Money mule operation morphs

This fraudulent job offer (i.e. for a money mule laundering stolen funds) originates from 109.169.243.117 and points to a server on 193.104.94.57, both in the Russian Federation. This is the same server as this scam although the domain names have changed.

Subject: Vacancy ID053 USA
Date: Wed, February 17, 2010 2:12 am

Dear job seekers!

Apply for the job. We recommend this position.

Job Description:

We are looking for people who can control the payment of our customers from your state / region.

The responsibilities of work included compiling monthly reports on the overall turnover of funds, sending documents on each transfer.

We offer you confidentially as you conduct a search to meet your career goals and we can help you to understand and communicate what makes you stand out in a crowd.

My role is to find the best candidates to meet the needs of my clients. You could be just the person I'm looking for.

Job Requirements:

As a Finance Manager, you are responsible for all aspects of operation, including customer relations, team management, financial management and team recognition/retention.

You must:
- be 23 years of age or older
- be resident of United States of America
- have a bank account
- must have full internet access (at home or at work)

Minimum qualifications include:
- Well developed analytical, communication, and interpersonal skills
- Strong operational background and knowledge
- Exceptional people skills
- Problem solving skills
- Top notch communication and writing skills
- A drive to be the best

Benefits:
- Monthly salary starting at $2000(after a month evaluation period)
- 5% commission for every task you complete
- Banking and Western Union fees covered by the company

If you are interested in applying for this position please send your resume
Cara@new-job-position.com

Robtex reports a number of dodgy domains and mail servers on that domain, all of which should be considered fraudulent.

• 7-job-net.com
• company-euro.com
• euro-shopping.net
• gold-es-net.com
• goldes-it.com
• good-nets.com
• it-financess.com
• job-for-yours.com
• mail.7-job-net.com
• mail.company-euro.com
• mail.gold-es-net.com
• mail.goldes-it.com
• mail.job-for-yours.com
• mail.online-web-net.com
• mail.people-and-job.net
• mail.web-euro-it.com
• mail.webpages-it.com
• mail.wesst-netts.com
• online-web-net.com
• people-and-job.net
• web-euro-it.com
• webcompany-es.net
• webcompany-euro.net
• webfiless.com
• webpages-it.com
• wesst-es.net
• wesst-netts.com

donotemail@wearespammers.com |

I'm Bob Gatchel, and I'm a spammer

OK, spam isn't exactly uncommon, and get-rich-quick MLM schemes are a bit like the dog shit that you sometimes tread on while out walking. This particular piece of spam caught my eye:

Subject: [redacted], your just released 5 Ways to Make a Fast $5,000 CD at absolutely no cost from Bob
From: "EWI" <robertallen4@ewiadvisory.com>
Date: Fri, February 12, 2010 12:43 am

Dear [redacted],

Hi, I'm Bob Gatchel and recently you visited one of my websites where you requested more information about starting your own internet based home business ... that's GREAT! And because you did this, I have a very special free gift for you -
with no strings attached!

Look ...because you took the time to learn more about this industry, I want to give you my brand new Ebook and TeleSeminar that will show you how to pick out the PERFECT online home based business for you!

It's called: "Internet Home Business EXPOSED"

And you can secure your FREE copy of this course at this website:

http://InternetHomeBusinessExposed.com

This is an info-packed 54 page ebook and 50 minute TeleSeminar that reveals the TOP 12 online based home businesses for 2010 and beyond! Discover how a new and exciting home business can:
* Give you FREEDOM form a normal 9-5 job
* Give you more free time for your family
* Give you financial stability without the struggle
* Let you live a happier & healthier life!

Look ... I did the investigating and hard research so you don't have to and can show you how to make this happen in your life!

Who am I?

Why should you listen to me?

And why should you get this course?

For the past 12 years, I've not only been earning a high six figure income using the internet from the comfort of my home ... but I've been helping others do the same as an internet marketing consultant that specializes in the fields of home based business.

My courses, training and consulting are featured all over the internet ... and my unique insights into this industry have even been featured in the worldwide best selling book: "Multiple Streams of Internet Income" by the renowned wealth trainer, Robert G. Allen.

Bottom line? I know what I'm talking about when it comes to making money from home using the internet - and I know how to help the average person achieve amazing results!

When you get your copy of "Internet Home Business EXPOSED" at:

http://InternetHomeBusinessExposed.com

You'll see how it "cuts through the fluff" and gives you everything you need to avoid the TONS of scams out there ... I've done all of the hard work and research FOR YOU to find only the 12 BEST and PROVEN ways to make big money from home - in your spare time or even help quit your job and to it FULL time like me!

Again, get this course NOW at:

http://InternetHomeBusinessExposed.com

Take your first step to living the life you deserve and the freedom to live your dreams! Take the time to get your free copy of "Internet Home Business
EXPOSED" and get started on your path to success TODAY!

Successfully Yours,

Bob Gatchel

Creator of "Internet Home Business EXPOSED"

PS - This free ebook and teleseminar are only going to be available for free for limited time only. We are going to actually start selling this course very shortly. Be sure you get your copy today while it's still free OK?

Go to:

http://InternetHomeBusinessExposed.com

We respect your privacy. To remove yourself from this mailing list, please reply to this email.

"Bob" has made a couple of newbie mistakes here - firstly, the "Reply To" address is invalid as there is no such domain as "ewiadvisory.com" and he forgot to include his postal address, which makes in non CAN SPAM compliant.

InternetHomeBusinessExposed.com is the sort of name that almost begs to ripped apart. Hosted along with hundreds of other crummy MLM sites on 74.208.120.206, the domain has private registration details, which is a shame. Not to worry, a little bit of digging turns up a valid address of:

Robert Gatchel
16 Shire Lane
Port Deposit, Maryland 21904
United States

There's also a valid "reply-to" email address you can use of bobgatchel@gmail.com.

There you go Bob, fixed that for you.

Interestingly, it turns out that Bob is a bit of a stickler for rules, which is kind of odd when you consider his non CAN SPAM compliant message. Page 73 of this planning document shows Bob objecting to his neighbour installing a mobile home on their property because it broke the deed restrictions. OK Bob, that's fair enough.. but just remember this next time you send out spam.

So what is InternetHomeBusinessExposed.com? Well, it just forwards to another site at getthescoopabout.com (again, anonymised) and it's just pushing some crappy seminar. But what are they selling?

A little more digging finds that Bob is affiliated with some outfit called the Enlightened Wealth Institute which has a non-too-pretty report at the BBB. He is also affiliated with some scientifically unproven dietary supplement from Yoli Incorporated. A quick Google of "Yoli" shows an awful lot of people pushing Yoli as an MLM rather than something you would want to put in your body.

Now, excuse me Bob.. I have some dog shit to clean up.

"7-job-net.com" Money Mule Operation

This is a straightforward money mule (i.e. money laundering) operation with a twist:

Subject: from International Consulting Company
From: "Arnulfo Salas"
Date: Thu, February 11, 2010 9:24 am

Hello

Our company(Outsourse Solution) is proud to announce you that we now have positions
available(part time)

A candidate for the Payments Processing Position must meet the following
requirements:

* Is 23 years of age or older
* Is resident of United States of America
* Is fair and objective
* Is detail oriented
* Is very observant and able to focus on details
* Is fairly intelligent
* Has patience
* Is trustworthy
* Is practical
* Types well
* Loves to learn
* Explains well in writing
* Is discreet
* Handles deadlines
* Has bank account
* Has full internet access (at home or at work)

Benefits:
* Monthly salary starting at $2000(after a month evaluation period)
* 5% commission for every task you complete
* Banking and Western Union fees covered by the company

If you are interested in becoming a Payments Processor for our company
you can request more information at Arnulfo@7-job-net.com

Thank you,
Outsourse Solution Inc.

Usually we see spam like this soliciting replies to throwaway free email addresses. In this case, 7-job-net.com is a domain that has been registered specifically for this scam, on 14th January 2010.

Registrant details show the infamous "Private person" moniker.

Aleksandr Lapatau
Email: lapatasker@earthling.net
Organization: Private person
Address: Lenina, 34, 8
City: Minsk
State: Minskaya
ZIP: 456123
Country: BY
Phone: +375.172427204

The email address is connected with at least one other scam.

Of interest is the fact that the domain is hosted on 193.104.94.57 in Russia along with the following sites:

• Westitnet.net
• Company-euro.com
• Euro-company.net
• Euro-shopping.net
• Euro-webs.net
• Good-nets.com
• It-best-eur.net
• It-financess.com
• It-netx.com
• Net-euros.com

All these sites have bogus looking registration details and are best avoided.

Old pitch, new payload

This particular pitch from the badly-spelled "Internet Service Provider Consorcium" was doing the rounds back in September 2008, and it appears to have been recycled again to deliver a brand new Bredolab payload.

Subject: Your internet access is going to get suspended
From: "ICS Monitoring Team" <*****>
Date: Mon, February 8, 2010 9:34 pm
To: *****
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Your internet access is going to get suspended

The Internet Service Provider Consorcium was made to protect the rights of software authors, artists.
We conduct regular wiretapping on our networks, to monitor criminal acts.

We are aware of your illegal activities on the internet wich were originating from

You can check the report of your activities in the past 6 month that we have attached. We strongly advise you to stop your activities regarding the illegal downloading of copyrighted material of your internet access will be suspended.

Sincerely
ICS Monitoring Team

Attachment is report.zip which contains report.exe and of course you can probably guess that it contains something nasty.


Who know what other oldies this crew might try to use?

www.dynamoo.com/blog is now blog.dynamoo.com

Because of Google's sucky decision to terminate their sucky FTP publishing service, you might notice that the URL of this blog has changed from www.dynamoo.com/blog to blog.dynamoo.com.

Everything is lashed together with symbolic links and .htaccess files for now, if you notice anything odd then contact me.

More fake ad networks

The German news site Handelsblatt was recently the victim of a malvertising campaign:

02.02.2010 Handelsblatt malware on Web site

Update: Infection banners confirmed!

The S-CERT was able to reproduce the infection in its test laboratory on the IHT website. Infection occurs through an advertising banner, which is from "Doubleclick.net. This will in turn include advertisements from the domain "muentely.com" in the Handelsblatt-page insert. The latter site is obviously manipulated and contains malicious JavaScript code.

Further investigations in the S-CERT laboratory testing have confirmed that will be used including a PDF vulnerability to the spread of malware. The studies also show that there is an alternative to the vulnerability, attempts to exploit gaps by further appropriate attack code to install a malware onto vulnerable PCs.

According to the investigations of the S-CERT is the malware with the accessing PCs will eventually become infected, a so-called Scareware: Users are informed by insertion of appropriate dialogue, that their PC is infected with malware wide area. To remove this malware, an appropriate protective software is available for purchase. To give emphasis to the malware message that ensures Scareware that can be started on any new applications over infected PCs. Relevant information of users may also indicate an infection.

The malware campaign was running via Doubleclick and Nuggad.net, directing through a bunch of domains that look like ad agencies but aren't before ending up in a server in Panama.

The fake ad agencies are in the 213.163.75.x range, all recently registered through BIZCN.COM in China, a fairly well known black hat registrar.

Note that while the domains appear to be fake, the registration data may include the details of innocent third parties, so I have not published it here. I would recommend avoiding doing business with them unless you can absolutely verify their credentials.
Synopsystd.com

• Namdoline.com
• Quintat.com
• Bradfortnd.com
• Ealana.com
• Rovitalt.com
• Favorti.com
• Muentely.com
• Briarmod.com
• Deltamsc.com
• Jessiereet.com
• Startrailrs.com
• Connata.com
• Vehiced.com
• Essiell.com
• Holdrism.com
• Bellwaynetworks.com
• Forlifemedia.com
• Revoltechmarketing.com
• Hickoryhs.com
• Ingramctc.com
• Luxortd.com
• Morrelmedia.com
• Gappion.com
• Savoyee.com
• Goldbaynetwork.com

"Hello, this is Icon calling on behalf of BT.."

The phone rings from an undisclosed International number.. an automated voice say "Hello, this is Icon calling on behalf of BT.." and it then goes on to explain that there's nobody to talk to me and I should call back on 0800 980 0127 to unsubscribe. Except of course that I'm bloody on TPS.

So who are they? Icon Communications Centers are based in Prague and have a website at www.icon-cc.com (no, I'm not giving them a link). In fact, the crummy job is advertised right here. OK, I say crummy.. the good thing is that Prague is a very nice place, but you probably won't see too much of it in a call centre.

Enjoy.

Edited: so I spoke to the very polite person on the other end and very politely suggested that the stop ringing. Having plugged the caller for details (yes, they really do work near the centre of the city) it seems that Icon are perhaps not a bad gig if you can speak English and find yourself in Prague looking for a job.

Sergey Ryabov / director@climbing-games.com strikes again

There's a somewhat unusual spate of injection attacks doing the rounds, code is being injected into the middle of victim pages through an unknown flaw, starting document.write(unescape('%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%20%6C%61%6E%67%75%61%67%65%3D and then going on for a bit.. deobfuscating the code actually leads to a second layer of obfuscation, but once that is decoded it becomes clearer.

The injected code points to itsallbreaksoft.net


This then bounces through paymoneysystem.info/in.cgi?michaeleknowlton before hitting a seemingly random PPC search engine site hosted on 95.211.27.154, for example sdeh.net/iframe.html. Sophos have an excellent write-up of the anatomyof the injection attack here, and it's pretty clear that somebody is ripping somebody else off for PPC traffic.. its hard to say who the victims actually are.

The domains itsallbreaksoft.net and paymoneysystem.info belong to the same person, these are interesting because of the registration details:

Nexton Limited
Ryabov Sergey (director@climbing-games.com)
+79219270961
Fax: +79219270961
Scherbakova st., 6-38
Saint-Petersburg, 197375
RU

These contact details are very well known for very bad things. Incidentally, the registrar is ruler-domains.com, also an enterprise registered to "Sergey Ryabov" (if that's a real person).

It's all kind of strange as there doesn't appear to be a malware payload, which is good. But because of the way click arbitrage works, finding the real victims and villains is tricky, although interested researchers may want to have a poke around.

Using Google Images to fight fraud

A great post from the guys at F-Secure about how an employee used Google Images to stop being ripped off. Probably a good tip to stop getting defrauded at auction sites.

Pathetic

A multibillion dollar company operated by a bunch of f*cking amateurs.

In particular.. the bit that says "We are building a migration tool", but for some unfathomable reason we have decided to kick off this change before it's ready. Sure, Blogger is a free platform and I could always ask for my money back.

Another favourite is: "only .5% of active blogs are published via FTP".. and the reason for this is that for the past couple of years Blogger's FTP service has become increasingly unreliable for no particular reason.

Unfortunately, anyone who had business dealings with Google that involve real money will know that the the f*ck you attitude to customer service is very much ingrained in Google. To a certain extent, being jerked around when you are not paying for the service is one thing.. but business partners in things like advertising, YouTube and enterprise applications also suffer the same thing.

Yes, Google is still often awesome. But sometimes, like this time, it's just pathetic.

AdSlash.com is a bogus ad network

We've seen a number of ads being punted through AdSlash.com to legitimate ad networks, but it appears that these are leading to a PDF Exploit (don't visit these sites, obviously!).

For example:
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131939386&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=728x90&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131939386&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/stats_js_e.php?id=131939386
fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/bdb/Health/banner_728.gif
fridayalways.com/kven/index.php
fridayalways.com/kven/js/common.js
fridayalways.com/kven/pdfadmnplay.php
fridayalways.com/kven/files/backoutblack.pdf

or

fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131959519&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=120x600&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131959519&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
uparms.com/uparmglde/index.php
uparms.com/uparmglde/js/zingvaz.js
uparms.com/uparmglde/sexxhsdtk.php
which then loads a PDF exploit

or

fwlink.nx7.zedo.com.adslash.com/?alx=a27131958218&td=qcbp71pz=42834&sz=300x250&_zm=359161&st=n1n4&id=131958218&zcw=gh17chl277&xryr=3913771&mp=1460h1
setsup.com/setglde/index.php
setsup.com/setglde/js/common.js
setsup.com/setglde/ffcollab.php
setsup.com/setglde/files/slob.pdf

Despite the use of "zedo.com" in the subdomain, there is no evidence that these are being syndicated through Zedo.

Let's look at the WHOIS entry for AdSlash.com first:

Domain name: adslash.com

Registrant Contact:
PublishingAlert
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us

Administrative Contact:
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us

Technical Contact:
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us

Billing Contact:
Vivian Mitchell jacksosomands@gmail.com
650-887-5087 fax:
2069 Duck Creek Road
Oakland CA 94612
us

DNS:
ns1.everydns.net
ns2.everydns.net

Created: 2010-01-04
Expires: 2011-01-04

The address looks kind of legitimate, but there's no Duck Creek Road in Oakland and the phone number is most likely Los Altos, not Oakland. Also the fact that it has been registered just days ago is a clue.. and it turns out that the registrar is BIZCN.COM of China which is an odd choice for a California company.. in other words, the domain registration details are fake.

AdSlash.com is hosted on 217.23.7.6 which is reportedly a Worldstream Data Center in Faro, Portugal. There's a cluster of servers with fake registration details which are probably related:

217.23.7.6
Adslash.com
Dc2way.com
Ispmns.com
Rtcohost.com
Vpsroll.com

217.23.7.7
Net-wisp.com
Realhgost.com
Slhoste.com

217.23.7.8
Inhostin.com
Nx7tech.com
Vpbyte.com

217.23.7.9
Eywtech.com
Qhostin.com
Sslcode.com

Blocking the entire 217.23.7.x range will probably do no harm at all, it is full of typosquatting domains and other crap.

The PDF exploit itself is hosted in Russia on 213.108.56.18 at Infoteh Ltd (UNNET-LINER), there are a bunch of domains serving these exploits up:

• alwaysinwork.com
• fridayalways.com
• runsup.com
• uparms.com
• upmostly.com

WHOIS details show the infamous moldavimo@safe-mail.net email address.

Registrant:
Name: dannis
Address: Moskow
City: Moskow
Province/state: MSK
Country: RU
Postal Code: 130610

Administrative Contact:
Name: dannis
Organization: privat person
Address: Moskow
City: Moskow
Province/state: MSK
Country: RU
Postal Code: 130610
Phone: +7.9957737737
Fax: +7.9957737737
Email: moldavimo@safe-mail.net

Technical Contact:
Name: dannis
Organization: privat person
Address: Moskow
City: Moskow
Province/state: MSK
Country: RU
Postal Code: 130610

The whole UNNET-LINER netblock of 213.108.56.0 - 213.108.63.255 looks fairly sordid, blocking access to it will probably do no harm.

As a side note, AdSlash.com did used to be owned by a hosting company called RackSlash, but it expired and was re-registered.

If you are accepting new ad banners - always remember to look closely at WHOIS details and other credentials to ensure that you are dealing with who you think you are.

Is Q-dating.com a fake?

At first this looks like some random spam:

Subject: Find a sexdate - Free registration!
From: "Q-dating" <info@qdates.net>
Date: Mon, January 18, 2010 3:19 pm

Having trouble reading this email?

FIND A SEXDATE IN YOUR OWN AREA?

www.Q-Dating.com
[http://mailings.email-pro.net/link.php?M=000&N=143&L=118&F=T]

Chantal 24 jaaronline

Single, searching for sexdate!
I'm not ready to settle down
and looking for a sexbuddy
Irene 34 jaaronline

Married, looking for date.
I am a loving wife of 34 years looking for a nice man.
The best dating site of the UK. Advanced searching, Instant chat, test it
now FREE! Click here

Click here to unsubscribe
[http://mailings.email-pro.net/unsubscribe.php?M=000&C=00000&L=7&N=143]

After a bit of "wtf" I decided to check out the WHOIS details to see who was spamming:

Company: Realcom Limited
Name: Andy Ling
Address: 33, Throgmorton street
City: LONDON
Country: UNITED KINGDOM
Postal Code: EC2N 2BR
Phone: +44 7937 082 210
Fax:
Email: realcomltd@hotmail.com

Oh, well that's kind interesting.. they appear to be based in the UK. A quick check at Companies House does come up with a Realcom Ltd.. but it's a wholly innocent and unconnected company in Oxfordshire.

There's not much of a web presence about from this Dutch-language review [autotranslated] which also complains that the site is a fake and that unauthorised credit card transactions have been made.

A bit of searching around finds some related domains:
Q-dating.com [94.229.169.102]
Q-dating.eu [78.109.162.121]
Qdates.net [78.109.162.122]
Q-dating.be [78.109.162.119]
Q-dating.de [78.109.162.119]
Q-dating.net [78.109.162.119]
Credifact.net [94.229.169.102]
Megacasting.eu [94.229.169.102]
Email-pro.net [Parked].. mailings.email-pro.net is on 78.109.162.119

All infrastructure is supplied by UKFast (abuse -at- ukfast.co.uk)

There are plenty of other dating sites to choose from.. some of them may even be genuine. But given the complaints and the questionable WHOIS details, then probably best to avoid this one.

Is trafficbuyer@gmail.com Bryan Hunter of Modena, Inc?

We have seen quite a lot of the domain registrant trafficbuyer@gmail.com lately [1] [2] [3] and it would be fair to say that this email address has been connected with malware domains for a few months [4] [5].

Domains operated by trafficbuyer@gmail.com appear to be part of the routing mechanism to bad sites, but there's no indication of who the email address actually belongs to. Is it an ad network, or is it the bad guys themselves.. and if it's an ad network, why are they hiding their name?

This post at Spyware Sucks gave a clue. There are several domains which are interesting because they have changed hands during their lifetime from a firm called Modena Inc (modenainc.com) owned by one Bryan Hunter of Oregon and are now in the hands of "trafficbuyer".

• banner0609.com
  
• banner0709.com [6] [7] [8]
  
• banner07092.com
• banner08091.com
  
• banner08092.com [9]
• banner08093.com [10]
• bannersulike.com [11] [12] [13]
  
• extrabanner.com [14]
  
• islandbanner.com
• foobanner.com
• greenlightbanner.com [15] [16]
  
• more-banners.com [17] [18] [19] [20]
  
• paperbanner.com
  
• trendbanner.com [21]
  
• yellowlinebanner.com [22] [23]
  
• zoombanner.com [24]

In July 2009, these domains were registered to:

Manager, Domain domains@modenainc.com
Modena Inc.
921 SW Washington ST
Suite 228
Portland, Oregon 97205
United States
(503) 241-1091 Fax --

By September 2009 they had all changed to:

Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.com
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
+1.8005551212 Fax --

So, who are Modena Inc of Oregon? According to the State of Oregon, the two key people here are Bryan Hunter and Andrew Vilcauskas, although Mr Hunter's name is most often associated with Modena, Inc. The official status for Modena, Inc shows "Administrative Dissolution" which means that the state dissolved the company for non-filing of paperwork.. this seems to be a common issue. If we look at businesses related to Bryan Hunter then we see:

Big Truck Autobody (dissolved, failed to renew in 2004)
CreditYes, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2008, though still trading at CreditYes.com)
Diminished Value, Inc (filings overdue as of November 2009, trading at DiminishedValue.com)
ExitExchange Corporation (still active, although check the rating at WOT for ExitExchange.com or simple Google it)
Modena Homes, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2008)
Modena, Inc (administrative dissolution in 2009)
Modena, Inc (older incorporation, administrative dissolution in 2004)
Pro Web Design LLC (administrative dissolution in 2004)
Wind Song Creek Estates LLC (administrative dissolution in 2009)

Now, given the WHOIS history of these domains we would suggest that either Bryan Hunter is trafficbuyer@gmail.com or he sold the domains on to this person. If they are the same person, then perhaps he would like to review his business relationships and clean them up...

zoombanner.com / YieldManager malvertisement on ebuddy.com

ebuddy.com is running a malicious ad on the zoombanner.com domain, apparently managed by Yieldmanager.

First, the "legitimate" end of the malware chain loads at ad.zoombanner.com/content?campaign=1171557&sz=6
This forwards to deliver.commismanderakis.com/rotate?m=2;b=6;c=1;z=585778
Which goes to content.fishpotboutademalled.com/track/3388182/S_IT?[snip]
Then img.commismanderakis.com/img?XAhIPWtICDkJX0FVHXUDKFoRYhYlRxFCNlsBGEhLBEtVdRdiCRYKBA8kKV9RHBEaXFJfXFMHAQ
Followed by the payload domain at jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep
then jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/j006102Hd793447cR55e239b8T9cc338b5V0100f060203L69740000000000000000
then jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/o006102203317l0010Hd793447cR55e239b8T9cc338b6V0100f060
Finally jduvazuc.info/cgi-bin/dep/e006102203318l0010Hd793447cJ0d000601R55e239b8T9cc338a4U0ec2fc77V0100f0600

This last hop tries to load an executable (and probably some other crap I haven't spotted), not very well detected according to VirusTotal. Oh yes, there's a PDF exploit too.

The malicious ad is an Italian language vacation banner in this case.


Most of the domains have anonymous registration details, except zoombanner.com which has the same details that were used in the malicous ads featured here and here.

zoombanner.com

Registrant:
Domain Owner
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States

Domain Name: ZOOMBANNER.COM
Created on: 24-Jul-09
Expires on: 24-Jul-10
Last Updated on: 24-Jul-09

Administrative Contact:
Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.com
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
+1.8005551212 Fax --

Technical Contact:
Owner, Domain trafficbuyer@gmail.com
15156 SW 5th
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260
United States
+1.8005551212 Fax --

Domain servers in listed order:
NS45.DOMAINCONTROL.COM
NS46.DOMAINCONTROL.COM

A search for the IP addresses show Linode is providing most of the infrastructure (again) with ezzi.net providing the payload server.

ad.zoombanner.com
69.164.215.205, 69.164.215.204 [Linode]

deliver.commismanderakis.com
74.207.232.205, 74.207.232.206, 74.207.232.248, 74.207.232.249, 74.207.232.250, 74.207.232.25, 74.207.232.30, 74.207.232.31, 74.207.232.35, 74.207.232.39, 74.207.232.202, 74.207.232.203 [Linode]

content.fishpotboutademalled.com
69.164.196.55 [Linode]

jduvazuc.info
216.150.79.74 [AccessIT / ezzi.net]

Incidentally, 69.164.196.55 also hosts a bunch of domains which are probably malicious:

• Aspoutceringlapham.com
• Baalcootymalachi.com
• Bangywhoaswaikiki.com
• Bertbleepedupsurge.com
• Bluegumgodfulfrowzly.com
• Bookletjigsawsenam.com
• Boursesdeployporomas.com
• Cabullacoexertstephen.com
• Camastuthbroomer.com
• Camocaexcidealaric.com
• Cursarophitkamass.com
• Dunnishbribesteen.com
• Dusaexsurgeenzed.com
• Eelfishminibusdaniel.com
• Enyopensilflux.com
• Fishpotboutademalled.com
• Galasynjingkoendoss.com
• Gombayuranidetripper.com
• Haileschoralephydra.com
• Haredjuvenalalkyds.com
• Hoofishsmutsdela.com
• Jigmenbrasschaves.com
• Jumnamontanodillon.com
• Limanadernaggly.com
• Malabarvoiotiahsln.com
• Mashlampeasewahima.com
• Miauwbustianraynold.com
• Mowewindsortejo.com
• Nahshufrosterpappus.com
• Negreetflurtagma.com
• Nitrotowelvidovic.com
• Oaterhabeasroyalet.com
• Ospswraxledfummel.com
• Oundycelticrecomb.com
• Pcdosbahnerdalea.com
• Pealedlupulicdunker.com
• Polarlyfoetiskart.com
• Potwareabipondeana.com
• Psatchargeehewart.com
• Puddyolderrippon.com
• Sallierdiaushawed.com
• Sarddieterchuted.com
• Scullogmooerslarking.com
• Siwardupttorntrib.com
• Skouthlazordurning.com
• Suttenbnetifla.com
• Tacomanheathsdisodic.com
• Temperabiceswayaka.com
• Teughlyhesperegerek.com
• Toterterrenobrasero.com
• Vaccarykakkakcaddoan.com
• Viperanmeatsoths.com
• Viznomyboohoorigs.com
• Voluntyseventechny.com
• Wartedbiterhunter.com
• Woodardvirgetoruli.com
• Yawybottlersuccahs.com
• Zirklehalavahhaunchy.com

I suspect that you probably wouldn't miss much by null-routing Linode completely at the moment.

"Croft Pole Distributors Limited" bogus job offer

Croft Pole Distributors Ltd (www.croftpoles.co.nz) are a wholly legitimate business based in Whangarei, New Zealand. This is a fake offer that falsely used Croft Pole's name in order to recruit into a money mule scam.

Subject: Online Job Offer
From: "Croft Pole Distributors Limited" <croftpole.update@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, January 15, 2010 10:52 am

Dear Sir/Ma,

Croft Timber Company Limited is a family owned business that began in 1905 and is still in Croft family hands today.

CTC moved more towards the specialised production of timber poles approximately 20 years ago and now trades locally as Croft Pole Distributors Limited with pole supply outlets in both Northland, Rodney and Auckland.

Within the last ten years CTC has grown considerably with investments in a new and larger site, plant modernisation/expansion and the introduction of equipment such as the Bezner Rounding Machine, Fogarty Kiln, Automatic Stacker, Machine stress grader and edge tester, planer and dry-mill department as well as the constant replacement and upgrading of existing plant and machinery.

The mill site is on about thirty acres of land with rail facilities adjacent and is approximately 25 minutes from the deep water port of Marsden Point. The plant ispresently capable of processing around 2,500-3,000 m3 per month.

We are committed to customer service and our aim is to remain flexible to meet the ever changing market needs with product and service unparalleled in the timber pole industry to date..

Most of our customers from Australia, Canada,United States & United Kingdom pay through various terms of payment which some are not negotiable here in New Zealand. This brings our quest to employ a credible and trustworthy fellow as our representative to coordinate our payments. This would not affect your present job but add more to your income.

Being our representative and assisting us in processing the payments from our clients should earn you a commission of 10% of every payment you coordinate.

Once we makes a sale we deliver the product to a customer (usually through UPS).The customer receives and check the products. After this has been done, the customer has to pay for the products. About 90 percent of our customers prefer to pay through Bank Wire Transfers or certified cheque. We have decided to open this new job position for solving this problem.

Your tasks are;

1. Receive payment from Customers through your Bank Accounts

2. Deduct 10% which will be your percentage/pay on Payments processed

3. Forward balance after deduction of percentage/pay to any of the offices you will be contacted to send payment to. (Payment is to forwarded by Local transfers (Western Union only). A local Money transfer takes barely hours, so it will give us a possibility to get customers payment almost immediately.

For example you have got �50,000.00

You take your income: �5,000.00


You will be able to operate with larger orders and you will be able to earn more.

Our payments will be sent into your Bank account that you provided, deduct your 10%(Salary) and forward the balance to the company via Western Union only.

We understand it is an unusual and incredible job position. This job takes only 3-7 hours per week.

You Will have a lot of free time doing another job, you will get good income and regular job. But this job is very challenging and you should understand it. We are looking only for the worker who satisfies our requirements and will be an earnest assistant, We are glad to offer this job position to you. If you feel that you are serious about this and be an earnest worker, All we will need for recording you to our database is below:

Full Name:-
Address:-
Age:-
Your Phone Number(s):-


Chris Moyle
Branch Manager
Croft Pole Distributors Limited
www.croftpoles.co.nz

The reply-to address is croftpole.update@gmail.com rather than croftpoles.co.nz, originating IP is 213.132.197.149 in the Netherlands, which hosts three porn sites but has probably been compromised. It is nothing at all to do with Croft Poles.

Of course, this 10% fee is a "too good to be true" scam which could well wind up with you going to prison, so it should be avoided at all costs.

Aurora

According to McAfee, the attack on Google and several other tech companies that led to the likelihood that Google will quit China was called "Aurora" by the bad guys.

The cruiser "Aurora" signalled the start of the Russian Revolution in St Petersburg in 1917.. I wonder if this name was chosen deliberately when the attackers targeted some of the West's biggest tech companies?

Image source

More malvertisment domains

The malicious ads were running through (and I understand now terminated by) bootcampmedia.com, related to this post, according to commenter cerdo:

Blogger cerdo said...

bootcampmedia.com was also likely hosting a malicious campaign yesterday afternoon, and perhaps still ongoing. I'd contact you Jamie, but I don't have contact info for you. This all is clearly closely related to Dynamoo's post...

traffic.worldseescolor.com is an obvious bad actor. The other related domains:
deliver.bailagequinismregrow.com
img.bailagequinismregrow.com
content.cabullacoexertstephen.com

as well as:
aanserver88.com
bonnapet.com
afkenai.com
bfskul.com

14 January 2010 18:40

Blogger cerdo said...

Yep - saw traffic.worldseescolor.com via bootcamp again less than 30 minutes ago.

Related sites, accessed immediately after traffic.worldseescolor.com:

deliver.boaterdunnagechicot.com
img.boaterdunnagechicot.com

14 January 2010 18:45

Worth checking your logs for and blocking in case they turn up on another network. Checking IPs comes up with:

traffic.worldseescolor.com
69.164.215.208, 69.164.215.210, 69.164.215.205, 69.164.215.207, 69.164.215.204 [Linode]

deliver.bailagequinismregrow.com
74.207.232.205, 74.207.232.250, 74.207.232.249, 74.207.232.248, 74.207.232.203, 74.207.232.30, 74.207.232.206, 74.207.232.31, 74.207.232.39, 74.207.232.25, 74.207.232.202, 74.207.232.35 [Linode]

img.bailagequinismregrow.com
174.143.243.220, 98.129.238.102, 98.129.238.106, 98.129.236.239, 174.143.245.236, 98.129.237.14, 174.143.242.109, 174.143.243.90, 98.129.236.154, 98.129.238.101, 98.129.238.112, 98.129.236.254, 174.143.241.174, 98.129.238.105, 98.129.238.103, 174.143.243.162, 174.143.242.58, 98.129.238.99
[Slicehost / Rackspace]

content.cabullacoexertstephen.com
69.164.196.55 [Linode]

aanserver88.com
67.225.149.152 [Liquid Web]

bonnapet.com
Was 217.20.114.40 [Netdirekt / internetserviceteam.com] now appears to be down.

afkenai.com
195.2.253.93 [Madet Ltd, Moscow]

bfskul.com
195.2.253.93 [Madet Ltd, Moscow]

I don't have the full trace of these, so it's not exactly clear what these domains are doing in the reported chain.

More malicious OWA domains

In addition to these and these.

• yht30.net.pl
• yht36.com.pl
• yht37.com.pl
• yht38.com.pl
• yht39.net.pl
• yht3e.net.pl
• yht3q.net.pl
• yht3r.pl
• yht3t.pl
• yht3w.net.pl

And there's more..

More domains relating to this Zbot attack:

• ui7772.co.kr
• ui7772.kr
• ui7772.ne.kr
• ui7772.or.kr
• ui7772co.kr
• ui777f.kr
• ui777f.ne.kr
• ui777f.or.kr
• ui777for.kr
• ui777l.co.kr
• ui777l.co.kr
• ui777lco.kr
• ui777p.co.kr
• ui777p.kr
• ui777p.or.kr
• vcrtp.eu
• vcrtp1.eu
• vcrtp21.eu
• vcrtprsa21.eu
• vcrtps21.eu
• vcrtpsa21.eu
• vcrtrsa21.eu
• vcrtrsr21.eu
• vcrtrsrp2.eu
• vcrtrsrp21.eu

Convincing look OWA fake leads to PDF exploit

There are getting spammed out at the moment:

From: automailer@blahblah.blah [mailto:automailer@blahblah.blah]
Sent: 13 January 2010 11:08
To: Victim Username
Subject: The settings for the username@blahblah.blah mailbox were changed

Dear user of the blahblah.blah mailing service!

We are informing you that because of the security upgrade of the mailing service your mailbox (username@blahblah.blah) settings were changed. In order to apply the new set of settings click on the following link:

http://blahblah.blah/owa/service_directory/settings.php?email=username@blahblah.blah&from=blahblah.blah&fromname=username

Best regards, blahblah.blah Technical Support.

Letter ID#NGTS7OTY8XPZX8FEUYTTTZ1PF

The displayed link isn't the actual link, underneath it points to something like:
http://blahblah.blah.vcrtp21.eu/owa/service_directory/settings.php?email=username@blahblah.bah&from=blahblah.blah&fromname=username

Clicking through the link takes you to a convincing looking OWA (Outlook Web Access) forgery page, populated with the victim's domain name and email address.

There are two exploits on the page, the first one is a drive-by download of an infected PDF file called pdf.pdf for which VirusTotal detection is only 10/41, detected by McAfee as Exploit-PDF.ac and various others. The executable file you are directed to download is also a bit patchy on detections.

Sender names include:

• operator@
• support@
• notifications@
• no-reply@
• system@
• alert@
• info@

..all on your local domain, obviously.

Subjects include:

• The settings for the blah@blah.blah mailbox were changed
• The settings for the blah@blah.blah were changed
• A new settings file for the blah@blah.blah mailbox
• A new settings file for the blah@blah.blah has just been released
• For the owner of the blah@blah.blah e-mail account
• For the owner of the blah@blah.blah mailbox

Some domains in use on this are:

• vcrtp1.eu
• vcrtp21.eu
• vcrtprsa21.eu
• vcrtpsa21.eu
• vcrtrsa21.eu
• vcrtrsr21.eu
• vcrtrsrp2.eu
• vcrtrsrp21.eu

..there are probably many more of a similar pattern.

WHOIS details are fake:

Name:
Quezada, Ramon
Address:
1800 N. Bayshore Drive
33132 Roma
Roma
Italy
Email:
wawddhaepny@yahoo.com

Domains are on a fast flux botnet, so there's no point listing IPs. However, nameservers are as follows:
ns1.raddoor.com
84.243.201.159 [Netrouting Data Facilities, Amsterdam]
ns2.raddoor.com
71.123.51.158 [Verizon Internet Services Inc, Aston]
ns1.elkins-realty.net
84.243.201.159 [Netrouting Data Facilities, Amsterdam]
ns2.elkins-realty.net
71.123.17.61 [Verizon Internet Services Inc, Whitesboro]

Registrant details for raddoor.com are probably bogus:

edmund pang figarro77@gmail.com
751 kinau st. #30
honolulu
HI
96813
US
Phone: +1.8085362450

Registration details for elkins-realty.net are DEFINITELY bogus:

Name : B O
Organization : B O
Address : 123 elm str.
City : Los Angeles
Province/State : beijing
Country :
Postal Code : 23456
Phone Number : 86--8586104812
Fax : 86--8586104819
Email : BO.la@yahoo.com

Once your machine is infected, it probably gets infected with a Zbot variant as in these two previous examples.