85.214.64.153 is an IP belonging to Strato AG in Germany, it appears to host some legitimate sites but the server seems to be serving up the Neutrino exploit kit (example) which is being injected into hacked websites (specifically, malicious code is being appended to legitimate .js files on those site).
The follow Dynamic DNS domains are being abused in this attack, while they are not malicious in themselves they are abused so often that I would recommend blocking them anway:
dontexist.com
dvrdns.org
dynalias.org
gotdns.com
gotdns.org
gotdns.com
homeftp.net
mine.nu
podzone.net
selfip.biz
webhop.org
These sites appear to be legitimate, I cannot vouch for them being clean or not:
drachenschutzverein.de
rollenbeck.de
rollenbeck.eu
thefinalcut.eu
thefirstcut.de
triton-world.de
These sites are mostly flagged as malicious by Google, you can see some indicators of badness here and here:
004d28e2d38895c1245cab9b.dynalias.org
02b2b43ea1ba9bb9e72d3a69.selfip.biz
04e9e737a91bd31be2668861.mine.nu
08af1b8d55e2ba1f62732d85.gotdns.com
08ed70ff228cfd034f170d5a.mine.nu
0a935f252dd7c6a97658c956.dynalias.org
0c36d49d8ec82656db219bb5.dontexist.com
0ce19c234b42bfc3f5ae92cd.mine.nu
0ce54ec3d86cf07f5ac4640d.dontexist.com
101357ada1366203f8f3410e.podzone.net
10ffeb808d1a476d6ee06d2b.dontexist.com
11ec862e5fb9ec0762af7600.dynalias.org
128d4a163a90f543c259b1e5.mine.nu
1603db959a32f7b6f070e7b1.dontexist.com
166bb7f29be512bfc5d4c949.podzone.net
16b8286aab3437edeb846cf9.gotdns.com
17323cb4c3ff8ed8cbb0cf27.dvrdns.org
19329577e3905949b51c567c.dynalias.org
19941643733a38ef578bf12e.gotdns.org
1d26ff47b5aadad2d755979a.dvrdns.org
1d3beb9da9c09a58399e1d43.homeftp.net
1d946845b43b656d8f981e66.dynalias.org
1db064c3643e8c7cb6f89b54.gotdns.com
1f68faa21ae717bdda0536dc.dontexist.com
22c4daf753a7da024bf8b24e.mine.nu
250f1e3f1a2940aa4255deb5.dynalias.org
28d23e8ed4a6dfee2643ffce.dynalias.org
2e671f830928f031ff49f94c.dontexist.com
304ef8935293491f8259aebf.podzone.net
33409d12ccd5f348eb9e1d33.dontexist.com
33ab845252f3569c05a5ac70.dynalias.org
36a42ceaeee91822ecd84d1f.dynalias.org
37a9618442c3bd213d4877e2.gotdns.com
3896ca0bf37e183b734a6632.gotdns.org
3a009cd88f47dbd55a51ca0a.webhop.org
3b22c29409273c2ba45019e4.mine.nu
3cb79af7f0615a1eb638fd11.webhop.org
3e54c514284b705b4a6d8386.dynalias.org
3e91663455c489443d2ba75d.gotdns.com
3f80c8356bec83904a0a4b82.mine.nu
428836867237c5453a08da8e.webhop.org
43ea343452c7ac0f0846c988.podzone.net
448d3de8b830b70be22600bf.gotdns.com
44f32cf9971710b869a9e9c8.dontexist.com
47b10a4ab30e61e4b74aa661.gotdns.org
48e972108842e0d0c9e5fdf2.mine.nu
4916e2635dceb69776862390.dynalias.org
4a017cd6908b09d62c425718.selfip.biz
4c7e7dacb398c086c58d3faa.dynalias.org
4cac5eabb6a2214a81ad0760.selfip.biz
4e874edeea1e68fc792bdae2.gotdns.org
5328e9f6069f470758a00acc.dvrdns.org
549b11272b8a4b3095b0537e.dontexist.com
571ea1436338cc0d99eb8078.dynalias.org
58e74d65a3cc4fe035dbbda2.gotdns.com
5adde68d3bc12bb5e625cabb.homeftp.net
5c9d25cc7cd882479a609796.mine.nu
60a25d608e4a649e4af444e0.podzone.net
60e2af3686d06f21f3020026.homeftp.net
665b44722928d6bfbeaf988b.webhop.org
66bc311918791a6794866f50.dvrdns.org
67c97cbed3d264d19d8e5b27.dvrdns.org
6b2eb59711013d300e880d1c.dynalias.org
6b3c3cc0b4dd780c2fec2f6f.gotdns.com
6b52de135dc1495e89c0ab58.dontexist.com
6b60af16dc1d0e8ea821fdbc.gotdns.org
725a523df99960216bcfbffa.homeftp.net
73c5db9904cc52e4eace0764.webhop.org
779c26501c761d5e919a6624.homeftp.net
794b5ca01bb64c48754faf0c.dynalias.org
7e0a9746bba240206beb0fd0.homeftp.net
7e781346baa3a3bce70aa5bf.webhop.org
80cb766e88b70c906ecbefd3.dontexist.com
8140d66059dfec6425f71131.podzone.net
818644b1831c84e0798f9ee0.mine.nu
856990d5b0456a8ba9dbeb32.dontexist.com
88444afacffba122547670d1.mine.nu
8cd2b11586888ecb52ffd053.gotdns.com
8e3468104627c54bc068dd44.selfip.biz
8ec80631144f0fbc1eaa8f68.mine.nu
900139eaffbcd38018876df0.homeftp.net
90499263ca224ca95ff01024.webhop.org
909e65f061017672744285f3.dontexist.com
90d52c7d0c92f6ddacf68711.dontexist.com
910396ce5254bef0819e633d.selfip.biz
92afd94d55a6da9d1f519a7c.podzone.net
94488376b5d8d3f6c6a40bc5.webhop.org
95191465ad24aa061517253a.dynalias.org
95482702ed214a4b556619c6.selfip.biz
970fdfd18df4813f52d2472b.selfip.biz
9b212ac718b2e1235943adec.dynalias.org
9b4358c823382cbb4e82bf41.dontexist.com
9c850ba00e51786140490a36.mine.nu
9d2e959724edd7f66cec301e.selfip.biz
9eae6ea1c34249c042bf0037.podzone.net
a26f23656bab8dc4508eb5a2.mine.nu
a4c2b706b85923bb957823c2.mine.nu
a6197eccdfe18ef2ca06e48c.webhop.org
a798f98455df470c0b29b34f.mine.nu
a828fe5c598dc865e924fbb9.webhop.org
aae039e0629bd1614947f0f0.dynalias.org
ab690c910c49ad2bef9cce75.dynalias.org
b0a357b5735f902bdff042c1.podzone.net
b22d5de582060e586061f15b.homeftp.net
b66583b617d2d7b6a1dded9f.gotdns.com
b6e0134b7d7da747fe0c74e0.dynalias.org
b793df5e348aeb2c7dd5b7cc.podzone.net
ba028a028a38fcd8443e5c8f.dynalias.org
bb6e1f75f8fe369d7971ecdb.dynalias.org
bc1837ebe4d995b08079df38.mine.nu
bd7421fee539607f46f1f26a.dontexist.com
bdb7e7001bfbf6865e0e5fc7.dontexist.com
bf14f07423a53dc55ea35535.mine.nu
c1642b97da37c657a97bd848.mine.nu
c467917ae834519814e0d49a.dontexist.com
c58e1b1edc0e04195f01017a.dynalias.org
c6492763968289bebce065cf.gotdns.com
c8870d5fa9727a8d5fa2b5a8.gotdns.org
d1bfb154de06cbd381ef9751.mine.nu
d827f2ea240954322849260f.dynalias.org
d83c3de86bed61e7fb14d7b1.dynalias.org
dae7fb32afe3c0f9dc6d5ad2.mine.nu
db8c62855fb701cd676004e5.dynalias.org
dcbf23097800332e59ac4def.selfip.biz
dcc4374eda96873afb137b44.dynalias.org
dff3a271573578b6cc43c725.dontexist.com
e08bcee3f8586e0d3f3a8e31.gotdns.com
e119b0eb7fc7cb31bf64c66d.dvrdns.org
e2706818cafcdf67ea2552cb.gotdns.com
e64d445987e618bea6482938.podzone.net
eb3f72f1952b17acf62ee80d.selfip.biz
eb578347b30a518687364a9e.podzone.net
f0834c7ec0926ebe78029dc0.dynalias.org
f555bf015261100d38e0f2de.webhop.org
f5e647d0a9aa2dda4898fd2f.dynalias.org
f671629e0f16049db9ccd856.mine.nu
f777e097f711778ec22426a1.selfip.biz
fa0ccbcf1b5f74984a9530d7.mine.nu
fb857508b0c9cc35e3bab1e2.gotdns.org
fd7d46aa07ab0406560b4126.mine.nu
fd8c8f5b6a2867f79d1b8e71.gotdns.com
fe753d5f9ea4f311d1d14cc2.gotdns.com
fe8b7219896da7dbd4e28520.dynalias.org
ff5267331e22549fde4ca643.mine.nu
Monday, 17 June 2013
Something evil on 85.214.64.153
Labels:
Dynamic DNS,
Germany,
Injection Attacks,
Malware,
Viruses
Saturday, 15 June 2013
HAIR / Biostem Pump and Dump rakes in the dollars
If like me you've been plagued with pump and dump spam messages for Biostem US Corp (stock ticker HAIR) for the past several days, you might be curious to know if this massive spam run is actually having any impact on the company's share price.
The stock spam started after the close of trading on Friday 7th June 2013 and has continued aggressively ever since. In parallel, the message boards for HAIR were spammed with some fairly obvious attempts to pump up the price, the following screenshot is from the Yahoo! message board.
If we look at a stock chart for Biostem, we can see that something raised the stock price from the $0.21 it had been stuck on for a while (after collapsing from about $1 a share in February) up to $0.36 on the close of business on 10th June, an increase of 71%, before settling at around $0.29 (a 38% increase).
As pointed out here, Biostem is a pretty awful looking stock where the CEO was recently arrested, accounts are overdue and the last reported financial position of the company was dire, so it looks like it is on its last legs. But crucially there seems to be no news of substance about the company, so we can assume that all the stock price movement is purely down to the pump and dump spam.
The usual volume of trade for Biotech (HAIR) stocks is pretty close to zero. From when the markets opened on Monday 10th June to the close of the market on Friday 14th June, over 2.2 million shares were traded when normally we would expect to see a few thousand if that.
There had been bursts of trading activity recently, but the most interesting was a period from 9th May for about 6 trading days when over 1.3 million shares were bought for no particular reason. After that was a period from 20th May when a further 270k shares were purchased, perhaps as speculators sniffed around the company.
We don't know who is behind the pump and dump spam run, but we assume that the spammers are the ones who bought the 1.3 million shares or so after the 9th May. If they manage to dump those shares at the peak they could have made over $200,000. But the spam run didn't stop there, and as of 15th June it is still going on. Why? Presumably because somebody still has shares in the company that they are still trying to offload. In total there are 114.2 million shares, and only 2.2 million (1.9%) of them were traded during that week.
The sad fact of the matter seems to be that pump and dump does seem to have a positive effect on this sort of thinly-traded low-value share price. But the thing is that the spammers have already taken out their positions in the target company, it is almost impossible for a normal investor to make any money out of this because as soon as the spamming starts, then the stock dumping starts as well.
The stock spam started after the close of trading on Friday 7th June 2013 and has continued aggressively ever since. In parallel, the message boards for HAIR were spammed with some fairly obvious attempts to pump up the price, the following screenshot is from the Yahoo! message board.
If we look at a stock chart for Biostem, we can see that something raised the stock price from the $0.21 it had been stuck on for a while (after collapsing from about $1 a share in February) up to $0.36 on the close of business on 10th June, an increase of 71%, before settling at around $0.29 (a 38% increase).
As pointed out here, Biostem is a pretty awful looking stock where the CEO was recently arrested, accounts are overdue and the last reported financial position of the company was dire, so it looks like it is on its last legs. But crucially there seems to be no news of substance about the company, so we can assume that all the stock price movement is purely down to the pump and dump spam.
The usual volume of trade for Biotech (HAIR) stocks is pretty close to zero. From when the markets opened on Monday 10th June to the close of the market on Friday 14th June, over 2.2 million shares were traded when normally we would expect to see a few thousand if that.
There had been bursts of trading activity recently, but the most interesting was a period from 9th May for about 6 trading days when over 1.3 million shares were bought for no particular reason. After that was a period from 20th May when a further 270k shares were purchased, perhaps as speculators sniffed around the company.
We don't know who is behind the pump and dump spam run, but we assume that the spammers are the ones who bought the 1.3 million shares or so after the 9th May. If they manage to dump those shares at the peak they could have made over $200,000. But the spam run didn't stop there, and as of 15th June it is still going on. Why? Presumably because somebody still has shares in the company that they are still trying to offload. In total there are 114.2 million shares, and only 2.2 million (1.9%) of them were traded during that week.
The sad fact of the matter seems to be that pump and dump does seem to have a positive effect on this sort of thinly-traded low-value share price. But the thing is that the spammers have already taken out their positions in the target company, it is almost impossible for a normal investor to make any money out of this because as soon as the spamming starts, then the stock dumping starts as well.
Labels:
Pump and Dump
Friday, 14 June 2013
On 195.110.124.133
A couple of days ago I recommended blocking 195.110.124.133 (Register.it, Italy) as a malware C&C server. It turns out that I didn't do enough checking, and this is a parking server with nearly 200k sites on it, mostly for Italian customers.
You might want to unblock the IP and block the domain ftp.videotre.tv.it instead. On the other hand, there is still some actual evil-ness on this server so you may want to keep it blocked, especially if you don't send much traffic in Italy's way.
You might want to unblock the IP and block the domain ftp.videotre.tv.it instead. On the other hand, there is still some actual evil-ness on this server so you may want to keep it blocked, especially if you don't send much traffic in Italy's way.
Yahoo! "We want you back" email mystery
Here's a minor mystery with something that looks very much like a phishing email..
It just looks so much like a phishing email that a sensible person probably wouldn't click on it.. except, the links in the email actually go to Yahoo! and the email has been signed, so this really does appear to be a genuine email.
Except for one thing.. the email address that it was sent to has never been used to register a Yahoo! account. Yup.. something somewhere is not right with this email..
Yahoo!'s explanation can be found here.
From: Yahoo! [noreply@email.yahoo-inc.com]
Date: 14 June 2013 08:42
Subject: We want you back
Signed by: email.yahoo-inc.com
Yahoo!
We want you back.
Sign in now
Keep your account active by signing in before July 15th, 2013.
By reactivating your Yahoo! account you can experience the new Yahoo! Mail, more personalized content on Yahoo.com, and so much more.
Once your account is reactivated, every time you sign in, your account will be extended by 12 months.
Need to reset your password?
Assistance is here!
Have additional questions?
Visit Customer Care
Yahoo! Customer Experience
Privacy Policy | Web Beacons in Email
It just looks so much like a phishing email that a sensible person probably wouldn't click on it.. except, the links in the email actually go to Yahoo! and the email has been signed, so this really does appear to be a genuine email.
Except for one thing.. the email address that it was sent to has never been used to register a Yahoo! account. Yup.. something somewhere is not right with this email..
Yahoo!'s explanation can be found here.
Wednesday, 12 June 2013
"Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre" spam / Scan_06122013_29911.zip
This fake Xerox WorkCentre spam comes with a malicious attachment and appears to come from the victim's own domain:
VirusTotal results are 23/47 which is typically patchy. Comodo CAMAS reports that the malware attempts to phone home to forum.xcpus.com on 71.19.227.135 and has the following checksums:
ThreatExpert has some more information, but the ThreatTrack report [pdf] is more detailed and also identifies the following domains and IPs which are probably worth blocking or looking out for:
71.19.227.135
205.178.152.164
198.173.244.62
204.8.121.24
173.246.106.150
forum.xcpus.com
apparellogisticsgroup.net
ftp.celebritynetworks.com
portal.wroctv.com
ftp.videotre.tv.it
buildmybarwebsite.com
Update: I'd previously listed 195.110.124.133 on the blocklist which is a register.it parking server in Italy. That was probably overkill, you might want to unblock it and block ftp.videotre.tv.it instead.
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 10:36:16 -0500 [11:36:16 EDT]Attached is a ZIP file, in this case called Scan_06122013_29911.zip which in turn contains an executable Scan_06122013_29911.exe. Note that the date is encoded into the filename so future versions will be different.
From: Xerox WorkCentre [Xerox.Device9@victimdomain.com]
Subject: Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Please download the document. It was scanned and sent to you using a Xerox multifunction device.
File Type: pdf
Download: Scanned from a Xerox multi~3.pdf
multifunction device Location: machine location not set
Device Name: Xerox2023
For more information on Xerox products and solutions, please visit http://www.xerox.com
VirusTotal results are 23/47 which is typically patchy. Comodo CAMAS reports that the malware attempts to phone home to forum.xcpus.com on 71.19.227.135 and has the following checksums:
MD5 | 8fcba93b00dba3d182b1228b529d3c9e |
SHA1 | 54f02f3f1d6954f98e14a9cee62787387e5b072c |
SHA256 | 544c08f288b1102d6304e9bf3fb352a8fdfb59df93dc4ecc0f753dd30e39da0c |
ThreatExpert has some more information, but the ThreatTrack report [pdf] is more detailed and also identifies the following domains and IPs which are probably worth blocking or looking out for:
71.19.227.135
205.178.152.164
198.173.244.62
204.8.121.24
173.246.106.150
forum.xcpus.com
apparellogisticsgroup.net
ftp.celebritynetworks.com
portal.wroctv.com
ftp.videotre.tv.it
buildmybarwebsite.com
Update: I'd previously listed 195.110.124.133 on the blocklist which is a register.it parking server in Italy. That was probably overkill, you might want to unblock it and block ftp.videotre.tv.it instead.
Labels:
Malware,
Printer Spam,
Spam
Fedex spam / oxfordxtg.net
This fake FedEx spam leads to malware on oxfordxtg.net:
The link in the email goes through a legitimate hacked site and ends up on a malware payload page at [donotclick]oxfordxtg.net/news/absence_modern-doe_byte.php (report here) hosted on:
124.42.68.12 (Langfang University, China)
190.93.23.10 (Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago)
The following partial blocklist covers these two IPs, but I recommend you also apply this larger blocklist of related sites as well.
124.42.68.12
190.93.23.10
biati.net
condalinneuwu5.ru
condalnuas34637.ru
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
icensol.net
janefgort.net
jetaqua.com
klosotro9.net
mortolkr4.com
myhispress.com
nipiel.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oxfordxtg.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
pnpnews.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
trleaart.net
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2013 01:18:09 +0800 [13:18:09 EDT]
From: FedEx [wringsn052@emc.fedex.com]
Subject: Your Fedex invoice is ready to be paid now.
FedEx(R) FedEx Billing Online - Ready for Payment
fedex.com
Hello [redacted]
You have a new outstanding invoice(s) from FedEx that is ready for payment.
The following ivoice(s) are to be paid now :
Invoice Number
5135-13792
To pay or review these invoices, please sign in to your FedEx Billing Online account by clicking on this link: http://www.fedex.com/us/account/fbo
Note: Please do not use this email to submit payment. This email may not be used as a remittance notice. To pay your invoices, please visit FedEx Billing Online, http://www.fedex.com/us/account/fbo
Thank you,
Revenue Services
FedEx
This message has been sent by an auto responder system. Please do not reply to this message.
The content of this message is protected by copyright and trademark laws under U.S. and international law.
Review our privacy policy. All rights reserved.
The link in the email goes through a legitimate hacked site and ends up on a malware payload page at [donotclick]oxfordxtg.net/news/absence_modern-doe_byte.php (report here) hosted on:
124.42.68.12 (Langfang University, China)
190.93.23.10 (Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago)
The following partial blocklist covers these two IPs, but I recommend you also apply this larger blocklist of related sites as well.
124.42.68.12
190.93.23.10
biati.net
condalinneuwu5.ru
condalnuas34637.ru
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
icensol.net
janefgort.net
jetaqua.com
klosotro9.net
mortolkr4.com
myhispress.com
nipiel.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oxfordxtg.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
pnpnews.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
trleaart.net
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
Is this Guy a moron spammer?
Here's a spam email from somebody I'll call Guy Van Dumbass (not quite his real name, but close enough). Is this Guy a moron spammer? Or does he just hire morons to push his CV through spam?
Now, I'm going to be charitable to Mr Van Dumbass and assume that he didn't intend to spam these out to random unsolicited recipients such as myself but has in fact hired a bunch of moron spammers to do the work for him. So who is actually sending out this crap?
The link in the email goes to a page at stats.wew167.com and then bounces to wew-storage.com, specifically a file in wew-storage.com/com_clients/emailbrokers/20130611/GuyCVNL07.06.2013.pdf that I'm not going to link to.These two domains are registered to:
EmailStrategie
Buron Frederic
6 rue de Belgique CP19
PUILBOREAU, 17138
FR
+33.546661000
(fax: +33.546661010)
domaines@emailstrategie.com
The originating IP is 82.97.29.167, and spamvertised domains are on 82.97.13.103 and 82.97.13.233 (all belonging to TAS France / Emailstrategie).
The danger with hiring a company to "market" you as a personal brand via email is that it can backfire completely, and you could end up like Bernard Shifman. Luckily for Mr Van Dumbass, I haven't felt it necessary to put his real name on this blog to save him the humiliation. This time, anyway..
From: Guy Van Dumbass [gvd@g-vanDumbass.be]I won't bother to translate it for you, but Mr Van Dumbass is some sort of accountant. Now, actually I could probably use an accountant to save me the bother of filing my tax return myself but I somehow think that employing him full-time would be rather excessive.
Date: 12 June 2013 09:52
Subject: Sollicitatie als directiemedewerker
Pour la version française, cliquez ici
Betreft : Spontane sollicitatie – onmiddellijk beschikbaar
Directiemedewerker - verantwoordelijke 14 jaar ervaring
Mevrouw, Mijnheer,
Een ervaring van 14 jaar in het beheer van een sociaal juridische en financiële functie heeft mij geleerd in volledige autonomie te werken. Ik heb goede ervaringen verworven welke me vandaag toelaten het volledige beheer van één of meerdere bedrijven tot aan de balans en fiscale aangifte op me te nemen.
Daarenboven, aangezien ik voor een aantal bedrijven met een verschillend juridische statuut en in verschillende sectoren heb gewerkt, heb ik mijn aanpassingsvermogen kunnen ontwikkelen.
Ik beheers meerdere software programma's met betrekking tot het beheer en de boekhouding van bedrijven (VISION, CUBIC, GEBAT pro,…) en ik kan snel operationeel zijn in elk nieuw systeem, uiteraard met opleiding.
Ik ben stipt, georganiseerd en zou mijn competenties ten dienste willen stellen van uw bedrijf, in een functie met verantwoordelijkheid. Ik heb eveneens de smaak van analyse te pakken en ik ben geïnteresseerd in de nodige werkzaamheden nodig in de opvolging van de resultaten van een bedrijf.
Ik nodig U uit om mijn parcours bij het lezen van mijn CV, in bijlage, te ontdekken. Ik kijk ernaar uit om deze te verduidelijken tijdens een onderhoud welke U kunt inplannen volgens de beschikbaarheden in uw agenda. Ik ben immers onmiddellijk beschikbaar wegens stopzetting van mijn huidige werkgever.
In afwachting van een positief antwoord, verblijf ik met vriendelijke groeten,
Klik hier om mijn CV te downloaden
Cliquez ici pour télécharger mon CV
Guy Van Dumbass
M: +32 (0) [redacted]
E: gvd@g-vanDumbass.be
To unsubscribe, click here
Now, I'm going to be charitable to Mr Van Dumbass and assume that he didn't intend to spam these out to random unsolicited recipients such as myself but has in fact hired a bunch of moron spammers to do the work for him. So who is actually sending out this crap?
The link in the email goes to a page at stats.wew167.com and then bounces to wew-storage.com, specifically a file in wew-storage.com/com_clients/emailbrokers/20130611/GuyCVNL07.06.2013.pdf that I'm not going to link to.These two domains are registered to:
EmailStrategie
Buron Frederic
6 rue de Belgique CP19
PUILBOREAU, 17138
FR
+33.546661000
(fax: +33.546661010)
domaines@emailstrategie.com
The originating IP is 82.97.29.167, and spamvertised domains are on 82.97.13.103 and 82.97.13.233 (all belonging to TAS France / Emailstrategie).
The danger with hiring a company to "market" you as a personal brand via email is that it can backfire completely, and you could end up like Bernard Shifman. Luckily for Mr Van Dumbass, I haven't felt it necessary to put his real name on this blog to save him the humiliation. This time, anyway..
Malware sites to block 12/6/13
This is a refresh of this list of domains and IPs controlled by what I call the "Amerika" gang, and it follows on from this BBB spam run earlier. Note that IPs included in this list show recent malicious activity, but it could be that they have now been fixed. I also noticed that a couple of the domains may have been sinkholed, but it will do you no harm to block them anyway.
Hosts involved:
5.175.157.110 (GHOSTnet, Germany)
41.89.6.179 (Kenya Education Network, Kenya)
42.62.29.4 (Forest Eternal Communication Tech. Co., China)
46.18.160.86 (Saudi Electronic Info Exchange Company (Tabadul) JSC, Saudi Arabia)
46.165.248.117 (Leaseweb, Germany)
49.212.221.29 (Sakura Internet Inc., Japan)
50.56.216.124 (Rackspace, US)
50.57.166.222 (Slicehost, US)
59.42.10.172 (Guangdong Tuosi Software Science Garden, China)
67.159.12.94 (FDCservers, US)
67.202.109.141 (Steadfast Networks, US)
67.215.2.251 (Colo-Serv Communications, Canada)
77.237.190.22 (Parsun Network Solutions, Iran)
81.252.120.250 (Collectivit Locale , France)
83.136.249.108 (Sigmatic Oy, Finland)
85.17.178.56 (Leaseweb, Netherlands)
85.26.31.60 (Brutele SC, Belgium)
85.201.12.244 (Brutele SC, Belgium)
86.84.0.11 (Planet Technologies, Netherlands)
88.80.222.73 (Alfahosting, Germany)
93.89.235.13 (FBS Bilisim Cozumleri, Cyprus)
95.143.41.16 (Inline Internet / VPS4less, Germany)
95.170.95.142 (TransIP, Netherlands)
109.95.23.4 (Kvartal Plus Ltd, Russia)
109.129.225.68 (Belgacom / Skynet, Belgium)
110.78.147.173 (CAT Telecom, Thailand)
111.93.156.171 (Tata Teleservices, India)
112.170.169.56 (Korea Telecom, Korea)
114.4.27.219 (IDIA Kantor Arsip MKS, Indonesia)
116.3.3.200 (China Unicom, China)
119.147.137.31 (China Telecom, China)
141.28.126.201 (Hochschule Furtwangen, Germany)
143.107.220.160 (Universidade De Sao Paulo, Brazil)
151.1.224.118 (ITnet, Italy)
159.90.91.179 (Universidad Simon Bolivar, Venezuela)
159.253.18.253 (FastVPS, Estonia)
160.75.169.49 (Istanbul Technical University, Turkey)
164.77.149.237 (Isapre Banmedica, Chile)
172.8.24.9 (Angela Curtolo DBA / AT&T, US)
172.246.16.27 (Enzu Inc, US)
177.84.128.54 (Informática Ltda, Brazil)
177.86.131.18 (Prime Telecomunicacoes Ltda, Brazil)
177.124.195.202 (Mundivox Do Brasil Ltda, Brazil)
178.16.216.66 (Gabrielson Invest AB, Sweden)
181.52.237.17 (Telmex, Colombia)
183.82.221.13 (Hitech / Beam Telecom, India)
184.82.115.37 (HostNOC, US)
186.215.126.52 (Global Village Telecom, Brazil)
188.32.153.31 (National Cable Networks, Russia)
187.33.48.12 (GTi Telecomunicacoes Ltda, Brazil)
190.93.23.10 (Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago)
192.64.80.143 (Interserver, US)
192.210.216.90 (ColoCrossing, US)
193.254.231.51 (Universitatea Transilvania Brasov, Romania)
196.1.95.44 (Ensut-Computer Department, Senegal)
198.199.93.55 (Digital Ocean, US)
200.3.153.91 (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia)
200.87.177.124 (EntelNet, Bolivia)
201.65.23.153 (Comercial 15 De Novembro Ltda, Brazil)
202.29.242.249 (UniNet, Thailand)
202.31.139.173 (Kum Oh National University Of Technology, Korea)
203.64.69.52 (Taiwan Academic Network, Taiwan)
203.157.216.77 (Information Technology Office, Thailand)
208.68.36.11 (Digital Ocean, US)
210.42.103.141 (Wuhan Urban Construction Institute, China)
213.74.79.236 (Superonline, Turkey)
216.172.102.230 (EBL Global Networks, US)
217.174.211.1 (Agarik SA, France)
222.200.187.83 (Sun Yat-sen University, China)
Plain IPlist for copy-and-pasting:
5.175.157.110
41.89.6.179
42.62.29.4
46.18.160.86
46.165.248.117
49.212.221.29
50.56.216.124
50.57.166.222
59.42.10.172
67.159.12.94
67.202.109.141
67.215.2.251
77.237.190.22
81.252.120.250
83.136.249.108
85.17.178.56
85.26.31.60
85.201.12.244
86.84.0.11
88.80.222.73
93.89.235.13
95.143.41.16
95.170.95.142
109.95.23.4
109.129.225.68
110.78.147.173
111.93.156.171
112.170.169.56
114.4.27.219
116.3.3.200
119.147.137.31
141.28.126.201
143.107.220.160
151.1.224.118
159.90.91.179
159.253.18.253
160.75.169.49
164.77.149.237
172.8.24.9
172.246.16.27
177.84.128.54
177.86.131.18
177.124.195.202
178.16.216.66
181.52.237.17
183.82.221.13
184.82.115.37
186.215.126.52
188.32.153.31
187.33.48.12
190.93.23.10
192.64.80.143
192.210.216.90
193.254.231.51
196.1.95.44
198.199.93.55
200.3.153.91
200.87.177.124
201.65.23.153
202.29.242.249
202.31.139.173
203.64.69.52
203.157.216.77
208.68.36.11
210.42.103.141
213.74.79.236
216.172.102.230
217.174.211.1
222.200.187.83
Identified malicious domains:
abacs.pl
autotradeguide.net
avastsurveyor.com
balckanweb.com
biati.net
bnamecorni.com
businessdocu.net
buyparrots.net
citysubway.net
cocainism.net
condalinarad72234652.ru
condalinneuwu5.ru
condalinra2735.ru
condalnuas34637.ru
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
diodmobilered.com
docudat.ru
ehchernomorskihu.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ehnutidalvchedu.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
ergopets.com
fastkrug.ru
federal-credit-union.com
freemart.pl
freenico.net
genown.ru
getstatsp.ru
ghroumingoviede.ru
giwmmasnieuhe.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gondatskenbiehu.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
haicut.com
hiddenhacks.com
historuronded.com
icensol.net
ingrestrained.com
inutesnetworks.su
janefgort.net
jetaqua.com
kirki.pl
klosotro9.net
lorganizedcue.com
ludena.ru
mantuma.pl
marvelfilms.net
mortolkr4.com
mslatearrival.com
multipliedfor.com
myhispress.com
nipiel.com
nvufvwieg.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
otoperhone.com
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
pleak.pl
pnpnews.net
privat-tor-service.com
proxy-tor-service.com
relectsdispla.com
relectsdispla.net
reportingglan.com
safe-browser.biz
safe-time.net
salesplaytime.net
secondfiddleu.com
securepro7.ru
shopkeepersne.net
sludgekeychai.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
smurfberrieswd.su
sngroup.pl
solarmiracles.net
techno5room.ru
televisionhunter.com
testerpro5.ru
thinkindi.net
tor-connect-secure.com
trleaart.net
twinkniche.net
twintrade.net
ukbarbers.net
unixawards.net
usergateproxy.net
usforclosedhomes.net
vip-proxy-to-tor.com
well-tailored.net
wmlawoffice.net
yelpwapphoned.com
Hosts involved:
5.175.157.110 (GHOSTnet, Germany)
41.89.6.179 (Kenya Education Network, Kenya)
42.62.29.4 (Forest Eternal Communication Tech. Co., China)
46.18.160.86 (Saudi Electronic Info Exchange Company (Tabadul) JSC, Saudi Arabia)
46.165.248.117 (Leaseweb, Germany)
49.212.221.29 (Sakura Internet Inc., Japan)
50.56.216.124 (Rackspace, US)
50.57.166.222 (Slicehost, US)
59.42.10.172 (Guangdong Tuosi Software Science Garden, China)
67.159.12.94 (FDCservers, US)
67.202.109.141 (Steadfast Networks, US)
67.215.2.251 (Colo-Serv Communications, Canada)
77.237.190.22 (Parsun Network Solutions, Iran)
81.252.120.250 (Collectivit Locale , France)
83.136.249.108 (Sigmatic Oy, Finland)
85.17.178.56 (Leaseweb, Netherlands)
85.26.31.60 (Brutele SC, Belgium)
85.201.12.244 (Brutele SC, Belgium)
86.84.0.11 (Planet Technologies, Netherlands)
88.80.222.73 (Alfahosting, Germany)
93.89.235.13 (FBS Bilisim Cozumleri, Cyprus)
95.143.41.16 (Inline Internet / VPS4less, Germany)
95.170.95.142 (TransIP, Netherlands)
109.95.23.4 (Kvartal Plus Ltd, Russia)
109.129.225.68 (Belgacom / Skynet, Belgium)
110.78.147.173 (CAT Telecom, Thailand)
111.93.156.171 (Tata Teleservices, India)
112.170.169.56 (Korea Telecom, Korea)
114.4.27.219 (IDIA Kantor Arsip MKS, Indonesia)
116.3.3.200 (China Unicom, China)
119.147.137.31 (China Telecom, China)
141.28.126.201 (Hochschule Furtwangen, Germany)
143.107.220.160 (Universidade De Sao Paulo, Brazil)
151.1.224.118 (ITnet, Italy)
159.90.91.179 (Universidad Simon Bolivar, Venezuela)
159.253.18.253 (FastVPS, Estonia)
160.75.169.49 (Istanbul Technical University, Turkey)
164.77.149.237 (Isapre Banmedica, Chile)
172.8.24.9 (Angela Curtolo DBA / AT&T, US)
172.246.16.27 (Enzu Inc, US)
177.84.128.54 (Informática Ltda, Brazil)
177.86.131.18 (Prime Telecomunicacoes Ltda, Brazil)
177.124.195.202 (Mundivox Do Brasil Ltda, Brazil)
178.16.216.66 (Gabrielson Invest AB, Sweden)
181.52.237.17 (Telmex, Colombia)
183.82.221.13 (Hitech / Beam Telecom, India)
184.82.115.37 (HostNOC, US)
186.215.126.52 (Global Village Telecom, Brazil)
188.32.153.31 (National Cable Networks, Russia)
187.33.48.12 (GTi Telecomunicacoes Ltda, Brazil)
190.93.23.10 (Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago)
192.64.80.143 (Interserver, US)
192.210.216.90 (ColoCrossing, US)
193.254.231.51 (Universitatea Transilvania Brasov, Romania)
196.1.95.44 (Ensut-Computer Department, Senegal)
198.199.93.55 (Digital Ocean, US)
200.3.153.91 (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia)
200.87.177.124 (EntelNet, Bolivia)
201.65.23.153 (Comercial 15 De Novembro Ltda, Brazil)
202.29.242.249 (UniNet, Thailand)
202.31.139.173 (Kum Oh National University Of Technology, Korea)
203.64.69.52 (Taiwan Academic Network, Taiwan)
203.157.216.77 (Information Technology Office, Thailand)
208.68.36.11 (Digital Ocean, US)
210.42.103.141 (Wuhan Urban Construction Institute, China)
213.74.79.236 (Superonline, Turkey)
216.172.102.230 (EBL Global Networks, US)
217.174.211.1 (Agarik SA, France)
222.200.187.83 (Sun Yat-sen University, China)
Plain IPlist for copy-and-pasting:
5.175.157.110
41.89.6.179
42.62.29.4
46.18.160.86
46.165.248.117
49.212.221.29
50.56.216.124
50.57.166.222
59.42.10.172
67.159.12.94
67.202.109.141
67.215.2.251
77.237.190.22
81.252.120.250
83.136.249.108
85.17.178.56
85.26.31.60
85.201.12.244
86.84.0.11
88.80.222.73
93.89.235.13
95.143.41.16
95.170.95.142
109.95.23.4
109.129.225.68
110.78.147.173
111.93.156.171
112.170.169.56
114.4.27.219
116.3.3.200
119.147.137.31
141.28.126.201
143.107.220.160
151.1.224.118
159.90.91.179
159.253.18.253
160.75.169.49
164.77.149.237
172.8.24.9
172.246.16.27
177.84.128.54
177.86.131.18
177.124.195.202
178.16.216.66
181.52.237.17
183.82.221.13
184.82.115.37
186.215.126.52
188.32.153.31
187.33.48.12
190.93.23.10
192.64.80.143
192.210.216.90
193.254.231.51
196.1.95.44
198.199.93.55
200.3.153.91
200.87.177.124
201.65.23.153
202.29.242.249
202.31.139.173
203.64.69.52
203.157.216.77
208.68.36.11
210.42.103.141
213.74.79.236
216.172.102.230
217.174.211.1
222.200.187.83
Identified malicious domains:
abacs.pl
autotradeguide.net
avastsurveyor.com
balckanweb.com
biati.net
bnamecorni.com
businessdocu.net
buyparrots.net
citysubway.net
cocainism.net
condalinarad72234652.ru
condalinneuwu5.ru
condalinra2735.ru
condalnuas34637.ru
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
diodmobilered.com
docudat.ru
ehchernomorskihu.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ehnutidalvchedu.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
ergopets.com
fastkrug.ru
federal-credit-union.com
freemart.pl
freenico.net
genown.ru
getstatsp.ru
ghroumingoviede.ru
giwmmasnieuhe.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gondatskenbiehu.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
haicut.com
hiddenhacks.com
historuronded.com
icensol.net
ingrestrained.com
inutesnetworks.su
janefgort.net
jetaqua.com
kirki.pl
klosotro9.net
lorganizedcue.com
ludena.ru
mantuma.pl
marvelfilms.net
mortolkr4.com
mslatearrival.com
multipliedfor.com
myhispress.com
nipiel.com
nvufvwieg.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
otoperhone.com
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
pleak.pl
pnpnews.net
privat-tor-service.com
proxy-tor-service.com
relectsdispla.com
relectsdispla.net
reportingglan.com
safe-browser.biz
safe-time.net
salesplaytime.net
secondfiddleu.com
securepro7.ru
shopkeepersne.net
sludgekeychai.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
smurfberrieswd.su
sngroup.pl
solarmiracles.net
techno5room.ru
televisionhunter.com
testerpro5.ru
thinkindi.net
tor-connect-secure.com
trleaart.net
twinkniche.net
twintrade.net
ukbarbers.net
unixawards.net
usergateproxy.net
usforclosedhomes.net
vip-proxy-to-tor.com
well-tailored.net
wmlawoffice.net
yelpwapphoned.com
BBB Spam / trleaart.net
This fake BBB spam with a "PLAINT REPORT" (sic) leads to malware on trleaart.net:
The link goes through a legitimate hacked site and end up with a malware landing page on [donotclick]trleaart.net/news/members_guarantee.php (report here) hosted on the following IPs:
160.75.169.49 (Istanbul Technical University, Turkey)
186.215.126.52 (Global Village Telecom, Brazil)
190.93.23.10 (Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago)
193.254.231.51 (Universitatea Transilvania Brasov, Romania)
This network of evil sites is rather large and I haven't had the time to look at it closely, but in the meantime here is a partial blocklist:
160.75.169.49
186.215.126.52
190.93.23.10
193.254.231.51
abacs.pl
balckanweb.com
biati.net
buyparrots.net
condalinarad72234652.ru
condalinneuwu5.ru
condalinra2735.ru
condalnuas34637.ru
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
ehchernomorskihu.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ehnutidalvchedu.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
ergopets.com
federal-credit-union.com
freemart.pl
genown.ru
ghroumingoviede.ru
giwmmasnieuhe.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gondatskenbiehu.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
haicut.com
icensol.net
janefgort.net
jetaqua.com
kirki.pl
klosotro9.net
ludena.ru
mantuma.pl
mortolkr4.com
myhispress.com
nipiel.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
pleak.pl
pnpnews.net
relectsdispla.net
safe-browser.biz
safe-time.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
sngroup.pl
televisionhunter.com
trleaart.net
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
From: Better Business Bureau [mailto:rivuletsjb72@bbbemail.org]
Sent: 11 June 2013 18:04
Subject: Better Business Beareau Complaint ¹ S3452568
Importance: High
Sorry, your e-mail does not support HTML format. Your messages can be viewed in your browser
Better Business Bureau ©
Start With Trust
Tue , 11 Jun 2013
Issue N. S3452568
The Better Business Bureau has been booked the above said claim letter from one of your customers in respect of their dealings with you. The detailed description of the consumer's trouble are available visiting a link below. Please pay attention to this matter and inform us about your mind as soon as possible.
We amiably ask you to open the PLAINT REPORT to answer on this claim.
We awaits to your prompt response.
Faithfully yours
Daniel Cox
Dispute Advisor
Better Business Bureau
________________________________________
________________________________________
Better Business Bureau
3083 Wilson Blvd, Suite 600 Arlington, VA 25301
Phone: 1 (703) 276.0100 Fax: 1 (703) 525.8277
This information was delivered to [redacted]. Don't want to receive these emails anymore? You can unsubscribe
The link goes through a legitimate hacked site and end up with a malware landing page on [donotclick]trleaart.net/news/members_guarantee.php (report here) hosted on the following IPs:
160.75.169.49 (Istanbul Technical University, Turkey)
186.215.126.52 (Global Village Telecom, Brazil)
190.93.23.10 (Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago)
193.254.231.51 (Universitatea Transilvania Brasov, Romania)
This network of evil sites is rather large and I haven't had the time to look at it closely, but in the meantime here is a partial blocklist:
160.75.169.49
186.215.126.52
190.93.23.10
193.254.231.51
abacs.pl
balckanweb.com
biati.net
buyparrots.net
condalinarad72234652.ru
condalinneuwu5.ru
condalinra2735.ru
condalnuas34637.ru
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
ehchernomorskihu.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ehnutidalvchedu.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
ergopets.com
federal-credit-union.com
freemart.pl
genown.ru
ghroumingoviede.ru
giwmmasnieuhe.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gondatskenbiehu.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
haicut.com
icensol.net
janefgort.net
jetaqua.com
kirki.pl
klosotro9.net
ludena.ru
mantuma.pl
mortolkr4.com
myhispress.com
nipiel.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
pleak.pl
pnpnews.net
relectsdispla.net
safe-browser.biz
safe-time.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
sngroup.pl
televisionhunter.com
trleaart.net
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
Tuesday, 11 June 2013
Amazon.com spam / goldcoinvault.com
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2013 14:25:21 -0600 [16:25:21 EDT]
From: "Amazon.com Customer Care Service" [payments-update@amazon.com]
Subject: Payment for Your Amazon Order # 104-884-8180383
|
Please note: This is not a VAT invoice.
The link in the email goes through a legitimate hacked site to an intermediate page with the following redirectors:
[donotclick]ftp.blacktiedjent.com/mechanic/vaccinated.js
[donotclick]piratescoveoysterbar.com/piggybacks/rejoiced.js
[donotclick]nteshop.es/tsingtao/flanneling.js
..from there it hits the main malware payload site at [donotclick]goldcoinvault.com/news/pictures_hints_causes.php (report here) hosted on goldcoinvault.com which is a hacked GoDaddy domain hijacked to point at 173.255.213.171 (Linode, US). This same server is very active and has been spotted here and here, also using hacked GoDaddy domains, but right at the moment the malware page appears to be 403ing which is good.
These following domains appear to be pointing to that server:
ccrtl.com
chrisandannwedding.com
chriscarlson.com
eaglebay5.com
eaglebay-eb5.com
freepokermoney.com
goldcoinvault.com
gosuccessmode.com
hraforbiz.com
margueritemcenery.com
mceneryfinancial.com
megmcenery.com
page10development.com
shrinerapparel.com
shrinersapparel.com
shrinersapparel.net
supportquilting.com
taxfreeincomenow.com
taxfreeincomenow.info
taxfreeincomenow.net
taxfreeincomenow.org
tmgfinancial.org
tmginsurance.org
uniformexpert.com
uniformexperts.com
uniformoutfitter.net
uniformoutfitters.net
wcaband.org
Something evil on 173.255.213.171
As a follow-up to this post, the exploit server on 173.255.213.171 (Linode, US) is hosting a number of hijacked GoDaddy-registered domains that are serving an exploit kit [1] [2]. If you are unable to block 173.255.213.171 then I would recommend the following blocklist:
ccrtl.com
eaglebay5.com
eaglebay-eb5.com
gosuccessmode.com
hraforbiz.com
margueritemcenery.com
mceneryfinancial.com
megmcenery.com
shrinerapparel.com
shrinersapparel.com
shrinersapparel.net
supportquilting.com
taxfreeincomenow.com
taxfreeincomenow.info
taxfreeincomenow.net
taxfreeincomenow.org
tmgfinancial.org
tmginsurance.org
uniformexpert.com
uniformexperts.com
uniformoutfitter.net
uniformoutfitters.net
wcaband.org
ccrtl.com
eaglebay5.com
eaglebay-eb5.com
gosuccessmode.com
hraforbiz.com
margueritemcenery.com
mceneryfinancial.com
megmcenery.com
shrinerapparel.com
shrinersapparel.com
shrinersapparel.net
supportquilting.com
taxfreeincomenow.com
taxfreeincomenow.info
taxfreeincomenow.net
taxfreeincomenow.org
tmgfinancial.org
tmginsurance.org
uniformexpert.com
uniformexperts.com
uniformoutfitter.net
uniformoutfitters.net
wcaband.org
Monday, 10 June 2013
Wells Fargo spam / Important WellsFargo Doc.exe / Important WellsFargo Docs.exe
This summary is not available. Please
click here to view the post.
Friday, 7 June 2013
"PAYVE - Remit file" spam / CD0607213.389710762910.zip
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 20:41:25 +0600 [10:41:25 EDT]Attached to the email is an archive file called CD0607213.389710762910.zip which in turn contains an executable named CD06072013.239871839.exe (note that the date is included in the filename). Virustotal reports that just 8/46 anti-virus scanners detect it.
From: "PAYVESUPPORT@AEXP.COM" [PAYVESUPPORT@AEXP.COM]
Subject: PAYVE - Remit file
A payment(s) to your company has been processed through the American Express Payment
Network.
The remittance details for the payment(s) are attached (CD06072013.389710762910.zip).
- The remittance file contains invoice information passed by your buyer. Please
contact your buyer
for additional information not available in the file.
- The funds associated with this payment will be deposited into your bank account
according to the
terms of your American Express merchant agreement and may be combined with other
American Express deposits.
For additional information about Deposits, Fees, or your American Express merchant
agreement:
Contact American Express Merchant Services at 1-800-528-0265 Monday to Friday,
8:00 AM to 8:00 PM ET. - You can also view PAYVE payment and invoice level details
using My Merchant Account/Online Merchant Services.
If you are not enrolled in My Merchant Account/OMS, you can do so at
www.americanexpress.com/mymerchantaccount
or call us at 1-866-220-3581, Monday - Friday between 9:00 AM-7:30 PM ET, and we'll
be glad to help you.
For quick and easy enrollment, please have your American Express Merchant Number,
bank account ABA (routing number)
and DDA (account number) on hand.
This customer service e-mail was sent to you by American Express. You may receive
customer service e-mails even if you have unsubscribed from marketing e-mails from
American Express.
Copyright 2013 American Express Company. All rights reserved Contact Customer Service:
https://www.americanexpress.com/messagecenter
******************************************************************************
"This message and any attachments are solely for the intended recipient and may contain
confidential or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, any
disclosure, copying, use, or distribution of the information included in this message and
any attachments is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please
notify us by reply e-mail and immediately and permanently delete this message and any
attachments. Thank you."
******************************************************************************
The Comodo CAMAS report gives some details about the malware, including the following checksums:
MD5 | fd18576bd4cf1baa8178ff4a2bef0849 |
SHA1 | 8b8ba943393e52a3972c11603c3f1aa1fc053788 |
SHA256 | f31ca8a9d429e98160183267eea67dd3a6e592757e045b2c35bb33d5e27d6875 |
The malware attempts to download further components from storeyourbox.com on 97.107.137.239 (Linode, US) which looks like a legitimate server that has been badly compromised. The following domains appear to be on the server, I would advise that they are all dangerous at the moment:
drjoycethomasderm.com
goodvaluemove.com
jacksonmoving.com
jacksonmoving.net
napervillie-movers.com
reebie.net
storageandmoving.net
storeyourbox.com
storeyourbox.net
storeyourthings.net
Update: the ThreatExpert report took a long time to process, but is quit interesting. It shows DNS queries for:
storeyourbox.com
storeyourbox.net
storeyourthings.net
drjoycethomasderm.com
www.archeting.it
www.errezeta.biz
190.147.81.28
207.204.5.170
The following URLs are accessed:
[donotclick]www.archeting.it/86zP.exe
[donotclick]www.errezeta.biz/ToSN79T.exe
[donotclick]190.147.81.28/yqRSQ.exe
[donotclick]207.204.5.170/PXVYGJx.exe
archeting.it and errezeta.biz are hosted on IPs belonging to Aruba S.p.A. in Italy (62.149.132.57 and 62.149.131.162 respectively). I've long suspected that there's a serious problem with Aruba due to a very high incidence of malware sites. Those are shared hosting IPs and as far as I can tell the rest of the sites on those servers are clean.
190.147.81.28 and 207.204.5.170 (Telmex, Colombia and Register.com US) have been seen before and don't seem to be shared hosts. I would strongly recommend blocking them.
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Linode,
Malware,
Spam,
Viruses
BBB spam / pnpnews.net
This fake BBB spam leads to malware on pnpnews.net:
The link in the email goes through a legitimate hacked site and then to a payload at [donotclick]pnpnews.net/news/readers-sections.php (report here) hosted on:
46.18.160.86 - Saudi Electronic Info Exchange Company (Tabadul) JSC
93.89.235.13 - FBS Bilisim Cozumleri, Cyprus
178.16.216.66 - Gabrielson Invest AB, Sweden
186.215.126.52 - Global Village Telecom, Brazil
190.93.23.10 - Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago
Blocklist:
46.18.160.86
93.89.235.13
178.16.216.66
186.215.126.52
190.93.23.10
abacs.pl
balckanweb.com
biati.net
buyparrots.net
citysubway.net
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
federal-credit-union.com
giwmmasnieuhe.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
icensol.net
janefgort.net
myhispress.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
pnpnews.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
sngroup.pl
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
From: Better Business Bureau [mailto:standoffzwk68@clients.bbb.com]
Sent: 07 June 2013 15:08
Subject: BBB information regarding your customer's pretension No. 00167486
Better Business Bureau ©
Start With Trust ©
Fri, 7 Jun 2013
RE: Complaint No. 00167486
[redacted]
The Better Business Bureau has been entered the above said grievance from one of your users in regard to their business relations with you. The information about the consumer's trouble are available visiting a link below. Please pay attention to this matter and notify us about your sight as soon as possible.
We kindly ask you to overview the CLAIM LETTER REPORT to meet on this claim.
We awaits to your prompt answer.
Faithfully yours
Jonathan Edwards
Dispute Advisor
Better Business Bureau
________________________________________
________________________________________
Better Business Bureau
3093 Wilson Blvd, Suite 600 Arlington, VA 29701
Phone: 1 (703) 276.0100 Fax: 1 (703) 525.8277
This letter was delivered to [redacted]. Don't want to receive these emails anymore? You can unsubscribe
The link in the email goes through a legitimate hacked site and then to a payload at [donotclick]pnpnews.net/news/readers-sections.php (report here) hosted on:
46.18.160.86 - Saudi Electronic Info Exchange Company (Tabadul) JSC
93.89.235.13 - FBS Bilisim Cozumleri, Cyprus
178.16.216.66 - Gabrielson Invest AB, Sweden
186.215.126.52 - Global Village Telecom, Brazil
190.93.23.10 - Greendot, Trinidad and Tobago
Blocklist:
46.18.160.86
93.89.235.13
178.16.216.66
186.215.126.52
190.93.23.10
abacs.pl
balckanweb.com
biati.net
buyparrots.net
citysubway.net
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
federal-credit-union.com
giwmmasnieuhe.ru
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
icensol.net
janefgort.net
myhispress.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
pnpnews.net
smartsecurityapp2013.com
sngroup.pl
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
Malware sites to block 7/6/13
Two IPs that look related, the first is 37.235.48.185 (Edis, Poland or Austria) which host some domains that are also found here (158.255.212.96 and 158.255.212.97, also Edis) that seem to be used in injection attacks. I can identify the following domains linked to 37.235.48.185:
faggyppvers5.info
finger2.climaoluhip.org
linkstoads.net
node1.hostingstatics.org
node2.hostingstatics.org
Injecting some of the same sites as the domains on the above IPs is jstoredirect.net which is currently offline but was hosted on 149.154.152.18 which is also Edis (can you see the pattern yet?) so I would assume that they are linked. In the few days that jstoredirect.net was online it managed to infect over 1500 sites.
Aggregate blocklist:
98.126.9.34
114.142.147.51
158.255.212.96
158.255.212.97
nethostingdb.com
netstoragehost.com
connecthostad.net
climaoluhip.org
hostingstatics.org
systemnetworkscripts.org
numstatus.com
linkstoads.net
faggyppvers5.info
jstoredirect.net
faggyppvers5.info
finger2.climaoluhip.org
linkstoads.net
node1.hostingstatics.org
node2.hostingstatics.org
Injecting some of the same sites as the domains on the above IPs is jstoredirect.net which is currently offline but was hosted on 149.154.152.18 which is also Edis (can you see the pattern yet?) so I would assume that they are linked. In the few days that jstoredirect.net was online it managed to infect over 1500 sites.
Aggregate blocklist:
98.126.9.34
114.142.147.51
158.255.212.96
158.255.212.97
nethostingdb.com
netstoragehost.com
connecthostad.net
climaoluhip.org
hostingstatics.org
systemnetworkscripts.org
numstatus.com
linkstoads.net
faggyppvers5.info
jstoredirect.net
Labels:
Austria,
Edis,
Injection Attacks,
Malware,
Viruses
Thursday, 6 June 2013
USPS spam / USPS_Label_861337597092.zip
This fake USPS spam contains a malicious attachment:
The Comodo CAMAS report shows an attempt to download more components from michaelscigarbar.net on 184.95.37.109 (Jolly Works Hosting, Philippines.. rented from Secured Servers in the US). URLquery shows a very large amount of malware activity on that IP, mostly apparently running on legitimate hacked domains. You should probably treat all of the following domains as hostile:
alliancelittleaviators.com
apparelacademy.com
apparelacademy.net
brokerforcolorado.com
carlaellisproperties.com
dragoncigars.net
heavenlycigars.net
libertychristianstore.com
michaelscigarbar.com
michaelscigarbar.net
michaelscigars.net
montverdestore.com
montverdestore.net
montverdestore.org
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 10:43:56 -0500 [11:43:56 EDT]There is an attachment called USPS_Label_861337597092.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable file USPS_Label_06062013.exe (note the date is encoded into the filename). VirusTotal results for this are 18/47.
From: USPS Express Services [service-notification@usps.com]
Subject: USPS - Your package is available for pickup ( Parcel 861337597092 )
Postal Notification,
We attempted to deliver your item at 6 Jun 2013.
Courier service could not make the delivery of your parcel.
Status Deny / Invalid ZIP Code.
If the package is not scheduled for redelivery or picked up within 48 hours, it will be returned to the sender.
Label/Receipt Number: 861337597092
Expected Delivery Date: Jun 6, 2013
Class: Package Services
Service(s): Delivery Confirmation
Status: eNotification sent
For mode details and shipping label please see the attached file.
Print this label to get this package at our post office.
Thank you,
© 2013 Copyright© 2013 USPS. All Rights Reserved.
*** This is an automatically generated email, please do not reply ***
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:
This electronic mail transmission and any attached files contain information intended for the exclusive use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and may contain information belonging to the sender (USPS , Inc.) that is proprietary, privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distributions of this electronic message are violations of federal law. Please notify the sender of any unintended recipients and delete the original message without making any copies. Thank You
The Comodo CAMAS report shows an attempt to download more components from michaelscigarbar.net on 184.95.37.109 (Jolly Works Hosting, Philippines.. rented from Secured Servers in the US). URLquery shows a very large amount of malware activity on that IP, mostly apparently running on legitimate hacked domains. You should probably treat all of the following domains as hostile:
alliancelittleaviators.com
apparelacademy.com
apparelacademy.net
brokerforcolorado.com
carlaellisproperties.com
dragoncigars.net
heavenlycigars.net
libertychristianstore.com
michaelscigarbar.com
michaelscigarbar.net
michaelscigars.net
montverdestore.com
montverdestore.net
montverdestore.org
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Jolly Works Hosting,
Malware,
Spam,
USPS,
Viruses
NatPay "Transmission Confirmation" spam / usforclosedhomes.net
This fake NatPay spam leads to malware on usforclosedhomes.net.
Version 1:
Version 2:
The malicious payload is on [donotclick]usforclosedhomes.net/news/walls_autumns-serial.php (report here) hosted on the following IPs:
41.89.6.179 (Kenya Education Network, Kenya)
46.18.160.86 (Saudi Electronic Info Exchange Company (Tabadul) JSC, Saudi Arabia)
93.89.235.13 (FBS Bilisim Cozumleri, Cyprus)
112.170.169.56 (Korea Telecom, South Korea)
The cluster of IPs and domains this belongs to identifies it as part of the Amerika spam run.
Blocklist:
41.89.6.179
46.18.160.86
93.89.235.13
112.170.169.56
abacs.pl
biati.net
buyparrots.net
citysubway.net
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
federal-credit-union.com
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
icensol.net
myhispress.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
smartsecurityapp2013.com
sngroup.pl
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
Version 1:
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 20:53:08 +0600 [10:53:08 EDT]
From: National Payment Automated Reports System [dunks@services.natpaymail.net]
Subject: Transmission Confirmation ~26306682~N25BHHL1~
Transmission Verification
Contact Us
To:
NPC Account # 26306682
Xavier Reed
Re:
NPC Account # 26306682
D & - D5
Thursday, July 04, 2013, Independence Day is a Federal Banking Holiday. All banks are closed for this holiday, therefore NatPay will not be able to process any files on that date. If you plan on transmitting for a paydate that falls between Thursday, July 04, 2013 and Thursday, July 11, 2013 you will need to the file a day earlier.
Batch Number 408
Batch Description VENDOR PAY
Number of Dollar Entries 2
Number of Prenotes 0
Total Deposit Amount $3,848.19
Total Withdraw Amount $3,848.19
Batch Confirmation Number 50983
Date Transmitted Thursday, June 06, 2013
Date Processed Thursday, June 06, 2013
Call Start Time 4:06 PM
Call End Time 4:07 PM
Funding Method 2 Day Funding
Cycle AM
Effective
Entry Date
Transaction Type
Entry
Identification
Routing/Transit
Bank Account
Entry Amount
06/08/2013 Checking - Deposit XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX $3,848.19
06/06/2013 Checking - Withdraw Offset Entry XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX -$3,848.19
Totals $0.00
Report reference ID # N25BHHL1 Created on Thursday, June 06, 2013
Have a question about this report? Please click here to send us an email with your question.
Version 2:
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 09:59:06 -0500
From: National Payment Automated Reports System [lemuel@emalsrv.natpaymail.com]
Subject: Transmission Confirmation ~10968697~607MPYRC~
Transmission Verification
Contact Us
To:
NPC Account # 10968697
Benjamin Turner
Re:
NPC Account # 10968697
D & - MN
Thursday, July 04, 2013, Independence Day is a Federal Banking Holiday. All banks are closed for this holiday, therefore NatPay will not be able to process any files on that date. If you plan on transmitting for a paydate that falls between Thursday, July 04, 2013 and Thursday, July 11, 2013 you will need to the file a day earlier.
Batch Number 219
Batch Description VENDOR PAY
Number of Dollar Entries 2
Number of Prenotes 0
Total Deposit Amount $2,549.12
Total Withdraw Amount $2,549.12
Batch Confirmation Number 24035
Date Transmitted Thursday, June 06, 2013
Date Processed Thursday, June 06, 2013
Call Start Time 4:06 PM
Call End Time 4:07 PM
Funding Method 2 Day Funding
Cycle AM
Effective
Entry Date
Transaction Type
Entry
Identification
Routing/Transit
Bank Account
Entry Amount
06/08/2013 Checking - Deposit XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX $2,549.12
06/06/2013 Checking - Withdraw Offset Entry XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX -$2,549.12
Totals $0.00
Report reference ID # 607MPYRC Created on Thursday, June 06, 2013
Have a question about this report? Please click here to send us an email with your question.
The malicious payload is on [donotclick]usforclosedhomes.net/news/walls_autumns-serial.php (report here) hosted on the following IPs:
41.89.6.179 (Kenya Education Network, Kenya)
46.18.160.86 (Saudi Electronic Info Exchange Company (Tabadul) JSC, Saudi Arabia)
93.89.235.13 (FBS Bilisim Cozumleri, Cyprus)
112.170.169.56 (Korea Telecom, South Korea)
The cluster of IPs and domains this belongs to identifies it as part of the Amerika spam run.
Blocklist:
41.89.6.179
46.18.160.86
93.89.235.13
112.170.169.56
abacs.pl
biati.net
buyparrots.net
citysubway.net
condalnuashyochetto.ru
cunitarsiksepj.ru
eheranskietpj.ru
ejoingrespubldpl.ru
enway.pl
federal-credit-union.com
gnunirotniviepj.ru
gstoryofmygame.ru
icensol.net
myhispress.com
onlinedatingblueprint.net
oydahrenlitutskazata.ru
ozonatorz.com
smartsecurityapp2013.com
sngroup.pl
twintrade.net
usforclosedhomes.net
Innex, Inc fake spam
Innex, Inc is a real company. This spam email message is not from Innex, Inc.
Innex is based in California in the US, but the email appears to be from a university in Colombia and solicits replies to an email address in Taiwan. Note as well that the email is very vague about the "product" they are interested in, and the To: field is blank as the recipient list has been suppressed (i.e. it is being sent to multiple recipients). Avoid.
From: PURCHASING DEPARTMENT [fdmelo@fucsalud.edu.co]
To:
Reply-To: pinky.yu@chanqtjer.com.tw
Date: 6 June 2013 08:55
Subject: Innex, Inc.
Sir/Madam,
Our Company is interested in your product, that we saw in trading site,
Your early reply is very necessary for further detail specification immediately you receive our email.
Regards
Purchasing manager,
Mr James Vincent .
Innex, Inc.
325 Enterprise Place,
Pomona, CA 91768
United States.
Innex is based in California in the US, but the email appears to be from a university in Colombia and solicits replies to an email address in Taiwan. Note as well that the email is very vague about the "product" they are interested in, and the To: field is blank as the recipient list has been suppressed (i.e. it is being sent to multiple recipients). Avoid.
rxlogs.net: spam or Joe Job?
I've had nearly one hundred of these this morning. Is it a genuine spam run or a Joe Job?
The link in the emails goes to multiple pages on rxlogs.net which as far I as can tell is not malware, but is a blog about online pharmacies. But is is spam? Well, let's dig a little deeper..
Each email comes from a different IP, probably being sent by a botnet. That's pretty normal for pharma spam, but in this case there appear to be some anomalous addition headers..
The mildly munged headers from an example email are quite revealing. It appears that there are references to Amazon ECS (Amazon's cloud service) and a valid sender address of whisis101 -at- gmail.com injected into the headers, along with a load of other elements that you'd expect from botnet spam. The email has at no point hit either Gmail or Amazon, but the headers appear to have been faked in order to generate reports to Amazon and/or Gmail. It's worth noting that rxlogs.net is hosted on 107.20.147.122 which is an Amazon IP, so this is beginning to look like a Joe Job.
domain: rxlogs.net
owner: Stephen K. Walker
email: whisis101 -at- gmail.com
address: [redacted]
city: [redacted]
postal-code: [redacted]
country: US
phone: +7.[redacted]
The "From" address in the email matches the registration address in the WHOIS. Does that make it a genuine email? No, because no spammer is stupid enough to use their real email address in a spam run like this. Again, this smells like a Joe Job.
Another key indicator that this is a Joe Job is that all the dozens of emails have been sent to a spamcop.net email address, and there are far more emails that you would normally see for this type of spam run. This behaviour is typical for a Joe Job attack, the spammer pick the people who are most likely to complain and then hit them repeatedly to get try to get them to file a complaint with the victim's web host.
If you use Gmail, the email links back to a spare but apparently genuine Google+ profile, which links back to rxlogs.net. Which really leads to the next question.. what is rxlogs.net about?
rxlogs.net appears to be a genuine attempt to look at and rate online pharmacies using secondary sources to judge reliability and trustworthiness. The sites carries some paid advertising, but doesn't appear to deal with prescription medications directly, it looks like an affiliate site.
I'm not an expert in the US online pharmacy market, but I do know that you can check the legitimacy of online pharmacies with LegitScript but this is not without criticism.
My guess is that what has happened here is that Mr Walker has posted something on rxlogs.net which exposes a bogus pharma operation run by the same spammers sending out these emails. In other words, I believe this is a Joe Job and not a "genuine" spam run, and rxlogs.net is simply another victim of the bad guys.
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 09:44:18 -0700 [12:44:18 EDT]
From: Admin [whisis101@gmail.com]
Reply-To: ec2-abuse@amazon.com
You recently requested a new password for your Facebook account. It looks like we sent you an email with a link to reset your password 4 ago.
This is a reminder that you need to complete this action by clicking this link and Confirm or Cancel your request.
If you have any other questions, please visit our Help Center.
Thanks,
The Facebook Team
The link in the emails goes to multiple pages on rxlogs.net which as far I as can tell is not malware, but is a blog about online pharmacies. But is is spam? Well, let's dig a little deeper..
Each email comes from a different IP, probably being sent by a botnet. That's pretty normal for pharma spam, but in this case there appear to be some anomalous addition headers..
The mildly munged headers from an example email are quite revealing. It appears that there are references to Amazon ECS (Amazon's cloud service) and a valid sender address of whisis101 -at- gmail.com injected into the headers, along with a load of other elements that you'd expect from botnet spam. The email has at no point hit either Gmail or Amazon, but the headers appear to have been faked in order to generate reports to Amazon and/or Gmail. It's worth noting that rxlogs.net is hosted on 107.20.147.122 which is an Amazon IP, so this is beginning to look like a Joe Job.
Received: from lsh410.van.ca.siteprotect.com (204.174.223.206)So what do we know about the domain rxlogs.net? Well, the WHOIS details appear to be genuine and not hidden, I've redacted the most of the personal information but some of the key details are:
by [redacted] with SMTP; 6 Jun 2013 07:37:53 -0000
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 00:37:53 -0700
To: [redacted]
From: Admin [whisis101 -at- gmail.com]
Return-Path: [bantstreetpottery -at- sctelco.net.au]
Reply-To: ec2-abuse -at- amazon.com
Subject: Reminder: Reset your password
Message-Id: [2cc3f11ac2ce3aa7d59d8682eee6df05@notify.amazon.com]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
domain: rxlogs.net
owner: Stephen K. Walker
email: whisis101 -at- gmail.com
address: [redacted]
city: [redacted]
postal-code: [redacted]
country: US
phone: +7.[redacted]
The "From" address in the email matches the registration address in the WHOIS. Does that make it a genuine email? No, because no spammer is stupid enough to use their real email address in a spam run like this. Again, this smells like a Joe Job.
Another key indicator that this is a Joe Job is that all the dozens of emails have been sent to a spamcop.net email address, and there are far more emails that you would normally see for this type of spam run. This behaviour is typical for a Joe Job attack, the spammer pick the people who are most likely to complain and then hit them repeatedly to get try to get them to file a complaint with the victim's web host.
If you use Gmail, the email links back to a spare but apparently genuine Google+ profile, which links back to rxlogs.net. Which really leads to the next question.. what is rxlogs.net about?
rxlogs.net appears to be a genuine attempt to look at and rate online pharmacies using secondary sources to judge reliability and trustworthiness. The sites carries some paid advertising, but doesn't appear to deal with prescription medications directly, it looks like an affiliate site.
I'm not an expert in the US online pharmacy market, but I do know that you can check the legitimacy of online pharmacies with LegitScript but this is not without criticism.
My guess is that what has happened here is that Mr Walker has posted something on rxlogs.net which exposes a bogus pharma operation run by the same spammers sending out these emails. In other words, I believe this is a Joe Job and not a "genuine" spam run, and rxlogs.net is simply another victim of the bad guys.
Wednesday, 5 June 2013
More Champions Club Community spam
These grubby little spammers are at it again. Apparently Steve Jobs is dead. Who knew?
Anyway, the originating IP is 217.174.248.194 [web1-opp2.champions-bounce.co.uk] (Fasthosts, UK). Spamvertised domains are champions.onlineprintproofing.co.uk also on 217.174.248.194 and championsclubcommunity.com on 109.203.113.124 (Eukhost, UK). Give these spammers a wide berth.
Anyway, the originating IP is 217.174.248.194 [web1-opp2.champions-bounce.co.uk] (Fasthosts, UK). Spamvertised domains are champions.onlineprintproofing.co.uk also on 217.174.248.194 and championsclubcommunity.com on 109.203.113.124 (Eukhost, UK). Give these spammers a wide berth.
From: The Editor - Champions Club Community
Reply-To: contactus2@championsclubcommunity.com
Date: 5 June 2013 05:45
Subject: CCC LIFE : This Month - Steve Jobs In Focus
Hello and a very warm welcome to the latest newsletter from Champions Club Community!
This month we have an eclectic mix of articles, hopefully with something for everybody.
Here are a few of the headline articles, with links directly to our site:
Steve Jobs, often described as a visionary during his life, there has been much speculation about the significance of his last words… http://championsclubcommunity.com/rip-steve-jobs/
His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales, Patron of Samaritans, hosted a reception for distinguished guests and volunteers to launch the celebrations marking 60 years since the charity received its first call in November 1953. http://championsclubcommunity.com/samaritans-start-60th-celebrations/
A question was posed to the Dalai Lama - “WHAT IS the thing about humanity that surprises you the most?” His answer: “Man… sacrifices his health to make money. Then he sacrifices his money to try to gain back his health.” http://championsclubcommunity.com/a-question-was-posed-to-dalai-lama-provided-by-guy-insull/
Pope Francis I. He is opposed to gay marriage, regards the Falklands Islands as being usurped by the UK, and it is not believed that he will allow priests to marry: controversial or merely traditionalist? http://championsclubcommunity.com/pope-francis-1-a-new-hope-for-the-world-by-dianna-moylan/
“The spirit of good business is the excellence of the connection between purchaser and supplier.” John Meredith examines “The 8th Habit” in which Stephen Covey says that a tactical plan begins with the customer… http://championsclubcommunity.com/execution-of-the-strategic-plan-by-john-meredith/
As always, there is a whole lot more inside the magazine. Enjoy the read and do join in if you have a story to tell that will inspire others to Make A Difference! (Go MAD!!).
Kind regards,
The Editor, Champions Club Community
Please note: if you no longer wish to receive these newsletter communications from us you can unsubscribe from our mailing list by using the "unsubscribe" link at the bottom of this email. Thank you.
Labels:
Spam
Monday, 3 June 2013
"Fiserv Secure Email Notification" spam with an encrypted, malicious ZIP attachment
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2013 14:11:14 -0500 [15:11:14 EDT]
From: Fiserv Secure Notification [secure.notification@fiserv.com]
Subject: Fiserv Secure Email Notification - IZCO4O4VUHV83W1
You have received a secure message
Read your secure message by opening the attachment, SecureMessage_IZCO4O4VUHV83W1.zip.
The attached file contains the encrypted message that you have received.
To decrypt the message use the following password - Iu1JsoKaQ
To read the encrypted message, complete the following steps:
- Double-click the encrypted message file attachment to download the file to your computer.
- Select whether to open the file or save it to your hard drive. Opening the file displays the attachment in a new browser window.
- The message is password-protected, enter your password to open it.
To access from a mobile device, forward this message to mobile@res.fiserv.com to receive a mobile login URL.
If you have concerns about the validity of this message, please contact the sender directly. For questions about secure e-mail encryption service, please contact technical support at 888.840.0668.
2000-2013 Fiserv Secure Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Of course, it would be supremely pointless password protecting a document and then including the password in the email! The file has been password protected in an attempt to thwart anti-virus software. In this case, the password for the file SecureMessage_IZCO4O4VUHV83W1.zip is Iu1JsoKaQ which in turn leads to a file called SecureMessage_06032013.exe (note the date in included in that filename).
At the moment the VirusTotal detection rate is a so-so 16/47. The ThreatTrack analysis identifies some locations that the malware phones home to:
netnet-viaggi.it
paulcblake.com
74.54.147.146
116.122.158.195
190.147.81.28
194.184.71.7
207.204.5.170
For the records, those IPs belong to:
74.54.147.146 (ThePlanet, US)
116.122.158.195 (Hanaro Telecom, Korea)
190.147.81.28 (Telmex, Colombia)
194.184.71.7 (Ouverture Service, Italy)
207.204.5.170 (Register.com, US)
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Malware,
Spam,
Viruses
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