The following IPs and domains appear to be in use for spreading exploit kits via injection attacks - 108.178.7.118 (Singlehop, US) [1] [2] and 212.83.164.87 (Online SAS, France) [3] [4]. The payload isn't clear, but some of the URLquery reports indicate Neutrino.
In the case I saw, the victim was directed to the EK from a compromised site at greetingstext.com. I cannot reproduce the problem with URLquery or any other tool, but log files do not lie.
I would recommend that you block these following IPs and domains as a precaution:
108.178.7.118
212.83.164.87
jakiewebs.com
sheethoo.com
chaefooh.com
goldnclouds.com
nofledno.com
zeuriele.com
wqywdo.xip.io
glindeb.com
Wednesday, 12 February 2014
Malware (Neutrino EK?) sites to block 12/2/14
Labels:
Injection Attacks,
Malware
Video: Somnath Bharti's links to TopSites LLC
Labels:
Somnath Bharti
Articles on Somnath Bharti and TopSites LLC
You can find some of the history about TopSites LLC and Mr Bharti's involvement in my old "diary" articles written between 2003 and 2007.
- Topsites Scam: TopSites LLC & MyDirectory LLC / My Directory LLC
- Topsites LLC - Correspondence Received
- Topsites Uncovered: Who is Behind the Topsites Scam and Spam?
- More Topsites LLC Scams and Lies
- Topsites Revisited: www--search.com, www.dirs.org, www.worldbiggest.com and My Directory LLC
- For Sale: Topsites.us / Topsites LLC
- www-goto.com Spam Emails and Edgetech Services
- INOVA Technology (inovatechnology.com): A History of Spam
Labels:
Somnath Bharti
Monday, 10 February 2014
81.4.106.132 / oochooch.com / 10qnbkh.xip.io
I don't like the look of this [urlquery], seems to be the payload site for some sort of injection attack. Might be worth blocklisting 81.4.106.132.
Labels:
Injection Attacks,
Malware
Evil .pw domains on 31.41.221.131 to 31.41.221.135
Thanks to Malekal for the heads up, the current batch of evil .pw domains that have been distributing malware appear to have shifted to the following IP addresses:
31.41.221.131
31.41.221.132
31.41.221.133
31.41.221.134
31.41.221.135
These IP addresses belong to Besthosting in Ukraine. A typical payload of one of these malicious sites looks like this URLquery report.
The evil .pw domains in use all use a subdomain of one of the following:
arrowjogger.pw
athleticsarchery.pw
athleticsjudo.pw
ballkayaker.pw
baseballcompetition.pw
basketballplaying.pw
batongoal.pw
battingfield.pw
battinggymnast.pw
boulesplaying.pw
boxerfielder.pw
boxerplay.pw
canoeingbaton.pw
canoekarate.pw
competearena.pw
competitiongolfer.pw
crewjumping.pw
dartgym.pw
defensebicycle.pw
diamondracer.pw
discushurdle.pw
divemedal.pw
diverbiking.pw
diverracket.pw
dodgeballkayaker.pw
fielddefense.pw
gearcompetitor.pw
golfbow.pw
golfercyclist.pw
golfingchampionship.pw
golfingorienteering.pw
halftimedecathlon.pw
handballdart.pw
huddledart.pw
huddledartboard.pw
javelinbaton.pw
leaguedart.pw
medaljogger.pw
medaljogger.pw
movementarchery.pw
pitchbiathlon.pw
pitchexercise.pw
playbunt.pw
playmove.pw
playoffschampion.pw
polediver.pw
polofencing.pw
pooljump.pw
racketrunning.pw
relaycompete.pw
rungymnastics.pw
I would recommend blocking those domains and the above-listed IPs (or alternatively 31.41.221.128/29 or 31.41.221.128/25). A full list of all the subdomains I can find is here [pastebin]
31.41.221.131
31.41.221.132
31.41.221.133
31.41.221.134
31.41.221.135
These IP addresses belong to Besthosting in Ukraine. A typical payload of one of these malicious sites looks like this URLquery report.
The evil .pw domains in use all use a subdomain of one of the following:
arrowjogger.pw
athleticsarchery.pw
athleticsjudo.pw
ballkayaker.pw
baseballcompetition.pw
basketballplaying.pw
batongoal.pw
battingfield.pw
battinggymnast.pw
boulesplaying.pw
boxerfielder.pw
boxerplay.pw
canoeingbaton.pw
canoekarate.pw
competearena.pw
competitiongolfer.pw
crewjumping.pw
dartgym.pw
defensebicycle.pw
diamondracer.pw
discushurdle.pw
divemedal.pw
diverbiking.pw
diverracket.pw
dodgeballkayaker.pw
fielddefense.pw
gearcompetitor.pw
golfbow.pw
golfercyclist.pw
golfingchampionship.pw
golfingorienteering.pw
halftimedecathlon.pw
handballdart.pw
huddledart.pw
huddledartboard.pw
javelinbaton.pw
leaguedart.pw
medaljogger.pw
medaljogger.pw
movementarchery.pw
pitchbiathlon.pw
pitchexercise.pw
playbunt.pw
playmove.pw
playoffschampion.pw
polediver.pw
polofencing.pw
pooljump.pw
racketrunning.pw
relaycompete.pw
rungymnastics.pw
I would recommend blocking those domains and the above-listed IPs (or alternatively 31.41.221.128/29 or 31.41.221.128/25). A full list of all the subdomains I can find is here [pastebin]
Labels:
Evil Network,
Malware,
Ukraine,
Viruses
Saturday, 8 February 2014
Somnath Bharti's allwebhunt.com linked to pro-pedophilia sites
Delhi minister Somnath Bharti's allwebhunt.com site was linking to pro-pedophilia sites as late as 31st December 2013, according to Google [warning: I do not advise that you click on the links in that page]. Here is a screenshot (some descriptions may offend) (if you have difficulty with seeing the text, try this version). The ownership link between allwebhunt.com and Mr Bharti is described here.
That content was most likely taken from a controversial category at The Open Directory Project which no longer exists.
The Open Directory Project does try to be all-inclusive in what it catalogues, but I suspect that pro-paedophile sites were something that it felt it could not condone.
That content was most likely taken from a controversial category at The Open Directory Project which no longer exists.
The Open Directory Project does try to be all-inclusive in what it catalogues, but I suspect that pro-paedophile sites were something that it felt it could not condone.
Labels:
Somnath Bharti
Friday, 7 February 2014
Headlines Today (India): Somnath Bharti's spammer connection
I'm not sure what all this fascination is with Mr Bharti's alleged connections to porn.. I've never found any evidence that he has hosted or owned sites with pornographic content. But there's certainly a great deal of evidence linking him with spam outfit TopSites LLC.
Labels:
Somnath Bharti,
Spam,
Video
Somnath Bharti denies link to TopSites LLC in 2004
This is Somnath Bharti's denial of any involvement in TopSites LLC (explored here and in other posts). I believe that the evidence of Mr Bharti's involvement is overwhelming. However, here is a copy of the original email he sent me complete with mail headers so that independent individuals can look into its authenticity.
Return-Path: <somnath.bharti@gmail.com>
Received: from unknown (HELO blade5.cesmail.net) (192.168.1.215)
by c60.cesmail.net with SMTP; 14 Nov 2004 13:43:23 -0500
Received: (qmail 5069 invoked by uid 1010); 14 Nov 2004 18:43:22 -0000
Delivered-To: spamcop-net-dynamoo@spamcop.net
Received: (qmail 5045 invoked from network); 14 Nov 2004 18:43:21 -0000
Received: from unknown (192.168.1.101)
by blade5.cesmail.net with QMQP; 14 Nov 2004 18:43:21 -0000
Received: from rproxy.gmail.com (64.233.170.197)
by mailgate.cesmail.net with SMTP; 14 Nov 2004 18:43:21 -0000
Received: by rproxy.gmail.com with SMTP id r35so540853rna
for <dynamoo@spamcop.net>; Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800 (PST)
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws;
s=beta; d=gmail.com;
h=received:message-id:date:from:reply-to:to:subject:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding;
b=AItQWQnfUOPREzb2USZ1AAdfuMy54ME4VonsHz7VdB93Wd8apOkFSOrdqjkbLLFqI6nUaFy2cKrbLXTrFSLC0p5Kj2ZdwK0Qb6CFZjbS24HecjymNLUahhMUBp3AbEb0M/t/EXhC4N0HZeCD06YP/TK7XF0dZaqNweevm4cXL4E=
Received: by 10.38.102.45 with SMTP id z45mr1019046rnb;
Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.38.151.16 with HTTP; Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <4e0e2d5304111410431d08a7bb@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800
From: Somnath <somnath.bharti@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Somnath <somnath.bharti@gmail.com>
To: dynamoo@spamcop.net
Subject: surprising and serious
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.0 (2004-09-13) on blade5
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: hits=0.0 tests=RCVD_BY_IP version=3.0.0
X-SpamCop-Checked: 192.168.1.101 64.233.170.197 10.38.102.45 10.38.151.16
Hi Conrad,
I was taken by surprise to find you listing my name, one of my
properties address and my picture in an article on a company named
"TopSites LLC" on your site. I don't know on what basis you have been
talking so emphatic without cross verifying with the person you are
talking about. To my utter surprise, you have been having this article
on your site accusing me of being related to a company I have heard
only through your article. Please have the same removed ASAP and
explain to me what made you write all this about a person, not even
remotely attached to any such company.
Please acknowledge of this email and have any and everything related
my name, my pic and c-28 address removed. I am available at
+91-9891819893, if you have anything to talk about. Also, post on the
same page an apology for this grievous mistake on your part.
--
Regards,
Somnath Bharti
Labels:
Somnath Bharti
Something evil on 69.64.39.166
69.64.39.166 (Hosting Solutions International, US) appears to be hosting an exploit kit (possibly Fiesta) according to URLquery reports such as this one.
The code is being injected into target websites, possibly through a malvertising campaign. I would recommend blocking the IP address as the simplest option, although I can identify the following domains on that same IP, all of which are likely to be malicious.
The code is being injected into target websites, possibly through a malvertising campaign. I would recommend blocking the IP address as the simplest option, although I can identify the following domains on that same IP, all of which are likely to be malicious.
advrzc.myftp.org |
amyoau.myftp.biz |
aokljwwsap.serveftp.com |
bgocodwsiu.myftp.org |
bpknbvmc.serveftp.com |
cjhkxfpdw.serveftp.com |
cvxeitw.serveftp.com |
cxrhtcau.myftp.biz |
czwaiys.myftp.org |
dhdwjwve.myftp.org |
djqlcce.myftp.org |
drituglgjh.serveftp.com |
drpmsmt.serveftp.com |
ehetlmna.myftp.biz |
euimho.serveftp.com |
fvyzhy.serveftp.com |
hljozqutc.myftp.org |
hlwswbaap.serveftp.com |
hwtlzdxic.serveftp.com |
idoplhj.serveftp.com |
iyrseedlt.myftp.biz |
lkuvivr.myftp.biz |
lxeoic.myftp.org |
orrlnypdvz.myftp.biz |
osuqlc.myftp.org |
plwxycxij.myftp.org |
pmkawqgvob.myftp.org |
puifnjav.myftp.biz |
sbrckuod.serveftp.com |
thtnuj.myftp.biz |
ucuqgd.myftp.org |
uqqyscgq.myftp.org |
uuzkpb.myftp.biz |
welfcsuybw.serveftp.com |
ykypxoub.myftp.org |
yrziqui.serveftp.com |
yxoiyjbjt.myftp.biz |
Labels:
Evil Network,
Injection Attacks,
Malvertising,
Malware
"Authorization to Use Privately Owned Vehicle on State Business" spam
We've seen this particular type of malware-laden spam before..
Anubis reports an attempted connection to faneema.com on 198.38.82.223 (Mochahost, US). I recommend blocking both the domain and IP address in this case.
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 17:08:16 +0700 [05:08:16 EST]The email appears to originate from within the victim's own domain but doesn't. Attached is an archive file Form_STD261.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable Form_STD261.scr which has a VirusTotal detection rate of just 3/51.
From: Callie Figueroa [Callie@victimdomain]
Subject: Annual Form - Authorization to Use Privately Owned Vehicle on State Business
All employees need to have on file this form STD 261 (attached). The original is
retained by supervisor and copy goes to Accounting. Accounting need this form to approve
mileage reimbursement.
The form can be used for multiple years, however it needs to re-signed annually by
employee and supervisor.
Please confirm all employees that may travel using their private car on state business
(including training) has a current STD 261 on file. Not having a current copy of this
form on file in Accounting may delay a travel reimbursement claim.
Anubis reports an attempted connection to faneema.com on 198.38.82.223 (Mochahost, US). I recommend blocking both the domain and IP address in this case.
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Malware,
Spam,
Viruses
rbs.co.uk "Important Docs" spam
This fake spam claiming to be from the Royal Bank of Scotland has a malicious attachment:
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show a downlad of en encrypted file from the following locations:
[donotclick]professionalonlineediting.com/theme/cc/images/07UKex.enc
[donotclick]mararu.ro/Media/07UKex.enc
Both those sites are hosted by Mochanin Corp in the US, indicating perhaps a wider problem with that host.
Recommended blocklist:
204.93.165.33
50.31.147.54
professionalonlineediting.com
mararu.ro
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 15:44:19 +0530 [05:14:19 EST]Attached is a file AccountReport.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable AccountReport.scr which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/50.
From: Doris Clay [Doris@rbs.co.uk]
Subject: Important Docs
Account report.
Tel: 01322 589422
Fax: 01322 296116
email: Doris@rbs.co.uk
This information is classified as Confidential unless otherwise stated.
CONFIDENTIAL NOTICE: The contents of this message, including any attachments, are
confidential and are intended solely for the use of the person or entity to whom the
message was addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please be
advised that any dissemination, distribution, or use of the contents of this message is
strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender.
Please also permanently delete all copies of the original message and any attached
documentation. Thank you.
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show a downlad of en encrypted file from the following locations:
[donotclick]professionalonlineediting.com/theme/cc/images/07UKex.enc
[donotclick]mararu.ro/Media/07UKex.enc
Both those sites are hosted by Mochanin Corp in the US, indicating perhaps a wider problem with that host.
Recommended blocklist:
204.93.165.33
50.31.147.54
professionalonlineediting.com
mararu.ro
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Malware,
Spam,
Viruses
Thursday, 6 February 2014
Trouble at CtrlS?
CtrlS is a large Indian hosting provider who seldom feature in this blog which is always a positive sign. However, the last two Zeus spam smail runs exclusively use CtrlS servers to host encrypted malware.
Three of the four domains are easy to spot:
wahidexpress.com is on 182.18.188.191
bsitacademy.com is on 103.8.127.189
oilwellme.com is on 182.18.151.160
The last one of the four domains is hosted on a Cloudflare IP.. but Cloudflare is only a reverse proxy and a bit of digging at IP records show that newz24x.com appears to be hosted on another CtrlS IP of 182.18.189.71.
So, four out of four IPs belong to CtrlS. It could be a coincidence, but I wonder if anybody else is seeing traffic (especially for downloads of .enc files) in CtrlS IP ranges?
Three of the four domains are easy to spot:
wahidexpress.com is on 182.18.188.191
bsitacademy.com is on 103.8.127.189
oilwellme.com is on 182.18.151.160
The last one of the four domains is hosted on a Cloudflare IP.. but Cloudflare is only a reverse proxy and a bit of digging at IP records show that newz24x.com appears to be hosted on another CtrlS IP of 182.18.189.71.
So, four out of four IPs belong to CtrlS. It could be a coincidence, but I wonder if anybody else is seeing traffic (especially for downloads of .enc files) in CtrlS IP ranges?
Labels:
India
Fake HMRC "VAT Return" spam
This fake HMRC spam comes with a malicious attachment:
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show an encrypted file being downloaded from:
[donotclick]wahidexpress.com/scripts/ie.enc[donotclick]bsitacademy.com/img/events/ie.enc
Recommended blocklist:
182.18.188.191
wahidexpress.com
bsitacademy.com
Update:
A second version of the email is circulating with the following body text:
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 20:32:34 +0100 [14:32:34 EST]I love the "certified virus-free" bit, because of course this thing comes with a malicious payload. Attached to the message is an archive Reference.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable Reference.scr (a plain old executable, not a screensaver). This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 2/50.
From: "noreply@hmrc.gov.uk" [noreply@hmrc.gov.uk]
Subject: Successful Receipt of Online Submission for Reference 3608005
Thank you for sending your VAT Return online. The submission for reference 3608005 was
successfully received on Thu, 6 Feb 2014 20:32:34 +0100 and is being processed. Make VAT
Returns is just one of the many online services we offer that can save you time and
paperwork.
For the latest information on your VAT Return please open attached report.
The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet
virus scanning service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with
MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate Number 2009/09/0052.) On leaving the GSi this email was
certified virus free.
Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for
legal purposes.
Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show an encrypted file being downloaded from:
[donotclick]wahidexpress.com/scripts/ie.enc[donotclick]bsitacademy.com/img/events/ie.enc
Recommended blocklist:
182.18.188.191
wahidexpress.com
bsitacademy.com
Update:
A second version of the email is circulating with the following body text:
The submission for reference 485/GB1392709 was successfully received and was not
processed.
Check attached copy for more information.
This is an automatically generated email. Please do not reply as the email address is not
monitored for received mail.
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
HMRC,
Malware,
Spam,
Viruses
Fake "TNT UK Limited " spam with zero detections
This fake TNT spam comes with a malicious attachment that is currently not detected by any AV vendors.
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 11:48:18 +0100 [05:48:18 EST]Attached is a file Label_798950432737.zip which contains a malicious executable Label02062014.scr (an executable despite the .scr extension) with a VirusTotal detection rate of 0/41.
From: TNT COURIER SERVICE [tracking@tnt.co.uk]
Subject: TNT UK Limited - Package tracking 798950432737
Your package have been picked up and is ready for dispatch.
Connote # : 798950432737
Service Type : Export Non Documents - Intl
Shipped on : 05 Feb 14 00:00
Order No : 2819122
Status : Driver's Return Description : Wrong Address
Service Options: You are required to select a service option below.
TNT COURIER SERVICE (TCS)
Customer/Delivery Services Department
Central Pk Est/Mosley Rd, Trafford Park
Manchester, M17 1TT UK.
DETAILS OF PACKAGE
Reg order no: 798950432737
The options, together with their associated conditions
Despite the zero detection rate, there is plenty of badness going on [1] [2] [3] [4] including downloads of an encrypted file from the following locations:
[donotclick]newz24x.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pdf.enc
[donotclick]oilwellme.com/images/banners/pdf.enc
The Malwr report indicates lots of IPs being communicated with, some of these look like Cloudflare addresses where newz24x.com is hosted. Take care with these if you are thinking about blocking them.
Recommended blocklist:
182.18.151.160
newz24x.com
oilwellme.com
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Malware,
Spam,
Viruses
Wednesday, 5 February 2014
"Payment Fund" spam with Wire.Transfer.rar attachment
It's rare to see malware with a .RAR attachment, but this is one of those unusual beasts..
The VirusTotal detection rate is 7/50 but most automated analysis tools seem to be having problems with the executable, so perhaps it is hardened against analysis or is simply corrupt. The ThreatExpert report (for some reason not showing in their database right now) has the following details:
From: Alison George allison.george@transferduc.nlAttached is a file Wire.Transfer.rar which you will need to unpack with a suitable application. In turn this creates a file Wire-Report which is actually an executable, but missing the .exe extension.. so you have to add that to get infected. Hmmm.. the phrase "some assembly required" springs to mind.
Date: 5 February 2014 22:41
Subject: Payment Fund
ALERT! A bank Wire transaction, Has just been rejected from checking 656778*** account.
to your bank confirmed by the FedWire.
Transaction ID: 99076900
Date: 2/3/2014
Transfer Origination: Fedline
Please review the attached copy of transaction report,
Federal Reserve Financial Services
Creating Nationwide Solutions for Your Payment Needs
20th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20551
The VirusTotal detection rate is 7/50 but most automated analysis tools seem to be having problems with the executable, so perhaps it is hardened against analysis or is simply corrupt. The ThreatExpert report (for some reason not showing in their database right now) has the following details:
Submission Summary:
- Submission details:
- Submission received: 5 February 2014, 04:39:38 PM
- Processing time: 6 min 0 sec
- Submitted sample:
- File MD5: 0x12F1265162AAD712C271DAC6A9B5E564
- Filesize: 248,320 bytes
- Summary of the findings:
What's been found | Severity Level |
Creates a startup registry entry. |
Technical Details:
Memory Modifications |
- There was a new process created in the system:
Process Name | Process Filename | Main Module Size |
server.exe | %Temp%\server.exe | 57,344 bytes |
Registry Modifications |
- The newly created Registry Values are:
- [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
- babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e = ""%Temp%\server.exe" .."
so that %Temp%\server.exe runs every time Windows starts
- [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment]
- SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS = "1"
- [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
- 5PmM1jWi05 = "%AppData%\y183imD2\java.exe.lnk"
- babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e = ""%Temp%\server.exe" .."
so that %Temp%\server.exe runs every time Windows starts
- [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
Other details |
- To mark the presence in the system, the following Mutex object was created:
- babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e
"LloydsLink reference" spam comes with a malicious attachment
This fake Lloyds TSB spam comes with a malicous payload:
The attachment is SecureMessage.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable SecureMessage.scr which has an icon that looks like Internet Explorer. Despire the .scr suffix, this file is a plain old .exe file and will execute if you double-click it (don't!).
VirusTotal detections are 11/51, and automated analysis between ThreatExpert, Malwr and Anubis show an attempted download from [donotclick]asianfarm.org/images/pdf.enc and [donotclick]ideasempurna.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pdf.enc with the following IPs being involved:
108.90.186.161 (AT&T, US)
111.90.133.246 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
121.117.209.51 (NTT, Japan)
124.217.241.34 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
174.103.25.199 (Time Warner Cable, US)
The .enc file is an encoded executable, explained in detail here. I haven't tried to decode it but obviously that too will be malicious.
Recommended blocklist:
asianfarm.org
ideasempurna.com.my
108.90.186.161
111.90.133.246
121.117.209.51
124.217.241.34
174.103.25.199
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2014 20:38:29 +0100 [14:38:29 EST]
From: GRP Lloydslink Tech [GRPLloydslinkTech@LLOYDSBANKING.COM]
Subject: LloydsLink reference: 8255820 follow up email and actions to be taken
Lloyds TSB
Help
(New users may need to verify their email address)
If you do not see or cannot click / tap the Download attachment button:
Desktop Users:
You will be prompted to open (view) the file or save (download) it to your computer. For best results, save the file first, then open it.
Mobile Users:
Install the mobile application.
Protected by the Voltage SecureMail Cloud
SecureMail has a NEW LOOK to better support mobile devices!
Disclaimer: This email and any attachments are confidential and for the sole use of the recipients. If you have received this email in error please notify the sender.
Email Security Powered by Voltage IBE™
Copyright 2002-2014 Voltage Security, Inc. All rights reserved.
Lloyds Bank plc. Registered Office: 25 Gresham Street, London EC2V 7HN. Registered in England and Wales no. 2065. Telephone 0207626 1500
Bank of Scotland plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC327000. Telephone: 08457 21 31 41
Cheltenham & Gloucester plc. Registered Office: Barnett Way, Gloucester GL4 3RL. Registered in England and Wales 2299428. Telephone: 0845 603 1637
Lloyds Bank plc, Bank of Scotland plc are authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority.
Cheltenham & Gloucester plc is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.
Halifax is a division of Bank of Scotland plc. Cheltenham & Gloucester Savings is a division of Lloyds Bank plc.
HBOS plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC218813.
Lloyds Banking Group plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC95000. Telephone: 0131 225 4555
This e-mail (including any attachments) is private and confidential and may contain privileged material. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender and delete it (including any attachments) immediately. You must not copy, distribute, disclose or use any of the information in it or any attachments.
Telephone calls may be monitored or recorded.
The attachment is SecureMessage.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable SecureMessage.scr which has an icon that looks like Internet Explorer. Despire the .scr suffix, this file is a plain old .exe file and will execute if you double-click it (don't!).
VirusTotal detections are 11/51, and automated analysis between ThreatExpert, Malwr and Anubis show an attempted download from [donotclick]asianfarm.org/images/pdf.enc and [donotclick]ideasempurna.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pdf.enc with the following IPs being involved:
108.90.186.161 (AT&T, US)
111.90.133.246 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
121.117.209.51 (NTT, Japan)
124.217.241.34 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
174.103.25.199 (Time Warner Cable, US)
The .enc file is an encoded executable, explained in detail here. I haven't tried to decode it but obviously that too will be malicious.
Recommended blocklist:
asianfarm.org
ideasempurna.com.my
108.90.186.161
111.90.133.246
121.117.209.51
124.217.241.34
174.103.25.199
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Malware,
Piradius.net,
Spam,
Viruses
"Barclays transaction notification" spam
This fake Barclays spam comes with a malicious payload:
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2014 03:02:52 -0500 [03:02:52 EST]Attached is a file Payment receipt Barclays PA77392733.zip which is turn contains a malicious executable Payment receipt Barclays PA77392733.exe with a surprisingly poor VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/51 (only Sophos detects it). Automated analysis tools are pretty inconclusive about the payload [1] [2] [3] with only the Malwr report having any real detail.
From: Barclays Bank [support@barclays.net]
Subject: Barclays transaction notification #002601
Transaction is completed. £9685 has been successfully transfered.
If the transaction was made by mistake please contact our customer service.
Receipt of payment is attached.
Barclays is a trading name of Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiaries. Barclays Bank PLC is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority (Financial Services Register No. 122702). Registered in England. Registered Number is 1026167 with registered office at 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP.
Labels:
EXE-in-ZIP,
Malware,
Spam,
Viruses
Tuesday, 4 February 2014
WTF? WFP.org spam? Or is it emailciti.com?
This spam is promoting the UN's World Food Programme. I'm surprised the the WFP should sink so low, but perhaps they engaged the services of spammers without realising.
The email itself is digitally signed, so we can be reasonable assure that it originates from loyaltyciti.com who are in Dubai:
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: mohammad Lahlouh
Registrant Organization: Emailciti
Registrant Street: Dubai Media City, Building #8
Registrant City: Dubai
Registrant State/Province: Dubai
Registrant Postal Code: 502382
Registrant Country: United Arab Emirates
Registrant Phone: +971.507735717
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: mlahlouh@emailciti.com
Registry Admin ID:
These people are persistent spammers who usually send through some unsolicited crap several times a week, using an email address that is effectively a spamtrap. What is really annoying is the the WFP is paying these spammers to run a campaign of dubious value when they could be helping to fee starving people.
From: World Food Programme newsletter@newsletter.loyaltyciti.comThe email originates from 208.95.135.84 [mail3345.emailciti.mkt3942.com] (Silverpop Systems, US) and spamvertises an intermediate site at links.emailciti.mkt3941.com on 74.112.69.20 (Silverpop again) and then forwards to www.wfp.org/hunger-hot-spots if you click through.
Reply-To: newsletter@newsletter.loyaltyciti.com
Date: 4 February 2014 09:58
Subject: 60% of people here don't have food
Signed by: newsletter.loyaltyciti.com
If you are unable to see the message below, click here to view.
Share: Delicious Digg Facebook LinkedIn Twitter
world food programme
There’s a common link between a mother in Central African Republic, a father in South Sudan, and a child in Syria. Hunger. Fortunately, there’s also a common solution – The World Food Programme (WFP)..
WFP provides food assistance so families can break the cycle of poverty and hunger. Our goal? Zero hunger. We rely on the support of our online community to make this a reality.
Will you join us? Sign up at wfp.org/join to receive monthly updates and info about how you can help achieve a zero hunger world.
When conflict erupts, hunger soon follows. In CAR, South Sudan, and Syria, WFP is fighting for families who are being pushed to the brink. Find out how we’re responding to ensure families have the security that comes with a daily meal.
central african republic
level 3 emergency
See where we’re sounding the alarm.
remembering what matters delivering despite
WFP’s Rasmus Egendal reflects on what really matters in Syria: The People. Thanks to our supporters like you, WFP has been able to deliver food in South Sudan rom the start.
starting stars from car reporting from damascus
Get the facts & figures you should know: 60% of families in Central African Republic have no food. Watch an update from WFP’s Executive Director who met Syrian families relying on WFP assistance.
follow wfp facebook twitter
You have received this email message from EmailCiti, the leading Email Behavior and Lead Generation Company in the GCC & Middle East. Your email address has been recorded because you have subscribed to one of our email &newsletters services or are registered with one of our Partner and affiliate sites. For more information, visit www.emailciti.com
If you don't wish to receive these emails anymore please click here.
The email itself is digitally signed, so we can be reasonable assure that it originates from loyaltyciti.com who are in Dubai:
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: mohammad Lahlouh
Registrant Organization: Emailciti
Registrant Street: Dubai Media City, Building #8
Registrant City: Dubai
Registrant State/Province: Dubai
Registrant Postal Code: 502382
Registrant Country: United Arab Emirates
Registrant Phone: +971.507735717
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: mlahlouh@emailciti.com
Registry Admin ID:
These people are persistent spammers who usually send through some unsolicited crap several times a week, using an email address that is effectively a spamtrap. What is really annoying is the the WFP is paying these spammers to run a campaign of dubious value when they could be helping to fee starving people.
Monday, 3 February 2014
Something evil on 192.95.43.160/28
More badness hosted by OVH Canada, this time 192.95.43.160/28 which contains pretty much the same set of evil described here. Here is a typical IP flagged by VirusTotal and a failed resolution by URLquery which frankly gives enough information to make it suspicious.
However, the key thing is the registrant details which have been used in many malware attacks before.
CustName: Private Customer
Address: Private Residence
City: Penziatki
StateProv:
PostalCode: 30000
Country: RU
RegDate: 2014-01-24
Updated: 2014-01-24
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C04859116
I can see the following .pw domains active in this range:
basecoach.pw
crewcloud.pw
boomerangfair.pw
kickballmonsoon.pw
martialartsclub.pw
runningracer.pw
All those domains are flagged by Google as malicious and I recommend that you block them along with 192.95.43.160/28.
(Hat tip to my source, you know who you are!)
However, the key thing is the registrant details which have been used in many malware attacks before.
CustName: Private Customer
Address: Private Residence
City: Penziatki
StateProv:
PostalCode: 30000
Country: RU
RegDate: 2014-01-24
Updated: 2014-01-24
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C04859116
I can see the following .pw domains active in this range:
basecoach.pw
crewcloud.pw
boomerangfair.pw
kickballmonsoon.pw
martialartsclub.pw
runningracer.pw
All those domains are flagged by Google as malicious and I recommend that you block them along with 192.95.43.160/28.
(Hat tip to my source, you know who you are!)
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