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Thursday, 6 February 2014

Trouble at CtrlS?

CtrlS is a large Indian hosting provider who seldom feature in this blog which is always a positive sign. However, the last two Zeus spam smail runs exclusively use CtrlS servers to host encrypted malware.

Three of the four domains are easy to spot:
wahidexpress.com is on 182.18.188.191
bsitacademy.com is on 103.8.127.189
oilwellme.com is on 182.18.151.160

The last one of the four domains is hosted on a Cloudflare IP.. but Cloudflare is only a reverse proxy and a bit of digging at IP records show that newz24x.com appears to be hosted on another CtrlS IP of 182.18.189.71.

So, four out of four IPs belong to CtrlS. It could be a coincidence, but I wonder if anybody else is seeing traffic (especially for downloads of .enc files) in CtrlS IP ranges?

Fake HMRC "VAT Return" spam

This fake HMRC spam comes with a malicious attachment:

Date:      Thu, 6 Feb 2014 20:32:34 +0100 [14:32:34 EST]
From:      "noreply@hmrc.gov.uk" [noreply@hmrc.gov.uk]
Subject:      Successful Receipt of Online Submission for Reference 3608005

Thank you for sending your VAT Return online. The submission for reference 3608005 was
successfully received on Thu, 6 Feb 2014 20:32:34 +0100  and is being processed. Make VAT
Returns is just one of the many online services we offer that can save you time and
paperwork.

For the latest information on your VAT Return please open attached report.

The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet
virus scanning service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with
MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate Number 2009/09/0052.) On leaving the GSi this email was
certified virus free.

Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for
legal purposes.
I love the "certified virus-free" bit, because of course this thing comes with a malicious payload. Attached to the message is an archive Reference.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable Reference.scr (a plain old executable, not a screensaver). This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 2/50.

Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show an encrypted file being downloaded from:
[donotclick]wahidexpress.com/scripts/ie.enc[donotclick]bsitacademy.com/img/events/ie.enc

Recommended blocklist:
182.18.188.191
wahidexpress.com
bsitacademy.com

Update:
second version of the email is circulating with the following body text:

The submission for reference 485/GB1392709 was successfully received and was not
processed.

Check attached copy for more information.

This is an automatically generated email. Please do not reply as the email address is not
monitored for received mail.

Fake "TNT UK Limited " spam with zero detections


This fake TNT spam comes with a malicious attachment that is currently not detected by any AV vendors.

Date:      Thu, 6 Feb 2014 11:48:18 +0100 [05:48:18 EST]
From:      TNT COURIER SERVICE [tracking@tnt.co.uk]
Subject:      TNT UK Limited - Package tracking 798950432737

Your package have been picked up and is ready for dispatch.

Connote #    :    798950432737
Service Type    :    Export Non Documents - Intl
Shipped on    :    05 Feb 14 00:00
Order No            :    2819122
Status            :       Driver's Return Description      :       Wrong Address
Service Options: You are required to select a service option below.

TNT COURIER SERVICE (TCS)
Customer/Delivery Services Department
Central Pk Est/Mosley Rd, Trafford Park
Manchester, M17 1TT UK.

DETAILS OF PACKAGE
Reg order no: 798950432737

The options, together with their associated conditions
Attached is a file Label_798950432737.zip which contains a malicious executable Label02062014.scr (an executable despite the .scr extension) with a VirusTotal detection rate of 0/41.

Despite the zero detection rate, there is plenty of badness going on [1] [2] [3] [4] including downloads of an encrypted file from the following locations:

[donotclick]newz24x.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pdf.enc
[donotclick]oilwellme.com/images/banners/pdf.enc

The Malwr report indicates lots of IPs being communicated with, some of these look like Cloudflare addresses where newz24x.com is hosted. Take care with these if you are thinking about blocking them.

Recommended blocklist:
182.18.151.160
newz24x.com
oilwellme.com

Wednesday, 5 February 2014

"Payment Fund" spam with Wire.Transfer.rar attachment

It's rare to see malware with a .RAR attachment, but this is one of those unusual beasts..

From:     Alison George allison.george@transferduc.nl
Date:     5 February 2014 22:41
Subject:     Payment Fund

ALERT! A bank Wire transaction, Has just been rejected from checking 656778*** account.
to your bank confirmed by the FedWire.
Transaction ID: 99076900
Date: 2/3/2014
Transfer Origination: Fedline

Please review the attached copy of transaction report,
Federal Reserve Financial Services
Creating Nationwide Solutions for Your Payment Needs
20th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20551
Attached is a file Wire.Transfer.rar which you will need to unpack with a suitable application. In turn this creates a file Wire-Report which is actually an executable, but missing the .exe extension.. so you have to add that to get infected. Hmmm.. the phrase "some assembly required" springs to mind.

The VirusTotal detection rate is 7/50 but most automated analysis tools seem to be having problems with the executable, so perhaps it is hardened against analysis or is simply corrupt. The ThreatExpert report (for some reason not showing in their database right now) has the following details:


Submission Summary:

  • Submission details:
    • Submission received: 5 February 2014, 04:39:38 PM
    • Processing time: 6 min 0 sec
    • Submitted sample:
      • File MD5: 0x12F1265162AAD712C271DAC6A9B5E564
      • Filesize: 248,320 bytes
  • Summary of the findings:
What's been found Severity Level
Creates a startup registry entry.

Technical Details:


Memory Modifications
  • There was a new process created in the system:
Process Name Process Filename Main Module Size
server.exe %Temp%\server.exe 57,344 bytes

Registry Modifications
  • The newly created Registry Values are:
    • [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
      • babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e = ""%Temp%\server.exe" .."

      so that %Temp%\server.exe runs every time Windows starts
    • [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment]
      • SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS = "1"
    • [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
      • 5PmM1jWi05 = "%AppData%\y183imD2\java.exe.lnk"
      • babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e = ""%Temp%\server.exe" .."

      so that %Temp%\server.exe runs every time Windows starts

Other details
  • To mark the presence in the system, the following Mutex object was created:
    • babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e



"LloydsLink reference" spam comes with a malicious attachment

This fake Lloyds TSB spam comes with a malicous payload:

Date:      Wed, 5 Feb 2014 20:38:29 +0100 [14:38:29 EST]
From:      GRP Lloydslink Tech [GRPLloydslinkTech@LLOYDSBANKING.COM]
Subject:      LloydsLink reference: 8255820 follow up email and actions to be taken


Lloyds TSB    
    Help

(New users may need to verify their email address)

If you do not see or cannot click / tap the Download attachment button:
Desktop Users:
   

You will be prompted to open (view) the file or save (download) it to your computer. For best results, save the file first, then open it.
Mobile Users:
   

Install the mobile application.

Protected by the Voltage SecureMail Cloud

SecureMail has a NEW LOOK to better support mobile devices!

Disclaimer: This email and any attachments are confidential and for the sole use of the recipients. If you have received this email in error please notify the sender.

Email Security Powered by Voltage IBE™

Copyright 2002-2014 Voltage Security, Inc. All rights reserved.

Lloyds Bank plc. Registered Office: 25 Gresham Street, London EC2V 7HN. Registered in England and Wales no. 2065. Telephone 0207626 1500

Bank of Scotland plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC327000.  Telephone: 08457 21 31 41

Cheltenham & Gloucester plc. Registered Office: Barnett Way, Gloucester GL4 3RL. Registered in England and Wales  2299428. Telephone: 0845 603 1637

Lloyds Bank plc, Bank of Scotland plc are authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority.

Cheltenham & Gloucester plc is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

Halifax is a division of Bank of Scotland plc. Cheltenham & Gloucester Savings is a division of Lloyds Bank plc.

HBOS plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC218813.

Lloyds Banking Group plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC95000. Telephone: 0131 225 4555

This e-mail (including any attachments) is private and confidential and may contain privileged material. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender and delete it  (including any attachments) immediately. You must not copy, distribute, disclose or use any of the information in it or any attachments.

Telephone calls may be monitored or recorded.

The attachment is SecureMessage.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable SecureMessage.scr which has an icon that looks like Internet Explorer. Despire the .scr suffix, this file is a plain old .exe file and will execute if you double-click it (don't!).

VirusTotal detections are 11/51, and automated analysis between ThreatExpert, Malwr and Anubis show an attempted download from [donotclick]asianfarm.org/images/pdf.enc and [donotclick]ideasempurna.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pdf.enc with the following IPs being involved:

108.90.186.161 (AT&T, US)
111.90.133.246 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
121.117.209.51 (NTT, Japan)
124.217.241.34 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
174.103.25.199 (Time Warner Cable, US)

The .enc file is an encoded executable, explained in detail here. I haven't tried to decode it but obviously that too will be malicious.

Recommended blocklist:
asianfarm.org
ideasempurna.com.my
108.90.186.161
111.90.133.246
121.117.209.51
124.217.241.34
174.103.25.199

"Barclays transaction notification" spam

This fake Barclays spam comes with a malicious payload:

Date:      Wed, 5 Feb 2014 03:02:52 -0500 [03:02:52 EST]
From:      Barclays Bank [support@barclays.net]
Subject:      Barclays transaction notification #002601

Transaction is completed. £9685 has been successfully transfered.
If the transaction was made by mistake please contact our customer service.
Receipt of payment is attached.

Barclays is a trading name of Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiaries. Barclays Bank PLC is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority (Financial Services Register No. 122702). Registered in England. Registered Number is 1026167 with registered office at 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP.
Attached is a file Payment receipt Barclays PA77392733.zip which is turn contains a malicious executable Payment receipt Barclays PA77392733.exe with a surprisingly poor VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/51 (only Sophos detects it). Automated analysis tools are pretty inconclusive about the payload [1] [2] [3] with only the Malwr report having any real detail.

Tuesday, 4 February 2014

WTF? WFP.org spam? Or is it emailciti.com?

This spam is promoting the UN's World Food Programme. I'm surprised the the WFP should sink so low, but perhaps they engaged the services of spammers without realising.

From:     World Food Programme newsletter@newsletter.loyaltyciti.com
Reply-To:     newsletter@newsletter.loyaltyciti.com
Date:     4 February 2014 09:58
Subject:     60% of people here don't have food
Signed by:     newsletter.loyaltyciti.com

If you are unable to see the message below, click here to view.

Share:     Delicious    Digg    Facebook    LinkedIn    Twitter   

world food programme
There’s a common link between a mother in Central African Republic, a father in South Sudan, and a child in Syria. Hunger. Fortunately, there’s also a common solution – The World Food Programme (WFP)..
WFP provides food assistance so families can break the cycle of poverty and hunger. Our goal? Zero hunger. We rely on the support of our online community to make this a reality.
Will you join us? Sign up at wfp.org/join to receive monthly updates and info about how you can help achieve a zero hunger world.
When conflict erupts, hunger soon follows. In CAR, South Sudan, and Syria, WFP is fighting for families who are being pushed to the brink. Find out how we’re responding to ensure families have the security that comes with a daily meal.
central african republic
level 3 emergency
See where we’re sounding the alarm.
remembering what matters         delivering despite
WFP’s Rasmus Egendal reflects on what really matters in Syria: The People.         Thanks to our supporters like you, WFP has been able to deliver food in South Sudan rom the start.
starting stars from car         reporting from damascus
Get the facts & figures you should know: 60% of families in Central African Republic have no food.         Watch an update from WFP’s Executive Director who met Syrian families relying on WFP assistance.
follow wfp     facebook     twitter

You have received this email message from EmailCiti, the leading Email Behavior and Lead Generation Company in the GCC & Middle East. Your email address has been recorded because you have subscribed to one of our email &newsletters services or are registered with one of our Partner and affiliate sites. For more information, visit www.emailciti.com
If you don't wish to receive these emails anymore please click here.
The email originates from 208.95.135.84 [mail3345.emailciti.mkt3942.com] (Silverpop Systems, US) and spamvertises an intermediate site at links.emailciti.mkt3941.com on 74.112.69.20 (Silverpop again) and then forwards to www.wfp.org/hunger-hot-spots if you click through.

The email itself is digitally signed, so we can be reasonable assure that it originates from loyaltyciti.com who are in Dubai:

Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: mohammad Lahlouh
Registrant Organization: Emailciti
Registrant Street: Dubai Media City, Building #8
Registrant City: Dubai
Registrant State/Province: Dubai
Registrant Postal Code: 502382
Registrant Country: United Arab Emirates
Registrant Phone: +971.507735717
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: mlahlouh@emailciti.com
Registry Admin ID: 


These people are persistent spammers who usually send through some unsolicited crap several times a week, using an email address that is effectively a spamtrap. What is really annoying is the the WFP is paying these spammers to run a campaign of dubious value when they could be helping to fee starving people.

Monday, 3 February 2014

Something evil on 192.95.43.160/28

More badness hosted by OVH Canada, this time 192.95.43.160/28 which contains pretty much the same set of evil described here. Here is a typical IP flagged by VirusTotal and a failed resolution by URLquery which frankly gives enough information to make it suspicious.

However, the key thing is the registrant details which have been used in many malware attacks before.

CustName:       Private Customer
Address:        Private Residence
City:           Penziatki
StateProv:     
PostalCode:     30000
Country:        RU
RegDate:        2014-01-24
Updated:        2014-01-24
Ref:            http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C04859116


I can see the following .pw domains active in this range:
basecoach.pw
crewcloud.pw
boomerangfair.pw
kickballmonsoon.pw
martialartsclub.pw
runningracer.pw


All those domains are flagged by Google as malicious and I recommend that you block them along with 192.95.43.160/28.

(Hat tip to my source, you know who you are!)

Something evil on 64.120.137.32/27

64.120.137.32/27 is a range of IP addresses belonging to Network Operations Center Inc in the US and suballocated to a customer which is currently being used in malware attacks as an intermediate step in sending victims to this malicious OVH range.You can see an example of some of the badness in action here.

The range was formerly used by a company called TixDepot but may have been hijacked or reassigned. NOC report the following contact details for the block:

%rwhois V-1.5:003fff:00 rwhois.hostnoc.net (by Network Solutions, Inc. V-1.5.9.5)
network:Class-Name:network
network:ID:NET-64.120.137.32/27
network:Auth-Area:64.120.128.0/17
network:network:NET-64.120.137.32/27
network:block:64.120.137.32/27
network:organization;I:T0000027307
network:address:1205 Oneill Highway
network:city:Dunmore
network:state:PA
network:postalcode:18512
network:country:US
network:admin-c;I:A9000000001
network:tech-c;I:T0000027307
network:abuse-c;I:I9000000001
network:created:20120208221612
network:Updated:20140203010039


About half the domains in this /27 have been flagged as malicious by Google, concentrated on the three IP addresses:
64.120.137.53
64.120.137.55
64.120.137.56

I would recommend blocking the entire /27, but this is the breakdown by IP address with domains tagged by Google highlighted (there's a plain list here)

64.120.137.34
kasorla.biz
kolyamba.biz

64.120.137.35
verybery.biz
dristohren.biz
vedmedical.biz
teasertease.biz

64.120.137.38
koshak.biz

64.120.137.39
meef.biz
www.meef.biz
chubanak.biz

64.120.137.41
jinkee.biz
tongpo.biz
kunuki.biz
omlette.biz

64.120.137.42
war-fear.biz
sleeping-rough.biz
www.war-fear.biz

64.120.137.47
searchsecurely.biz
whitehestence.com

64.120.137.48
webconnection.biz
trafficstatsanalytics.com

64.120.137.51
lohotron.biz
domainishere.biz
happygreentree.biz
plomaternia.com
greendo.biz
continuedomain.biz
personaldomain.biz
trafficqualitycheck.biz

64.120.137.52
swint.biz
elhooase.biz
fazatron.biz
peperrony.biz
pistorios.biz
papabudet.biz
papazdesj.biz
paparjadom.biz
besthitbotfilter.biz

64.120.137.53
hairyegg.biz
eegogo.biz
ilanus.biz
baldball.biz
moisturre.biz
mongoloid.biz
barbarisus.biz
damoinster.biz
horseinwood.biz

64.120.137.54
swineherd.biz
traffzilla.biz
blackfatcat.biz
trafficstation.biz

64.120.137.55
smokeme.biz
domentus.biz
yyynetlop.biz
goodweather.biz
hellparadise.biz
blog.bitcareer.com
bitewixibib.com
cuqerexejef.com
xocysibekyn.com
25blv.xocysibekyn.com
buy.si8a.net
tejedinehyh.net
68qn.tejedinehyh.net
vynifyqicedy.net
7dww.vynifyqicedy.net
vyzogosukoqy.net
ekc63s.vyzogosukoqy.net
bitewixibib.org
qyzuliponag.org
4ah781.qyzuliponag.org
xinuvytevem.org
s6pnl.xinuvytevem.org
xocysibekyn.org
ee5.xocysibekyn.org
hcm.xocysibekyn.org
vynifyqicedy.org
tejedinehyh.info
w0r4n.tejedinehyh.info
vyzogosukoqy.info
n45p6.vyzogosukoqy.info

nolericutis.com
qyzuliponag.com
xinuvytevem.com
cuqerexejef.org
nolericutis.org
tejedinehyh.org
iu1wxx.tejedinehyh.org
nvlrlh.tejedinehyh.org
vyzogosukoqy.org
wotunelurex.info
vynifyqicedy.info

64.120.137.56
en.xzhao.cc
us.yongbao.cc
ca.zhengerle.cc
me.transportesmelladogutierrez.cl
br.youu-and.me
dns.v9v8.com
gr.wew444.com
ls.wew999.com
dns.thejpg1.com
dns.acidcrud.com
dns.agoteenak.com
qajadyhizuli.com
fr.whenisthenextnhllockout.com
dns.uhgy.net
banewyjubuk.net
1qcz.banewyjubuk.net
diwopiroseq.net
7zz.diwopiroseq.net
gulumegesus.net
daij.gulumegesus.net
jadivyludal.net
pnps.jadivyludal.net
kafitetysyr.net
71sdqa.kafitetysyr.net
bucupyfomome.net
8q7.bucupyfomome.net
byqyrabewuti.net
iv3oj.byqyrabewuti.net
qajadyhizuli.net
symirijibimu.net
tusudygonipo.net
qjcd.tusudygonipo.net
banewyjubuk.org
9s33.banewyjubuk.org
ycooet.banewyjubuk.org
gulumegesus.org
8jek7.gulumegesus.org
jadivyludal.org
k64yx9.jadivyludal.org
kafitetysyr.org
hida.kafitetysyr.org
jyc8i.kafitetysyr.org
bucupyfomome.org
rdjjnh.bucupyfomome.org
byqyrabewuti.org
3v7opv.byqyrabewuti.org
qajadyhizuli.org
k8gcj.qajadyhizuli.org
symirijibimu.org
jadivyludal.com
pumiqudiqer.com
vemusiwubixe.com
kecynikamoc.net
3srjc.kecynikamoc.net
komikuxoced.net
pumiqudiqer.net
lejyvicuvagi.net
vemusiwubixe.net
kecynikamoc.org
komikuxoced.org
pumiqudiqer.org
lejyvicuvagi.org
vemusiwubixe.org

More on Somnath Bharti's link TopSites LLC spam sites

Somnath Bharti is apparently still denying any connection to TopSites LLC, but yet his company Madgen Solutions hosted several TopSites LLC domains back in 2004, and his name even appears at the registrant on several historical WHOIS records.

The following list is not comprehensive, but it does show a selection of the TopSites spam domains with Mr Bharti's name on them, plus the date that the WHOIS entry was recorded.

topsites.us


Record Date:     2004-01-12
Registrar:    
Server:    
Created:    
Updated:    
Expires:    

Domain Name:                                 TOPSITES.US
Domain ID:                                   D1947066-US
Sponsoring Registrar:                        INTERCOSMOS MEDIA GROUP, INC. D.B.A. DIRECTNIC.COM
Domain Status:                               ok
Registrant ID:                               IMG-525234
Registrant Name:                             Somnath Bharti
Registrant Organization:                     TopSites LLC
Registrant Address1:                         PO Box 7334 - 101591
Registrant City:                             San Francisco
Registrant State/Province:                   CA
Registrant Postal Code:                      94120-7334
Registrant Country:                          United States
Registrant Country Code:                     US
Registrant Phone Number:                     +1.4152945300
Registrant Email:                            listings2@www-topsites.com
Registrant Application Purpose:              P1
Registrant Nexus Category:                   C21
Administrative Contact ID:                   IMG-525234
Administrative Contact Name:                 Somnath Bharti
Administrative Contact Organization:         TopSites LLC
Administrative Contact Address1:             PO Box 7334 - 101591
Administrative Contact City:                 San Francisco
Administrative Contact State/Province:       CA
Administrative Contact Postal Code:          94120-7334
Administrative Contact Country:              United States
Administrative Contact Country Code:         US
Administrative Contact Phone Number:         +1.4152945300
Administrative Contact Email:                listings2@www-topsites.com
Administrative Application Purpose:          P1
Administrative Nexus Category:               C21
Billing Contact ID:                          IMG-525234
Billing Contact Name:                        Somnath Bharti
Billing Contact Organization:                TopSites LLC
Billing Contact Address1:                    PO Box 7334 - 101591
Billing Contact City:                        San Francisco
Billing Contact State/Province:              CA
Billing Contact Postal Code:                 94120-7334
Billing Contact Country:                     United States
Billing Contact Country Code:                US
Billing Contact Phone Number:                +1.4152945300
Billing Contact Email:                       listings2@www-topsites.com
Billing Application Purpose:                 P1
Billing Nexus Category:                      C21
Technical Contact ID:                        IMG-525234
Technical Contact Name:                      Somnath Bharti
Technical Contact Organization:              TopSites LLC
Technical Contact Address1:                  PO Box 7334 - 101591
Technical Contact City:                      San Francisco
Technical Contact State/Province:            CA
Technical Contact Postal Code:               94120-7334
Technical Contact Country:                   United States
Technical Contact Country Code:              US
Technical Contact Phone Number:              +1.4152945300
Technical Contact Email:                     listings2@www-topsites.com
Technical Application Purpose:               P1
Technical Nexus Category:                    C21
Name Server:                                 NS1.WWW-TOPSITES.COM
Name Server:                                 NS2.WWW-TOPSITES.COM
Created by Registrar:                        INTERCOSMOS MEDIA GROUP, INC. D.B.A. DIRECTNIC.COM
Last Updated by Registrar:                   INTERCOSMOS MEDIA GROUP, INC. D.B.A. DIRECTNIC.COM
Domain Registration Date:                    Thu Apr 25 00:01:49 GMT 2002
Domain Expiration Date:                      Sat Apr 24 23:59:59 GMT 2004
Domain Last Updated Date:                    Tue Jan 06 21:40:07 GMT 2004

>>>> Whois database was last updated on: Mon Jan 12 15:40:10 GMT 2004 <<<<
==================================


top--sites.com


Record Date:     2004-02-14
Registrar:     INTERCOSMOS MEDIA GROUP, INC. D/B/A DIRECTNIC.COM
Server:     whois.directnic.com
Created:     2003-11-08
Updated:    
Expires:     2004-11-08

Registrant:
 TopSites LLC
 1300 Evans Avenue
 PO Box 7334 - 101591
 San Francisco, CA 94120-7334
 US
 415-294-5300

Domain Name: TOP--SITES.COM

Administrative Contact:
 Bharti, Somnath sales@topsites.us
 1300 Evans Avenue
 PO Box 7334 - 101591
 San Francisco, CA 94120-7334
 US
 415-294-5300

Technical Contact:
 Bharti, Somnath sales@topsites.us
 1300 Evans Avenue
 PO Box 7334 - 101591
 San Francisco, CA 94120-7334
 US
 415-294-5300

Record expires on 11-08-2004
Record created on 11-08-2003

Domain servers in listed order:
    NS1.WWW-TOPSITES.COM    202.154.161.61
    NS2.WWW-TOPSITES.COM    202.154.161.62

==================================

top--sites.net


Record Date:     2003-10-23
Registrar:     INTERCOSMOS MEDIA GROUP, INC. D/B/A DIRECTNIC.COM
Server:     whois.directnic.com
Created:     2003-10-17
Updated:    
Expires:     2004-10-17

Registrant:
 Worldwide Management
 946 NW CIRCLE BLVD. #248
 CORVALLIS, OR 97330-1410
 US
 530-688-9820

Domain Name: TOP--SITES.NET

Administrative Contact:
 Bharti, Somnath listings2@www-topsites.com
 946 NW CIRCLE BLVD. #248
 CORVALLIS, OR 97330-1410
 US
 530-688-9820

Technical Contact:
 Bharti, Somnath listings2@www-topsites.com
 946 NW CIRCLE BLVD. #248
 CORVALLIS, OR 97330-1410
 US
 530-688-9820

Record expires on 10-17-2004
Record created on 10-17-2003

Domain servers in listed order:
    NS1.WWW-TOPSITES.COM    202.9.152.26
    NS2.WWW-TOPSITES.COM    202.9.152.24


==================================

www-topsites.com


Record Date:     2004-02-10
Registrar:     INTERCOSMOS MEDIA GROUP, INC. D/B/A DIRECTNIC.COM
Server:     whois.directnic.com
Created:     2003-08-31
Updated:    
Expires:     2004-08-31

Registrant:
 TopSites LLC
 PO Box 7334 - 101591
 San Francisco, CA 94120-7334
 US
 415-294-5300

Domain Name: WWW-TOPSITES.COM

Administrative Contact:
 Bharti, Somnath listings2@www-topsites.com
 PO Box 7334 - 101591
 San Francisco, CA 94120-7334
 US
 415-294-5300

Technical Contact:
 Bharti, Somnath listings2@www-topsites.com
 PO Box 7334 - 101591
 San Francisco, CA 94120-7334
 US
 415-294-5300

Record last updated 12-19-2003 12:07:24 AM
Record expires on 08-31-2004
Record created on 08-31-2003

Domain servers in listed order:
    NS1.WWW-TOPSITES.COM    202.154.161.61
    NS2.WWW-TOPSITES.COM    202.154.161.62


==================================

dirs.org


Record Date:     2005-07-23
Registrar:    
Server:     whois.publicinterestregistry.net
Created:    
Updated:    
Expires:    

Domain ID:D104710290-LROR
Domain Name:DIRS.ORG
Created On:01-Aug-2004 17:35:04 UTC
Last Updated On:30-Jun-2005 16:42:32 UTC
Expiration Date:01-Aug-2006 17:35:04 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:Intercosmos Media Group Inc. (R48-LROR)
Status:CLIENT DELETE PROHIBITED
Status:CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED
Status:CLIENT UPDATE PROHIBITED
Registrant ID:ODN-638485
Registrant Name:Somnath Bharti
Registrant Organization:Media  LLC
Registrant Street1:1158 26th Street #528
Registrant Street2:
Registrant Street3:
Registrant City:Santa Monica
Registrant State/Province:CA
Registrant Postal Code:90403
Registrant Country:US
Registrant Phone:+1.3108576666
Registrant Phone Ext.:
Registrant FAX:
Registrant FAX Ext.:
Registrant Email:listings@www-goto.com
Admin ID:ODN-638485
Admin Name:Somnath Bharti
Admin Organization:Media  LLC
Admin Street1:1158 26th Street #528
Admin Street2:
Admin Street3:
Admin City:Santa Monica
Admin State/Province:CA
Admin Postal Code:90403
Admin Country:US
Admin Phone:+1.3108576666
Admin Phone Ext.:
Admin FAX:
Admin FAX Ext.:
Admin Email:listings@www-goto.com
Tech ID:ODN-638485
Tech Name:Somnath Bharti
Tech Organization:Media  LLC
Tech Street1:1158 26th Street #528
Tech Street2:
Tech Street3:
Tech City:Santa Monica
Tech State/Province:CA
Tech Postal Code:90403
Tech Country:US
Tech Phone:+1.3108576666
Tech Phone Ext.:
Tech FAX:
Tech FAX Ext.:
Tech Email:listings@www-goto.com
Name Server:NS1.WWW--SEARCH.COM
Name Server:NS2.WWW--SEARCH.COM



==================================

teens-boy.net


Record Date:     2005-01-08
Registrar:     GOTNAMES.CA INC.
Server:     whois.gotnames.ca
Created:     2004-11-26
Updated:    
Expires:     2005-11-26

Domain teens-boy.net

  Date Registered: 2004-11-26
    Date Modified: 2004-11-30
      Expiry Date: 2005-11-26
             DNS1: ns1.www--search.com
             DNS2: ns2.www--search.com

  Registrant

                   My Directory LLC
                   PO Box 7334 - 101591
                   San Francisco, CA (US)
                   94120-73

  Administrative Contact

                   My Directory LLC
                   Somnath Bharti
                   PO Box 7334 - 101591
                   San Francisco
                   CA
                   US
                   94120-73
                   415-462-3044
                   530-504-8433
                   listings@mydir.org

  Technical Contact

                   My Directory LLC
                   Somnath Bharti
                   PO Box 7334 - 101591
                   San Francisco
                   CA
                   US
                   94120-73
                   415-462-3044
                   530-504-8433
                   listings@mydir.org

        Registrar: GotNames.ca
Back in 2004 these were all hosted on an IP address of 202.14.69.2 (at least for a period of time) which has now been reallocated to a firm in China, but at the time was registered to:

inetnum:      202.14.69.0 - 202.14.69.255
netname:      MADGENSITES
descr:        Madgen Solutions Pvt. Ltd. provides collocation services, shared
descr:        hosting services, private servers hosting, mailing solutions and
descr:        mailservers and is located in Malviya Nagar, New Delhi, India
country:      IN
admin-c:      HM339-AP
tech-c:       HM339-AP
remarks:      send all spam and abuse reports to abuse@madgen.com
mnt-by:       APNIC-HM
mnt-routes:   MAINT-IN-MADGEN
status:       ASSIGNED PORTABLE
remarks:      -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
remarks:      This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters.
remarks:      To update this object, please contact APNIC
remarks:      hostmasters and include your organisation's account
remarks:      name in the subject line.
remarks:      -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
changed:      hm-changed@apnic.net 20040817
changed:      hm-changed@apnic.net 20040929
source:       APNIC

person:       host master
nic-hdl:      HM339-AP
e-mail:       hostmaster@madgen.com
address:      C-28, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi-110017, India
phone:        +91-11-26672214
fax-no:       +91-11-26672214
country:      IN
changed:      somnath@madgen.com 20040922
mnt-by:       MAINT-IN-MADGEN
source:       APNIC

DomainTools hosting history for www--search.com shows the presence in Madgen's IP range of 202.14.69.0/24.



You can see a spam report from 2005 also identifying Madgen Solutions as the culprit, and we know from Mr Bharti's own filings [pdf] that he was connected with Madgen Solutions.


There is no doubt that this is this is the same Somnath Bharti as this one. And here are some spam reports directly connecting Madgen Solutions to the TopSites spam [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] that were made at the time.

But it seems that Mr Bharti is still denying everything and claims that this is part of a conspiracy organised by the BJP. Presumably the BJP own a time machine and went back a decade to plant the evidence? Or is the truth rather more straightforward?

Headlines Today (India) "Investigation report: Interesting history of Somnath aka Spamster Bharti"

Something evil on 192.95.7.224/28

Another OVH Canada range hosting criminal activity, 192.95.7.224/28 is being used for several malicious .pw domains being used to distribute malware (as used in this attack). The malware domains seem to rotate through subdomains very quickly, possibly in an attempt to block analysis of their payload.  This block is carrying out the same malicious activity that I wrote about a few days ago.

OVH have suballocated this IP block to an entity that I believe is connected with black hat host r5x.org.

CustName:       Private Customer
Address:        Private Residence
City:           Penziatki
StateProv:     
PostalCode:     30000
Country:        RU
RegDate:        2014-01-24
Updated:        2014-01-24
Ref:            http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C04859114


These IPs are particularly active:
192.95.7.232
192.95.7.233
192.95.7.234

There is nothing of value in this /28 block and I recommend that you block the entire IP range plus the following domains (which are all already flagged as being malicious by Google)

Recommended blocklist:
192.95.7.224/28
archerbocce.pw
athleticsmove.pw
battingrelay.pw
bicyclecompete.pw
bicyclingcrew.pw
billiardsdiver.pw
bronzecatcher.pw
competitionathletics.pw
competitionexercise.pw
dartboardolympics.pw
dartfield.pw
divebicycling.pw
divingrelay.pw
fieldergymnast.pw
golferboomerang.pw
hardballkayaker.pw
hockeyarchery.pw
hoopjudo.pw
javelinbowler.pw
leaguehockey.pw
netarcher.pw
playingriding.pw
racerathlete.pw
racerbronze.pw
runrafting.pw



Sunday, 2 February 2014

Times Now covers the Somnath Bharti story


Somnath Bharti's allwebhunt.com site exposes inner working of spam outfit

Recently I covered the somewhat surprising news that a former top spammer Somnath Bharti is now a minister in the Delhi regional government in India. That story has now made it to the front page of the Times of India, deepening the controversy about Mr Bharti's ethical standards.

I was interested to see Mr Bharti's response to these accusations:

Denying involvement in spamming, Bharti emailed TOI saying: "Back in early 2000, server of Madgen Solutions Pvt Ltd was entrusted with an associate by me who misused it without my consent/knowledge. When the matter cropped up, I came to know that the said associate had generated mass emails soliciting business and had also impersonated me on multiple occasions. On exploring I found out that the emails generated were for a legitimate business, originating from a valid traceable IP address and in proper compliance with the laws applicable in the US, ie CANSPAM Act, then... hence this breach of trust between me and this associate of mine was not pursued in a court of law."
I have to rely on the accuracy of the Times of India with this quote, although the way the TOI has presented it this does like a direct quote from Mr Bharti himself.

Before I start picking apart what Somath Bharti said, it is worth pointing out that the only time I have ever heard anything from him was when he made a flat-out lie claiming that he had never ever heard of the company involved (TopSites LLC), despite having his name listed as CEO on the company business card.


Just for good luck, the person sending me that information also sent me a copy of a very young looking Mr Bharti to prove his identity.

He looks a bit different today (source)


The evidence linking Mr Bharti's Madgen solutions with spam is overwhelming and does not seem to have been denied in the TOI interview, although you can see the reports made at the time here.

But let's look at Mr Bharti's statement to the TOI more closely..
"Back in early 2000, server of Madgen Solutions Pvt Ltd was entrusted with an associate by me who misused it without my consent/knowledge."
Well, this is kind of odd because the TopSites LLC spam did not start until 2002 at the earliest, and and Bharti's outfit was only identified much later than that (see this example). So Mr Bharti's memory is either faulty, or this is just an poorly though-out excuse, or maybe he meant the "early 2000s"?

But Mr Bharti's fingers have always been all over the TopSites business, such as the WHOIS details for the original domain used in the spam, topsites.us:


However, that is just a name on the WHOIS records. We can also see his name on the internal databases of one of the many clone sites of TopSites that was set up:


That information comes from a poorly-secured TopSites clone called allwebhunt.com hosted on a server at 119.82.71.132 (Citycom Networks, India) along with Mr Bharti's own personal website of somnathbharti.com.


allwebhunt.com was rapidly taken down after it was exposed in the Times of India, but you can still see an archived copy here, indicating that the operation was running until at least 2011.


The website was exceptionally poorly coded and exposed all of its internal details to the internet. Here's a screenshot of some of the code listing internal users.


The names of Mr Bharti are all over this particular operation, so it is unlikely that he did not know exactly what was happening. He even went as far as to use a TopSites domain on his somnathbharti.com home page back in 2003.

My conclusion is that despite Mr Bharti's protests, I believe that he was intimately involved in the spamming operation that his company Madgen Solutions was performing on behalf of TopSites LLC.

But there remains one further unanswered question. Back in 2005 the TopSites business was put up for sale claiming an annual turnover of 1.8 million US dollars. And although Mr Bharti's business partners would probably have pocketed the majority of that money, it would seem highly unlikely that Mr Bharti himself did not share in some of those profits.


Exactly how much did Mr Bharti make from this spamming operation? Even the people who did payment processing got a 9% cut..

..I have no idea. But perhaps somebody might like to find out :)

Saturday, 1 February 2014

"Unsure if you qualify for a refund of PPI paid on a loan or credit card?" SMS spam

This scumbag scammers are still at it, pumping away lead generation spam to persuade people to make PPI claims to which they are not entitled.
Unsure if you qualify for a refund of PPI paid on a loan or credit card? Reply PPI and we will run a no obligation check or reply STOP to opt out. TPPCO
In this case the scammers used the contact number +447743623103 but they burn through dozens of SIM cards every day with their illegal spamming operations.

If you get one of these, you should forward the spam and the sender's number to your carrier. In the came of T-Mobile, O2 and Orange the number to report to is 7726 ("SPAM"). Vodafone customers should use 87726 ("VSPAM") and Three customers should use 37726 ("3SPAM"). Hopefully the carriers will act if there are enough complaints.

You can also report persistent spam like this via the ICO's page on the subject.  With any luck these spammers will end up on the receiving end of a massive fine.

African Human Right and Refugees Protection Council (AHRRPC) scam

This spam email is actually part of an advanced fee fraud setup:

From:     fernando derossi fernandderossi59@gmail.com
To:     fernandderossi59@gmail.com
Date:     1 February 2014 13:22
Subject:     URGENT FOOD STUFF SUPPLY NEED FOR REFUGEES
Signed by:     gmail.com

Dear Sir:

My company has been mandated to look for a company capable of
supplying food stuffs product listed bellow by the  AFRICAN HUMAN
RIGHT AND REFUGEES PROTECTION COUNCIL (AHRRPC) for  assisting of the
refugee within the war affected countries IN middle east and Africa
like MALI,SYRIA, SOMALIA, CENTRAL AFRICA, and SOUTH SUDAN, which after
going through your company's profile, have decided to know if your
company is interested.

            Below are the list of food Stuffs and the targeted value
needed by (AHRRPC)

1.  Rice
2.  Beans
3.  Milk powder
4.  Sugar
5.  Vegetable Oil
6.  Used Cloths
7.  Wheat Flour
8.  White corn meal
9.  Corn Cooking oil
10. Cumin seed oil
11. Ground nut
12. Sage Oil
13. Soya bean oil
14. Palm oil
15.  Fresh Vegetables
16.  Fresh fruits
17.  Cocoa powder.

We will be happy to work with you company only as representing agent
to secure an allocation for your company while in return your company
will give us comission as soon as your receive your contract value. We
will give you more details about the contract when we recieve your
reply.

Regards,

Mr.Fernando Derossi
AHRRPC AGENT
Website:www.ahrrpc.8k.com
Bamako-Mali in West Africa.
The email links to a website at www.ahrrpc.8k.com which set off all sorts of alarms on my virus scanner, but I think it is just an ad-laden free web hosting site, and purports to be from the African Human Right and Refugees Protection Council (AHRRPC).


Of course, there is no such organisation as this and probably the main thrust of the scam is that there will be an "arrangement fee" payable in order to sell these goods.. and once the fee is paid the scammers will disappear.

One thing that I noticed is that "Mr Fenando Derossi" has a Google+ profile.. so is it a case the the Google account has been hijacked? Well, a simple way to find out is to take the image and upload it to Google Images (by clicking the little camera icon). That gives several positive matches for the photo which has been stolen from a French model and actor called Jean-Georges Brunet. In fact, poor Monsieur Brunet has had his picture stolen before for other types of scam.

Give any approaches from the so-called African Human Right and Refugees Protection Council (AHRRPC) a very wide berth. And remember, if you want to verify who a photo actually belongs to then Google Images is an excellent resource.

Friday, 31 January 2014

Something evil on 192.95.10.208/28

192.95.10.208/28 (OVH, Canada) is being used to deliver exploit kits utlising .pw domains, for an example see this URLquery report.  The following domains are being used in these attack (although there may be more):

accountantillustrator.pw
actuarydancer.pw
ambassadoradvisor.pw
animatorcarpenter.pw
animatorgovernor.pw
archeractor.pw
archerclub.pw
archerlecturer.pw
archerycartoonist.pw
arenacycling.pw
arenalandlord.pw
arrowcompete.pw
arrowfitness.pw
artistgovernor.pw
athleteexplorer.pw
athleteexterminator.pw
athletehandyman.pw
athleticsbanker.pw
athleticsdrycleaner.pw
attorneygeologist.pw
ballballerina.pw
ballcoroner.pw
ballerinaconsul.pw
ballerinalaundress.pw
balllobbyist.pw
ballracer.pw
baseballdefense.pw
baseballhardball.pw
baseballmechanic.pw
basketballdj.pw
basketballillustrator.pw
batdart.pw
batdj.pw
batmonk.pw
batolympics.pw
batterpool.pw
battingconcierge.pw
battingrunning.pw
biathlonlandscaper.pw
bicyclebarber.pw
bicyclechaplain.pw
bicycleracket.pw
bikegeneral.pw
bikingoptician.pw
biologistcabdriver.pw
bobsleighcaterer.pw
bobsleighcop.pw
bobsleighfirefighter.pw
bobsleighjockey.pw
boccebowling.pw
boccepercussionist.pw
boomerangbobsleigh.pw
boomerangcompete.pw
bowcobbler.pw
bowlerkayaking.pw
boxercashier.pw
bronzehairdresser.pw
buntcop.pw
buntexporter.pw
buntgymnastics.pw
butchernegotiator.pw
canoegardener.pw
carpenterorderly.pw
cartographerlandscaper.pw
catchergeologist.pw
catchlandscaper.pw
championbatting.pw
championshipcobbler.pw
championshipdoorman.pw
championshipgear.pw
championshipjester.pw
championshipjockey.pw
championshipmarketer.pw
clubfarmer.pw
coachbarber.pw
coachgolfer.pw
competeexporter.pw
competepediatrician.pw
competingbowler.pw
competingcoach.pw
competitioncryptographer.pw
competitionexplorer.pw
competitorhairdresser.pw
competitornovelist.pw
conciergemanufacturer.pw
contractorexterminator.pw
crewastronaut.pw
crewmusician.pw
cricketgoalie.pw
cricketjailer.pw
custodiancobbler.pw
cyclebellhop.pw
cyclistcaptain.pw
dartboardequipment.pw
dartboardnavigator.pw
dartboardpathologist.pw
dartlifeguard.pw
decathlonbellhop.pw
decathlondriver.pw
defensenet.pw
defensepaleontologist.pw
dermatologistinstructor.pw
designerbabysitter.pw
designercoach.pw
diamondgolfer.pw
diamondlobbyist.pw
divecycle.pw
diveeconomist.pw
divepainter.pw
diverbabysitter.pw
diverbowler.pw
divingauthor.pw
djnegotiator.pw
dodgeballgolfer.pw
doormanparkranger.pw
driverpawnbroker.pw
editordictator.pw
electricianbaker.pw
engineerastronaut.pw
entomologistbowler.pw
entrepreneurpatrol.pw
epeebowler.pw
epeeintern.pw
epeelandlord.pw
epeelinguist.pw
epeerunning.pw
exercisebatter.pw
exportercatcher.pw
farmerlecturer.pw
fencinghandball.pw
fieldercartographer.pw
fielderpaleontologist.pw
fielderpercussionist.pw
fieldingauctioneer.pw
figureskatingbuilder.pw
figureskatingchemist.pw
footballbunt.pw
footballcustodian.pw
footballlyricist.pw
frisbeebike.pw
gamenurse.pw
gearathlete.pw
generalillustrator.pw
geneticisteconomist.pw
geneticistgolfer.pw
goalbicycling.pw
goalcatcher.pw
goaldj.pw
goalhardball.pw
goaliebilliards.pw
goalielocksmith.pw
goalmedal.pw
goalmedal.pw
goalpawnbroker.pw
goalpercussionist.pw
golferdoorman.pw
golferentomologist.pw
golfingfirefighter.pw
guardcryptographer.pw
guardextra.pw
guardhandyman.pw
gymeducator.pw
gymmarketer.pw
gymnastcardiologist.pw
gymnasticsarchery.pw
gymnasticscobbler.pw
gymnasticsdictator.pw
gymnastnun.pw
halftimeillustrator.pw
handballhome.pw
hardballactress.pw
hardballastronomer.pw
hardballjumper.pw
helmetgolfer.pw
helmetjailer.pw
highjumpbiologist.pw
highjumpcashier.pw
highjumpguide.pw
hoboexporter.pw
hoopbiking.pw
hoopgear.pw
huddlecompete.pw
huddleparalegal.pw
hurdlebutler.pw
hurdlecompetitor.pw
hurdleforeman.pw
hurdlemove.pw
jailercardiologist.pw
javelinskate.pw
joggerdirector.pw
journalisthairdresser.pw
judomayor.pw
jumperfisherman.pw
jumperlibrarian.pw
jumpingorderly.pw
jumpingreferee.pw
karatemanufacturer.pw
karateparalegal.pw
kayakathlete.pw
kayakballerina.pw
kayakerbiologist.pw
kayakercabdriver.pw
kayakingconsul.pw
kayakingoperator.pw
kayakingskating.pw
kayaknurse.pw
kickballnurse.pw
lacrossemuralist.pw
lacrosseorderly.pw
landlordexterminator.pw
landlordgardener.pw
landscapercook.pw
landscaperoptician.pw
lecturergatherer.pw
linguistdetective.pw
locksmithillustrator.pw
maidblacksmith.pw
maidornithologist.pw
marinecellist.pw
martialartslinguist.pw
mayordrummer.pw
monklyricist.pw
movemedal.pw
oboistbowler.pw
olympicscompetition.pw
olympicsengineer.pw
opticiannegotiator.pw
orienteeringjanitor.pw
paintergeneral.pw
paralegalbuilder.pw
paralegaleconomist.pw
pawnbrokermanufacturer.pw
peddlerbellhop.pw
pingpongathlete.pw
pingpongbasketball.pw
pingpongempress.pw
pingponghelmet.pw
pitchactor.pw
pitchdart.pw
pitchjanitor.pw
pitchlifeguard.pw
playchauffeur.pw
playerskate.pw
playingoboist.pw
playoffscycle.pw
playoffspeddler.pw
playorienteering.pw
polekayaking.pw
poolgeneticist.pw
poolnegotiator.pw
quarterbackgeneral.pw
quartergeographer.pw
racedrummer.pw
raceengineer.pw
racercellist.pw
racketarcher.pw
racketbaseball.pw
racketdart.pw
racketleague.pw
racketskate.pw
raftingbarber.pw
raftingdancer.pw
raftingfrisbee.pw
raftingkayaker.pw
relaydrycleaner.pw
relayrace.pw
ridingcabdriver.pw
ridingnurse.pw
runbasketball.pw
rundrummer.pw
runningaccountant.pw
runningactuary.pw
skatepole.pw
skatingmuralist.pw
teacherjockey.pw
toolmakerfisherman.pw

The IP forms part of a /28 block belonging to a known bad actor:
NetRange:       192.95.10.208 - 192.95.10.223
CIDR:           192.95.10.208/28
OriginAS:       AS16276
NetName:        OVH-CUST-413973
NetHandle:      NET-192-95-10-208-1
Parent:         NET-192-95-0-0-1
NetType:        Reassigned
RegDate:        2014-01-24
Updated:        2014-01-24
Ref:            http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-192-95-10-208-1

CustName:       Private Customer
Address:        Private Residence
City:           Penziatki
StateProv:     
PostalCode:     30000
Country:        RU
RegDate:        2014-01-24
Updated:        2014-01-24
Ref:            http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C04859113


I believe that these IPs are connected with a black hat host r5x.org and IPs with these WHOIS details are very often used in exploit kit attacks. I would strongly recommend that you block 192.95.10.208/28 in addition to the domains listed above.

"Windsor Telecom Fax2Email" spam

Another day, another fake Fax spam with a malicious payload:

Date:      Fri, 31 Jan 2014 10:00:23 +0000 [05:00:23 EST]
From:      Windsor Telecom Fax2Email [no-reply@windsor-telecom.co.uk]
Subject:      Fax Message on 08983092722 from

FAX MESSAGEYou have received a fax on your fax number: 08983092722 from.The fax is
attached to this email.PLEASE DO NOT REPLY BACK TO THIS MESSAGE. 
Attached is an archive file FAX MESSAGE.ZIP which in turn contains a malicious executable FAX MESSAGE.EXE with a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/50. Well, I say malicious but both Malwr and Anubis report that the payload does not execute properly, however that might just be an issue with those particular sandboxes and it does not mean that it will fail to run on all systems.

Thursday, 30 January 2014

"Last Month Remit" spam

This fake "Last Month Remit" spam does a pretty good job of looking like it comes from your own organisation..

Date:      Thu, 30 Jan 2014 12:22:05 +0000 [07:22:05 EST]
From:      Administrator [victimdomain]
>
Subject:      FW: Last Month Remit

File Validity:Thu, 30 Jan 2014 12:22:05 +0000
Company : http://[victimdomain]
File Format: Office - Excel
Internal Name: Remit File
Legal Copyright: ? Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Original Filename: Last month remit file.xls

********** Confidentiality Notice **********.
This e-mail and any file(s) transmitted with it, is intended for the exclusive use by the person(s) mentioned above as recipient(s).
This e-mail may contain confidential information and/or information protected by intellectual property rights or other rights. If you
are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken
in relation to the contents of and attachments to this e-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this
e-mail in error, please notify the sender and delete the original and any copies of this e-mail and any printouts immediately from
your system and destroy all copies of it. The deception even goes as far as faking the mail headers:

Received:     

    (qmail 6160 invoked from network); 30 Jan 2014 12:22:06 -0000
    from unknown (192.168.1.88) by [redacted] with QMQP; 30 Jan 2014 12:22:06 -0000
    from 95-177-119-126.aurora.managedbroadband.co.uk (95.177.119.126) by [redacted] with SMTP; 30 Jan 2014 12:22:05 -0000
    from docs743.
[victimdomain] (10.0.0.170) by [victimdomain] (10.0.0.31) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id U5G10C1E; Thu, 30 Jan 2014 12:22:05 +0000
    from docs7075.[victimdomain] (10.39.36.29) by smtp.
[victimdomain] (10.0.0.131) with Microsoft SMTP Server id MJ25NOGJ; Thu, 30 Jan 2014 12:22:05 +0000
Going to to bother of inserting fake mail headers is odd, because anyone who knew enough to check the headers would probably also realist that the attached ZIP file with an EXE in it was probably bad news.

In this case, the attachment is called Remit_[victimdomain].zip  which in turn contains a malicious executable called Remit.exe which has an icon that makes it look like a PDF file.

This file has a VirusTotal detection rate of 10/49. Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] show an attempted connection to poragdas.com  on 182.18.143.140 (Pioneer Elabs, India) which is a server that has been seen before, and excelbizsolutions.com on 103.13.99.167 on (CtrlS Private, India).

Recommended blocklist:
103.13.99.167
182.18.143.140
poragdas.com
excelbizsolutions.com




WTF is s15443877[.]onlinehome-server[.]info?

Something that caught my eye was this Google Safebrowsing diagnostic for [donotclick]s15443877.onlinehome-server.info:

Safe Browsing

Diagnostic page for s15443877.onlinehome-server.info

What is the current listing status for s15443877.onlinehome-server.info?
This site is not currently listed as suspicious.
What happened when Google visited this site?
Of the 1746 pages we tested on the site over the past 90 days, 582 page(s) resulted in malicious software being downloaded and installed without user consent. The last time Google visited this site was on 2014-01-29, and the last time suspicious content was found on this site was on 2014-01-29.Malicious software includes 166 scripting exploit(s), 166 trojan(s), 89 exploit(s). Successful infection resulted in an average of 5 new process(es) on the target machine.
Malicious software is hosted on 198 domain(s), including mendozaempleos.com/, e-veleta.com/, forogozoropoto.2waky.com/.
155 domain(s) appear to be functioning as intermediaries for distributing malware to visitors of this site, including chebro.es/, formandfinishpdr.com/, mendozaempleos.com/.
This site was hosted on 1 network(s) including AS8560 (ONEANDONE-AS).
Has this site acted as an intermediary resulting in further distribution of malware?
Over the past 90 days, s15443877.onlinehome-server.info did not appear to function as an intermediary for the infection of any sites.
Has this site hosted malware?
No, this site has not hosted malicious software over the past 90 days.


Not only are (exactly) one third of the pages crawled hosting malware, but there are a staggering 198 domains spreading it. Usually it's just a handful of sites, but this is the most I've ever seen.

VirusTotal also shows some historical evil going on with the IP of 212.227.141.247 (1&1, Germany) and a Google of the site contents shows thousands of hits of what appears to be scraped content in Spanish.

It's hard to say just what this site is, but with Google diagnostics like that then it is unlikely to be anything good and blocking s15443877.onlinehome-server.info or 212.227.141.247 might be prudent.