent references to this organisation existing in Bristol.

Domains used:

treasurymanagementinstitute.com
treasurymanagementinstitute.cc
treasurymanagementinstitute.org

Financial Models India

Sharing the same contact details as some of these other highly questionable sites, and hosted on the same infrastructure, Financial Models India would appear to fail the Duck Test.

79 Thornall Street,
6th Floor, Edison, NJ 08837,
New Jersy,
USA

19th Floor,
Prudential Towers (North Side),
Office no: 1901,
Chulia Street, Singapore

Aeschenvorstadt, 405,
Basel, Switzerland

70 Sheppard Avenue,
Suite 301, North York,
Ontario M2N 3A4,
Canada

DLF Square M Block,
Jacaranda Marg DLF City, Phase II,
Gurgaon 122002, INDIA  

Domains used:

financialmodelsindia.com
financialmodels.co.in
fmtsglobal.com
unitedcapital-financialmodels.com
unitedcapitalglobal.com

Virat World Wide

This appears to be the firm or individual behind these sites. The "About Us" page says:

Ravindhar.V - Managing Director

Mr. Ravindhar is an able administrator and change master. He has rich experience in thearea of Financial Information Technology(FIT). He has developed financial software products and Information Technology management solutions for financial institutions and banks in more than a fifty countries and for top global Banks and companies. His qualification is Master of Finance and Accounting with a track of computer applications in Finance and Accounting(MFA). Mr.Ravindhar comes from Business Family of Poranki Sugars and his family is a legacy of entrepreneurs based in India. Group is widely respected by the industry.

I'm guessing the the "V" stands for "Virat", making him "Ravindhar Virat". The contact details list an address in the... errr. UNITED KIGDOM.

Global Support
+919-618-921-876
customersupport@virat.consulting
120, CENTRAL STREET
CLERKENWELL
LONDON
UNITED KIGDOM

This address is actually a hotel. The +91 telephone number is a number in India, not the UK.

Domains used:

virat.consulting
virat-transitionalhunts.biz
virat-th.co.in

Other domains

The other domains (mostly now defunct or with no content) also appear to belong to the same operator:

financialmodelsglobal.net
fortunicia-munich.org

europiafintech.com
europiafintech.net

fisher-n-moreglobal.com
fishernmore-global.org
fmg-singapore.org

intrinsic-pulse.com
intrinsic-pulse.asia


baselknowledge.net
clarklc.com
luthanskane.in
panarab-consulting.in
porankisugars.org
profectuspartners-singapore.com
proximitycorp.org
rfb-research.net
sino-overseasholdings.org
stermarc-worldwide.com
vertasbar.net

If you have any experiences with any of these "companies", feel free to leave a comment.

Malware spam: "Your new PHS documents are attached" / "PHSOnline" [documents@phsonline.co.uk]

This spam does not come from PHSOnline, but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment.

From     "PHSOnline" [documents@phsonline.co.uk]
Date     Mon, 26 Oct 2015 20:28:50 +0700
Subject     Your new PHS documents are attached

I don't have a copy of the body text for these messages, but the attachment is named G-A0287580036267754265.doc which comes in three different versions (VT results [1] [2] [3]) containing a macro like this [pastebin] which downloads a malicious binary from one of the following locations:

tranquilosurf.com/~info/76r56e87y8/65df78.exe
masaze-rumburk.cz/76r56e87y8/65df78.exe
img1.buyersbestfriend.com/76r56e87y8/65df78.exe

The Hybrid Analysis reports those those documents are here: [1] [2] [3]. The file is saved as %TEMP%\ZipCock32.exe and this has VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/55. The Hybrid Analysis report for this binary shows it downloading from the following location:

195.154.251.123 (Online SAS / Iliad Entreprises / Poney Telecom, France)

This is almost definitely the Dridex banking trojan. Note that the documents and download locations appear to be the same as the one use in this earlier attack, but the payload has now changed.

Malware spam: "#NC-242455-Zmj Your Norwich Camping Order has shipped!" / sales@norwichcamping.co.uk

This fake financial spam does not come from Norwich Camping but is instead a simple forgery with a malicious attachment:

From     "Norwich Camping" [sales@norwichcamping.co.uk]
Date     Mon, 26 Oct 2015 13:43:14 +0430
Subject     #NC-242455-Zmj Your Norwich Camping Order has shipped!

You Norwich Camping & Leisure order "#NC-242455-Zmj" has now been shipped. Your chosen
payment method has now been charged.

Kind regards,
The Norwich Camping & Leisure

Attached is a file invoice-2425.doc of which I have only seen a single sample so far with a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/55. The document contains this malicious macro [pastebin] which apparently downloads a malicious binary to %TEMP%\|ZipCock32.exe

Analysis of the document and the payload is pending (please check back later), it is most likely that it downloads the Dridex banking trojan.

UPDATE:

According to this Hybrid Analysis report version of the malicious document downloads an executable from:

img1.buyersbestfriend.com/76r56e87y8/65df78.exe

This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/55. That report indicates malicious traffic to:

195.154.251.123 (Online SAS / Iliad Entreprises / Poney Telecom, France)

I recommend that you block traffic to that IP.

Malware spam: "Credit Note CN-06536 from Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc. for [redacted] (2752)"

This fake financial spam has a malicious attachment:

From:    Accounts [message-service@post.xero.com]
Date:    23 October 2015 at 15:08
Subject:    Credit Note CN-06536 from Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc. for [redacted] (2752)

Hi Mattie,

Attached is your credit note CN-06536 for 8954.41 GBP.

This has been allocated against invoice number

If you have any questions, please let us know.

Thanks,
Avnet, Inc.

The message is neither from Avnet, Xero or Trump Hotels, but is a simple forgery. Attached is a file Credit Note CN-06536.doc ..  but  it's actually a ZIP file rather than a DOC file. Whoops. Renaming the .DOC to .ZIP creates a valid archive, and the executable inside is named Credit Note CN-83607.exe  and has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/55. VT identifies this as Upatre which implies that the payload is the Dyre banking trojan.

Analysis is still pending for this malware (please check back later) but the current version of Update/Dyre phones home to 197.149.90.166 (Cobranet, Nigeria) which I strongly recommend you block.

UPDATE:
The Hybrid Analysis report is here, reporting the Nigerian IP and also showing that the malware saves itself as:
%TEMP%\homebast.exe
C:\Windows\mLunoMqU.exe

Malware spam: "DocuCentre-V C6675 T2" / "Scan Data from FX-D6DBE1"

This fake document scan appears to originate from within the victim's own organisation, but doesn't. Instead it comes with a malicious attachment.

From:    DocuCentre-V C6675 T2 [reception@victimdomain.com]
Reply-to:    reception@victimdomain.com
Date:    23 October 2015 at 09:23
Subject:    Scan Data from FX-D6DBE1

Number of Images: 1
Attachment File Type: DOC

Device Name: DocuCentre-V C6675 T2
Device Location:

Attached is a file 22102015160213-0001.doc which comes in a few different versions. The payload is Dridex and all the files and downloaded binaries are the same as used in this spam run.

Malware spam: "cleaning invoice" / "deborah Sherer" [thesherers@westnet.co.uk]

This fake financial spam comes with a malicious attachment:

From     "deborah Sherer" [thesherers@westnet.co.uk]
Date     Fri, 23 Oct 2015 17:03:19 +0700
Subject     cleaning invoice

Hello

attached is invoice for payment

thanks

Deborah Sherer

---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus

Attached is a file Cleaning022958.doc which comes in three different versions (VirusTotal results [1] [2] [3]) containing a macro that looks like this [pastebin] and downloads a malicious binary from one of the following locations:

www.bhtfriends.org/tydfyyur54/43e67tko.exe
zomb.webzdarma.cz/tydfyyur54/43e67tko.exe
nisanyapi.com/tydfyyur54/43e67tko.exe

This is saved as %TEMP%\lenderb2.exe and has a VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/55 (that's just a generic detection by Kaspersky).

That VirusTotal report plus this Hybrid Analysis report show network traffic to:

195.154.251.123 (Online SAS / Iliad Entreprises / Poney Telecom, France)

Private sources also identify these following IPs as part of the C2 infrastructure:

157.252.245.49 (Trinity College Hartford, US)
198.74.58.153 (Linode, US)
68.168.100.232 (Codero, US)

The payload appears to be the Dridex banking trojan.

Recommended blocklist:
195.154.251.123
157.252.245.49
198.74.58.153
68.168.100.232

MD5s:
d897c1cdab10a2c8cb5ce95bff03411f
a4bdc332d9cecafcc8381cd6e5ff4667
16fabe48278f84f8ae1bc682a3bd71d7
c08519230b49ad87bc6aa12933aa0cec

Malware spam: "Notice to Appear" / Notice_to_Appear_00800614.zip

This fake legal spam comes with a malicious attachment:

From:    District Court
Date:    22 October 2015 at 19:03
Subject:    Notice to Appear

Notice to Appear,

This is to inform you to appear in the Court on the October 27 for your case hearing.
Please, prepare all the documents relating to the case and bring them to Court on the specified date.
Note: The case may be heard by the judge in your absence if you do not come.

You can review complete details of the Court Notice in the attachment.

Sincerely,
Michael Newell,
District Clerk.

Attached is a file Notice_to_Appear_00800614.zip which in turn contains a malicious script Notice_to_Appear_00800614.doc.js which looks like this [pastebin]. This obfuscated script translates into something a bit more understandable which clearly references the following domains:

www.flowarrior.com
www.abama.org
littlefacesofpanama-association.com

The Hybrid Analysis report  shows that it downloads a file as %TEMP%\5883173.exe which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 5/55 (possibly Cridex). It reference the following IPs as being highly suspect:

91.121.108.77 (OVH, France)
78.24.220.229 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)

A large number of IPs are queried according to that report:

66.147.244.241	80	TCP	United States ASN: 46606 (Unified Layer) Possibly Malicious (Details)	5 times
78.24.220.229	80	TCP	Russian Federation ASN: 29182 (ISPsystem, cjsc)	35 times
74.231.32.162	80	TCP	United States	1 times
118.120.73.233	80	TCP	China	1 times
29.225.112.86	80	TCP	United States	1 times
100.73.14.38	80	TCP	Reserved	1 times
58.101.131.47	80	TCP	China	1 times
123.59.97.196	80	TCP	China	1 times
166.32.216.239	80	TCP	United States	1 times
149.91.92.120	80	TCP	United States	1 times
24.216.168.199	80	TCP	United States	1 times
105.140.148.131	80	TCP	Morocco	1 times
163.58.44.144	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
142.84.237.228	80	TCP	Canada	1 times
15.108.255.248	80	TCP	United States	1 times
220.168.3.242	80	TCP	China	1 times
169.69.97.65	80	TCP	United States	1 times
136.48.1.199	80	TCP	United States	1 times
193.224.232.11	80	TCP	Hungary	1 times
46.156.117.74	80	TCP	Norway	1 times
15.73.25.4	8080	TCP	United States	1 times
156.95.94.161	80	TCP	United States	1 times
2.95.43.213	80	TCP	Russian Federation	1 times
201.112.96.9	443	TCP	Mexico	1 times
168.202.241.83	80	TCP	Italy	1 times
126.200.226.38	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
218.169.88.145	80	TCP	Taiwan; Republic of China (ROC)	1 times
25.227.76.74	80	TCP	United Kingdom	1 times
7.58.91.181	80	TCP	United States	1 times
2.9.47.33	80	TCP	France	1 times
82.64.212.187	80	TCP	France	1 times
160.252.229.129	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
3.19.211.174	80	TCP	United States	1 times
206.36.90.112	80	TCP	United States	1 times
70.162.95.85	80	TCP	United States	1 times
179.74.44.184	80	TCP	Brazil	1 times
27.60.28.101	80	TCP	India	1 times
72.131.92.208	80	TCP	United States	1 times
192.15.148.68	80	TCP	United States	1 times
161.183.113.148	80	TCP	United States	1 times
89.194.8.74	80	TCP	United Kingdom	1 times
74.60.141.199	443	TCP	United States	1 times
185.124.201.36	80	TCP	Germany	1 times
57.254.22.27	80	TCP	Belgium	1 times
223.212.109.175	443	TCP	China	1 times
184.128.6.160	80	TCP	United States	1 times
222.26.8.100	80	TCP	China	1 times
201.80.124.250	80	TCP	Brazil	1 times
28.245.107.140	8080	TCP	United States	1 times
7.205.88.91	80	TCP	United States	1 times
134.208.174.118	443	TCP	Taiwan; Republic of China (ROC)	1 times
101.42.94.123	80	TCP	China	1 times
89.184.155.55	8080	TCP	Denmark	1 times
73.136.226.227	80	TCP	United States	1 times
92.242.113.252	80	TCP	Ukraine	1 times
183.80.180.237	80	TCP	Viet Nam	1 times
189.217.246.252	80	TCP	Mexico	1 times
162.124.240.218	80	TCP	United States	1 times
169.244.37.32	80	TCP	United States	1 times
121.213.170.136	8080	TCP	Australia	1 times
91.121.108.77	80	TCP	France	1 times
161.187.226.73	8080	TCP	Canada	1 times
160.124.108.194	8080	TCP	South Africa	1 times
132.201.159.171	80	TCP	United States	1 times
36.136.60.81	80	TCP	China	1 times
155.159.37.116	80	TCP	South Africa	1 times
139.171.227.16	80	TCP	United States	1 times
119.243.117.9	443	TCP	Japan	1 times
42.199.100.99	80	TCP	China	1 times
170.225.41.44	80	TCP	United States	1 times
27.122.177.126	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
151.75.83.209	80	TCP	Italy	1 times
203.207.191.222	8080	TCP	China	1 times
208.97.41.75	80	TCP	United States	1 times
179.184.50.147	80	TCP	Brazil	1 times
126.155.24.64	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
86.14.23.181	80	TCP	United Kingdom	1 times
182.162.87.90	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
126.85.62.33	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
96.60.99.19	80	TCP	United States	1 times
118.123.163.35	80	TCP	China	1 times
69.190.137.38	80	TCP	United States	1 times
49.56.139.124	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
135.35.59.201	80	TCP	United States	1 times
57.25.34.69	80	TCP	Belgium	1 times
174.190.210.89	80	TCP	United States	1 times
206.91.83.240	80	TCP	United States	1 times
16.143.86.194	80	TCP	United States	1 times
99.212.19.159	80	TCP	Canada	1 times
171.214.61.169	80	TCP	China	1 times
194.184.155.135	80	TCP	Italy	1 times
98.30.91.219	80	TCP	United States	1 times
30.130.130.227	80	TCP	United States	1 times
201.231.21.9	80	TCP	Argentina	1 times
10.85.253.242	8080	TCP	Reserved	1 times
41.70.25.98	80	TCP	Malawi	1 times
2.239.93.99	80	TCP	Italy	1 times
178.216.173.66	80	TCP	Ukraine	1 times
102.239.48.12	80	TCP	Indonesia	1 times
170.229.125.27	443	TCP	United States	1 times
170.202.85.86	80	TCP	United States	1 times
138.204.51.115	80	TCP	Brazil	1 times
90.59.134.25	80	TCP	France	1 times
179.105.47.26	80	TCP	Brazil	1 times
190.128.247.9	80	TCP	Paraguay	1 times
62.74.109.148	80	TCP	Greece	1 times
39.6.23.63	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
199.12.247.12	80	TCP	United States	1 times
1.235.148.23	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
128.166.232.112	80	TCP	United States	1 times
198.12.245.130	80	TCP	United States	1 times
180.59.204.28	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
191.205.91.94	443	TCP	Brazil	1 times
166.97.6.127	80	TCP	United States	1 times
35.174.179.31	80	TCP	United States	1 times
202.94.163.179	80	TCP	Malaysia	1 times
199.2.172.193	80	TCP	United States	1 times
36.4.249.54	80	TCP	China	1 times
87.60.146.60	80	TCP	Denmark	1 times
159.157.156.108	80	TCP	United States	1 times
41.103.3.7	80	TCP	Algeria	1 times
190.5.47.228	80	TCP	Chile	1 times
102.197.139.86	8080	TCP	Indonesia	1 times
79.181.62.136	80	TCP	Israel	1 times
196.221.146.64	8080	TCP	Egypt	1 times
45.215.43.254	80	TCP	Zambia	1 times
133.50.67.191	443	TCP	Japan	1 times
197.187.96.58	80	TCP	Tanzania United Republic of	1 times
81.11.14.8	80	TCP	European Union	1 times
165.216.148.197	80	TCP	United States	1 times
26.159.93.175	80	TCP	United States	1 times
55.192.224.240	80	TCP	United States	1 times
99.183.118.77	8080	TCP	United States	1 times
97.132.112.64	80	TCP	United States	1 times
161.158.216.248	80	TCP	Netherlands	1 times
171.36.6.24	80	TCP	China	1 times
86.17.207.59	80	TCP	United Kingdom	1 times
65.170.164.185	80	TCP	United States	1 times
203.116.171.38	80	TCP	Singapore	1 times
81.131.210.206	80	TCP	United Kingdom	1 times
144.69.59.80	80	TCP	United States	1 times
108.132.28.175	80	TCP	United States	1 times
54.173.72.227	80	TCP	United States	1 times
48.227.99.193	80	TCP	United States	1 times
165.244.29.101	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
61.163.159.70	80	TCP	China	1 times
141.54.70.120	80	TCP	Germany	1 times
22.6.129.165	80	TCP	United States	1 times
16.65.24.201	80	TCP	United States	1 times
107.66.193.112	80	TCP	United States	1 times
113.185.128.185	80	TCP	Viet Nam	1 times
185.242.98.255	80	TCP	Germany	1 times
39.247.94.231	80	TCP	Indonesia	1 times
1.136.195.240	80	TCP	Australia	1 times
176.2.178.107	443	TCP	Germany	1 times
211.57.175.126	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
16.78.184.90	80	TCP	United States	1 times
121.237.58.132	80	TCP	China	1 times
45.115.246.94	80	TCP	China	1 times
42.213.207.250	80	TCP	China	1 times
202.217.115.34	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
20.100.36.35	80	TCP	United States	1 times
73.178.96.229	80	TCP	United States	1 times
177.85.76.19	80	TCP	Brazil	1 times
184.148.22.247	80	TCP	Canada	1 times
153.228.8.191	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
196.226.207.67	443	TCP	Liberia	1 times
171.178.119.233	80	TCP	United States	1 times
175.198.60.5	80	TCP	Korea Republic of	1 times
196.9.179.56	80	TCP	South Africa	1 times
20.163.126.33	443	TCP	United States	1 times
152.223.8.195	80	TCP	United States	1 times
12.51.242.168	80	TCP	United States	1 times
197.169.155.191	80	TCP	South Africa	1 times
95.198.239.136	8080	TCP	Sweden	1 times
209.93.5.164	80	TCP	United States	1 times
200.17.48.177	80	TCP	Brazil	1 times
37.147.149.212	80	TCP	Russian Federation	1 times
113.201.208.234	80	TCP	China	1 times
157.219.20.253	80	TCP	United States	1 times
45.72.49.98	80	TCP	United States	1 times
87.196.69.215	80	TCP	Portugal	1 times
141.251.31.43	80	TCP	United States	1 times
30.28.29.139	8080	TCP	United States	1 times
211.72.127.114	80	TCP	Taiwan; Republic of China (ROC)	1 times
126.62.177.152	8080	TCP	Japan	1 times
67.62.93.143	80	TCP	United States	1 times
4.219.11.148	80	TCP	United States	1 times
220.15.135.111	80	TCP	Japan	1 times
6.193.44.176	80	TCP	United States	1 times
88.18.235.212	80	TCP	Spain	1 times
65.235.102.3	80	TCP	United States	1 times
212.246.252.248	80	TCP	Finland	1 times
65.44.223.34	80	TCP	United States	1 times
67.147.184.3	443	TCP	United States	1 times
218.100.198.67	8080	TCP	China	1 times
183.74.253.72	443	TCP	Japan	1 times
189.99.113.170	443	TCP	Brazil	1 times
202.113.235.65	80	TCP	China	1 times
78.193.245.197	80	TCP	France	1 times
20.87.185.21	443	TCP	United States	1 times
34.94.156.167	80	TCP	United States	1 times
16.154.131.128	443	TCP	United States	1 times
112.236.139.20	80	TCP	China	1 times
37.217.232.246	80	TCP	Saudi Arabia	1 times

I have not had the change to check those individual IP addresses, but I recommend that you block the following two at least:

91.121.108.77
78.24.220.229 

UPDATE 26/10/15:

A slightly revised version of this is circulating:

Notice to Appear,

This is to inform you to appear in the Court on the November 03 for your case hearing.
Please, prepare all the documents relating to the case and bring them to Court on the specified date.
Note: If you do not come, the case will be heard in your absence.

You can review complete details of the Court Notice in the attachment.

Yours faithfully,
Nathan Andrews,
District Clerk.

The attachment is Notice_to_Appear_000314661.zip which contains a file Notice_to_Appear_000314661.doc.js which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 14/55. According to this Hybrid Analysis report it contacts a LOT of IPs, but these in particular should be blocked:

67.199.5.184 (CrystalTech Web Hosting, US)
78.24.220.229 (TheFirst-RU, Russia)
189.131.94.156 (UniNet, Mexico)
74.10.19.66 (Knox Attorney Service Inc., US)

The following files are dropped (VT reports) [1] [2] [3]

Recommended blocklist:
67.199.5.184
78.24.220.229
189.131.94.156
74.10.19.66

  ssf