Malware sites to block 14/2/14

This bunch of OVH Canada hosted nameserver and IP ranges are supporting malware distribution via the Nuclear Exploit Kit (as described here by Umbrella Labs).

OVH Canada have a long history with this bad actor (who I believe to be r5x.org), and these /29 and /30 blocks spread throughout OVH's range make it more difficult to block the IPs. Are OVH providing snowshoe malware distribution services? It does look like it. Perhaps OVH can prove me wrong by banishing this bad customer once and for all.

First of all, we have a set of nameservers being used to support mostly .pw domains hosting the Nuclear EK. The nameservers I can see that are active are:

dns1.alcogylogyc.com
dns2.alcogylogyc.com

dns1.bedroklow.com
dns2.bedroklow.com

dns1.boobledns.com
dns2.boobledns.com

dns1.dedains.com
dns2.dedains.com

dns1.dnshelpers.com
dns2.dnshelpers.com

dns1.eleziks.info
dns2.eleziks.info

dns1.europinghome.com
dns2.europinghome.com

dns1.flouwping.com
dns2.flouwping.com

dns1.geovipns.com
dns2.geovipns.com

dns1.glousby.com
dns2.glousby.com

dns1.goldrushns.net
dns2.goldrushns.net

dns1.goupfaster.info
dns2.goupfaster.info

dns1.grephipst.com
dns2.grephipst.com

dns1.hazahaza.net
dns2.hazahaza.net

dns1.highlinerservices.com
dns2.highlinerservices.com

dns1.hiporq.com
dns2.hiporq.com

dns1.hopsups.com
dns2.hopsups.com

dns1.hyperbola.info
dns2.hyperbola.info

dns1.kakzumi.com
dns2.kakzumi.com

dns1.masscarete.com
dns2.masscarete.com

dns1.koljong.com
dns2.koljong.com

dns1.masssilk.com
dns2.masssilk.com

dns1.mifthme.net
dns2.mifthme.net

dns1.mitilean.net
dns2.mitilean.net

dns1.muslibusli.org
dns2.muslibusli.org

dns1.neitronefx.org
dns2.neitronefx.org

dns1.nutizk.org
dns2.nutizk.org

dns1.performanced.net
dns2.performanced.net

dns1.platusinplatus.org
dns2.platusinplatus.org

dns1.plemians.org
dns2.plemians.org

dns1.poeglu.net
dns2.poeglu.net

dns1.popkirko.com
dns2.popkirko.com

dns1.portfoliorealtors.com
dns2.portfoliorealtors.com

dns1.seburingo.net
dns2.seburingo.net

dns1.sretunset.net
dns2.sretunset.net

dns1.timverbahdd.net
dns2.timverbahdd.net

dns1.telalcobuh.info
dns2.telalcobuh.info

dns1.vinigretov.net
dns2.vinigretov.net

dns1.yakuns.net
dns2.yakuns.net

Those nameservers are hosted in the following ranges, exclusively supplied by OVH Canada. If you are in a security-sensitive environment then I would recommend using larger blocks.

142.4.194.0/29
192.95.6.24/29
192.95.10.16/29
192.95.46.56/30
192.95.46.60/30
192.95.47.232/30
192.95.47.236/30
198.50.164.240/30
198.50.172.64/30
198.50.172.68/30
198.50.172.72/30
198.50.172.76/30
198.50.197.28/30
198.50.197.48/30
198.50.197.52/30
198.50.197.56/30
198.50.197.60/30
198.50.204.240/30
198.50.204.244/30
198.50.212.172/30
198.50.219.240/30
198.50.219.248/30
198.50.224.240/30
198.50.235.196/30
198.50.242.120/30
198.50.246.240/30
198.50.247.248/30
198.50.247.252/30
198.50.251.168/30
198.50.251.172/30

I can see the following domains being actively supported by these nameservers, all of which should be considered hostile:

activresa.biz
airlead.biz
allbat.biz
battingkayaking.pw
bikinghighs.pw
blackconstruction.biz
blizzardfielder.pw
bowpollutant.pw
bronzefoger.pw
cardiologistfastlane.pw
choiceshell.biz
clubdewef.pw
coachmacroburst.pw
competitordownburst.pw
competitormist.pw
competitormoisture.pw
cookray.pw
creativegeo.biz
cricketslush.pw
cricketsmoke.pw
curlingdefense.pw
dailyaqua.biz
decemberboxer.pw
digitalra.biz
drummerballerina.pw
epeeradar.pw
evergreenplay.pw
exercisebreeze.pw
experptware.biz
expertsurvey.biz
eyefreeze.biz
fieldingboxer.pw
fieldingdrizzle.pw
fieldingrainbands.pw
firstozip.biz
fitnessrafting.pw
flypanda.biz
furnacerace.pw
galekarate.pw
gamecoldfront.pw
glacierfootball.pw
glacierhelmet.pw
goalsnowstorm.pw
goldhailey.pw
heaterboxing.pw
hibernatebatting.pw
hibernateguard.pw
homesteamz.pw
hotchocolatefield.pw
hotchocolateplayoffs.pw
icebergcatcher.pw
icecaprace.pw
icehockeyair.pw
jacketcyclist.pw
januarygame.pw
javelinmicroburst.pw
jockeycustodian.pw
judodegreeo.pw
kayakermacroburst.pw
kayakingleeward.pw
kickballeyer.pw
lacrossebarometer.pw
lightcasa.biz
magicse.biz
manufacturerpresto.pw
mapmove.biz
mittensrafting.pw
movieprice.biz
negotiatorsecond.pw
netfogert.pw
novelistflutist.pw
onbytce.biz
onlincerobo.biz
playingsnowflake.pw
polarkayaking.pw
poolridgeq.pw
quiltcanoe.pw
quiltquarter.pw
racketforecast.pw
ridingmacroburst.pw
safemeta.biz
scanbeat.biz
snowflakereferee.pw
snowyboules.pw
stovecricket.pw
stovegolfer.pw
thermometerequipment.pw
thinkisoftware.biz
winterdefense.pw
zerocompetition.pw

"Track shipments/FedEx" spam

This fake FedEx spam leads to malware:

Date:      Wed, 12 Feb 2014 07:53:36 -0700 [09:53:36 EST]
From:      FedEx [yama@rickyz.jp]
Subject:      Track shipments/FedEx 7487214609167750150131 results: Delivered

Track shipments/FedEx Office orders summary results:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Tracking number        Status              Date/Time
7487214609167750150131  Delivered           Feb 11, 2014     
                                           11:20 AM     

Track shipments/FedEx Office orders detailed results:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Tracking number       7487214609167750150131

Reference             304562545939440100902500000000
Ship date             Feb 03, 2014
Ship From           NEW YORK, NY
Delivery date         Feb 11, 2014 11:20 AM
Service type          FedEx SmartPost

Tracking results as of Feb 11, 2014 3:37 PM CST


Click Here and get Travel History
-----------------------------------------------------------------------


Disclaimer
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FedEx has not validated the authenticity of any email address.

In this case, the link in the email goes to [donotclick]pceninternet.net/tracking.php?id_7487214609167750150131 which downloads an archive file track_shipments_FedEx.zip.


In turn, this ZIP file contains the malicious executable with the lovely name of Track_shipments_FedEx_Office_orders_summary_results_Delivered_tracking_number_9384758293431234834312_idju2f83f9hjv78fh7899382r7f9sdh8wf.doc.exe
which has an icon that makes it look like a Word document. This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 15/49, but automated analysis tools are inconclusive as to its payload [1] [2] [3].

Malware (Neutrino EK?) sites to block 12/2/14

The following IPs and domains appear to be in use for spreading exploit kits via injection attacks - 108.178.7.118 (Singlehop, US) [1] [2] and 212.83.164.87 (Online SAS, France) [3] [4]. The payload isn't clear, but some of the URLquery reports indicate Neutrino.

In the case I saw, the victim was directed to the EK from a compromised site at greetingstext.com. I cannot reproduce the problem with URLquery or any other tool, but log files do not lie.

I would recommend that you block these following IPs and domains as a precaution:

108.178.7.118
212.83.164.87
jakiewebs.com
sheethoo.com
chaefooh.com
goldnclouds.com
nofledno.com
zeuriele.com
wqywdo.xip.io
glindeb.com

Video: Somnath Bharti's links to TopSites LLC

Articles on Somnath Bharti and TopSites LLC

You can find some of the history about TopSites LLC and Mr Bharti's involvement in my old "diary" articles written between 2003 and 2007.

• Topsites Scam: TopSites LLC & MyDirectory LLC / My Directory LLC 
• Topsites LLC - Correspondence Received
• Topsites Uncovered: Who is Behind the Topsites Scam and Spam? 
• More Topsites LLC Scams and Lies 
• Topsites Revisited: www--search.com, www.dirs.org, www.worldbiggest.com and My Directory LLC
• For Sale: Topsites.us / Topsites LLC 
• www-goto.com Spam Emails and Edgetech Services 
• INOVA Technology (inovatechnology.com): A History of Spam

Later articles can be found by looking for the Somnath Bharti tag on this blog.

81.4.106.132 / oochooch.com / 10qnbkh.xip.io

I don't like the look of this [urlquery], seems to be the payload site for some sort of injection attack. Might be worth blocklisting 81.4.106.132.

Evil .pw domains on 31.41.221.131 to 31.41.221.135

Thanks to Malekal for the heads up, the current batch of evil .pw domains that have been distributing malware appear to have shifted to the following IP addresses:

31.41.221.131
31.41.221.132
31.41.221.133
31.41.221.134
31.41.221.135

These IP addresses belong to Besthosting in Ukraine. A typical payload of one of these malicious sites looks like this URLquery report.

The evil .pw domains in use all use a subdomain of one of the following:
arrowjogger.pw
athleticsarchery.pw
athleticsjudo.pw
ballkayaker.pw
baseballcompetition.pw
basketballplaying.pw
batongoal.pw
battingfield.pw
battinggymnast.pw
boulesplaying.pw
boxerfielder.pw
boxerplay.pw
canoeingbaton.pw
canoekarate.pw
competearena.pw
competitiongolfer.pw
crewjumping.pw
dartgym.pw
defensebicycle.pw
diamondracer.pw
discushurdle.pw
divemedal.pw
diverbiking.pw
diverracket.pw
dodgeballkayaker.pw
fielddefense.pw
gearcompetitor.pw
golfbow.pw
golfercyclist.pw
golfingchampionship.pw
golfingorienteering.pw
halftimedecathlon.pw
handballdart.pw
huddledart.pw
huddledartboard.pw
javelinbaton.pw
leaguedart.pw
medaljogger.pw
medaljogger.pw
movementarchery.pw
pitchbiathlon.pw
pitchexercise.pw
playbunt.pw
playmove.pw
playoffschampion.pw
polediver.pw
polofencing.pw
pooljump.pw
racketrunning.pw
relaycompete.pw
rungymnastics.pw

 I would recommend blocking those domains and the above-listed IPs (or alternatively 31.41.221.128/29 or 31.41.221.128/25). A full list of all the subdomains I can find is here [pastebin]

Somnath Bharti's allwebhunt.com linked to pro-pedophilia sites

Delhi minister Somnath Bharti's allwebhunt.com site was linking to pro-pedophilia sites as late as 31st December 2013, according to Google [warning: I do not advise that you click on the links in that page]. Here is a screenshot (some descriptions may offend) (if you have difficulty with seeing the text, try this version). The ownership link between allwebhunt.com and Mr Bharti is described here.

That content was most likely taken from a controversial category at The Open Directory Project which no longer exists.

The Open Directory Project does try to be all-inclusive in what it catalogues, but I suspect that pro-paedophile sites were something that it felt it could not condone.

Headlines Today (India): Somnath Bharti's spammer connection

I'm not sure what all this fascination is with Mr Bharti's alleged connections to porn.. I've never found any evidence that he has hosted or owned sites with pornographic content. But there's certainly a great deal of evidence linking him with spam outfit TopSites LLC.

Somnath Bharti denies link to TopSites LLC in 2004

This is Somnath Bharti's denial of any involvement in TopSites LLC (explored here and in other posts). I believe that the evidence of Mr Bharti's involvement is overwhelming. However, here is a copy of the original email he sent me complete with mail headers so that independent individuals can look into its authenticity.

Return-Path: <somnath.bharti@gmail.com>
Received: from unknown (HELO blade5.cesmail.net) (192.168.1.215)
  by c60.cesmail.net with SMTP; 14 Nov 2004 13:43:23 -0500
Received: (qmail 5069 invoked by uid 1010); 14 Nov 2004 18:43:22 -0000
Delivered-To: spamcop-net-dynamoo@spamcop.net
Received: (qmail 5045 invoked from network); 14 Nov 2004 18:43:21 -0000
Received: from unknown (192.168.1.101)
  by blade5.cesmail.net with QMQP; 14 Nov 2004 18:43:21 -0000
Received: from rproxy.gmail.com (64.233.170.197)
  by mailgate.cesmail.net with SMTP; 14 Nov 2004 18:43:21 -0000
Received: by rproxy.gmail.com with SMTP id r35so540853rna
        for <dynamoo@spamcop.net>; Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800 (PST)
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws;
        s=beta; d=gmail.com;
        h=received:message-id:date:from:reply-to:to:subject:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding;
        b=AItQWQnfUOPREzb2USZ1AAdfuMy54ME4VonsHz7VdB93Wd8apOkFSOrdqjkbLLFqI6nUaFy2cKrbLXTrFSLC0p5Kj2ZdwK0Qb6CFZjbS24HecjymNLUahhMUBp3AbEb0M/t/EXhC4N0HZeCD06YP/TK7XF0dZaqNweevm4cXL4E=
Received: by 10.38.102.45 with SMTP id z45mr1019046rnb;
        Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.38.151.16 with HTTP; Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <4e0e2d5304111410431d08a7bb@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2004 10:43:20 -0800
From: Somnath <somnath.bharti@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Somnath <somnath.bharti@gmail.com>
To: dynamoo@spamcop.net
Subject: surprising and serious
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.0.0 (2004-09-13) on blade5
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: hits=0.0 tests=RCVD_BY_IP version=3.0.0
X-SpamCop-Checked: 192.168.1.101 64.233.170.197 10.38.102.45 10.38.151.16

Hi Conrad,

I was taken by surprise to find you listing my name, one of my
properties address and my picture in an article on a company named
"TopSites LLC" on your site. I don't know on what basis you have been
talking so emphatic without cross verifying with the person you are
talking about. To my utter surprise, you have been having this article
on your site accusing me of being related to a company I have heard
only through your article. Please have the same removed ASAP and
explain to me what made you write all this about a person, not even
remotely attached to any such company.
Please acknowledge of this email and have any and everything related
my name, my pic and c-28 address removed. I am available at
+91-9891819893, if you have anything to talk about. Also, post on the
same page an apology for this grievous mistake on your part.


--
Regards,
Somnath Bharti

Something evil on 69.64.39.166

69.64.39.166 (Hosting Solutions International, US) appears to be hosting an exploit kit (possibly Fiesta) according to URLquery reports such as this one.

The code is being injected into target websites, possibly through a malvertising campaign. I would recommend blocking the IP address as the simplest option, although I can identify the following domains on that same IP, all of which are likely to be malicious.

advrzc.myftp.org

amyoau.myftp.biz

aokljwwsap.serveftp.com

bgocodwsiu.myftp.org

bpknbvmc.serveftp.com

cjhkxfpdw.serveftp.com

cvxeitw.serveftp.com

cxrhtcau.myftp.biz

czwaiys.myftp.org

dhdwjwve.myftp.org

djqlcce.myftp.org

drituglgjh.serveftp.com

drpmsmt.serveftp.com

ehetlmna.myftp.biz

euimho.serveftp.com

fvyzhy.serveftp.com

hljozqutc.myftp.org

hlwswbaap.serveftp.com

hwtlzdxic.serveftp.com

idoplhj.serveftp.com

iyrseedlt.myftp.biz

lkuvivr.myftp.biz

lxeoic.myftp.org

orrlnypdvz.myftp.biz

osuqlc.myftp.org

plwxycxij.myftp.org

pmkawqgvob.myftp.org

puifnjav.myftp.biz

sbrckuod.serveftp.com

thtnuj.myftp.biz

ucuqgd.myftp.org

uqqyscgq.myftp.org

uuzkpb.myftp.biz

welfcsuybw.serveftp.com

ykypxoub.myftp.org

yrziqui.serveftp.com

yxoiyjbjt.myftp.biz

"Authorization to Use Privately Owned Vehicle on State Business" spam

We've seen this particular type of malware-laden spam before..

Date:      Fri, 7 Feb 2014 17:08:16 +0700 [05:08:16 EST]
From:      Callie Figueroa [Callie@victimdomain]
Subject:      Annual Form - Authorization to Use Privately Owned Vehicle on State Business

All employees need to have on file this form STD 261 (attached).  The original is
retained by supervisor and copy goes to Accounting. Accounting need this form to approve
mileage reimbursement.

The form can be used for multiple years, however it needs to re-signed annually by
employee and supervisor.

Please confirm all employees that may travel using their private car on state business
(including training) has a current STD 261 on file.  Not having a current copy of this
form on file in Accounting may delay a travel reimbursement claim. 

The email appears to originate from within the victim's own domain but doesn't. Attached is an archive file Form_STD261.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable Form_STD261.scr which has a VirusTotal detection rate of just 3/51.

Anubis reports an attempted connection to faneema.com on 198.38.82.223 (Mochahost, US). I recommend blocking both the domain and IP address in this case.

rbs.co.uk "Important Docs" spam

This fake spam claiming to be from the Royal Bank of Scotland has a malicious attachment:

Date:      Fri, 7 Feb 2014 15:44:19 +0530 [05:14:19 EST]
From:      Doris Clay [Doris@rbs.co.uk]
Subject:      Important Docs

Account report.

Tel:  01322 589422
Fax: 01322 296116
email: Doris@rbs.co.uk

This information is classified as Confidential unless otherwise stated.

CONFIDENTIAL NOTICE: The contents of this message, including any attachments, are
confidential and are intended solely for the use of the person or entity to whom the
message was addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please be
advised that any dissemination, distribution, or use of the contents of this message is
strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender.
Please also permanently delete all copies of the original message and any attached
documentation. Thank you.

Attached is a file AccountReport.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable AccountReport.scr which has a VirusTotal detection rate of 4/50.

Automated analysis tools [1] [2] show a downlad of en encrypted file from the following locations:
[donotclick]professionalonlineediting.com/theme/cc/images/07UKex.enc
[donotclick]mararu.ro/Media/07UKex.enc

Both those sites are hosted by Mochanin Corp in the US, indicating perhaps a wider problem with that host.

Recommended blocklist:
204.93.165.33
50.31.147.54
professionalonlineediting.com
mararu.ro

I love Google's home page..

I love Google's home page today..

Trouble at CtrlS?

CtrlS is a large Indian hosting provider who seldom feature in this blog which is always a positive sign. However, the last two Zeus spam smail runs exclusively use CtrlS servers to host encrypted malware.

Three of the four domains are easy to spot:
wahidexpress.com is on 182.18.188.191
bsitacademy.com is on 103.8.127.189
oilwellme.com is on 182.18.151.160

The last one of the four domains is hosted on a Cloudflare IP.. but Cloudflare is only a reverse proxy and a bit of digging at IP records show that newz24x.com appears to be hosted on another CtrlS IP of 182.18.189.71.

So, four out of four IPs belong to CtrlS. It could be a coincidence, but I wonder if anybody else is seeing traffic (especially for downloads of .enc files) in CtrlS IP ranges?

Fake HMRC "VAT Return" spam

This fake HMRC spam comes with a malicious attachment:

Date:      Thu, 6 Feb 2014 20:32:34 +0100 [14:32:34 EST]
From:      "noreply@hmrc.gov.uk" [noreply@hmrc.gov.uk]
Subject:      Successful Receipt of Online Submission for Reference 3608005

Thank you for sending your VAT Return online. The submission for reference 3608005 was
successfully received on Thu, 6 Feb 2014 20:32:34 +0100  and is being processed. Make VAT
Returns is just one of the many online services we offer that can save you time and
paperwork.

For the latest information on your VAT Return please open attached report.

The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet
virus scanning service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with
MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate Number 2009/09/0052.) On leaving the GSi this email was
certified virus free.

Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for
legal purposes.

I love the "certified virus-free" bit, because of course this thing comes with a malicious payload. Attached to the message is an archive Reference.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable Reference.scr (a plain old executable, not a screensaver). This has a VirusTotal detection rate of 2/50.

Automated analysis tools [1] [2] [3] [4] show an encrypted file being downloaded from:
[donotclick]wahidexpress.com/scripts/ie.enc[donotclick]bsitacademy.com/img/events/ie.enc

Recommended blocklist:
182.18.188.191
wahidexpress.com
bsitacademy.com

Update:
A second version of the email is circulating with the following body text:

The submission for reference 485/GB1392709 was successfully received and was not
processed.

Check attached copy for more information.

This is an automatically generated email. Please do not reply as the email address is not
monitored for received mail.

Fake "TNT UK Limited " spam with zero detections

This fake TNT spam comes with a malicious attachment that is currently not detected by any AV vendors.

Date:      Thu, 6 Feb 2014 11:48:18 +0100 [05:48:18 EST]
From:      TNT COURIER SERVICE [tracking@tnt.co.uk]
Subject:      TNT UK Limited - Package tracking 798950432737

Your package have been picked up and is ready for dispatch.

Connote #    :    798950432737
Service Type    :    Export Non Documents - Intl
Shipped on    :    05 Feb 14 00:00
Order No            :    2819122
Status            :       Driver's Return Description      :       Wrong Address
Service Options: You are required to select a service option below.

TNT COURIER SERVICE (TCS)
Customer/Delivery Services Department
Central Pk Est/Mosley Rd, Trafford Park
Manchester, M17 1TT UK.

DETAILS OF PACKAGE
Reg order no: 798950432737

The options, together with their associated conditions

Attached is a file Label_798950432737.zip which contains a malicious executable Label02062014.scr (an executable despite the .scr extension) with a VirusTotal detection rate of 0/41.

Despite the zero detection rate, there is plenty of badness going on [1] [2] [3] [4] including downloads of an encrypted file from the following locations:

[donotclick]newz24x.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pdf.enc
[donotclick]oilwellme.com/images/banners/pdf.enc

The Malwr report indicates lots of IPs being communicated with, some of these look like Cloudflare addresses where newz24x.com is hosted. Take care with these if you are thinking about blocking them.

Recommended blocklist:
182.18.151.160
newz24x.com
oilwellme.com

"Payment Fund" spam with Wire.Transfer.rar attachment

It's rare to see malware with a .RAR attachment, but this is one of those unusual beasts..

From:     Alison George allison.george@transferduc.nl
Date:     5 February 2014 22:41
Subject:     Payment Fund

ALERT! A bank Wire transaction, Has just been rejected from checking 656778*** account.
to your bank confirmed by the FedWire.
Transaction ID: 99076900
Date: 2/3/2014
Transfer Origination: Fedline

Please review the attached copy of transaction report,
Federal Reserve Financial Services
Creating Nationwide Solutions for Your Payment Needs
20th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20551

Attached is a file Wire.Transfer.rar which you will need to unpack with a suitable application. In turn this creates a file Wire-Report which is actually an executable, but missing the .exe extension.. so you have to add that to get infected. Hmmm.. the phrase "some assembly required" springs to mind.

The VirusTotal detection rate is 7/50 but most automated analysis tools seem to be having problems with the executable, so perhaps it is hardened against analysis or is simply corrupt. The ThreatExpert report (for some reason not showing in their database right now) has the following details:

Submission Summary:

• Submission details:
  • Submission received: 5 February 2014, 04:39:38 PM
  • Processing time: 6 min 0 sec
  • Submitted sample:
    • File MD5: 0x12F1265162AAD712C271DAC6A9B5E564
    • Filesize: 248,320 bytes

• Summary of the findings:

What's been found	Severity Level
Creates a startup registry entry.

Technical Details:

Memory Modifications

• There was a new process created in the system:

Process Name	Process Filename	Main Module Size
server.exe	%Temp%\server.exe	57,344 bytes

Registry Modifications

• The newly created Registry Values are:
  • [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
    • babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e = ""%Temp%\server.exe" .."
    
    so that %Temp%\server.exe runs every time Windows starts
    
  • [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment]
    • SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS = "1"
  • [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
    • 5PmM1jWi05 = "%AppData%\y183imD2\java.exe.lnk"
    • babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e = ""%Temp%\server.exe" .."
    
    so that %Temp%\server.exe runs every time Windows starts

Other details

• To mark the presence in the system, the following Mutex object was created:
  • babe8364d0b44de2ea6e4bcccd70281e

"LloydsLink reference" spam comes with a malicious attachment

This fake Lloyds TSB spam comes with a malicous payload:

Date:      Wed, 5 Feb 2014 20:38:29 +0100 [14:38:29 EST]
From:      GRP Lloydslink Tech [GRPLloydslinkTech@LLOYDSBANKING.COM]
Subject:      LloydsLink reference: 8255820 follow up email and actions to be taken


Lloyds TSB    
    Help

(New users may need to verify their email address)

If you do not see or cannot click / tap the Download attachment button:
Desktop Users:
   

You will be prompted to open (view) the file or save (download) it to your computer. For best results, save the file first, then open it.
Mobile Users:
   

Install the mobile application.

Protected by the Voltage SecureMail Cloud

SecureMail has a NEW LOOK to better support mobile devices!

Disclaimer: This email and any attachments are confidential and for the sole use of the recipients. If you have received this email in error please notify the sender.

Email Security Powered by Voltage IBE™

Copyright 2002-2014 Voltage Security, Inc. All rights reserved.

Lloyds Bank plc. Registered Office: 25 Gresham Street, London EC2V 7HN. Registered in England and Wales no. 2065. Telephone 0207626 1500

Bank of Scotland plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC327000.  Telephone: 08457 21 31 41

Cheltenham & Gloucester plc. Registered Office: Barnett Way, Gloucester GL4 3RL. Registered in England and Wales  2299428. Telephone: 0845 603 1637

Lloyds Bank plc, Bank of Scotland plc are authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority.

Cheltenham & Gloucester plc is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

Halifax is a division of Bank of Scotland plc. Cheltenham & Gloucester Savings is a division of Lloyds Bank plc.

HBOS plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC218813.

Lloyds Banking Group plc. Registered Office: The Mound, Edinburgh EH1 1YZ. Registered in Scotland no. SC95000. Telephone: 0131 225 4555

This e-mail (including any attachments) is private and confidential and may contain privileged material. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender and delete it  (including any attachments) immediately. You must not copy, distribute, disclose or use any of the information in it or any attachments.

Telephone calls may be monitored or recorded.

The attachment is SecureMessage.zip which in turn contains a malicious executable SecureMessage.scr which has an icon that looks like Internet Explorer. Despire the .scr suffix, this file is a plain old .exe file and will execute if you double-click it (don't!).

VirusTotal detections are 11/51, and automated analysis between ThreatExpert, Malwr and Anubis show an attempted download from [donotclick]asianfarm.org/images/pdf.enc and [donotclick]ideasempurna.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pdf.enc with the following IPs being involved:

108.90.186.161 (AT&T, US)
111.90.133.246 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
121.117.209.51 (NTT, Japan)
124.217.241.34 (Piradius Net, Malaysia)
174.103.25.199 (Time Warner Cable, US)

The .enc file is an encoded executable, explained in detail here. I haven't tried to decode it but obviously that too will be malicious.

Recommended blocklist:
asianfarm.org
ideasempurna.com.my
108.90.186.161
111.90.133.246
121.117.209.51
124.217.241.34
174.103.25.199

"Barclays transaction notification" spam

This fake Barclays spam comes with a malicious payload:

Date:      Wed, 5 Feb 2014 03:02:52 -0500 [03:02:52 EST]
From:      Barclays Bank [support@barclays.net]
Subject:      Barclays transaction notification #002601

Transaction is completed. £9685 has been successfully transfered.
If the transaction was made by mistake please contact our customer service.
Receipt of payment is attached.

Barclays is a trading name of Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiaries. Barclays Bank PLC is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority (Financial Services Register No. 122702). Registered in England. Registered Number is 1026167 with registered office at 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP.

Attached is a file Payment receipt Barclays PA77392733.zip which is turn contains a malicious executable Payment receipt Barclays PA77392733.exe with a surprisingly poor VirusTotal detection rate of just 1/51 (only Sophos detects it). Automated analysis tools are pretty inconclusive about the payload [1] [2] [3] with only the Malwr report having any real detail.